US Realignment SHOCKS Europe / Pakistan Changes The Game / Nepal Color Revolution? | Arnaud Bertrand

## Introduction A tectonic shift in Western strategic alignments is unfolding: one in which the United States appears to be re-evaluating the assumptions of its post–Cold War security posture, Europe is scrambling to preserve the transatlantic bargain, and other global actors are rapidly repositioning to exploit openings. That is the central narrative emerging from a wide-ranging conversation with the French analyst Arnaud Bertrand, whose observations stitch together political turmoil in Paris, Washington’s changing priorities, and fresh diplomatic maneuvers across Eurasia and West Asia. Taken together, these developments suggest not merely episodic friction but a structural realignment with deep implications for European sovereignty, U.S.-China competition, and the balance of influence across the Global South. ## France's Diminishing Role in Europe France’s domestic instability is more than an internal political drama; it is a mirror of a country struggling to project consistent leadership in a fracturing European architecture. The conversation highlighted how the oscillation of French governments recalls the prior eras that the Fifth Republic was designed to prevent. Frequent changes at the head of government, coupled with a president who repeatedly selects like-minded centrists rather than reflecting electoral shifts, have left Paris with diminished credibility and leverage in Brussels. This erosion matters because France historically positioned itself as Europe’s voice in matters of foreign policy and strategic autonomy—projecting a third way between uncritical Atlanticism and a naive neutralism. Yet recent episodes, from vocally opposing major EU–U.S. commercial and energy pacts to being sidelined in key decisions, indicate Paris no longer sets the terms of external policy. Where once a Franco-German tandem might steer Europe’s posture, the balance has tilted toward German economic heft and an EU leadership that appears more willing to align with U.S. strategic preferences. The consequence is a weakened European ability to act independently. Rather than using the present stress in transatlantic ties as an incentive to build indigenous capacities—military industry, diplomatic outreach, economic resilience—many European elites have doubled down on dependency. Political elites educated within the same Atlanticist intellectual circuits find the prospect of American disengagement existentially threatening, prompting behavior that reinforces the very subordination they fear. In short, political volatility at home is translating into strategic impotence abroad. ## Is the US Pivoting Towards China? One of the most striking contours of the discussion was the suggestion that the United States under the current administration may be rethinking where its primary strategic focus should lie. Multiple indicators—public statements, selective arms-sale refusals, and notably warm readouts from a recent call between the U.S. president and China’s leader—point toward a nuanced thaw rather than a simple intensification of containment. This should not be read as a straightforward “pro-China” turn. Instead, the conversation framed Washington’s posture as an instance of prioritization: a pivot toward defending what it calls the homeland and focusing finite military and economic resources on the Indo-Pacific theater and great-power competition with China. The implication is that commitments on Europe’s periphery—especially expensive, open-ended security guarantees—may be scaled back. An official’s remark about shifting attention back to the defense of the homeland was reported as emblematic of this thinking: the U.S. is, at least rhetorically, signaling that the old burden-sharing calculus has changed. The practical signs are subtle but significant. Denial of transit for a high-profile Taiwanese figure, withholding certain arms sales, and unusually warm diplomatic language in public readouts all suggest Washington is calibrating its engagement with Beijing. At the same time, hawkish elements in Congress still agitate for punitive measures and maximal pressure, creating an ambiguous mix of signals. For Europe, that ambiguity is toxic: it can be read either as an opportunity for strategic autonomy or as a risky abandonment that demands immediate accommodation. Crucially, the conversation emphasized that China’s interests do not necessarily align with a desire to re-entangle the United States in old patterns. Beijing has little incentive to replicate the conditions of deep interdependence with Washington; it benefits instead from stable competition and guarded cooperation where useful. Thus, what appears at first glance as rapprochement could be a pragmatic truce—functional stability rather than political reconciliation. ## The Iran Factor in the New Alliance Realignments seldom occur in isolation. The emergence of a tighter Saudi–Pakistan axis and