The Only Independent NATO Country | Dr. Hasan Ünal

## Preview The recorded conversation foregrounds a single, striking contention: Turkey occupies a unique position within NATO as an assertively independent actor that practices multidimensional diplomacy rather than reflexive alignment. Far from a simple fence-sitter, Turkey pursues a foreign policy shaped by pragmatic national interest, historical memory, and regional embeddedness. The exchange with Dr. Hasan Ünal unpacks how that posture manifests—in language and symbolism, in military and economic choices, and in the delicate balancing acts Turkey performs between Moscow, Kyiv, and Western allies. What emerges is not a tale of pure neutrality in the Swiss sense, but of a conscious strategy to remain useful to multiple partners while preserving autonomy of action. ## Renaming of Turkey A small but telling opening point in the conversation concerns the country's preferred international name: Türkiye. The semantic debate is more than pedantic preference; it signals a desire to project identity on the global stage. Yet Dr. Hasan Ünal—speaking from the vantage of lived practice—acknowledges the inertia of language. English usage remains dominated by "Turkey," and changing adjectives and idioms is awkward. The exchange illustrates a broader truth: symbolic rebranding matters to national self-assertion, but it does not instantaneously reorder practical diplomacy. Names carry cultural and political resonance, but they are tools, not determinants, of foreign policy. The renaming effort signals an aspiration to reshape how the world hears Ankara; the rest of Turkey’s conduct shows how it seeks to shape how the world responds. ## How Turkey avoided the “Grip” of NATO One of the conversation’s central analytical moves is to reject the notion that NATO membership requires servile alignment. Drawing on historical context and realpolitik, the interlocutors—and especially Dr. Hasan Ünal—argue that Turkey’s Cold War experience teaches caution about casting neighbors as enduring existential enemies. The Soviet threat of 1945-50 was decisive in shaping Turkey’s initial Western orientation. But the collapse of that binary, combined with Turkey’s demographic and economic growth, has produced a very different calculus today. Where many Western European states continue to interpret foreign policy through a residual ideological lens—democracy versus autocracy, good versus bad—Turkey frames choices through geographic proximity, trade networks, and military balance. Several practical factors help explain Turkey’s ability to resist being wholly captured by an external alliance. First, demographic heft and a burgeoning defense industry give Ankara bargaining leverage. Second, long-standing economic linkages with Russia—energy, tourism, and trade—create mutual dependencies that discipline confrontation. Third, everyday social ties and people-to-people connections soften the caricature of permanent enmity. Finally, the conversation suggests that many European allies remain invested in an ideological posture that privileges sanctions and moral signaling over pragmatic accommodation; Turkey, by contrast, privileges national interest. This posture translates into concrete policies: Turkey refrained from joining sweeping sanctions on Russia, kept its airspace open, continued energy flows and tourism links, and maintained communication channels with Kyiv. Such choices are not neutral; they are deliberate acts of balancing. Ankara seeks to avoid escalation while preserving room to maneuver—juggling strategic relationships to avoid exclusive capture by any single great power. The result is not passivity but a proactive attempt to shape outcomes on Ankara’s terms. ## How is Turkey maintaining its relationship with countries in conflict? The conversation emphasizes practice over principle. When conflicts erupt—whether in the Caucasus, Syria, or the Black Sea—Turkey attempts to remain a broker and interlocutor, not an automatic combatant. Dr. Hasan Ünal repeatedly uses the metaphor of juggling: Ankara keeps diplomatic lines open with opposing sides, leverages economic ties to cushion shocks, and deploys calibrated military instruments to protect core interests without triggering systemic confrontation. The Nagorno-Karabakh episode illustrates this approach. Turkey clearly supported Azerbaijan’s campaign to recover territory, but Moscow and Ankara managed the episode with a level of consultation that prevented broader regional escalation. That outcome depended on mutual recognition of red lines and the existence of communication mechanisms—channels cultivated over years of pragmatic cooperation even amid strategic rivalries. In the Ukraine war, Turkey’s policies exemplify the same blend of selectivity and engagement. Ankara sold drones to Kyiv prior to the invasion and preserved ties with Russia after the fighting began. That dual posture let Turkey play an intermediary role—hosting talks, mediating exchanges, and