The EU Is Still Getting Drunk On Its Own Lies | Caroline Galactéros

## The Political Deadlock in France France’s domestic paralysis is not merely a matter of cabinet shuffles and electoral arithmetic; it is a structural crisis that bleeds into foreign policy. The conversation exposes a presidency that concentrates decision-making power while presiding over a fragmented political landscape that resists coherent domestic management. This dissonance produces a leadership that finds its most effective outlet not in repairing social or economic strains at home but on the grand stage of international diplomacy. The result is a paradox: an institutionally powerful presidency that, because it lacks a stable parliamentary base, becomes increasingly untethered from domestic accountability and more dependent on symbolic, high-profile foreign initiatives to sustain relevance. The fragmentation of France’s party system — splintered right, an energized far right, and an alliance of left-leaning forces — creates incentives for executives to play ephemeral political games rather than build lasting coalitions. The prime minister’s office becomes expendable, a role tailored to execute presidential whims rather than develop policy autonomy. In such a system, the temptation to escape into geopolitics is strong: foreign policy theater confers prestige without requiring the painstaking compromises necessary at home. That detachment renders France vulnerable to adopting foreign positions that reflect elite signaling more than national interest, and it weakens the capacity to pursue a distinctive, balanced role internationally. ## France's Role in the Ukraine War 00: 13:41 Were the Minsk Accords a Masquerade? The discussion reframes the Minsk process not as a sincere attempt at conflict resolution but as a cloak for parallel policies aimed at consolidating Eastern European alignment with NATO. The Minsk Accords were signed into being amid simultaneous efforts by Western powers to rebuild and retrain Ukrainian forces within NATO structures — a dual track that made meaningful implementation politically and practically impossible. The consequence was a diplomacy that provided cover for escalation, allowing states to proclaim peacemaking while pursuing a strategy of containment through military strengthening. This reading insists that France’s participation in the Minsk framework was, in part, performative. By lending diplomatic credibility to an agreement that lacked genuine enforcement mechanisms, France inadvertently—or perhaps willingly—normalized a charade that extended the conflict’s life. If Minsk had been enforced and respected, the violent trajectory that followed might have been different. Instead, the accords became a staging ground for narratives that absolved Western policy of responsibility: a convenient story that peace was attempted and scuttled solely by the other side. The transcript suggests that such narratives obscure a more uncomfortable truth—that diplomacy and escalation were often synchronized, not antithetical. ## French Military vs. Political Views on Russia A striking divide emerges between France’s military professionals and its political class. Military circles, grounded in historical experience and strategic prudence, are depicted as more skeptical of simplistic declarations that frame Russia as an existential menace poised to march on Western capitals. Those with operational knowledge and a grasp of geopolitical constraints perceive Moscow as a rational actor with defensible security concerns, not a faceless, ideologically driven imperial monster. By contrast, political elites and broader policymaking communities have gravitated toward a binary moral narrative: friend versus foe, democracy versus autocracy. That simplification enables policies premised on maximal opposition and escalatory assistance to Ukraine, policies that the military recognizes as strategically risky and unlikely to secure decisive victories. The friction between these perspectives has concrete consequences: operational advice that might prioritize de-escalation, negotiation bandwidth, or calibrated support is sidelined in favor of political signaling that insists on unambiguous moral alignment. ## Why Europe Lost its Strategic Autonomy The erosion of European strategic autonomy is traced to a slow process of institutional and elite capture by transatlantic networks and commercial interests. The argument laid out in the conversation is that strategic autonomy was rhetorically embraced but scarcely operationalized. Contracts, procurement patterns, and diplomatic alignments have increasingly tied European capitals to American strategic priorities, undercutting the very sovereignty those capitals claim to desire. Practical examples include defense procurement that favors transatlantic interoperability and economic deals that bind the EU into trade-offs privileging American industry. When the rubber meets the road—on decisions about arms, sanctions, or