shifts in regional calculations around Iran introduce a third dimension to the evolving global order. In the analysis, the Middle East is no longer a peripheral theater where NATO’s posture or European security concerns are the only determinants. Rather, new partnerships—especially those involving energy, military cooperation, and diplomatic realignments—are reshaping the incentives for both Washington and Beijing. Iran sits at the intersection of these currents. Its posture and the reactions it triggers among Gulf states, Pakistan, and regional powers alter the equation for the U.S. and Europe. If Saudi Arabia deepens ties with countries like Pakistan, empowering a Sunni axis that can project power and deter Tehran’s influence, American policymakers may find it easier to reduce their own footprint in certain corridors while relying on regional balancing. Conversely, if Iran responds by deepening its partnerships with Russia and non-state proxies, the region could become even more fragmented, and Europe’s vulnerability—energy dependence, migration pressures, and security threats—would increase. The conversation suggested that the new alliance dynamics could either cushion U.S. retrenchment or complicate it sharply, depending on the extent to which regional players can act as credible security providers. For Europe, wary of becoming collateral in a shifting regional calculus, the lesson is stark: the Middle East’s secondary alignments will have first-order effects on European security and energy markets. ## What to Watch: US-China Relations & Europe's Future If there is a single takeaway from the discussion, it is that the short- to medium-term future hinges on a handful of interlinked trends. First, watch Washington’s balance between rhetoric and resource allocation. Declarations of “America First” are less consequential than where defense budgets, base deployments, and high-level diplomacy are actually directed. A sustained reprioritization toward the Indo-Pacific—combined with symbolic but limited reassurance to Europe—will push the EU into clearer choices between dependency and independence. Second, monitor the tone and content of diplomatic exchanges with China. The unusually warm language in recent official readouts is not mere window dressing; it signals the possibility of transactional understandings that could reduce the risk of miscalculation. Yet domestic political currents in each country—Congressional hawks in the U.S., nationalist imperatives in China—could rapidly reintroduce volatility. The durability of any détente will depend on whether these elite currents can be disciplined by strategic calculus rather than electoral theater. Third, Europe’s internal political cohesion will determine how it navigates this moment. If Paris is consumed by domestic instability and Brussels remains dominated by a few member states oriented toward Washington, the EU will be poorly placed to seize the opportunity of U.S. retraction. Alternatively, if European capitals take seriously the imperative to build defens

US Realignment SHOCKS Europe; Pakistan Changes The Game; Nepal Color Revolution? As Europe begs the US to stay, a new Trump administration appears to be pivoting away from its old allies and towards a surprising new understanding with China. Is the transatlantic alliance fracturing for good, and what does this mean for the global balance of power? To discuss this and more, today I’m talking again to Arnaud Bertrand, the French geopolitical analyst and prolific Twitter publisher. We explore the signs of a major US pivot away from Europe and towards China, and how European leaders are panicking in response. We also break down the political chaos consuming France, the game-changing new Saudi-Pakistan alliance reshaping the Middle East, and why the recent protests in Nepal might not be the color revolution some analysts claim. Links: Arnaud's X (Twitter): https://x. com/rnaudbertrand Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Goods Store: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall.com Timestamps: 00:00:00 Introduction 00:00:29 Turmoil in France: A Return to Instability? 00:06:45 France's Diminishing Role in Europe 00:10:40 Europe's "Threat Hype" to Keep the US Engaged 00:20:12 Is the US Pivoting Towards China? 00:28:11 New Saudi-Pakistan Alliance Reshapes West Asia 00:31:24 The Iran Factor in the New Alliance 00:38:03 Nepal Protests: Genuine Uprising or Color Revolution? 