China Shocks USA: The Fight Is Already Over | Prof. Wang Wen

The recorded exchange with Professor Wang Wen presents a provocative, if measured, counter-narrative to prevailing Western accounts of Sino‑American rivalry: China is not simply reacting to U.S. pressure; it is confident in a long-term development trajectory that renders containment less effective and strategic confrontation less likely. The conversation reframes the competition as a plural‑track struggle—economic, technological, and normative—while insisting that China’s objectives remain domestically focused and non-zero‑sum. This outlook matters because it challenges assumptions about inevitability of conflict, offers a distinct reading of recent U.S. policy shifts, and recasts instruments like BRICS and the Belt and Road as parts of a resilient hedging strategy rather than ideological blocs. ## China’s Long-Term Development Model Across the discussion, the central pillar of China’s security and foreign-policy confidence is its development model—steady, state‑guided modernization rooted in improving livelihoods rather than geopolitical dominance. Professor Wang Wen repeatedly emphasizes that Beijing’s targets are internal: raising living standards, completing national rejuvenation on terms defined by domestic needs, and sustaining large‑scale structural projects such as urban‑rural integration, social safety nets, and green transformation. This is not to deny ambition; rather, the ambition is framed as systemic resilience. The Five‑Year planning tradition, institutional continuity, and a coordinated industrial policy are presented in the conversation as strategic assets that contrast with the perceived volatility of U.S. decision‑making. Importantly, the conversation pushes back on a widespread interpretive error: reading China’s rise as inherently zero‑sum. Instead, China’s developmental calculus is described as cumulative and internally oriented. Investment in capabilities—semiconductors, renewable energy value chains, electric vehicles, and large language models—is framed as building domestic self‑sufficiency and creating exportable standards and supply‑chain leadership. The argument here is subtle but consequential: by prioritizing domestic consolidation and systemic effectiveness, China reduces the probability that its rise will translate into a revisionist drive to overthrow global institutions by force. That same internal focus also shapes how Beijing chooses to respond to external pressures—through reciprocal economic measures, diversification of partnerships, and multilayered diplomacy rather than unilateral escalation. ## US-China Conflict Risks 00:23: 17 China’s Future Advantages The transcript surfaces a paradox: while U.S. elites publicly ratchet up rhetoric and instruments of competition, Chinese analysts interpret those moves as both predictable and ultimately self‑limiting. Professor Wang notes that what is sometimes presented in Western discourse as an unbroken line of U.S. hegemonic intent is, from Beijing’s vantage, a series of domestic‑political eruptions—policy swings fueled by electoral logic and transactional impulses. Thus, Trump‑era measures, while disruptive, are judged by Chinese observers to have limited strategic coherence and a tendency to accelerate multipolar outcomes rather than restore unipolarity. This is where future advantages are located. The conversation identifies concrete domains where China believes it has gained structural headway: green energy and low‑carbon industrial chains (photovoltaics, wind, lithium batteries, and electric vehicles), scalable digital governance architectures, and a maturing innovation ecosystem in semiconductors and AI. These are not portrayed as merely incremental improvements but as the setting of global standards, production capacities, and export platforms that will shape the next several decades. In the interview, this structural leadership is argued to confer time as an ally: gradual, cumulative advantage that compounds while U.S. policy remains subject to oscillation and political polarization. Yet the conversation does not deny risk. The specter of proxy conflicts, escalatory miscalculation, and economic weaponization remains a central concern for Chinese strategists. What changes is the appraisal of likelihood: the belief that China’s domestic strengths and its ability to proactively shape diplomatic channels reduce the chance of catastrophic rupture. This framing turns attention away from purely military scenarios and toward contests of governance, technology standards, and supply‑chain resilience. ## Iran War and US Power The exchange situates recent Middle East crises as an inflection point in how Chinese strategists assess American power projection. Rather than seeing U.S. actions in isolation, the conversation reads the Iran conflict and other interventions as evidence of American overextension and internal political dysfunction. For Chinese observers, sustained campaigning in multiple