diplomatic initiatives—Europe often discovers it lacks leverage or independent means. The irony is stark: strategic autonomy became a slogan that masked dependence, and the political architecture of the EU and member states rewarded signaling over substance. Without industrial capacity, coherent defense planning, or unified political will, talk of autonomy is rendered hollow. ## The Ideology of European Globalism 00: 35:13 The EU's Bureaucratic Power Grab The exchange highlights a cultural and bureaucratic momentum within the EU that equates global projection with moral leadership and administrative expansion. European institutions have, over time, consolidated regulatory and normative power in ways that make political elites feel globally consequential even while their capacity to act strategically remains limited. The ideological framework of European globalism elevates values-based diplomacy—human rights, sanctions regimes, and regulatory harmonization—into instruments of power, but often without the coercive or diplomatic tools necessary to translate norms into outcomes. This tendency produces a kind of colonial bureaucratization: policy becomes the management of symbols and standards rather than the pursuit of concrete geopolitical leverage. The EU’s bureaucratic edifice enables a “power grab” that is less about territorial control and more about shaping the terms of economic and normative life across markets. Yet when hard choices arrive—energy security, defense industrial policy, or crisis mediation—the institutional muscle often proves cosmetic. The result is an EU that commands moral attention but lacks the hard instruments to reconcile its ambitions with strategic reality. ## Europe's Moral Superiority Complex vs. Military Reality A central theme is the mismatch between Europe’s self-image as a moral arbiter and the stark realities of military and strategic weakness. The continent’s elites are portrayed as intoxicated with a narrative of moral superiority: casting conflicts in Manichean terms that flatter self-conceptions and absolve responsibility for unintended consequences. This moralistic posture justifies uncompromising sanctions and weapon transfers while minimizing the heavy lift of building credible deterrence or diplomatic exit routes. In practical terms, moral posturing has substituted for investment in defense capabilities, coherent alliance strategy, and industrial resilience. Europe’s capacity to impose costs on adversaries, or to credibly back down from escalation, is constrained by energy dependencies, fractured political wills, and limited military logistics. The gap between lofty declarations and functional capacity invites both strategic overreach and reputational loss when Europe is unable to carry through on its pronouncements. In short, virtue-signaling becomes a strategic liability when confronted with the hardware and calculus of modern geopolitics. ## Preparing for Europe's "Hangover" What follows from a prolonged period of strategic indulgence

The EU Is Still Getting Drunk On Its Own Lies Why has Europe abandoned its own interests to become a pawn in a larger geopolitical game? Has its talk of "strategic autonomy" become a hollow slogan, covering a dangerous dependency? And how has a childish "good vs. evil" narrative replaced pragmatic statecraft, pushing the continent towards a crisis it is ill-equipped to handle? To discuss this and more, today I’m talking to Dr. Caroline Galactéros. Dr. Galactéros is a former french reservist Colonel and geostrategist who taught strategy and ethics at the “Écoel de Guerre” in Paris, and she is currently running her own YouTube Channel in french called “Paix et Guerre” - “Peace and War”. We explore the deep political paralysis gripping France and how it drives President Macron's foreign policy. We also break down Europe's historical shift from a potential bridge-builder to a compliant follower of confrontational policies, the cynical failure of the Minsk Accords, and the vast disconnect between the continent's self-deceiving elites and a public hungry for truth. Links: Caroline's channel: @cgalacteros Geopragma: https://geopragma.fr/caroline-galacteros/ Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz.substack. com Goods Store: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall.com Timestamps: 00:00:00 Preview & Introduction 00:01:19 The Political Deadlock in France 00:07:46 France's Role in the Ukraine War 00: 13:41 Were the Minsk Accords a Masquerade? 