00:50:39 What to Watch: US-China Relations & Europe's Future 00:52:50 Conclusion #M2 Hello, everybody. This is Pascal Lottaz from Neutrality Studies. And today I'm talking again to Arnaud Bertrand, the French geopolitical analyst and prolific Twitter publisher. Arnaud, welcome back to the show. #M3 Thank you, Pascal. It's great to be here again. #M2 It's always wonderful having you because you have so many good insights, and your Twitter feed is just a joy. The way you take these current events and actually put them into context is fantastic. So let's maybe start with your home country of France. I already had a talk about it yesterday, but I'd like your take on the current turmoil and yet another prime minister—what does this mean for your country? #M3 -- 1 of 15 -- Yeah, I mean, I'm not sure there is much more to say beyond it's a mess, really. That's where we are, you know. Currently in France, we're in the Fifth Republic. And the way the system—well, the reason why De Gaulle started the Fifth Republic was because before, during the Third or the Fourth Republic, France was extremely unstable and had a new prime minister, you know, every few weeks. And it had much more of a parliamentary attitude—a system with, you know, new governments all the time. De Gaulle wanted to put an end to that and bring a bit of stability to the system. But somehow, we've managed to strangely change the spirit of the Fifth Republic and go back to what we were trying to avoid with it, which is a bit of an irony, basically. And yeah, it shows that I don't see how this ends. I think we're simply going to have to wait for the end of Macron's term, which comes in 2027, and expect until then to have new governments probably every couple of months or so. That's probably what will happen, given the current divisions in the French parliament. #M2 It's like dissolving parliament is not an option anymore, right? Calling for new elections. #M3 I forgot exactly about the rule. I think the French parliament always—I might be wrong—but they always have the option to file what's called a motion of no confidence against the government. And they can do that at any point, at least that's what I think. So I think it is still an option. But, of course, it depends on the forces in the parliament. So it needs to be a certain threshold of MPs that agree with that in order for it to happen. #M2 Right. And, you know, we've seen there are other political systems which produce a lot of prime ministers. Japan is one of them—they change quite a lot. Right now, they're again going through one of those changes. But it doesn't necessarily mean instability for the country because, A, the bureaucratic arm is very stable and strong, and B, the ruling party and the coalition they form—even though they change prime ministers and cabinet—the overall direction remains more or less the same because the forces are on one page. It's different for France, isn't it? #M3 It's actually not that different. When you look at it, it should have been different because, based on the way the French people voted, the two leading parties they voted for are either the left—I mean, what I call the left, which is the real left, like Mélenchon and so on—or the far right, meaning Le Pen. So if Macron had respected the people's votes, he should have put either of those two forces in -- 2 of 15 -- government. But he didn't. He chose to put basically, you know, people from his own family of centrists—basically the same people who have been ruling France for decades. And that's what he's done with each new prime minister. Because as a reminder, you know, despite the fact that the parliament can dissolve the government, it's still the president who chooses the new prime minister. So obviously, he's going to choose someone who is quite close to his beliefs. In fact, the new one that he chose is one of his closest allies, someone who has spent his entire political life with Macron. And so was the one before, François Bayrou, also extremely close to Macron, and so was the guy before. So it goes to show that you change the figurehead, but actually the same ideology, if you will, remains in power. #M2 Yeah, I find it most amusing to hear him say before the vote, you know, "I want to hear the voice of the country and of the people because we respect the voice of the people. Therefore, we dissolve parliament and have an election." And once the election was over, he said, "OK, I heard you, and I choose not to listen to you. Thank you very much. This is what's going to happen." France understands that, right? I mean, the general population now gets what kind of leader Macron is toward them, I suppose. #M3 Yeah, of course. I mean, he's very unpopular in France. Most people feel betrayed because the first prime minister he chose after that specific vote was actually from the one party that got the least votes, which is especially shocking, right? No one wanted that specific party at all. So, yeah, it feels like a betrayal. #M2 So what does this do to France's position in Europe's overall geopolitics? I mean, over the last two months, we've seen these, to me, kind of amazing portrayals of European subservience to the United States. I mean, sitting eight people in the Oval Office in front of the desk of the boss, and they're still trying to drag the Americans back into Europe, and the US actually saying, "Look, you have to put the draconian sanctions on China," something that they knew wouldn't be possible for the Europeans, but they put it out there