From the Ocean to the Sea, Hawaii will be Free | Dr. Keanu Sai

## Welcome and core claim The central claim that animates this conversation is straightforward and radical in equal measure: the Hawaiian Kingdom did not cease to exist when U.S. forces overthrew its government in 1893, and that continuity has legal consequences today. Framed as a law-first strategy rather than a call to arms, this approach treats Hawaii’s status through the lens of international law—occupation, state continuity, treaty obligations—and pursues remedies through courts and intergovernmental institutions. What emerges from the exchange is less a single courtroom gambit than a sustained campaign to shift the legal and political facts on which sovereignty rests: verify statehood, expose the occupation, and, ultimately, negotiate an exit from occupation through instruments of law and treaty. The significance of this orientation is twofold. First, it reframes the dispute away from purely political or social claims about history and identity into questions of legal status that have real consequences for jurisdiction, human rights, and administrative authority. Second, it exemplifies a contemporary form of lawfare—using litigation, arbitration, and exposure to compel compliance with international norms when military and political power have created facts on the ground. Throughout the conversation, Dr. Keanu Sai’s work is presented as operating on this legal axis: a methodical, phased strategy that leverages precedents, obligations, and the machinery of international adjudication to contest a long-standing occupation. ## Lawfare and US court strategy The legal strategy pursued is deliberately bifurcated: pursue international recognition and remedies while litigating domestically to force U.S. courts to confront the occupation question. At its core is the argument that U.S. domestic law simply lacks extraterritorial application over territory that remains, under international law, the territory of an occupied state. If the Hawaiian Kingdom continues to exist, then American civil statutes cannot be given effect there without triggering the law of occupation’s requirements, and potentially war crimes for unlawful imposition of law. This posture manifests in tactical interventions in U.S. federal litigation. The Hawaiian Kingdom has entered cases where plaintiffs seek to apply U.S. civil rights law to institutions operating on Hawaiian soil—most recently in a lawsuit involving Kamehameha Schools. By intervening, the Kingdom flags a threshold issue: before American courts can adjudicate or enforce domestic statutes against entities operating in Hawaii, they must first determine whether the territorial and legal preconditions for such jurisdiction are met. The tactic aims to force federal courts to engage directly with the occupation claim, thereby elevating the question from political rhetoric to juridical determination. Two dynamics make this approach potent. One is procedural: U.S. courts are bound to grapple with jurisdictional and sovereign-immunity questions when properly presented, which creates opportunities for legal findings on status even if the ultimate outcome of a case is unfavorable. The other is normative: repeated contestation in court forces public institutions—law professors, government lawyers, judges—to reckon with the legal architecture underpinning the occupation claim, thereby eroding the space for complacent assumptions that domestic law can be applied uncritically. ## Hague arbitration and state continuity The Permanent Court of Arbitration episode supplies the campaign with a pivotal evidentiary and diplomatic moment. The tribunal’s secretariat concluded there was no evidence that the Hawaiian Kingdom had ceased to exist, and the court accepted that a non-contracting state could invoke arbitration under Article 47 of the 1907 Hague Convention. Those findings did not resolve every question, but they offered a form of intergovernmental validation: an international adjudicatory body treated the Kingdom as a state for the purposes of access and standing. More consequentially, the exchange with the U.S. embassy produced what the Kingdom regards as an executive agreement—an exchange of notes recognizing the Hawaiian Kingdom and its Council of Regency as the relevant government for the purpose of participating in arbitration. Even though the United States declined to be a party to the arbitration substantively, allowing access to records and entering into that diplomatic exchange created an instrument that the Kingdom reads as a treaty-like acknowledgment. The existence of opinio juris—no state protested the Court’s handling of the matter—adds a customary-law dimension: states’ silence in the face of the court’s actions can be read as acquiescence to the legal reasoning underpinning continuance of statehood. Taken together, the Hague episode fulfilled the first phase of the Kingdom’s plan: verification. It shifted the debate from