Iran War ENDS The Collective West | Ali Borhani

## Context and Stakes: an escalation hyperloop and a shifting order The recent short, intense exchange in the Gulf has done more than puncture the region’s fragile ceasefires: it has accelerated a transformation in how states conceive the use of force, trade, and diplomatic restraint. The conversation with geopolitical strategist Ali Borhani wrestles with the contours of that transformation, arguing that what many call an escalation ladder has become an “escalation hyperloop.” The image is apt: faster, less incremental, and with far less room for de-escalatory brakes. Seen through this lens, specific actions—surgical strikes, clandestine operations, dramatic weapons employment—are not isolated incidents but indicators of a broader unraveling of multilateral restraint and an emergent consent among Western capitals to intervene more readily. The consequence is not only more dangerous security dynamics in the Middle East but a geopolitics that rewards unilateral leverage while undermining long-standing international norms. ## Historical roots: the 1979 embassy crisis and the long memory To understand contemporary choices, Borhani takes us back decades, to the 1978–79 period when Iran’s revolutionary moment and the U.S. embassy takeover established a durable grievance and a repository of mistrust. He highlights a contested but consequential claim: that domestic U.S. politics at the time—elements of Reagan’s circle—may have influenced the hostages’ fate in ways that hardened Iranian perceptions of American duplicity. Whether or not every detail of that narrative is beyond dispute, the larger point stands: the post-revolution relationship has been filtered through episodes that shape popular memory and elite policy preferences alike. Historical incidents—shifts in patronage, covert diplomacy, and the selective disclosure of events—have a way of becoming causal engines for later strategic behavior. Decisions made under the shadow of hostage diplomacy, sanctions, and regime-change ambitions are still shading current choices over strikes, sanctions, and alliance politics. ## The June strikes and the erosion of multilateralism Borhani’s account of the June strikes frames them as more than kinetic action; they are symbolic punctuation marks in a story about the weakening of the rules-based order. He provocatively renames the Massive Ordnance Penetrator as a “Multilateral Order Pulverizer,” suggesting that major uses of force by leading powers corrode the very international frameworks intended to check arbitrary violence. This is not simply rhetorical. The pattern—high-profile strikes justified on security grounds, rapid public praise in allied capitals, and muted institutional pushback—signals a growing willingness among Western states to tolerate or tacitly endorse unilateral military coercion. Such tolerance reshapes expectations: if states can strike strategic sites with little effective censure, then the diplomatic calculus for rivals changes. Deterrence becomes less predictable; retaliation is more likely; and the space for neutral or nonaligned mediation shrinks as the political costs of appearing “soft” rise. ## Iran as the buckle: geography, corridors, and resources When geopolitical arguments move beyond the immediate rhetoric about nuclear programs and proxy forces, geography returns as a decisive variable. Borhani frames Iran as a “buckle” in Eurasian connectivity: a hinge between north–south access to the Persian Gulf and east–west trade corridors that crisscross the Asian landmass. This is a useful corrective to reductionist narratives that treat Iran solely as a nuclear problem or a regional spoiler. Beneath the security headlines sit large stakes—energy reserves, rare earths, copper, and the potential to unlock alternative trade and transit routes that would reduce Western leverage over Eurasian markets. The Belt and Road Initiative is not the only enterprise at play, but it is emblematic of a deeper contest: whether Eurasia can knit itself into complementary markets that erode the strategic premium traditionally enjoyed by maritime and transatlantic powers. From this vantage, sanctions and coercion are instruments not merely to punish behavior but to shape access to corridors and resources. Containing Iran, therefore, is as much an attempt to maintain geoeconomic advantage as it is to diffuse military risk. ## The Israel–United States dynamic and the good cop / bad cop frame One of the more delicate threads in the discussion is the role of allied relationships in shaping escalation. Rather than resolving the question of who is pulling whom, Borhani insists the more meaningful inquiry concerns the performative choreography of alliances. The “good cop, bad cop” framework captures how policies can be synchronized across capitals to produce plausible deniability or to create pressure that stops short of full commitment. Whether Israel is dragging the United States into riskier