The Political West Is Collapsing. Imperial Globalism Is Not | Prof. Richard Sakwa

## Introduction The conversation with Prof. Richard Sakwa offers a wrenching diagnosis: the post-1945 architecture that promised an orderly, law-grounded world is unraveling, not because international law failed to exist, but because political practice abandoned its spirit. What emerges from the exchange is less a neat theory than a layered account of how institutions, ideologies, and entrenched power networks interact to reproduce conflict. The central claim is blunt: the political West — an Atlantic power system forged in and after the first Cold War — is fraying, yet a resurgent form of globalism remains, one that is imperial rather than liberal in orientation. Understanding that distinction, and the forces that sustain it, matters for any realistic hope of de-escalation or a return to the UN Charter’s universal principles. ## US Hegemony: Continuity of agenda or a genuine chance for peace? The debate over whether U.S. foreign policy is essentially continuous — a hegemonic project that only periodically rebrands itself — or genuinely open to a peaceful reset is a recurrent theme. The conversation frames Donald Trump’s shifts not as random tantrums but as signaling two layered tendencies: a superficial, situational rhetoric and a deeper strategic posture. On the surface, leaders’ statements can look contradictory and opportunistic, a “weathervane” responding to the latest interlocutor or photo-op. Underneath, however, runs a long-term trend: the decline of liberal globalism and the persistence of imperial globalism. This imperial strand is not merely a neoconservative obsession; it is embedded in the structures and habits of power that have defined Atlantic politics for decades. It coexists uneasily with populist, America First impulses that would prefer retrenchment. The result is a policy oscillation — a tug-of-war between different elites and interest groups — that prevents coherent disengagement. Rather than choosing clear withdrawal or sustained restraint, the United States drifts between offshore-balancing arguments, a revival of classic neocon interventionism, and transactional bargains that offload the costs of conflict onto allies while preserving strategic control. What this explains is why the idea of an easy peace — a leader willing to end a war overnight — collides with a much denser reality. Even if a president wants de-escalation, a constellation of institutions, corporate interests, military commitments, and allied expectations can blunt or reverse that impulse. The implied paradox is stark: the political will necessary to end great-power confrontations cannot simply be wished into existence because the system that sustained the confrontation has become self-reproducing. ## The US doctrine of a "Sphere of Interference" One of the most consequential strands in the discussion is the notion that, after 1945, the United States and its partners developed not merely a sphere of influence but a “sphere of interference.” This is more than a geographic claim; it is a doctrine that presumes a right to shape political outcomes beyond its borders. The result was an international order that paid lip service to multilateral institutions like the UN while simultaneously reserving the practical freedom to impose or defend its security interests by other means. This doctrine explains much of the post-Cold War dynamics where promises of integration, partnership, and cooperation braided together with interventions, regime-change operations, and security guarantees. The political West’s machinery — encompassing military alliances, intelligence networks, think tanks, and media ecosystems — matured into what some officials and commentators warned would be a self-perpetuating complex. When combined with moral narratives about universal values, the sphere of interference could be narrated as benevolent global stewardship even as it functioned as domination. The conversation underscores how this doctrine now collides with a rising multipolar sensibility. States that were once expected to acquiesce to Western prerogatives, or to be assimilated into liberal institutions, increasingly reject that assumption. That rejection has not been met consistently with diplomacy. Instead the reflexive answer in many Western capitals has been to intensify containment, cast dissent as existential threat, and deploy coercive instruments. The cumulative effect feeds a new Cold War dynamic: not simply rivalry among states, but a contest over the legitimacy of global ordering principles themselves. ## How the West "lost the peace" after the Cold War The phrase “lost the peace” captures a paradoxical historical failure: winning the Cold War did not translate into a durable peace. The conversation reconstructs why. In the immediate aftermath of 1989–91, the international system offered a rare opportunity to embed cooperative security arrangements and to anchor a plural, rule-based