00:16:06 French Military vs. Political Views on Russia 00:24:33 Why Europe Lost its Strategic Autonomy 00:31:10 The Ideology of European Globalism 00: 35:13 The EU's Bureaucratic Power Grab 00:38:30 Europe's Moral Superiority Complex vs. Military Reality 00:41:43 Preparing for Europe's "Hangover" 00:52:26 Why We Don't Learn from History 00: 55:47 Where to find Caroline Galacteros #F1 ...which means that you have other great powers and political and cultural models emerging—not as a small thing, but as something right in front of you. And the only mode we have is that we want to defy them, defeat them, beat them, and erase them. #M2 Yeah. #F1 Which is childish. It's completely childish. #M2 -- 1 of 18 -- Hello, everybody. This is Pascal from Neutrality Studies, and today I'm talking to Dr. Caroline Galactéros. Dr. Galactéros is a former French reservist colonel and geostrategist who taught strategy and ethics at the École de Guerre in Paris, and she is currently running her own YouTube channel in French called "Paix et Guerre," that is, "War and Peace" in English. Madame Galactéros, Caroline, welcome. #F1 Thank you. Thank you for inviting me. Yes, it's "Peace and War," not "War and Peace." #M2 Yeah, yeah, yeah. Peace and war, because peace should always come first. #F1 Yeah, for me, in my opinion. #M2 No, absolutely. You're absolutely right. And that's actually what we want to discuss today. But before we go into the grand scheme of things and world politics, let me ask a little bit—since you're sitting in Paris, how is the French political system doing at the moment, now that you've just disposed of another prime minister and a new one is in? What's the situation at the moment? #F1 Yeah, I'm afraid I have to say we are in a real quagmire, I would say, in English, because the political situation is completely deadlocked, you know, and our president has—yeah, there is no government, right? So it's about to come, it's about to appear, but nothing is happening, actually. And as you may know, the economic situation is not very brilliant either. And not to mention our positions on the international scene, especially concerning the war in Ukraine. The Middle East is a little bit different. I must say, I'm okay with the coming declaration of President Macron about recognizing the state of Palestine, even if he's doing that certainly not for the right reasons, but for internal political ones. But at least it's time. It was time to do that. But concerning all the rest, it's less hopeful. #M2 -- 2 of 18 -- So what led to the political deadlock, actually? Why is it that prime ministers are being forced to resign time and again? And maybe, can you also explain what, in that case, the power of the president is? Is it easy to just appoint a new prime minister all the time? What's the role of parliament in that case? #F1 You know, the Fifth Republic in France is a very special regime, a very special form of republic. So in this shape, in this form, in this regime, the power goes to the president, first and foremost. And of course, especially in foreign relations matters, and defense matters also. So he has the power to do practically what he wants. The problem he has is that he doesn't have any majority, because he just broke everything into pieces in 2017 when he first came to power—he put the whole political landscape in France into pieces. And now you have all these parties: former left, former right, far right, far left. So everybody has ambitions, of course. They don't want to reunite to be stronger all together, except on the left. Except on the left. #M2 Mélanchon. #F1 Mélenchon, plus the Socialists, plus the Communists, plus, plus, plus. But on the right, it's completely, you know, divided. And so for him, it's easy because he can play one against the other all the time, and he can change the people because the people don't matter—it doesn't matter in the French balance of power. You know, the prime minister is not so important. The prime minister is running the policy the president asks him to run. And normally, he has a parliament which allows him to do that. But in this case, there is a contradiction because the parliament is completely fragmented. So, yeah, that's why. And probably it's also—I must say, it's terrible to say that, but I must say it's easier for Emmanuel Macron to have this kind of presence, because nothing is evolving. He doesn't have anything to do, finally. And that's why he's moving towards foreign matters, towards the great world, if I may say. Yeah, because there he can be what he wants to be. I mean, he cannot run again, right? #M2 I mean, this is his last term in France, so he must have his eyes on the next position, which must be in an international institution. And in a sense, now the current situation, in which things are blocked— as the opposition is divided—he doesn't need to care very much about there being an internal revolt -- 3 of 18 -- within parliament. Although the parliament can revolt against the prime minister, and they do so, they cannot seriously harm him, and he doesn't really want anything at the moment from parliament. That's the thing, right? #F1 Exactly. I think you understood perfectly. #M2 But that means France is deadlocked. Nothing internally will fundamentally move for now. And Mr. Macron is going to be on the world stage and leave France behind. #F1 In a way, that's what is so concerning for all the people who care about the country—which is my case, of course—not