ventures or whether the United States is permitting Israel to act as a force multiplier, the outcome is similar: a diffusion of responsibility and a multiplication of flashpoints. This interplay complicates accountability and reduces transparency, allowing military action to proceed amid diplomatic ambiguity. For neutrality scholars, such ambiguity is a structural problem: it makes impartial mediation harder and invites third-party actors to exploit gaps in communication and intention. ## Militarism, rhetoric, and the decay of norms A striking strand of the conversation is the concern about how language and public posture shape political possibilities. Celebratory rhetoric from allied capitals after strikes, the normalization of targeted assassinations, and the casual invocation of “decapitation” all reflect a broader slide toward militarism. Borhani warns that this rhetorical cavalcade does something more than inflame passions: it narrows policy choices. When leaders and publics become habituated to visual images of precision strikes and claims of decisive blows, the political space for patience, sanctions, and patient diplomacy retreats. Equally important is the observation that the victims of prolonged sanctions and conflict develop their own “never again” narratives. Suffering—whether from the Iran–Iraq War, chemical weapons use, or decades-long economic deprivation—matters in shaping future behavior. This reciprocal hardening of memory and rhetoric accelerates cycles of retaliation, making the restoration of norms all the more difficult. ## Technological leakage, intelligence, and the role of private actors The conversation also flags an underappreciated element of modern conflict: the role of commercial technologies and private intelligence firms in enabling operations that were once solely the province of state apparatuses. Information gathered through commercial satellites, data analytics, and corporate platforms can now be weaponized in ways that bypass institutional checks. Borhani notes how the International Atomic Energy Agency’s role is being perceived in some quarters not as neutral verification but as a conduit for intelligence that feeds into coercive action. The legal and ethical frameworks for policing such conduits remain underdeveloped. If private-sector capabilities continue to outpace the norms and regulations governing them, then states will find it easier to outsource coercive intelligence-gathering and attribution, thereby further blurring lines of responsibility. ## What comes next: implications for neutrality and nonalignment For scholars and practitioners of neutrality and nonalignment, the current moment poses several demanding questions. First, the shrinking of diplomatic leeway—driven by rapid kinetic responses and rhetorical hardening—reduces the space for effective third-party mediation. Neutral states find themselves squeezed between great-power narratives that frame impartiality as moral equivalence and the practical need to

Iran War ENDS The Collective West Today I’m talking again to Ali Borhani a Geopolitical Strategist, the cohost of the BRI-Diaolgue podcast, and the Substack FuturEarly. Ali is a Canadian with Persian roots, so today we want to discuss the many levels on which the 12-Day War is going to impact the politics and economics of the globe. Ali’s Substack: https://futurearly.substack.com/ [**Lawmaker Confirms ‘October Surprise’ Plot to Sabotage Jimmy Carter’s Re-election**](https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2023/03/lawmaker- admits-1980-gop-plot-to-prolong-iran-hostage-crisis.html) **The Books : [Profits of War] (https://openlibrary.org/books/OL1728454M/Profits_of_war) and [War is a Racket](https://www. amazon.co.uk/War-Racket-Antiwar-Americas-Decorated/dp/0922915865)** [**Interview with Shah – 60 Minutes : A MUST WATCH**](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9RH2wXQtFdo) #M3 My argument is that, you know, today you hit Natanz, and tomorrow morning, if Iran hits the Negev Desert, what is the answer from the Western hemisphere? You know, these are the danger zones that the West is cheering and clapping for without having, I would say, a geopolitical de-risking mechanism. And then they find themselves in a very challenging position. The escalation ladder, in my opinion, is an escalation hyperloop right now. #M2 Hello everybody, this is Pascal from Neutrality Studies, and today I'm talking again to Ali Borhani, a geopolitical strategist and the co-host of the BRI Dialogue podcast. Ali recently also started a Substack called Futurely, so please check it out. He posts very interesting insights and analysis over there as well. Ali is a Canadian with Persian roots. So today we want to discuss the many levels on which this so-called 12-day war is going to impact the political and economic situation of the globe. Ali, welcome back. Thank you, Pascal. Pleasure to be with you. Glad to have you back. Last time we already talked about geoeconomics, but