one of historical grievance to a legally recognized posture of continuity. That shift matters because under the law of occupation sovereignty remains with the state even when its government is displaced; occupancy imposes duties on the occupying power, including the obligation to administer the existing laws of the occupied territory. ## US overreach and extraterritorial law A persistent theme is the critique of U.S. legal overreach—domestic laws being applied extraterritorially in ways that contravene established principles of international law. The conversation points to contemporary examples beyond Hawaii: efforts to apply domestic criminal or civil statutes to foreign actors or territories (cited in passing with reference to other geopolitical disputes). This is striking not because extraterritorial assertions are novel, but because they are presented here as part of a broader pattern of disregarding occupation norms and the territorial limits of domestic law. For the Hawaiian Kingdom’s strategy, this pattern offers both a danger and an opportunity. The danger lies in an expansive U.S. jurisprudence that routinely asserts domestic reach; if courts accept that domestic rights and obligations extend beyond treaty and international-law constraints, the Kingdom’s claims could be marginalized. The opportunity, however, arises when those assertions are challenged: each time a U.S. court is confronted with the issue, there is a chance to articulate and reinforce the principle that domestic law cannot displace the law of occupation. In other words, the Kingdom’s lawfare approach is not merely reactive; it seeks to create doctrinal constraints within U.S. law that will ultimately check executive overreach. This also reframes “lawfare” away from opportunistic litigation aimed at tactical wins toward a jurisprudential project aimed at clarifying legal boundaries. The aim is to make the extraterritorial application of domestic law legally costly or infeasible when applied to an occupied state—thereby nudging political actors toward compliance with occupation rules or negotiated settlements. ## Three phase plan and exposure strategy The campaign is explicitly staged into three phases: verification, exposure, and treaty resolution. Verification—establishing the Hawaiian Kingdom’s legal persistence—was the immediate priority and the domain where The Hague intervention played its strongest role. Exposure follows: a deliberate effort to make visible the legal facts of occupation through education, litigation, public diplomacy, and documentation. Exposure is not merely about public opinion; it seeks to generate legal responsibility by establishing mens rea—the knowledge element necessary for certain war crimes—so that officials and institutions acting in full awareness of the occupation may be identified as complicit in its legal violations. Phase two’s activities are designed to create a ripple effect. As the legal status of the Kingdom gains traction in domestic and international fora, compliance

From the Ocean to the Sea, Hawaii will be Free | Dr. Keanu Sai After over 125 years of occupation, Hawaii is fighting a battle to free itself from the colonial occupiers. This is where Hawaii's struggle for sovereignty stands in 2026. I’m joined by Dr. Keanu Sai, senior lecturer in political science and Hawaiian studies at the University of Hawaii and chairman of the Hawaiian Kingdom. Together we track his law-first campaign, the Permanent Court of Arbitration episode, and the Kamehameha Schools lawsuit that he says forces US courts to face the occupation question. Links: Hawaiian Kingdom blog: https://hawaiiankingdom.org/blog Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com (Opt in for Academic Section from your profile settings: https://pascallottaz.substack.com/s/academic) Merch & Donations: https://neutralitystudies- shop.fourthwall.com Timestamps: 00:00:00 Welcome and core claim 00:00:51 Lawfare and US court strategy 00:01:55 Hague arbitration and state continuity 00:14:48 US overreach and extraterritorial law 00:18:12 Three phase plan and exposure strategy 00:22:29 Kamehameha Schools lawsuit intervention 00:41:17 Pushback risks and public leverage 00:47:00 Following updates and resources #Pascal Hello, everybody, and welcome back to Neutrality Studies. My name is Pascal Lottaz. I'm an associate professor at Kyoto University, and today I'm joined once more by Dr. Keanu Tsai, a senior lecturer in political science and Hawaiian studies at the University of Hawaii, and the chairman of the Hawaiian Kingdom. Keanu, welcome to the show. #Keanu Sai Thank you, Pascal, for inviting me again. I appreciate it. #Pascal Very glad to have you back. You’re one of the few voices working hard through various legal and publicity projects to raise awareness about the situation in Hawaii, which you say has been under occupation for 130 years. But your argument is that the Hawaiian Kingdom actually never ceased to exist. Before we get into