order. Instead, choices were made — both ideological and institutional — that prioritized expansion and consolidation of Atlantic influence over genuine integration. Several mechanisms explain this failure. First, liberal globalism always contained an imperial kernel; the promise of common goods such as open markets or multilateral institutions was intertwined with power projection and privilege. Second, the political West, as an elite formation, fostered path dependencies — NATO enlargement, security architectures, and military basing — that became self-justifying rites rather than contingent policies. Third, domestic political economies in Western states, including defense industries and security bureaucracies, accrued incentives to perpetuate a state of competition. The result is that the post-Cold War moment of reconciliation was squandered. Rather than embracing the Charter’s universalism as a basis for shared security, Western policy-makers repeatedly treated Russian security concerns as secondary or negotiable. That marginalization of legitimate interests created grievance and defensive reaction, which in turn was read by Western elites as vindication of prior assumptions, rather than a signal to recalibrate. The spiral led to polarization, to the re-politicization of geopolitics in ways that now imperil the broader international order. A further, more troubling consequence is the narrowing of acceptable public debate within Western societies. The conversation documents how dissenting voices — analysts, intellectuals, and journalists who call for restraint or for a return to Charter principles — face ostracism, demonization, or worse. That suppression reduces the political space for corrective policy and makes escalation more likely, because alternatives are silenced rather than engaged. ## Does capitalism necessitate imperialism? The final segment of the discussion wrestles with an old, urgent question: does capitalism inherently require imperial expansion? The interlocutors reject simplistic determinism: capitalism is neither destiny nor a uniform driver of foreign policy. But the modern capitalist system, especially in its liberal-globalist phase, has produced incentives that align closely with interventionist, imperial practices. Economic interdependence and global markets created both channels for cooperation and instruments for coercion. Access to markets, energy, and technological dominance often become securitized. Corporate interests, markets for arms, and the geopolitics of supply chains can push states toward policies that look imperial. That said, the conversation cautions against treating capitalism as a monolith: different capitalist systems, domestic political coalitions, and strategic cultures can lead to restraint rather than domination. The stronger claim emerging is institutional: the political structures that channel capitalist interests — defense complexes, geopolitical doctrines, alliance architectures — are what most reliably produce imperial practice. I

The Political West Is Collapsing. Imperial Globalism Is Not While the West champions a "rules-based order," it consistently bypasses the UN Charter it helped create. Is this selective application of international law the real driver of the new Cold War? And could a return to the universal principles of 1945 be the only way to avoid global conflict? To discuss this and more, today I’m talking to Dr. Richard Sakwa, an Emeritus Professor at the University of Kent. Professor Sakwa studies among other issues political developments in Russia, international politics, and multipolarity. He is the author of the very insightful book “The Lost Peace: How the West Failed to Prevent a Second Cold War”. We explore his analysis of the "political West" and how its post-Cold War expansion squandered a historic chance for peace. We also break down the two faces of Donald Trump's foreign policy, why European elites have become more hawkish than their American counterparts, and the dangerous suppression of intellectual debate that is silencing critical voices across the continent. Links: Richard's books (Amazon): https://www.amazon.com/stores /Richard-Sakwa/author/B001IXRYIY Richard's publications (Kent Uni): https://kar.kent.ac.uk/view /email/r=2Esakwa=40kent=2Eac=2Euk.html Timestamps: 00:00:45 Introduction 00:01:39 How do you interpret Trump's recent "change of heart" on Ukraine? 00:04:41 US Hegemony: Continuity of agenda or a genuine chance for peace? 00:10:01 What drives this conflict: Devious leaders or a systemic failure? 00:23:55 The US doctrine of a "Sphere of Interference" 00:30:04 Is the "with us or against us" mentality a Western cultural trait? 00:38:07 How the West "lost the peace" after the Cold War 00:48:00 Are there signs of hope for de-escalation? 00:53:00 Does capitalism necessitate imperialism? 