also a lot about China. And, you know, the last couple of weeks were extremely dramatic, also because of what happened to a place very dear to your heart. Can you maybe tell us a little bit about your analysis of where this sudden war with Iran was coming from? #M3 Well, I am pleased to be with you on Neutrality Studies, a subject that deserves much more attention these days in particular. But allow me to start with a poem. As evening fell, the day's oppression lifted. Tall peaks came into focus. It had rained. Across the lawns, wide lawns and cultured flowers drifted A conversation of the highly trained. Ten gardeners watched them pass and price their shoes. A chauffeur waited, reading in the drive, For them to finish their exchange of -- 1 of 16 -- views. It looked a picture of the day to live. Far off, no matter what good they intended, Two armies waited for the verbal error, With well-made implements for causing pain, And on the issue of their charm depended A land laid waste, with all its young men slain, Its women weeping, and its towns in terror. W.H. Auden—the poem is called "The Embassy." The reason it reads that way, and the reason I read it, is that all of this happened while the diplomats were negotiating, while the whole world was pausing and hoping that we would not find ourselves in another conflict. But very few people understand that the challenge between the United States and Iran—or in that context, the United States, Israel, and Iran—is a matter of a Betamax videotape and a VHS videotape. These two do not fit one another's operating system. This is not something that is just from, you know, the past 40 years and post-revolution. It is something that goes back even to the time of the Shah and before the revolution. Recently, it just dawned on me where this crisis has brewed and is coming from. We didn't have a ribbon, you know, like the yellow ribbons for the hostages. Now, it started in 1978 when Iranian students took over the American embassy. But very few people, Pascal, know that that incident— which is the mother and cornerstone of the post-revolution grudge between Americans and Persians—was never properly shared with the American people. The reason is that the day the Iranian students jumped the American embassy walls, a few weeks later, they were ready to release the hostages. And yet, a delegation from Reagan's team met with the new revolutionaries in Geneva. And, you know, this is well documented in a book called *Prophets of War*, written by Ari Ben- Menashe, who is an Israeli-Iraqi-Iranian Jewish author. And as well, as recently as last year, you know, a former Texas lawmaker, when he heard that Jimmy Carter was passing away, came out and said, yes, there was an agreement to release the hostages on the day that Ronald Reagan came into office. So they were kept for 444 days at the orders of Americans. This is not a small, I would say, development. And this is something that historians should look into. And the American people, particularly the MAGA base, should better understand. #M2 Sorry, can you repeat that? Because I wasn't aware of this. Wait, there was an agreement to keep these hostages longer than necessary? #M3 Yes, this is a shocking revelation. I will send you the link after our call so you can put it in the comments so people can read it. A former Texas lawmaker came out when Jimmy Carter was being sent to hospice in his last few days, and he felt the pressure on his chest. There were articles going around, according to New York Magazine and others, and that book, that the GOP had discussions with the Persians to keep the hostages—not just for two, three, or four weeks, but until the morning -- 2 of 16 -- that Reagan came into office. And that's how, you know, this whole story of bringing them home was credited to the Republicans. Why I bring that up is that this fixation on Iran is nothing new. Another piece of information that people should look up historically, which is very informative for the times we live in, is the April 17, 1974 interview of Mike Wallace with Mohammad Reza Shah. That interview is so telling and has so many nuggets of information in it. When he is challenged by Mike Wallace, he says, "Why don't you put all the headlines of your publications in a computer and see what they answer?" And this is in 1974. I mean, that just tells you about the power of computation, the importance of narratives, the importance of stories, and how we arrive from one crisis to another. Now, when you look at the latest issue in the region, I would like to go—and I will share those links with you, of course, so you can share them with your audience. But I think what happened on Friday the 13th, which is, you know, in itself quite a remarkable day to pick, but even more so with the unilateral, unprovoked—some say aligned, some say unaligned, some say, you know... Regardless of how you look at it, dropping a Massive Ordnance Penetrator on Iran by the United States created not just a few