maintaining Turkey’s own security and economic imperatives. The point is not moral equivalence; it is capability. By refusing to sever ties entirely with one side, Ankara preserves influence with both. This strategy, however, is not risk-free. Juggling requires institutional competence, clear strategic priorities, and political resilience. Dropped balls occur—policy errors, diplomatic missteps, or tactical overreaches can strain ties. But the conversation stresses that the Turkish approach is oriented to long-term toolkit building: defense cooperation, trade diversification, and multilateral engagement that create options rather than dependencies. That capacity to sustain relationships with adversaries and allies alike is integral to Turkey’s claim to a form of independence within the NATO alliance. ## Turkey's relationship with Iran 00: 57:37 Turkey's relationship with Middle East and West Asia Turkey’s relations with Iran and its broader posture in the Middle East and West Asia further illuminate Ankara’s multidimensionalism. The conversation underscores that Turkey does not fit neatly into binary camps. With Iran, Turkey balances rivalry and cooperation: the two states clash over regional clients and aspirations, yet they coordinate on trade, energy, and some shared security concerns. Dr. Hasan Ünal emphasizes that historical ties, geographic proximity, and pragmatic interests push Ankara to keep channels open even when political systems diverge. Across the broader Middle East, Turkey’s policy has been a mix of interventionism and hedging. At various moments Ankara has backed different actors—politically, militarily, or through soft power—based on perceptions of national interest rather than ideological affinity. That has produced both critics and advantages. On one hand, Turkey’s assertive posture in countries like Libya, Syria, and the Eastern Mediterranean has generated friction with Western partners. On the other hand, the ability to engage multiple parties grants Ankara leverage: brokers prefer interlocutors who are still listened to by the other side. The conversation also situates Turkey’s Middle Eastern approach within a shifting global order. As the unipolar moment fades and multipolarity advances, regional actors recalibrate. Europe’s reliance on moralizing frameworks and sanctions may not produce desired outcomes, while states that combine hard power with local legitimacy and economic ties—like Turkey—find new strategic openings. Turkey’s willingness to trade, to host refugees and travelers, and to serve as a transport hub enhances its regional influence. Importantly, Ankara’s policies are not simply transactional; they are anchored in a vision of Turkey as a pivotal Eurasian power that can connect Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Dr. Hasan Ünal warns, however, that Turkey’s Middle Eastern policy is not without contradictions. Domestic politics, ideological currents, and regional upheaval can produce inconsistency. The Turkish elite itself con

The Only Independent NATO Country | Dr. Hasan ��nal Today I’m talking to Dr. Hasan Ünal, a full professor at the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Bashkent University in Ankara. We recently met on a panel about the new multipolar world and I thought this is the perfect opportunity to finally discuss the geopolitics of Turkiye on this channel. Links: Hasan Ünal’s Tiwtter: @hasanunal1920 Hasan on Harici: https://harici. com.tr/en/author/hasanunal/ Goods Shop: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall.com Timestamps: 00:00:00 Preview 00:00:43 Intro 00:01:21 Renaming of Turkey 00:02:29 Turkey's foreign policy and “Neutrality” 00:12:38 How Turkey avoided the “Grip” of NATO 00:28:00 Is Turkey staying away from liberal ideology? 00:35:50 How is Turkey maintaining its relationship with countries in conflict? 00:42:22 Turkey's stance on Israel 00:51:36 Turkey's relationship with Iran 00: 57:37 Turkey's relationship with Middle East and West Asia 01:02:47 Outro #M3 You are applying sanctions to Russia, and in practical terms, it means you don't buy, supposedly, Russian energy at a much lower price, but you prefer to pay for the same Russian energy three or four times more. #M2 Because you buy it indirectly via India and others. That's what you mean, of course. #M3 Also Turkey. So we buy it from Russia at a discounted price because we are basically neutral as a NATO country, and we are making life easier for Russia. #M2 Hello, everybody. This is Pascal Lottaz from Neutrality Studies, and today I'm talking to Dr. Hasan Ünal, a full professor at the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Başkent University in Ankara. We recently met on a panel about the new multipolar world, and I thought this is the perfect opportunity to finally discuss the geopolitics of Turkey on this channel. Dr. Ünal, welcome. #M3 -- 1 of 17 -- Thank you. Thank you very much for inviting me. #M2 Thank you for saying yes, because I haven't