EU Parliament Member EXPOSES Craziness Of EU Elites | M. Schulenburg & J. Sachs

## A Continent at Risk: elites, panic and the politics of self‑destruction What emerges from the conversation is a stark diagnosis: European governance is beset by a combination of panic-driven rhetoric, institutional capture by hawkish narratives, and an elite project aimed at turning the EU into a great power through enlargement and militarization. Rather than a sober debate about strategy, what the discussion describes is a politics dominated by existential framing—“we must stand together or lose”—that muffles dissent, sidelines long-range planning, and treats foreign policy as a theatre of symbolic commitment rather than practical problem‑solving. The result is not merely bad policy; it is a trajectory that risks strategic isolation, economic harm, and a deeper security crisis for the continent. ## The atmosphere inside EU institutions: Russia‑hatred, hysteria and the crowding out of alternatives The conversation paints European institutions as permeated by what participants call “war hysteria.” Parliamentary exchanges and public ceremonies, the discussion says, are saturated with triumphalist predictions about a collapsing Russia and with an almost ritualized denunciation of any alternative view. In that environment, voices that advocate restraint, negotiation, or a policy of balance are shouted down or ignored. That pattern has an obvious effect: if debate is stifled, policy becomes echo chamber‑driven. Decisions shift from deliberative to performative; policy aims more to signal loyalty to a bloc than to produce outcomes that secure European interests. The problem is structural as much as cultural. The conversation notes that both left and right in the European Parliament have converged on similar positions regarding the war in Ukraine. When political incentives reward visible toughness and internal cohesion over nuanced diplomacy, elected officials—facing declining approval ratings at home—may double down on confrontation as a badge of credibility. But this strategy, the discussion warns, conflates short‑term signaling with long‑term security, and it ignores how domestic politics and external strategy are in fact mutually constraining. ## Historical context and missed opportunities: enlargement, assurances and the spiral to conflict A powerful thread in the exchange reconstructs a more than three‑decade arc: the end of the Cold War opened a chance to build a wider Europe that would include Russia in cooperative security arrangements. The conversation suggests that various diplomatic opportunities to avoid escalation—constraints on NATO enlargement, fuller implementation of Minsk II, or an earlier neutral status for Ukraine—were not pursued with sufficient seriousness by Western actors. According to this account, policy choices over many years amounted to a slow drift toward confrontation: promises and understandings were eroded, transactional pressures favored expansion, and the cumulative effect was to provoke a security dilemma rather than to defuse one. That historical judgement is sobering because it reframes current conflicts not as sudden aberrations but as the result of a long sequence of missed diplomacy and reinforcement of adversarial postures. If true, this interpretation implies that strategic correction requires more than tactical changes in armaments or incremental sanctions; it suggests the need to revive frameworks of indivisible security and to rebuild trust through verifiable, multilateral agreements. ## The elite vision: making the EU a great power through enlargement and majoritarian decision‑making Another major theme in the conversation is the aspiration among parts of the European elite to transform the EU into a full‑fledged global power. The discussion describes a push to accelerate enlargement—toward Ukraine, Moldova, parts of the Western Balkans and beyond—paired with institutional reforms to shift decision‑making from unanimity to qualified majority voting. Within this project, criteria such as democratic governance and rule‑of‑law norms are, the conversation claims, being downplayed or reinterpreted in service of rapid geopolitical expansion. This agenda is animated by a belief that only a larger EU can stand as a pole in a multipolar world against the United States, China, and Russia. Yet the conversation warns of the paradox: enlargement aimed at geopolitical balance can hollow out the EU’s internal cohesion, strain its absorptive capacity, and produce a bloc that is large but brittle. Indeed, incorporating heavily contested territories or fragile states into a union of already disparate economies and political cultures could fuel internal fragmentation rather than creating a stable counterweight. In short, expansion without clear strategic humility or realistic institutional planning risks creating the very weakness it seeks to remedy. ## Militarization, propaganda and the marginalization of alternative