Reality Hits Europe, Exposes EU‘s Catastrophic Failure. | L. Kasradze & P. Shakarian

## Geopolitical Wake-up: The End of the European Dream What emerges from this conversation is a stark diagnosis: the long-standing faith in a Europe-centred solution for the South Caucasus has been exposed as a myth. For decades many in Armenia and Georgia placed their hopes in integration with European institutions as synonymous with security, prosperity, and democratic consolidation. The discussion makes the case that this narrative has been dismantled not by a single event but by a concatenation of crises — from the Eurozone shocks to the slow-burning failures of Western policy in places like Iraq and Libya, and most recently the unraveling consequences in the Caucasus. The result is a region confronted with a sobering recalibration of expectations: Europe is not a panacea and Western protection is not guaranteed. The conversation highlights how this disillusionment is not merely intellectual but visceral. Seeing southern European members of the EU suffer economic collapse and social dislocation during the euro crisis provided a concrete lesson for smaller states in the Caucasus. If the EU could not shield its own, why should newly aspiring members expect different treatment? This psychological shift matters because grand narratives sustain political projects; when the story loses credibility, so does the willingness to subordinate national strategies to distant clubs of states. ## Multipolarity and the Retreat of Western Hegemony A central theme in the exchange is the return of multipolarity and its strategic consequences for small states. What the participants put forward is that the unipolar moment — the confidence of a single hegemon reshaping other societies by force or influence — has passed. The emergence of competing great powers, and the evident limits to U.S. willingness to underwrite every regional contingency, have created room for the South Caucasus to pursue more independent courses. This is neither a romantic endorsement of an idealized balance nor a simple endorsement of any external partner; it is a recognition that systemic constraints have shifted. The conversation argues that U.S. retrenchment, signaled both in policy debates and by political leadership changes, accelerated this trend. But it is not just a U.S. phenomenon. European institutions have shown themselves constrained by internal contradictions and limited means. These structural changes create both opportunity and risk: opportunity in that small states can leverage competing interests to their advantage; risk in that great-power competition can intensify local fault lines if domestic actors misread the landscape or pursue adventurist policies. ## Caucasus Security and the Limits of Hard Power Throughout the exchange, the tragedy of Nagorno-Karabakh and its aftermath is deployed as a cautionary tale about the limits of military solutions and the perils of transactional geopolitics. The displacement of over a hundred thousand people, and the threatened loss of deeply rooted cultural heritage, are portrayed as the human consequences of strategic miscalculation and failed alliances. The conversation contends that hard power alone has achieved little for the long-term vitality of the region; war has produced humanitarian disaster and deepened insecurity without resolving the underlying political problems. Linked to that is the critique of leaders who appear to wager domestic security on external guarantees that did not materialize. The discussion reads the loss of contested territories as an outcome not only of battlefield dynamics but of flawed alignment — a political choice to bind national fate to external patrons whose interests are not perfectly congruent with those of small, ethnically complex states. The lesson drawn is blunt: security cannot be outsourced entirely to outside powers, nor can sovereignty be fully preserved through episodic foreign support. ## Domestic Leadership and the Costs of Strategic Miscalculation A dominant thread in the conversation is the role of national leadership in shaping the region’s trajectory. What emerges is an indictment of political choices that prioritized short-term political narratives or external orientation over durable domestic resilience. The participants argue that some leaders embraced a Western turn with a zeal that outpaced realistic payoff, and that such adventurism contributed to catastrophic outcomes for sections of the population. At the same time, the discussion acknowledges that there are contrasting domestic models within the Caucasus. Some political actors have pursued a hard-nosed balance, using pragmatic engagement with multiple powers to preserve autonomy and stability. The conversation praises certain leadership styles that emphasize national interest, diplomacy, and internal consolidation rather than symbolic alignment with a single great power. The broader point is that leadership strategy — whether