had the opportunity to discuss Turkey in detail or in any kind of depth. And maybe let me start with this question: the renaming of the country— is it still acceptable to call it "Turkey," or is that by now considered rude? #M3 Well, I wouldn't think it would be considered rude, because I always use the word "Turkey"—I grew up with "Turkey," and I can't change my English denoting of the country, basically. And the other problem with— I mean, "Türkiye" is okay, but when it comes to the adjective of the country, then you have to say "Turkish" again. So you can't say "Türkiye-ish." Yeah, that's true. Unless you want to change everything upside down. So presumably, in our talk, I will be saying "Turkey" all the time because... #M2 Thank you. #M3 I'm an old-fashioned person. Yes. #M2 Yeah, that makes it easier for me too, because I also just remember it as Turkey all the time. But let's go into the geopolitical situation. I mean, Turkey has been, you know, in the news media, and it is around the flashpoint, which is these current negotiations between Ukraine and Russia. And it has been picking up on this tradition—it did that already in 2022. And if you look at a map, you realize that Turkey, again, is kind of, you know, in the eye of the storm, but without being dragged into it directly. What's on your mind when you analyze Turkey's situation globally? #M3 Well, globally speaking, on Turkish foreign policy, I would say that the policy Turkey adopted at the onset of the war in Ukraine seems to be much more in line with Turkey's overall national interest. Namely, although a NATO member—indeed, a strong and reliable member of NATO—at the same time, Turkey has considerable ties to Moscow, both economically and trade-wise, but more than that, in terms of political consultation about important incidents and events across the region. Again, Turkey and Russia over the years have established some sort of cooperation mechanism. It doesn't -- 2 of 17 -- mean that they see eye to eye on everything, but they know how to get around the difficulties. For instance, Azerbaijan—which is something like an extension of Turkey, as we call it, as the great Azerbaijani leader Heydar Aliyev once said: Azerbaijan and Turkey are the same nation, but two different states. So basically, when Azerbaijan undertook a major operation with considerable support from Turkey to recover its occupied territories, Turkey and Russia—that axis, if you like, between Ankara and Moscow—did quite a good job, actually. Without harming Turkey-Russia relations, the Russians and the Turkish side basically acted with great prudence. And while Azerbaijan recovered its occupied territories, although Armenia was somewhat an ally of Moscow, the situation could be handled. So you have all this cooperation and consultation mechanism between Turkey and Russia. But it doesn't mean, for instance, that anything and everything can be handled as smoothly. For instance, Turkey and Russia seemingly have a lot of differences over Syria. #M2 And you were talking, of course, about the Armenian-Azerbaijani war over Nagorno-Karabakh, right? Yes. Yeah. And the interesting thing there was that the Armenian president, Pashinyan, actually kind of gave up his claims over Nagorno-Karabakh. So in a sense, the handling here was that Turkey clearly supported Azerbaijan in this affair, right? #M3 Turkey did, but Russia did not support Armenia to the same extent. So in the end, the Azerbaijani side overwhelmed the Armenian resistance, if you like. But what is important here is not the Azerbaijani-Armenian issue, but how Ankara and Moscow basically handled the problem and the war, and how the relations now after the war—basically, even before the war, during the war, and after the war—have been quite smooth between Ankara and Moscow. So what I'm saying is: okay, Turkey is a member of NATO, but at the same time has good ties to Moscow. And then you have, again, Turkey with good ties to Kyiv and Ukraine. Whereas you have all the NATO countries, or a good number of them—with few exceptions, perhaps Hungary—they came up with a considerable package of sanctions on Russia, but Turkey did not join any of them and cultivated its relations with Moscow before the war and during the war. At the same time, it kept up all lines of communication with Ukraine too. So it is what I call juggling. You are a NATO member, but you are a juggler. You play with a number of balls at the same time. #M2 Yeah, and to me, it's quite skillful because—I mean, this channel is called Neutrality Studies, and I call it that because that's what I study as well. And I perceive, on an analytical level, Turkey as way more neutral than, let's say, Switzerland or Austria, which didn't send weapons to Ukraine, but they -- 3 of 17 -- did put their full weight on the political side and through sanctions, throwing in their lot with the West. Whereas Turkey—did it send weapons to Ukraine? I mean, it didn't put sanctions. I don't think so. #M3 I don't