pathways The exchange is blunt about the politics of militarization. The conversation describes the surge in military spending and the normalization of ultra‑hawkish rhetoric as feeding a self‑reinforcing cycle: more talk of existential threats legitimizes larger defense budgets, which in turn empowers constituencies invested in perpetuating conflict dynamics. The “armed class” or military‑industrial constituencies—together with ideological networks that have constructed Russia as an implacable foe—shape policy debates and narrow the range of acceptable options. A related concern is the role of information and narrative control. The conversation highlights how war propaganda and performative displays of unity have crowded out pragmatic discussions on ceasefires, neutral status arrangements, or phased de‑escalation. That crowding out is both normative and procedural: dissenting parliamentarians are silenced, expert voices outside the mainstream are dismissed, and the media ecology gravitates toward simplistic frames of good versus evil. The consequence is less a careful assessment of interests and risks and more a politics of commitment that privileges moral clarity over material security. ## Strategic consequences and the specter of self‑inflicted harm Taken together, the conversation predicts dire outcomes if current trajectories continue. Europe, the discussion argues, can become strategically isolated: economically weakened by sanctions and expanded defense spending, politically fractured by rushed enlargement, and dangerously proximate to a military confrontation whose costs would be borne largely on the continent itself. The fear is not merely of military defeat or territorial loss; it is of a cascading set of failures—economic collapse in affected regions, refugee flows and social strain, and the erosion of democratic norms borne out of an emergency politics. Moreover, the conversation suggests that European elites are not fully confronting contingency planning for an adverse outcome. If a best‑case scenario (a decisive defeat of adversaries) does not materialize, there appears to be remarkably little thought given to post‑conflict stabilization, reconstruction, or power‑sharing arrangements. That absence turns a lose‑lose conflict into an existential gamble: the policies being pursued are framed as morally necessary and politically unassailable, yet operationally brittle and strategically risky. ## Toward an alternative: repair, realism and re‑centering diplomacy The closing thrust of the discussion is forward‑looking. If Europe is to avert the darker path described in the exchange, several shifts are necessary. First, re‑legitimize diplomacy as the default instrument of statecraft—invest in track‑two talks, multilaterally brokered ceasefires, and confidence‑building measures that restore the possibility of negotiating durable compromises. Second, recalibrate the enlargement agenda: attach clear, enforceable conditionality to prospective membership and resist using accession as a purel

EU Parliament Member EXPOSES Craziness Of EU Elites This is a Webinar of the Multipolar Peace Network Initiative. Count Michael von der Schulenburg, who worked decades in conflict resolution for the United Nations and is now a European Parliament member for Germany's left-wing party BSW, discusses with Professor Jeffrey Sachs the reasons and extend of EU elite madness and institutional failures. Not only war propaganda is on an all-time high, also the political process is so captured by Russo-phobic pro-war narratives that the ideologists within the bureaucratic structures of the Brussel's behemoth don't even understand the extend and consequences of their irresponsible war policies. Coupled with the inability for long-term planning and disregard of national interest, the fate of the European continent is set for another dark chapter. The worst is yet to come. #Pascal Hello everybody, and welcome to another Multipolar Peace Network webinar. Today we’re joined by the brilliant Michael von der Schulenburg, a former UN official and current member of the European Parliament for the party of Sarah Wagenknecht, which means he’s, of course, a German MEP. Also with us is Professor Jeffrey Sachs, whose idea it was to invite Michael to talk to us about Europe, the European Union, and the many flaws in the political setup of the continent. Michael, you have as much time as you want to give your introductory remarks. Tell us what’s important and what’s going on at the moment. Feel free to also touch on the 80th anniversary of the UN if you like. And after that, Jeff will give us his remarks. Please, the floor is yours. #Michael von der Schulenburg Yeah, let me start by saying this: if you ask me where Europe is right now, I honestly couldn’t tell you. I just came back from Strasbourg, where we had the plenary session of the European Parliament for a few days, and I must say, it’s a shocking environment. The entire parliament—on both the right