theaters—Europe, the Middle East, and the Indo‑Pacific—exposes limits to Washington’s capacity for sustained global leadership and creates openings for diversified diplomatic architectures. Professor Wang advances a contrarian interpretation: U.S. pressure does not translate automatically into effective containment because it strains domestic resources and global credibility, prompting other actors to seek alternatives. The interviewsuggests Beijing reads the regional disorder not primarily as a direct threat to China but as a structural weakness of the existing order that can be hedged against. That hedging takes practical form: deepen ties with the Global South, accelerate Belt and Road infrastructure partnerships, and expand economic diplomacy to nations disillusioned with binary alignments. The implicit calculation is that conflicts like the Iran war create strategic space for China’s diplomatic and economic initiatives, even if they simultaneously raise the danger of localized spillover. The conversation also underscores a disciplined Chinese hope: that rational leaders, confronted with mutual destruction, will prefer managed competition to open war. The May summitary consensus between the two major powers—described as a commitment to constructive engagement, orderly competition, and manageable differences—is cited as evidence that even fraught crises need not precipitate systemic collapse. ## BRICS and Chinese Foreign Policy BRICS, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and multilateral cooperation emerge in the conversation as instruments of strategic insulation rather than offensive ideology. Rather than constituting an anti‑Western bloc, these initiatives are characterized as pragmatic platforms for economic connectivity, alternative governance inputs, and diversification of global partnerships. Professor Wang’s account presents BRICS expansion and BRI outreach as part of a broader strategy to construct a multipolar set of nodes that mitigate risks from single‑actor coercion. Chinese foreign policy, in this telling, is incrementalist and institutionally inventive: it combines formal multilateral forums with bilateral economic ties and selective reciprocity in trade measures. The conversation stresses reciprocity as a central theme—using export controls, tariff countermeasures, and entity lists not simply as punishment but as bargaining tools to open negotiation space. Through this lens, BRICS and related fora are less about creating rival camps and more about enlarging the space in which China can pursue technological, trade, and governance partnerships that reduce vulnerability to unilateral embargoes or sanctions. This posture also reflects a normative claim: that global governance should be plural and pragmatic rather than ideologically monopolized. The interview suggests that many countries in the Global South prefer cooperation that delivers infrastructure, technology, and growth without the conditionalities associated with great‑power rivalry. For Beijing, this

China Shocks USA: The Fight Is Already Over | Prof. Wang Wen While the US is in high panic about "the rise of China" and its failing warmongering in the word, Beijing is at its most relaxed yet. Turns out, China is confident that it won the race roughly 10 years ago and is now only working on expanding its lead. Professor Wang Wen, Dean of the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies at Renmin University of China, discusses how Chinese scholars view Trump’s second administration, trade pressure, China’s domestic development, and US-China competition. He shares his views on Iran, Taiwan risks, BRICS, the Belt and Road Initiative, global governance, green energy, AI, and why he believes cooperation can replace conflict. Links: Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies, Renmin University of China: https://rdcy.ruc.edu.cn Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Merch: https://neutralitystudies.com /shop Donation: https://neutralitystudies.com/donate Timestamps: 00:00:00 Trump and China’s Response 00:12:14 China’s Long-Term Development Model 00:18:39 US-China Conflict Risks 00:23: 17 China’s Future Advantages 00:30:32 Iran War and US Power 00:36:39 BRICS and Chinese Foreign Policy 00:44:57 China, Realism and Peaceful Coexistence #Pascal Welcome back, everybody, to Neutrality Studies. Today, for the first time, with Professor Wang Wen, the Dean of the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies at Renmin University of China. Professor Wang, welcome. #Wang Wen Thank you. Thank you for the opportunity to give me. #Pascal It's fantastic to have a Chinese scholar here, and you've been—actually, you are one of the very attentive people who try to analyze international relations. And that's why I would like to ask you, you know, a little bit mainly about China's relationship today with the United States. And maybe let's start with Donald Trump, because it's hard to get past him. How do you think Chinese