the updates on what’s been happening, can you give us, in a nutshell, what you’ve been working on and how your project is going? #Keanu Sai Well, you might say I'm a firm believer in lawfare, not warfare. We've been engaged in a federal case in the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii. There's a lawsuit where a plaintiff -- 1 of 13 -- claims that a particular school established in the 19th century, called Kamehameha Schools, is subject to U.S. civil rights law. We intervened and made the point that American law—whether civil rights law or otherwise—has no application outside U.S. territory, because the Hawaiian Kingdom is an occupied state. #Pascal Right. The central claim of yours is that the Hawaiian Kingdom is currently, or should be, under the law of occupation, right? And not under local law. You actually had an important case in the past, right? You didn’t win, but you managed to bring it before an international court. Can you maybe just recount that instance? #Keanu Sai Sure. So, very quickly, just to precede what took place at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, or Den Haag, Netherlands: the Hawaiian Kingdom in the 19th century was an independent state. It had existed as an independent state since 1843. Prior to that, since 1794, the Hawaiian Kingdom was a British protectorate. Now, in 1893—on January 16th—U.S. Marines invaded Honolulu and illegally overthrew the government of the Hawaiian Kingdom, the following day, on January 17th. Under the law of occupation, or rather under international humanitarian law—the law of armed conflict—when you overthrow a government, sovereignty is not transferred to the occupier; it remains with the state itself, despite the government being militarily overthrown. What happens is, according to the 1907 Hague Regulations—which were recognized as customary international law even before 1907 and 1899—Article 42 in particular says that territory is considered occupied when it is under the effective control of the occupier, right? On January 17, 1893, Queen Liliʻuokalani, the head of state of the Hawaiian Kingdom, conditionally surrendered to the United States and called for an investigation into the U.S. invasion, which was unwarranted. The overthrow of the government through that surrender effectively transferred control to the U.S. military, which triggered Article 42—occupation, or effective control of territory. Then, under Article 43, the occupier is supposed to administer the laws of the occupied state. The United States didn’t do that. The U.S. did complete an investigation, found that the queen was correct, and entered into an executive agreement to restore her—but they didn’t follow through. And five years later, in 1898, the United States Congress passed a law purporting to have annexed a foreign country. Since 1898, American laws have been imposed illegally in the Hawaiian Kingdom, in violation of the law of occupation, right? Now, this federal lawsuit—excuse me, let me back up. The Permanent Court of Arbitration case stemmed from the unlawful imposition of American laws. Lance Paul Larson, a Hawaiian subject, was alleging that the Hawaiian Kingdom, through its Council of Regency, which restored the government in 1997, was liable for allowing American laws to be -- 2 of 13 -- imposed, which led to his incarceration. So that became a humanitarian matter. He suffered an unfair criminal trial and then unlawful confinement. Those are two war crimes under the Geneva Conventions. Now, when we entered into that agreement with him to go to binding arbitration, we knew—and I was the agent for the Hawaiian Kingdom as well as the chairman of the Council of Regency—that the Permanent Court of Arbitration would be tasked with determining whether or not the Hawaiian Kingdom is a state, an existing state. Not a nation with self-determination to choose to become a state, but rather a state in continuity since the 19th century, despite the government being overthrown in 1892. So I was in communication with their legal counsel at the Permanent Court, and she was asking for additional information beyond what she had already researched, because she had to determine whether or not the Hawaiian Kingdom was continuing to exist as a state, and whether the Hawaiian Kingdom would then be a contracting or non-contracting state to have access to the Permanent Court. So all contracting states have access. But Article 47 of the 1907 Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes provides access to non-contracting states. So I'll give you an example: currently, there are 127 contracting states, but there are 193 members of the United Nations. #Keanu Sai That means you have a large number of states that are members of the United Nations but are non- contracting states. Again, they would have access. For the Hawaiian Kingdom, we're not a member of the United Nations, but rather a non-member of the United Nations—yet a state nevertheless. And she