00:58:50 Where to find Professor Sakwa's work #Guest The ambition today is no longer liberal globalism, but simply good old-fashioned imperial globalism. It's still globalist. So this is where the tension comes with his constituency—MAGA, Make America Great Again—an America First constituency, the Restrainers within Washington, D.C. So he wavers internally, but the wavering is no longer about liberal globalism; that's over, but imperial globalism remains. What form will it take? Will it take the form of offshore balancing, as Mearsheimer and Walt have argued for many years? Or is it going to take the form of the neocon agenda? #Pascal Hello, everybody. This is Pascal Lottaz from Neutrality Studies, and today I'm talking to Dr. Richard Sakwa, an emeritus professor at the University of Kent. Professor Sakwa studies, among other -- 1 of 19 -- issues, political developments in Russia, international politics, and multipolarity. He is the author of the very insightful book, The Lost Peace: How the West Failed to Prevent a Second Cold War. This is what we want to discuss today. So, Richard, welcome. #Guest My pleasure. #Pascal Richard, you are one of the people out there who has for a long time been saying that we squandered a wonderful opportunity for peace in the '90s, and that there were so many mistakes made, especially when it comes to Russia. Let's start in 2023, as we are speaking today on September 26th. How do you interpret the most recent change of heart—or, let's say, the temper tantrum—of the U.S. president about Ukraine? It's like, "OK, Ukraine, go and fight the war. You can win. You can win everything back. It's fine. And we're going to keep selling you weapons. And Europe, you have to buy the weapons and give them." Where are we in this long, long, and very sad trajectory of the Ukraine war? #Guest Yeah. I think that whenever it comes to Trump, there's always a kind of double bottom to his outbursts, let's put it like that. There's a superficial level, which is often very disturbing and, of course, very situational. And I've argued elsewhere, it's like a weathervane—it's whoever has spoken to him last. In this particular case at the United Nations, he spoke to President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. And also, if he's just been talking to Keith Kellogg on one side rather than Steve Witkoff on the other, and so on. So that's the first level. But there is also a deeper Trump. On the superficial level, it seems as if he's finally getting tough on Putin, getting tough on Russia, and actually going fully behind the Ukraine war position. The deeper side, of course, in this case, as in so many cases, is that it could be the exact opposite. The idea there is the Europeanization of this war—that even though, as you know, Trump has always said this is Biden's war, it was very much becoming Trump's war. And he didn't really want that to happen for various reasons. He'd prefer to fight other wars, like against Venezuela or perhaps in Palestine. So it was quite clear that, in a sense, the deeper level would be: "OK, you Europeans, you want to keep this war going." And it has to be seen in conjunction with his statement not so long ago, in which he said that all NATO states—not European Union, but NATO states—have to cut energy imports from Russia and impose 100% tariffs on China and India if they continue to take Russian energy and other oil energy supplies. So that's the deep Trump. It's basically to say, "OK, you Europeans, you want the war, you take it over. We'll pay, perhaps—so you buy our weapons and you pay for it. But you can use our weapons, -- 2 of 19 -- maybe some intelligence, ISR, surveillance stuff." So that's the argument. With Trump, the first level is always entirely inconsistent. The second level is, in a sense, there is this deep Trump, and it goes all the way back, by the way, to his first political comments back in the 1980s, when even then he was obsessed with tariffs, and he was very much anti-Japanese at that time—an ally. And, of course, then it shifted over to China in his first term. #Pascal There are these arguments out there. One argument, made most prominently by this other YouTuber, Brian Berletic, is that overall what we can be sure of is that we've got a continuity of agenda: the United States will continue to push for hegemonic policy, control over the planet more or less, and then they run into a brick wall every once in a while. What then happens is they just reload and try to go again, while they fake interest in genuinely rekindling their relationships. He most famously reminded us of the big reset button that Hillary Clinton was physically pushing together with Mr. Lavrov during her term as Secretary of State. And then there's the other school that says—and so this school says—that what we are seeing is just the latest version of that. Donald Trump and the Trump administration were never serious about this. The establishment is not serious about peace with Russia. We are just seeing a, you know, a reloading and getting ready again to strike another day, and also a division of labor—dumping the war on the Europeans. The other