only on the international stage. But yeah, what can I do? What can I do? #M2 So maybe let's look a little bit now at this international level and how you evaluate Emmanuel Macron's and France's role in the Ukraine war. I know we both belong to the same group of critical onlookers, but how did France interact with Ukraine? And maybe also, if you go back a little bit further than just 2022, I mean, there has been an evolution as well. We all remember that it was Hollande and Merkel who, in 2008, actually were not in favor of promising NATO membership to Ukraine, but both Hollande and Merkel let it happen. Maybe you can speak to that a bit. #F1 Yeah, that's right. There has been an evolution. There was a time, probably around 2000... Yeah, I think the shift in the French position on the global international stage started with Nicolas Sarkozy. #M2 Yeah, Sarkozy, not Hollande. #F1 Yes, Sarkozy. So it's around 2007 or 2008. Then it started to move, to shift. And it shifted towards America and towards total alignment with American orders and American masters, indeed. That's terrible to say, but that's the truth. So then we started to refuse, to decline the possibility we had as an atomic power, as a permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations. We had the ability to imagine our own foreign policy, at least a little bit. We did it concerning the Iraq War in -- 4 of 18 -- 2003. We were still able to ask a simple question: Where is our national interest in doing that, in following that path, in choosing this policy instead of that one? In 2007 and 2008, as Mr. Sarkozy came to power, it was over. He aligned the country completely with American policy, American desiderata, and, of course, British will. And then, you know, it was too late because events took a different path. And of course, from the Russian point of view, the attitude of the president of Russia also evolved. There was the Georgian War. There had been the first attempt at regime change in Ukraine in 2003-04 with the so-called Orange Revolution. And then you had the Libyan War, the Syrian War—you had all that, which for me is the real beginning of the hardening of the empire. You know, we were just proxies for that, especially in Libya, but also in Syria. And then, concerning the Eastern Front—the Ukrainian case—we just had to renounce, to forget that we could make our own decisions, and just follow the others. And the others were very simple: just push, push, push, rebuild Ukrainian forces. And after the Maidan coup, and after the start of the civil war in Ukraine between the separatists—Russian-speaking people—and the Ukrainian nationalists, it was just about aligning with NATO, aligning with what America wanted. And America wanted Ukraine in NATO, that's all—just to be on the border of Russia, just to threaten more, to take the advantage. #M2 Yeah. Again, France used to be the country that provided a bit of counterweight. And, you know, it's the only country that ever basically suspended NATO membership. I mean, not completely, but it's the one that said, "We're out for a moment." But that was long ago. And, sorry, Mr. Sarkozy in 2008 was not in favor of promising NATO membership at the Bucharest summit, but then they gave in. And Mr. Hollande and Ms. Merkel were also working on the Minsk agreements. And right now, both of them have said they just wanted to buy time. But I don't entirely believe them. I think they also used that just as a way to say, "Look, we want to be on good terms with everybody." I also read it as an excuse, because at the time, the Minsk agreements were well designed and a pragmatic way forward, had they been kept. They were never kept. So what is your assessment of this policy period of the Minsk Accords, in which France was a pivotal part of building that structure? And we know the Russians wanted this, right? #F1 Yes, but France was, in my opinion, already instrumental. France was just a tool. France was a big country—okay, or a medium-sized country, as you prefer—but it put its credibility in the... in the joke, in the... How can I say that? In English, in the masquerade. Yeah, okay, so... As Minsk was a masquerade. Of course, because at the same time, we were training Ukrainian forces in NATO, you know? All NATO members, all NATO countries—the Ukrainian army didn't just fall from the sky, out of the blue, from scratch. No, we built it. We built it. We, France, we, America, of course, the British, the Poles, everybody, for years in NATO structures. So the move was really conceived during the -- 5 of 18 -- same years that we were negotiating and trying to implement, officially, the Minsk agreements, which was not the case. Even monitoring it was not possible. #M2 Do you think that, or did you, from your discussions also with your colleagues in the security—well, cloud, the security part of France, right? I mean, this is a group of people and you talk. How much of this was understood at the time—that this kind of polic