people actually view the second Trump administration? #Wang Wen Yeah, well, this is a very important question. You know, Trump is so famous. Also, he's very famous in China. Every Chinese person knows him. But the problem is that gradually, you know, compared -- 1 of 13 -- to eight years ago or two years ago when he got to office again, I think the Chinese people now have formed many consensuses about Trump 2.0. Let me show you a few consensuses of Chinese people's viewpoints on Trump 2.0. First is that Trump 2.0 is a concentrated outbreak of inherent contradictions within the American system. The transactional America First policy is rapidly eroding American global leadership. As I said, compared to Trump 1.0, who took office in 2017, Trump 2.0 is no longer merely about impacting the Washington establishment, but a systematic transformation of U.S. governance rules, purging the federal public office system, unlimited expression of executive power. So now we can see from the Chinese people, I mean, especially Chinese scholars... #Wang Wen Most Chinese academics agree that all of Trump's policies are driven by short-term electoral and commercial interests, lacking any medium- or long-term global governance planning. These policies are actively undermining the global order framework built by the U.S. after World War II, objectively accelerating the multipolarization process. So I think for Chinese people, especially for Chinese scholars, nowadays President Trump is destroying American hegemony. That's, I think, a very important consensus on Trump 2.0. #Pascal You know, there are people in my world, in this bubble of this YouTube bubble, that try to analyze U. S. hegemony, that argue that overall Trump is not that exceptional because overall, the Trump administration continues with this hegemonic approach: the war on Iran, the proxy war on Russia, the undermining of the global order that doesn't benefit the United States anymore. So it's still kind of the continuation of U.S. expansionism, and also its ratcheting up of war rhetoric with China. And the U.S. bases are not going away, and the energy shock is rather also causing problems for the Chinese economy. What do you and Chinese scholars make of such arguments? Do you think this is, you know, just the latest version of a long-term strategy, or is this, you know, Donald Trump as a kind of a very bizarre administration that's actually harming U.S. interests more than it helps? #Wang Wen Yeah, I agree with you. You know, for most Chinese scholars, they think that competing with China is a longstanding strategic consensus between the two U.S. parties. But the problem is that Trump 2.0's businessman-like transactional thinking allows more controllable negotiation space in China-U. S. games. Whether it's Biden or Trump, the underlying logic of the U.S. positioning China as its primary strategic competitor remains unchanged, as you mentioned right now. However, the biggest difference from the Biden era is that Trump is not fixated on ideological confrontation. All negotiations are measured by economic gains and reciprocal exchanges. In 2025, I mean, last year, the U.S. raised the tariffs on Chinese goods to 145%. -- 2 of 13 -- However, many U.S. domestic businesses protested, and inflationary pressure forced the U.S. to actively seek multiple rounds of trade negotiations with China. So I think there were a lot of cases confirming our shared judgment. Trump's tough stance on China is a means to an end. The real goal is to gain economic benefits. So this leaves a window for China-U.S. relations to manage differences and engage in pragmatic cooperation in certain areas. And another point I want to share with you is that, because you mentioned containment, or Trump's so-called competitive strategy, but nowadays, from China's side, we think the comprehensive external pressure has not... So that's what makes us more and more confident. Look at the... #Wang Wen The changes happened in the past eight years. I'll give you an example. When Trump launched his first trade war in 2018, there was considerable anxiety in Chinese public opinion. But what was the result by 2026, I mean this year? The blockade spurred independent innovation. China is rising in semiconductors, ships, new energy vehicles, photovoltaics, robotics, large-scale models, and more. So I don't know whether you read my very interesting article written last year, which was cited by media outlets in over 20 countries, including The Economist. My article last year was that, thanks to Trump for making China great again. This article stated that extreme external pressure cannot impede Chinese-style modernization. Instead, it has allowed us to fill gaps in our industrial chain, expand our global cooperation, and achieve a qualitative leap in our strategic resilience. #Pascal Hey, just a very quick note. The best way to support this channel is by signing up for my free Substack. You can also help with a paid subscription there, or you can get