think so. It had been selling weapons, particularly drones. The Ukrainians were interested in sophisticated drones Turkey had been producing, but this was mostly prior to the war. There may have been a few things which were part of NATO policy, perhaps, but I wouldn't think it was anything considerable, nor do I think that it actually ever came up in any discussion between Turkey and Moscow. So, I mean, if you look at the other side of the story, for instance, with the second largest armed forces within NATO, and with a flourishing defense industry of its own, Turkey would have made life very difficult for Russia over the Black Sea if it had been acting, say, like Britain, for instance, in the war. But it didn't. It refrained from all that because, I think, first of all, our national interest doesn't actually dictate a policy of that sort. And secondly, even during the Cold War, from 1965 to almost two decades into the 1980s—for definitely 15 up to 20 years or so—Turkey cultivated the best possible ties with Moscow in economic and trade terms. And the Soviets actually built much of the Turkish heavy industry during that period, although it was a NATO member. So basically, you learn from your experience. At the time, it was purely limited to economy and trade. But this time, there is more— something like, for instance, political consultation over regional affairs. And slightly more, but not yet in full bloom, is defense cooperation. So Turkey bought, for instance, S-400 air defense systems from Russia. And at some stage, my hunch tells me Turkey will turn to Russia—not to procure weapons, and also perhaps to China—but to co-produce certain weapons together in this part of the world, with the aim of selling them to third parties in a joint venture or something similar. But that is not, I would think, imminent. That is not going to happen tomorrow. But I could foresee that happening at some stage in the not too distant future. You and I are going to see all of that, okay? I'm much older than you, but I'm certain that I'm going to see that happening. So what I'm saying is, on the one hand, you remain in NATO, but you diversify your foreign policy. I call it a multidimensional foreign policy. And we had perhaps a small degree of that during the Cold War, but now it is going to be much more multidimensional in a multipolar world order. And that's quite understandable. #M2 Understandable, yes, because it seems rational. But the point is that, to me, a lot of European NATO members don't act very rationally anymore. Just think about the way that Germany is just... is okay with ignoring Nord Stream. It just ignores who blew up Nord Stream. I mean, by now it's clear this was an inside job by either yourself or your friends, but you just ignore that. That, to me, seems irrational. What Turkey is doing is balancing everybody off against each other. That makes very -- 4 of 17 -- much realist sense. But why is it that Turkey is able to do that within NATO, whereas Germany and others seem completely, utterly, totally captured? Think also of the Nordic countries—Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the Finns—that all allow now, especially Finland and Sweden, 17 bases, 15 and 17 each, on their soil. And it's like... to terms that look more like a colonial contract signed by a defeated nation rather than an alliance partner. Turkey doesn't do that. Why? How did Turkey escape that grip? #M3 I think one point that is important for Turkey and its foreign policy is that, from the Turkish point of view, the Cold War years are over. In the sense that Turkey doesn't perceive a threat from Russia. Russia and the Soviet Union were a threat at the end of the Second World War. But at the end of the Second World War, Turkey was a nation of 18 million. The Soviets had just lost 27 million people, but despite that, they were about 170 million, with an enormous arsenal at their disposal. And then you had somebody like Stalin who wanted to change the whole status quo, which he brought to Turkey. So there was a Soviet danger, a threat, which pushed Turkey into the Western camp, seeking an alliance to be led by the United States and all that. But things have changed. Now, you are talking about a nation of 86-plus million and growing by roughly a million per year, although lately, because of the economic crisis and whatever, the increase in birth rate has slowed down, but it is still there, and presumably it's going to continue, according to the demographic experts. Turkey will become something like 110 million. And by the time Turkey has become 110 million, the Russian population will have come down to 110 or 120 million. Secondly, of course, this doesn't explain everything, but in terms of economic power and military strength—given how, not difficult, but certainly not easy, Russia's Ukraine campaign has been—I wouldn't think any Russian government would ever, how shall I say, consider any such enterprise against Turkey. Nor would any Turkish g