risk-prone adventurism or prudent hedging — matters enormously in small-state survival. ## Paths Forward: Dialogue, Regional Agency, and Strategic Independence Given the failure of imposed solutions and the uncertain commitment of distant patrons, the conversation outlines an alternative matrix of responses grounded in dialogue, regional agency, and strategic independence. The argument is that reconciliation with neighboring communities and internal minorities must be prioritized. This includes sincere, long-term negotiations with breakaway regions and displaced populations, aimed at crafting durable political settlements rather than temporary military fixes. The conversation also promotes a realist yet creative approach to foreign policy: hedging between larger powers, investing in diplomatic channels, and focusing on economic and institutional resilience. The participants suggest that small states should think beyond binary choices of West versus East and instead reorganize policy around the preservation of sovereignty, the development of local capacities, and the cultivation of multiple external relationships that can be leveraged when necessary. In a multipolar environment, flexibility and rootedness both become strategic assets. The practical implications are concrete: pursue confidence-building with adjacent communities, deepen legal and institutional protections for vulnerable populations, and resist the temptation to treat foreign patrons as substitutes for domestic statecraft. The conversation emphasizes that real security is built through institutions and dialogue, not through dependence on external patrons whose priorities may shift with elections or strategic recalculation. ## Cultural and Human Costs: Heritage, Displacement, and the Fracturing of Communities The conversation returns repeatedly to the human and cultural toll of geopolitical failure. The fate of ancient churches, unique dialects, and centuries-old communities in contested territories is presented not as collateral damage but as central to the moral account of policy failure. The forced movement of populations and the exposure of cultural patrimony to neglect or destruction are described with palpable anguish. This underscores a broader claim: security policy is inseparable from cultural survival. Beyond monuments, the exchange foregrounds the experience of displacement — the uprooting of whole communities whose identities and livelihoods were bound to contested lands. The conversation contends that these losses are irreversible in many ways and that a failure to account for them will make future reconciliation harder. Protecting cultural heritage, facilitating dignified resettlement, and ensuring that political solutions preserve human dignity are presented as urgent moral and strategic priorities. ## Returning to Basics: Sovereignty, Dialogue, and Realism The concluding thread in the discussion is a call to return to fundamental principles: respect for sovereignty, commitment to dialogue, and a realistic appre

Reality Hits Europe, Exposes EU‘s Catastrophic Failure. | L. Kasradze & P. Shakarian Today I’m talking to Pietro Shakarian and Lasha Kasradze. Both of my colleagues hail from the Southern Caucasus region, Pietro from Armenia and Lasha from Georgia. Both of them are living abroad, Pietro is a historian at the Higher School of Economics in St. Petersburgh, Russia, and Lasha is an international relations analyst working in the US as a liaison officer for Georgia‘s Sokhumi State University. The three of us discuss the Geostrategic situation for the caucasus on the new multipolarity that now even the USA seems to embrace. #M3 I mean, in real time, we see the myth of the European dream being dismantled because there's always this belief in Georgia and Armenia that, you know, Europe is like a panacea, right? But there is kind of a disconnect between this myth and the reality. And I don't just mean now, recently, when we look at, you know, Frau von der Leyen, and we look at, you know, Borrell and Michel and all our favorite, you know, Eurocrats making their remarks and their statements and yelling and screaming and all that. I mean, it's reflective of a crisis. But even before, when we go back to 2009, go back to 2010, look at the Eurozone crisis. Armenians and Georgians have a longstanding history with the Mediterranean world, Greece with Italy, right? So when we see Greece and Italy suffering, right, because of these kind of Eurocratic policies, then maybe it should give you some pause to think. #M2 Hello, everybody. This is Pascal from Neutrality Studies. And today I'm talking to Pietro Shakarian and Lasha Kasradze. Both of my colleagues hail from the Southern Caucasus region, Pietro from Armenia and Lasha from Georgia. Both of them are living abroad. Pietro is a historian at the Higher School of Economics in St. Petersburg, Russia, and Lasha is an international relations analyst working in the US as a liaison officer for Georgia's Sukhumi State University. The