anyway. Where does France fit into this picture at the moment? #M3 I mean, France, to Macron's credit, at least is saying the right things when it comes to this. So, for instance, the new deal that von der Leyen signed with Trump in Scotland, which is, you know, pure imperial tribute because we—Europeans—commit to giving, I think, almost $2 trillion directly to the U.S., either by buying their energy, their LNG, which is extremely expensive compared to what it -- 3 of 15 -- would cost from other countries—Russia first and foremost—and we commit to investing $600 billion in their economy. And the U.S. will decide where that money is invested. It's not even our decision. I mean, it's a series of things like that. It's pure imperial tribute. Macron pretty much said so. France—you know, both Macron and the prime minister at the time, François Bayrou—actually had extremely harsh words against that deal. But the fact that they did shows France's position in the EU, because it shows that they completely disagreed with it. But, you know, the EU went ahead anyway. So it shows that actually they are not in control of the EU, and it's probably more Germany who is. And in fact, von der Leyen is a German politician. So, yeah, I think it's France. In the way the Europeans—at some point, there was talk of a Franco-German couple co-managing the EU. The idea was that France would be the one managing external relations—those types of relationships with the U.S. and so on—trying to find some sort of third way for Europe that's not completely aligned with the U.S. That was the case back when Mitterrand was president, or Chirac, and so on. And Germany would be the industrial powerhouse of Europe, managing all the monetary aspects—more of the domestic economic stuff at the European level. But that's clearly not the case anymore. France's voice, when it comes to the external relations of the EU, clearly doesn't have much sway anymore. #M2 Right. And you can see how the dependency on the US is now so high that the Europeans are basically begging at the feet of the US not to be left alone, especially when it comes to Ukraine. And in this context, I want to ask you for your interpretation of this media hype—first about some paper drones, then about something that exploded in Poland, and then about the MiG, these Russian jet fighters that either for 8 or 12 minutes crossed Latvian or Estonian airspace. To me, and to some of our colleagues, this seems like a lot of the Europeans, again, trying to hype up the threat in order to maintain the connection to the United States and get them to recommit. How do you interpret this? #M3 So, first of all, just to finish the previous thought... There is a kind of irony, or paradox, in that you're right: the Europeans are trying their best to keep the U.S. involved, to keep them in the fight, committing to buy all those weapons from the U.S. in order to seduce Trump, and so on. But in the long run, that actually weakens Europe, because it increases our dependence on the U.S., which means it's going to be even harder next time to negotiate from a position of strength when it comes to any deal with the U.S. The reason why we have to submit to this imperial tribute is because we have no leverage, right? They have complete sway over us. They protect us almost completely, and so they can dictate terms. So it's not the right direction. The direction that we should be going towards is reducing the -- 4 of 15 -- dependence, building our own European armaments industry, trying to cut the umbilical cord bit by bit from the U.S. And then on this question specifically, I mean, I think we are quite clearly in a security dilemma dynamic between Europe and Russia, where, as you say, there is threat hyping on both sides. Russia sees Europeans, quite rightly, as very hostile to them, and then they respond to that. And, of course, the Europeans interpret that in the worst possible manner, and bit by bit it's escalating. The only solution to that—the real solution to dial down the tension—should be dialogue. But here is another paradox: we won't speak directly to Russia. We only do so via Trump, who is himself quite hostile to our interests as Europeans and who’s on record dozens of times saying that he hates Europe, Europeans, and so on. So, you know, obviously he's not the right person to negotiate for Europe's interests. So it's also stupid. To me, it makes no sense whatsoever. The strategic thinking of European leaders is appalling. #M2 Is it possible—I mean, Alex Christoforou had that analysis the other day on his channel—that what we are seeing is a reaction of Europe to the US decision not to increase militarization in the border states with Russia, in the Baltics, but also in Finland? And, you know, in Finland, the U.S. now has an agreement to open up to 15 U.S. military bases, but they haven't acted on it yet, except for one. The other 14 are nowhere to be found yet, right? So, are we actually witnessing a moment when the US seems