some of our new merch on neutralitystudies.com. Links below. See you there. So, yeah, that is a very—it's a very good title for a very good article. And it actually, you know, made me wonder whether you and other Chinese scholars actually kind of think like, thank you, Trump, like, for being a teacher without wanting to be one. Is that kind of a sentiment that is currently around in China, that, okay, we can learn a lot from what's going on over there? Let's make the best out of it. #Wang Wen Well, yes, I agree with you. Nowadays, more and more Chinese people, when they face Trump 2.0, are becoming more and more confident. I must tell you a fact: China may be better at dealing with the US than the US is at dealing with China. China is not afraid of Trump 2.0. On the contrary, China has successfully responded to Trump's trade war, high-tech war, and other containment and suppression efforts. So I think this self-confidence is the proactive self-confidence in dealing with external games. As I said, eight years ago, when Trump 1.0 came to power, when faced with a sudden trade war, China responded more positively and took advantage of the situation. -- 3 of 13 -- However, after the Trump 2.0 cycle, China has learned to proactively shape U.S.-China relations. Let me give a few examples. At the economic and trade level, we have accurately implemented rare earth export controls, energy product tariff countermeasures, and unreliable entity-list reciprocity constraints, and we no longer persistently endure unilateral barriers. At the global governance level, we rely on BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Belt and Road Initiative expansion, and cooperation in the Global South to hedge against U.S. unilateralism. And more importantly, very interesting is that China's experience, though, is that at the communication level with the U.S., we take the initiative to conduct hierarchical dialogues, distinguish different topics such as economic, trade, climate change, humanities, and security, to set cooperation agendas, proactively manage risks, and avoid escalation of conflicts with the U.S. So now it's very obvious that, as you mentioned, in the past eight years, the mentality of Chinese people has changed very clearly. In the past, we persistently adapted to the rules set by the United States. But now we have the ability to balance the differences, proactively create opportunities for bilateral cooperation, and are no longer dictated by the lens of U.S. policy. That's one kind of Chinese self-confidence. #Pascal That is very interesting, because what I hear from your words is that you are actually rather optimistic about China's ability to deal with the United States. So does that influence now the planning, the future planning of the U.S.-China relationship, that China doesn't feel that they just need to deal with anything being thrown at them, but that they can also now start long-term planning of how to proactively approach the U.S. and balance things? Is that the thinking in Beijing these days? #Wang Wen Well, I think you mentioned why China has more and more confidence, self-confidence in dealing with the United States. I think the fundamental confidence is in China's own development path. So, because—let me explain to you—because I think many Western public opinions have fallen into a cognitive misunderstanding. They think that China-U.S. relations are a zero-sum competition, and they believe that China's development goal is to surpass and defeat the United States. I think this is precisely the biggest misunderstanding of Chinese development logic. Let me tell you that the development goal of China has never been to defeat any country, but to improve the people's livelihood, achieve common prosperity for all people, and complete national rejuvenation. So now I think, even though it has been in a competitive environment among major powers for a long time, from Europe, from Japan, or from the U.S., China's policy focus has always been based on domestic demand. I don't know whether you know, this year is the first year of our 15th Five-Year -- 4 of 13 -- Plan. The 15th Five-Year Plan focuses on boosting domestic demand, technological innovation, urban-rural balance, and ecological protection, ensuring tens of millions of jobs every year, improving the pension and medical system, and continuing to revitalize the countryside. All strategic starting points are the needs of a better life for the 1.4 billion Chinese people. But look at Trump's rule. Look at American society. There is so much polarization between rich and poor in the United States. There are so many problems that the welfare of the people at the bottom has shrunk. So I think our confidence is that our target has never been to catch up with the United States, but to continue to do our own things well. So we become more and more confident because we do very well, much better than before. So China has become much better than before. And we think that we can have mor