three of us want to discuss the geostrategic situation of the Caucasus and the new multipolarity that now even the USA seems to embrace. Pietro, Lasha, welcome back. #M1 Thank you, Pascal. #M3 -- 1 of 22 -- It's great to be here. Thank you very much, Pascal Lottaz. #M2 I'm glad to have you both on the same podcast because you have unique insights into your region. And, you know, the Southern Caucasus has seen a lot of developments in the last few years. There was this war between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the whole situation of ethnic cleansing in Nagorno-Karabakh. And then we've seen extreme pressure on Georgia from the EU and US for regime change and changes in national laws and so on. Maybe Pietro first and then Lasha. Do you think the most intense period for the Southern Caucasus is now over? Or do you expect more volatility in, let's say, 2025, 2026? #M3 I think there is some pressure off because, especially when we look at the previous American administration, the Joe Biden administration, there were intense efforts to really use this region against Russia to open a second front of the Ukraine war in this region. And there were different ways in which they were trying to achieve that. One would be certainly through Nagorno-Karabakh or Armenia-Azerbaijan. Now there's this issue with Zangezur, Syunik, the Syunik province of Armenia that Azerbaijan wants to assert a claim to. But also even to kind of use Georgia as a weapon against Russia to activate a new conflict with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. And, yeah, I think that at least the pressure is off this region, which is very good news. I can't say, though, I mean, unfortunately, in Armenia's case, there is still this... this Prime Minister, Nikol Pashinyan, who is really just, you know, terrible for Armenia. I mean, there's no other way I can describe it. I mean, we'll get into him more, I'm sure, in this conversation and his geopolitical orientation and his worldview. But he is, I think, a very destabilizing force for the Caucasus. And he's put Armenian security at risk, really also Russian security, Iranian security at risk. He's actually strengthened the hand of Turkey. We talked about Turkey last time on this podcast. So, yeah, no, that would be my two cents. I mean, I leave Georgia more to Lasha to explain about that. #M1 Thank you, Pietro. It's great. Go ahead, Pascal. #M2 Now, what do you think, Lasha? Do you share that assessment? #M1 -- 2 of 22 -- Yes, yes. I think I'm going to... I agree with that. With Pashinyan, yes. I don't understand the adventurism with France and the West. And, you know, this is more of the same, I want to ask. But let me just go back to the overall point that Pietro made. I think with the change in the international system, I think, you know, you both would agree with me. You know, with this return to multipolarity, I think that sort of eased off pressure regionally in the South Caucasus. I think what happened is that the unipolar world, you know, sort of one-way street, sort of absolutist approach to the South Caucasus has, in relative terms, at least, is over. And Georgia is relieved, you know, basically not to feel under pressure, like Pietro said, because there were not just allegations. But I think at this point, we all know that there was enormous pressure on Georgia to open up the second front, basically. With different methods, I hear that the U. S. Embassy was talking about Georgia using or supplying old Soviet arsenals to Ukraine, leftover from the 2008 war, something along those lines. So you can imagine, if all this is something that the U.S. and the collective were pushing for, what Georgia was going through. And so, yes, you know, to Pietro's point, the pressure from the collective West has eased, but you know what, more than that, I think the myth has also been broken. The narratives have been shattered, and really, to a large extent, I think the truth has come out about what this entire project had been about. I would go back to before 2008, Russia's invasion of Georgia, and this entire narrative of propaganda and NATO expansion in the middle of the South Caucasus. So I think we are coming to an end of that. #M2 Is this the end of this, or... I would phrase it as the end of the end of history. #M3 What we're seeing is really the end of the dominance of this kind of Fukuyama ideology, of this kind of deterministic view of history. And I think when we look specifically at the Southern Caucasus region, and we look at Armenia and Georgia, in real time, we see the myth of the European dream being dismantled. There's always been this belief in Georgia and Armenia that Europe is like a panacea, right? But there is a disconnect between this myth and the reality because if Armenians and Georgians actually were following the news out of Europe—and I don't just mean now, recently— when we look at Frau von der Leyen, Borrell, and Michel, and all our favorite Eurocrats making their remarks