big holes hundreds of meters below the ground, but—I think it wasn't a MOP as in Massive Ordnance Penetrator. I think it was a Multilateral Order Pulverizer, because it took all the multilateralism out. The biggest first beneficiary of this act—the biggest beneficiary of this act—is China. If you look at it at the macro level, the very little respect for the international rules-based order was demolished on June 13th and June 22nd. Ironically, right now, in Brussels, NATO, everybody's celebrating. But if you remember as well, the last time America dropped something this big, with such a scale, was the MOAB—the Mother of All Bombs—that was dropped in the last few months of Trump’s term on Afghanistan. And we know what happened after that, right? So it's not about the significance of the explosion or the size of the ordnance. The keys were handed back to the Taliban. My view is that the United States has moved from MOABs—through MOABs and mobs, or whatever you want to call it—from the Mother of All Bombs to the mother of all deficits, which are growing and ticking, to MOAE, which is the Mother of All Emissions, because we have never talked about the emissions of wars, the pricing of this footprint. And if your audience will forgive my French, the MOAF, which is the Mother of All Fuck-Ups, because these things come with their political, economic, and geostrategic ramifications, and there's no shortage of those mistakes. The other thing I think we have to talk about is: was this a delivery of B2 cargo from Misery, United States? Was it a delivery of misery—to play with words? Or are we arriving at something new? And I'll stop there and take any questions you may have, but just to set the scene as to how we have arrived here. #M2 No, it's a huge scene. And, you know, you haven't even touched on the role of Israel in this entire thing yet. Because, you know, one of the things we've been trying to guess in the background is: -- 3 of 16 -- who is pushing whom? Is it Israel that's pushing the United States into a new Gulf War? Or is it the United States that's abusing—or rather, using—Israel as its attack dog in order to go against Iran? We know that these ideas have been around forever. We know that there have been strategists in the U.S. who have, for decades, advocated and talked about how and when to attack Iran, and that there's an entire obsession with the way in which Iran has been able to basically survive despite the crippling sanctions that were put on it. Which one do you think it is? Is Israel the one who pushes, or is Israel the one who implements? #M3 I think that, you know, there are movies like *Wag the Dog* with Robert De Niro and Dustin Hoffman, and which is it—the tail or the body? I think, in the totality of it, we will come to that, and I will spend some time on that. But I think the bigger picture here is the good cop, bad cop dynamic, and who moves the other is irrelevant, because I think the bigger issue here is the centricity of Iran. If you look at Iran as a country—putting aside its history of 2,500 years, the first sanctuary for the Jewish people, they've been mentioned in the Torah by, you know, Princess Esther, you know—so putting all of those things, and having the largest population of Jews anywhere living in the Middle East, with synagogues, with hospitals, and the rest of that. I think let us park that aside, because a nation whose borders are like a miniature... If you look at Iran's map, the borders are as if, you know, a calligrapher or a miniaturist has been painting them. And you look at the rest of the region—it's all straight lines, like somebody drew them with a ruler, making some holes. So that tells you a lot about this body of land. And in my opinion, it's not about nuclear power or a nuclear arsenal, and Iran is going to drop a bomb tomorrow on Israel, and Israel will be, you know... Benjamin Netanyahu has been on the record for the past, you know, 30 years—every year saying they're three months away, two weeks, one month. It's like *Groundhog Day*. I mean, he doesn't look like Bill Murray, and Bill Murray doesn't look like Benjamin Netanyahu, but it's like *Groundhog Day*. The bigger issue here, Pascal, is the centricity of Iran in the north-south corridor, the access of Russia to Persian Gulf waters and the Sea of Oman, and the east-west corridor. And I dare say that in many ways, you know, we talk about the Belt and Road Initiative, but just metaphorically, I think Iran is the buckle of the belt. You know, so if the United States is able to remove the buckle, the belt will be very loose. I know it's a sea belt and a road, but just to play on the words. And here, you know, the issue of nuclear proliferation has been a red herring to go around every now and then. The first round of sanctions was applied on Iran at the time of Carter, just after the embassy walls and the occupation of the embassy by the Iranian students. Iran is, even today by many standards, the most sanctioned country—a