Australian Icon EXPOSES Racist White-Man-Media Narrative. Real Threat Is USA | John Menadue

Australia’s strategic anxiety is less a matter of objective threat than a legacy of history, race, and habit. The conversation with John Menadue unspools this argument plainly: Australia’s foreign policy and public imagination remain tethered to a bygone settler-colonial mindset that reflexively looks outward for guardians rather than inward toward its own region. Menadue’s reflections—rooted in decades in public life, diplomacy, and media—challenge the prevailing narrative that casts China as an imminent menace and the United States as an unassailable protector. The result is a policy posture misaligned with geography, demography, and the lived realities of Asia-Pacific states. ## Historical legacies and settler colonialism Australia’s strategic orientation cannot be understood without acknowledging its settler-colonial origins. Menadue traces the country’s persistent external reliance to foundational anxieties: a small, predominantly European-descended population on a vast continent, historically fearful of “the yellow peril” and therefore predisposed to seek protection from distant empires. For much of the 20th century that meant the United Kingdom; more recently the United States. This pattern is not merely bureaucratic; it is psychological and cultural. It shapes electoral politics, elite thinking, and the media’s framing of foreign policy. That psychology explains some otherwise puzzling features of Australian public life. The loyalty to external patrons continues long after the formal structures of empire have decayed: the sentimental ties to the Crown, the emulation of American institutions and culture, and a political class that habitually aligns with Washington’s policy choices. Menadue insists that this pattern stems from deeper attitudes—racism and a lingering belief in Western moral superiority—that distort perceptions of regional neighbors and of global conflicts. These inherited dispositions make it difficult for Australia to reorient toward its immediate geographical realities and growing Asian plurality. ## The myth of the Chinese threat A central contention in the discussion is that the perceived Chinese threat is largely overstated and often serves as a political and economic instrument rather than a sober assessment. Menadue argues that China’s historical behavior does not warrant the alarmist rhetoric dominating large parts of Australian media and elite discourse. He notes China’s long period without major external wars and points to its internal and regional priorities—managing a massive population, complex land borders, and domestic economic challenges—which make global military adventurism unlikely in the model of recent U.S. interventions. Yet despite these realities, the anti-China narrative has become pervasive, amplified by vested interests and media ecosystems that recycle fear. Menadue likens this to a “dodgy butcher” nudging the scales: the narrative is tilted to favor policies and perspectives that treat China as an imminent, existential adversary. This framing is not merely academic; it drives concrete choices: military posture, alliance commitments, and trade relationships. The result is a self-reinforcing loop in which diplomacy is constrained by preconceptions rather than driven by sober national interest. ## Americanization and media influence The conversation places particular emphasis on how American influence has reshaped Australian institutions and public opinion. Menadue, drawing on his media experience, warns that Australia’s news landscape replicates U.S. frames and priorities. Major print outlets rely heavily on syndicated material from American and British sources; corporate ownership structures—with significant foreign stakeholding—further align domestic reporting with external interests. The net effect is a national conversation filtered through foreign lenses. This media architecture matters because it amplifies certain fears and obscures alternative vantage points. If most political commentary is produced under the same paradigms—one that valorizes Western interventionism—then marginal or dissenting views about engagement with Asia struggle for airtime. Menadue also highlights the role of powerful domestic actors and economic dependencies—multinational ownership of banks and resource firms—that bias discussion toward policies congenial to Anglo-American networks. Correcting this imbalance requires both more plural media ownership and a renewed civic literacy about Australia’s place in the world. ## Regional integration and the case for independence If the prevailing narrative is misplaced, what should replace it? Menadue’s answer is a clear call for strategic independence rooted in the region. For Australia, the logic is straightforward: Indonesia, Southeast Asia, and the broader Asia-Pacific are not merely distant theaters of policy; they are proximate neighbors and partners whose stability directly affects Australian welfare. Menadue stresses Indonesia’s centrality—not only as the world’s largest Muslim-majority country but as a strategic partner on Australia’s doorstep. Shifting toward regional engagement requires shedding old psychological habits: overcoming fear of the “other,” rejecting reflexive deference to distant allies, and investing in institutions of cooperation. That means more than trade deals and diplomatic gestures. It implies sustained, mutually respectful engagement with ASEAN neighbors, deeper cultural and educational exchange, and a reorientation of defense policy away from automatic alignment with U.S. strategy. Menadue acknowledges the difficulty of such a transition—political elites are embedded in networks that profit from the status quo—but he sees growing signs of change among the electorate and insists the move is both necessary and possible. ## Politics, protests, and the shifting electorate The conversation also connects these foreign policy debates to domestic political shifts. Menadue observes rising third-party votes and a decline in the two-party dominance that once characterized Australian elections. This fragmentation presents both risk and opportunity: it can lead to political instability, but it also opens space for new voices to shape the national conversation on sovereignty, alliances, and migration. Issues such as Palestinian solidarity and concerns within Muslim communities have already begun to influence electoral dynamics, signalling a public more diverse in outlook than the political class yet recognizes. Crucially, Menadue suggests that events—sudden shocks or disruptive leadership—often catalyze change. He cites how international figures and crises can jolt public opinion into reassessing alliances and priorities. The paradox is that destabilizing actors or policies might create openings for recalibration; the challenge for reformers is to harness those moments for a considered, principled shift rather than a haphazard retrenchment. ## Western moralism, hypocrisy, and the path forward A recurrent theme in the exchange is the West’s self-conception as morally superior—an idea that has outlived its usefulness and credibility. Menadue is blunt: Western powers proclaim values while often practicing a different politics—intervening militarily, fostering inequality, and selectively applying humanitarian rhetoric. The Gaza crisis, with its disproportionate toll and the West’s relative silence or complicity, is cited as emblematic of this moral gap. The result is declining legitimacy for Western-led narratives and growing skepticism among countries and communities affected by those policies. Repairing that legitimacy requires humility and a willingness to learn. Menadue urges Western societies, Australia included, to confront their histories honestly, to recognize the ongoing impacts of colonialism and racism, and to engage with other nations on the basis of mutual respect. That does not mean naïve pacifism; rather, it means recalibrating foreign po