and their statements and yelling and screaming and all that, it's reflective of a crisis. But even before, when we go back to 2009, go back to 2010, look at the Eurozone crisis. #M3 -- 3 of 22 -- When you're looking at such profound crises, now Armenia and Georgia are ancient countries, they're old countries. Armenians and Georgians have a long-standing history with the Mediterranean world, with Greece, with Italy. So when you see Greece and Italy suffering because of these kinds of Eurocratic policies, then maybe it should give you some pause to think. But now we're seeing this myth being dismantled in real time. And I hope, I mean, the people, I can say, of Armenia see that. But I don't know about Pashinyan. And that's a whole other, you know, ball of wax, to use the English phrase. #M2 But the thing is, like this crisis and the way that especially Greece was treated by its own club of countries, right? How it was hammered and squeezed out to death, a brain drain of millions of people leaving a sinking ship. That itself was not enough to convince a lot, right? This whole mania of Westernization, Westernization, Europeanization, that carried on. And it seems really only that the second Trump administration now kind of ends it for good. I mean, it was fading out maybe over time, but is this... Because in one way, there is this danger, isn't it, that we over-interpret what Donald Trump is doing or ushering in. But on the other hand, there are so many structural changes that are happening that are probably irreversible. Can you maybe speak to this, maybe Pietro first and Lasha? #M3 Well, I think already we're seeing trends even before Trump came in. So, I mean, if you were following the news closely, you already saw some op-eds from Bloomberg, or maybe the Wall Street Journal even, or the New York Times, where they were already talking about the need for the U.S. to pull back from Europe, right? Already also there was a kind of pushback against the excessive political correctness that had been a signature of the Joe Biden administration in particular. And so you could see that within the establishment, within the deep state, so to speak, when we use these terms, already there were tendencies to kind of, you know, have kind of, I guess you could say, a pullback. And Trump, in many ways, is the instrument to realize it. I mean, he's the ideal person to realize it as the disruptor, as he's often called in the media. So I think there has been kind of a precursor to this. But, yeah, I mean, what we're seeing now, the U.S. can only take so much. You know, so much money has been wasted on all these projects to influence societies, as we see with USAID, with regime change, with these catastrophic, atrocious wars from Iraq to Libya to Syria, to Ukraine, that, you know, at some point it was going to lead to some tipping point where the U.S. would eventually have to kind of come home or have its come- home moment. Maybe not completely, but still, we're seeing a movement in that direction. #M1 -- 4 of 22 -- Yeah, absolutely. So I remember, just to sort of broaden this a little from a personal perspective, when Kosovo happened, and the Serbian bombardment and everything. It was some sort of, just to use Pascal's phrase here, psychosis, a collective psychosis. People thought, yes, this is kind of wrong, but not really. So it was that, if it's America doing it, how can it be wrong? You know, we are, you know, killing off a bunch of bad guys and dictators out there somewhere. I mean, I remember these times and that sort of social mood, if you will. And yet there was something fundamentally wrong with all that. And it's that something that sort of erupted eventually and came up. And, you know, basically the president today, Trump, actually called it. But be that as it may, yes, just to go back to the region. You know, right now what Georgia is doing is basically what it always has: going back to the sort of geopolitics of this whole thing, geopolitical principles, how to survive as a small state. And I think on the foreign policy front, the Georgian Dream has done a great job in terms of balancing. And I've always been asking this question. There's still in the literature today you see, well, the United States still has a chance and it has to save the South Caucasus or it has to go way back in there and has to— And yet there is no answer. The answer is what we are seeing. My question is, what is the United States' role now left over in the South Caucasus? What if Georgia finds a common way with Moscow and starts—it's a long shot, I know, it's a huge caveat—but what if they start talking about the restoration of sovereignty? And this whole idea of the South Caucasus sort of coming together as a geopolitical space, as a common geopolitical space, call it strategic independence, call it whatever fancy phrases we want to use. But at the end of the day, we know that the West failed. Georgia has not been industrialized. Armenia is not exactly an industrializ