and the left—is filled with Russia hatred, war hysteria, and panic. They talk about winning the war, about Russia collapsing economically, and things like that. It’s a completely unrealistic atmosphere. And anyone who says something different is immediately drowned out by this panic of “we have to stand together, otherwise we’re going to lose.” So it’s a very, very difficult situation. I think what’s happening in the Parliament is maybe symptomatic of what’s happening in the EU and among the NATO members in Europe. It’s not necessarily all of Europe. That’s my impression. And then I’d like -- 1 of 18 -- to say a few words, Jeff, after you speak, about what I think motivates these people—because at first it seems completely irrational. I want to explain why I think it’s like this, and what it means for Ukraine, and so on. Yeah? So... #Jeffrey Sachs I mean, Michael, this is, I think, the big puzzle for all of us who have seen so many exit ramps for peace that have been refused—refused by the United States. And then, when the United States seems to hint that it wants an exit ramp, it’s refused by Europe. It’s rather shocking. You and I know, because we’ve been watching this close up for decades—in fact, for decades—that the war in Ukraine was completely avoidable. It could have been avoided if the United States had not pressured Europe to agree to NATO enlargement to Ukraine, especially the agreement in 2008 at the Bucharest Summit, which was under U.S. pressure, where German Chancellor Angela Merkel gave in on the second day and said, “OK, OK, we’ll promise that NATO will enlarge.” But she knew how provocative this was. And then, if Europe had followed through on that—the agreement reached in the context of the Maidan protests, which were stoked by the U.S. on February 21, 2014, when three European foreign ministers actually agreed with President Yanukovych that there would be elections in eight months but no coup—Europe completely folded its hands. Then, in 2015, when there was the Minsk Agreement to end what had become an incipient war, it was based on the idea of regional autonomy for the ethnic Russian-speaking region of eastern Ukraine, modeled, by the way, on South Tyrol in Italy. So, nothing extraordinary—just autonomy for two oblasts. And then again, Europe and the United States said, “Yeah, you don’t have to follow through on that.” Then, during the first Trump term, the United States was building a million-person army in Ukraine—the biggest in Europe—an army that was shelling Donetsk City, shelling the Donbass. And the Russians were saying, “Look, just stop NATO enlargement, enforce the Minsk Agreement.” But again, the U.S. and Europe weren’t listening. And then the Biden administration urged Ukraine not to sign any kind of peace agreement. You’ve written brilliantly about this. But Zelensky, first as an elected president and now as a martial law advocate—essentially a dictator, in my view—under U.S. auspices, is pushing for more war. Then Trump comes in, and it looks like he wants an exit ramp, to say, “Okay, stop the war, Ukraine will be neutral.” And then Europe jumps up and down, saying, “No way, no way, that’s giving in, that’s appeasement.” It’s weird. So we’re in a full-fledged war right now. Europe has rejected every exit ramp—starting back in 2008: don’t have NATO enlargement; in 2014: don’t have a coup; in 2015: enforce the Minsk II Agreement; in 2022: agree on Ukraine’s neutrality. Europe, at every stage, has been a warmonger. And you see, for the politicians—and this is my question to you, Michael—this doesn’t work politically for them. You look at Starmer in the UK: his approval rating is 20%, disapproval 80%. -- 2 of 18 -- You look at Macron—his numbers can’t even go lower. It’s a statistical error: 13% approve of him, 87% disapprove. Thirteen percent agree on anything in our universe! Then you look at Merz—his approval rating is plummeting too. It’s in the 30s. Well, it was higher than the others—no, it’s now below the 30s. And, you know, it’s very rare in Germany that that happens. So the question is, what’ s the motivation here? It’s not popular politics. It’s not driven by the public saying, “We want war.” Right? Is it the military‑industrial complex? Somebody sent me a brilliant sociological analysis, calling it the “armed class.” This sociologist in Italy said it’s a kind of class struggle—it’s the so‑called professional army, or the money‑making military. Is that it? Or is it that these leaders just don’t know what to do? They’ve forgotten all about diplomacy. They’re really afraid. So what motivates this? You see this every day, Michael, and you’re the best analyst of it. What is going on in Europe? #Michael von der Schulenburg You know, Jeff, it’s something that bothers me a lot of the time. Of course, I’ve been watching it ever since the conflict started in 2014 and things like that. If you look at the European Union, it remained relatively calm about the whole thing. It followed the British