school says, no, Mr. Trump is actually serious, but he's maybe not able to deliver because he gets bogged down in many different ways, and he's just not able to deliver on the promise that, well, "I will finish the war within 24 hours"—that one, for sure. But it's a genuine interest, yet the deep state might be such, plus the Europeans and the Ukrainians might be set up in a way that it's just not possible. Where do you see the issue that apparently we are not getting out of this war? #Guest I think that to answer that, we need to look at the bigger picture, which I think Joachim Belich does, and which I've been trying to do in recent thinking and work on the subject. My basic argument today would be that, in the larger picture of things, we've had, since 1945, the United States pursuing what I nowadays call liberal globalism. John Mearsheimer and Walt Nutter argue that after 1989, it's called liberal hegemony. And of course, Ikenberry and so on call it the liberal international order, and so on. But let's call it simply liberal globalism. This was always a—how can I put it—a reserved but genuine commitment to the charter international system, to the United Nations, to multilateralism. But liberal globalism had two faces. It had this commonwealth face, which was delivering public goods. We're talking about the World Trade Organization, which later became that open trading system—the Rooseveltian agenda. But the second side was empire, which is what you just referred to: hegemony, dominance, and so on. And that was always there. The US Senate, of course, would never have ratified the UN treaty way back in '45, just as they didn't in 1919, if it was really going to infringe on US freedom of maneuver and, -- 3 of 19 -- indeed, clear dominance as it was in 1945. So we have liberal globalism on the one side— engagement, building alliances, and such like. And Trump, again, let's go back to this deep Trump. He hasn't emerged just out of nowhere. Of course, his style is unique, maverick, and indeed unrivaled—yeah, unrepeatable, probably. But what he's doing is reflecting another aspect of all this. And so the ambition today is no longer liberal globalism, but simply good old-fashioned imperial globalism. It's still globalist. So this is where the tension comes with his constituency—MAGA, Make America Great Again, and the America First constituency, the Restrainers within Washington, D.C. So he wavers internally, but the wavering is no longer, "OK, liberal globalism is over," but rather, "imperial globalism remains." What form will it take? Will it take the form of offshore balancing, as Mearsheimer and Walt have argued for many years? Or is it going to take the form of the neocon agenda? You may have seen just today, for example, Robert Kagan, the real master of neocon US interventionism, has written an article in The Atlantic arguing that those alleged—well, drone incursions into Poland, MiGs over the Baltic, well away from the Estonian coast—that this is now the make-or-break moment. NATO has to fight and it has to go effectively, or otherwise Russia will win. So you have the neocons saying this, and you have these Trump America Firsters. So that's, in a sense, the matrix in which we can examine these recent events. And I think it's important to do so. Otherwise, it simply doesn't make sense. And of course, so much in the world today does not make sense. Why do we need these wars? Why do we need this constant militarism, and so on? And indeed, why not put an end, as Trump tried to, to the Ukraine war? Yeah, but this is what we are trying to understand, right? #Pascal Because there's this one possibility, which is that the people in charge are simply liars, right? They just lie. I mean, they are actually fueled by the desire for domination and power. And they are more than happy to achieve that through millions of deaths, right? And they lie to our faces when they say that that's not what they're looking for. The other thing is that, you know, we might be structurally captured in a system that doesn't allow us to escape, at least with the current setup, the violence that the system produces. And in a sense, you know, John Mearsheimer's argument is a bit like that, right? The tragedy of great power politics. Once these great powers and superpowers get so powerful, they will try to create so much security for themselves that they necessarily encroach on the others, which then creates the backlash. That is also how he interprets the situation—the war in Ukraine, right? He doesn't approach it from the perspective of what Russia was allowed to do and what not. It's more like: what would Russia obviously do, because great powers just act like that. And for the United States, it was a reasonable approach to try to dominate Europe completely, but by doing so, you kick off the security dilemma, -- 4 of 19 -- and in the end, you destroy security for everybody. On that point, which side are you on? How do you see where we are, where the current s