confirmed: they determined that the Hawaiian Kingdom existed as a state. #Pascal Hey, very brief intermission because I was recently banned from YouTube. And although I'm back, this could happen again at any time. So please consider subscribing not only here but also to my mailing list on Substack—that’s pascallottaz.substack.com. The link’s in the description below. And now, back to the video. Right, because of course the occupation of Hawaii started before the Permanent Court of Justice was founded, so naturally it couldn’t be a member. But what was established in front of the Permanent Court of Justice is that the Court recognized the statehood— and the continuous statehood—of the Kingdom of Hawaii, right? And that was confirmed at that hearing, because they said you had, in fact, standing in front of the Court, right? #Keanu Sai Yes, that was confirmed. And that prompted Jaco van den Hout, the Secretary-General of the Permanent Court at that time—he was a Dutch national. He spoke to me on the phone and stated -- 3 of 13 -- that the secretariat had concluded they could find no evidence that the Hawaiian Kingdom ceased to exist as a state, and that the Hawaiian-Dutch Treaty had not been terminated. I believe that treaty was from 1863, a treaty of most-favored-nation status. He then recommended to me, as the head of the government, to provide a formal invitation to the United States to join in the arbitration—to answer for the unlawful imposition of American law within Hawaiian territory that led to the claimant’ s unfair trial and incarceration, Mr. Larson. So that request prompted an exchange of notes between the Hawaiian Kingdom government and the United States to reach an executive agreement. The first note I delivered was after a meeting I had with counsel for Lance Larson in Washington, D.C., during a conference call with Mr. John Crook from the U.S. State Department—he’s a legal advisor. I remember in our conversation he said, “And the Permanent Court accepted this case,” because he knew what that meant—that they had verified the Hawaiian Kingdom was a state, not the 50th state of the United States. So what we have there is, I provided the formal invitation to the United States, and I put that conversation into writing—that became the note, or the offering instrument. I sent that to Mr. Crook, and I also sent a copy to the Permanent Court for the record, showing that the United States had been given an invitation. A few weeks later, I received a call from the Deputy Secretary-General, Phyllis Hamilton—she’s an American—and she said that the American embassy, the ambassador, had notified the Court that they had an answer. They respectfully declined to join in the arbitration, but they asked permission from the Hawaiian government to have access to all records and pleadings. And I consented to that. What we have there is an executive agreement. Now, this executive agreement is important because it’s a treaty under international law by exchange of notes. So, coincident with granting permission to the United States to access all records was the United States’ recognition of the Hawaiian Kingdom and its Council of Regency as its government. That was important right there. It wasn’t just that the Permanent Court had verified the Hawaiian Kingdom still exists under customary international law, but now we have a treaty. That treaty has come to be known as the Sai–Clinton Treaty—between myself, because I was in direct communication with the embassy, and the Permanent Court, which was brokering that agreement. And that embassy was representing President Clinton, who was the president at that time. So that was significant. That was significant. Now, what’s also significant is that the Permanent Court—this is all before the proceedings were instituted, because the tribunal wasn’t established until June of 2000, and this was March of 2000. What’s important is that not only did the United States recognize the Hawaiian Kingdom’s continued existence and the Council of Regency as a government by treaty, but also by *opinio juris*—an opinion of law or practice. So, all 127 countries today—but back then, I think it was fewer; I’m not sure how many, maybe around eighty-something contracting states—but no state, including the United States, protested or objected to the Permanent Court’s designation and finding that the Hawaiian Kingdom tribunal was established pursuant to Article 47 for non‑contracting states. That became an acceptance of the practice. -- 4 of 13 -- Now, the legal reasoning behind their not protesting or objecting—which is part of *opinio juris*—is that you have the “what,” which is the action, and the “why,” meaning there’s some legal requirement. Under international law, there is a presumption of continuity of a state despite its government being overthrown, and the internal laws of any state have no extraterritorial effect. So there was nothing the United States could protest against, because under internationa