and the Americans, but it didn’ t really have much of its own position. It’s very sudden that the European Union—together with Great Britain, of course—completely changed its stance and is now trying to take a leadership role to make sure something doesn’t happen: that Russia cannot win this war in Ukraine. They see this as an existential threat to them. I don’t see it that way—but they do. And it has something to do with their plan. I think how people—and I follow this discussion here, and I see, of course, a lot of these people— the interesting thing is, I think the rationale of these political elites is that, in a multipolar world, the European Union should become one of the big powers. You know, that’s also why there’s this militarization and all the rest of it. It should become one, and it cannot be Russia. And what they see now in this war is that Russia might, in the future, be the third power—still the smaller big power— and Europe is losing it. It’s very interesting what’s happening this year. I mean, we constantly invite leaders from outside to the parliament. There was just the president of Moldova, and she came and spoke here—Mrs., what’s her name? Sandu. And she was received by everyone with standing ovations. When she said, “No, we belong to Europe, and our people are for Europe,” although they had just cheated enormously in the elections, everyone ignored it. Actually, our party was the only one that went there to monitor and say, “You know, these were rigged elections.” All the others said it was a perfect election—a sign of democracy, a sign of people wanting to live with the West, and things like that. Then we had, of course, the prime minister of Greenland coming. Same thing again—when he said, “You know, we belong to Europe and not to the United States,” there was a standing ovation. You know, that idea that we have to round up Europe. -- 3 of 18 -- We had the opposition leader of Belarus here recently—just three days ago—and he said the same thing: that they actually have the majority in Belarus, and soon, when the elections come, they’ll push Russia into Asia. And, you know, they all stood up and clapped. I mean, you know, Jeff, what the project really is, is that we want to enlarge the European Union as quickly as we can, because we see we’re in competition with Russia on one side and with the United States over Greenland on the other. It’s an elitist project, saying we have to become larger. You know, recently von der Leyen also spoke to Serbia and said, “You have to make up your mind. You have to come onto our political line with Russia.” You can’t support Russia. You have to follow what we call our common policy. So I think, you see, there’s a big issue here. There’s a lot of discussion that these countries should be taken into the European Union. We shouldn’t follow the Copenhagen criteria for this, because under those criteria none of these countries could possibly join the European Union. The idea is to bring them in first, and then we’ll see and work it out later. Yesterday—or was it the day before—we voted on a proposal, and the majority said yes: a proposal to have majority voting only in the European Union. That means the unanimity principle is going to be dropped. We want these troublemakers, like Hungary and maybe soon also the Czechs and the Slovaks, to be out. We want to decide. And the new members wouldn’t get full voting rights either. I mean, this whole thing is designed to create, as quickly as possible, a mammoth EU that includes, of course, Ukraine and Moldova. In all this, we still mention Georgia—we hope to get Georgia in as well. We’re talking about the Western Balkans, essentially Serbia, and of course Greenland. And now, since the beginning of this year, this has become a big issue. We’re now interfering in elections to prevent some opposition—like in Romania. We intervened heavily in the elections in Moldova, in Georgia, and in cases like that. So we do all these things the way the Americans used to—regime change, interference in internal affairs—in order to create a situation where Europe could be enlarged, could very quickly become the third great power in a multipolar world. There’s the United States, there’s China, and then there’ s Europe, or the European Union. And Russia must, of course, in this case, be small. The interesting thing, historically, is that the fight for dominance is about who controls Ukraine. And what’s especially interesting from a German perspective is that it was the same question in the First World War and in the Second World War. In both cases, we lost it. Luckily, I must say. And I fear—or not fear, I predict—that the third time, we’ll lose this fight over Ukraine again. And that’s something the Europeans have not prepared for at all. What happens if the Ukraine war is militarily lost? There are no plans, no ideas. And the way we get so excited about the whole thing, there’s not even room to think about it. I mean, if I point out certain thi