Australian Icon EXPOSES Real Threat Is USA | John Menadue The best ways to support us: Donations on Patreon: patreon.com/NeutralityStudies. A subscription on Substack: pascallottaz.substack.com. Today I’m talking to John Menadue, one of Australia’s most prolific publishers and public figures. Born in 1935, John worked in Australian media, served as head of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet from 1974 to 1976 and was Australia’s Ambassador to Japan fon 1977-1980. He was appointed Head of the Department of Trade in December 1983. And after returning to the private sector, he became the CEO of Qantas Airline from 1986-1989. After several more positions in and out of Government, John founded influential public policy journal Pearls and Irritations at http://johnmenadue.com/ in January 2013 on which he and his colleagues have been reporting very critically on current affairs. #M1 There is no sign, in my view, that China is a threat. But it's the basis on which so much consideration and debate rests in Australia. China has not had a war for over 40 years. It had a border skirmish with Vietnam, teaching Vietnam a lesson, I think, in 1979, and since then has not been involved other than occasional border skirmishes. In that time, America has had war after war after war. #M2 Hello, everybody. This is Pascal from Neutrality Studies, and today I'm talking to John Menadue, one of Australia's most prolific publishers and public figures. Born in 1935, John worked in Australian media, served as head of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet from 1974 to 76, and was Australia's ambassador to Japan from 1977 to 1980. He was appointed head of the Department of Trade in December 1983, and after returning to the private sector, he became the CEO of Qantas airline from 1986 to 1989. After several more positions in and out of government, John founded the influential public policy journal Pearls and Irritations at johnmenadue.com in January 2013, on which he's now publishing, together with his colleagues, various reports and critical analysis on current affairs. John, it's a great honor having you online. Welcome. #M1 Thank you very much, Pascal. #M2 -- 1 of 14 -- John, you've been active in politics, active in business, and you have a lot of memories about how international politics used to work ever since the '60s, I suppose. How do you make sense of the current state of affairs in Australia, but also in the world, and generally just the West as we know it? #M1 My concern goes back quite a way. I was very active as a student in opposition to White Australia and our lack of interest and competence in dealing with Asia, which was our nearest neighbor. We're a settler colonial country, first dependent upon the United Kingdom and later the United States. And we've seen what I often call the Americanization of Australia on so many fronts, not just military, but in many other areas as well. From those early days and working with Gough Whitlam, I developed an interest in what the media was doing and, frankly, was pretty disappointed with it. I worked with Rupert Murdoch for seven years. In what I call his better days, I managed his Sydney operations, and it was quite exciting. Rupert was open to new ideas. He was in South Australia and, in fact, a thorn in the side of the Adelaide establishment, and he went on to establish The Australian. So I've been interested in the media, I guess, ever since, and particularly in recent years, with trying to come to terms with our own region. We are more intent in almost everything we do to draw upon our history with the UK and, more recently, the United States, than establishing relations with our own region. And of course, that's now almost reached debacle point with the Trump administration. But we are tied so much, both major parties, to the American coattails, it'll be very hard to pull back. It is so deep- seated, but I think there might be a way in the future. The prospects at our next election are that the third-party vote will be much higher and will keep growing. We used to have about 90% of Australians voting for the two major parties, the Labor Party, which I've traditionally always supported, and the Conservative Coalition. About 90%. But now their vote is down to about two-thirds, 65%, 66%. And so third parties are growing. And I think they're going to be very important come the next election on issues such as our relationship with the United States and, I guess, more locally, the concern of our Palestinian Muslim communities about what's happening in Gaza. So that broadly, I think, describes the political scene. It's not very encouraging at the moment and requires some strong leadership. We had it in the past. John Curtin in the early 1940s decided that a major change was necessary, that we could no longer rely on the United Kingdom to look after us in the attacks by, invasions possible by Japan. And he, in fact, made it clear that we had to look to America for guidance, for protecting us in the future. And at that point in time, he was probably convinced. Right. And I think we're looking for new leadership now that will grasp the nettle and decide that we have to be more independent and less reliant on the United States. That's, I think, the central problem we face politically and internationally. #M2 -- 2 of 14 -- I had previously Professor Hugh White on this channel and also an ambassador, and probably, I suppose you know him, Geoff Raby, who both said very similar things to you. It's like Australia's and New Zealand's failure to integrate into their own region and realize that they are, you know, kind of the southernmost tip of Southeast Asia. I mean, it goes all the way down there, right? This is clearly one geographical region. And both of them also come to the conclusion that Australia, particularly, is very much afraid, irrationally afraid of being abandoned by the US, by the UK, to which they feel closer, much, much closer than, let's say, to Indonesia or Malaysia. Do you see it that way as well? And where... Is it only history that explains that and the settler colonial experience? But if we look at the mix, the ethnic mix of Australia at the moment, there should be more history, right, and more preferences on the ground, shouldn't there? #M1 That's right. We're still a frightened country. We're frightened of our region. And being a settler colonial country, we look to former empires, the United Kingdom, and now the United States for protection. There's a high degree, historically, of racism in that. The yellow peril, being frightened of Asia. And that's the origin of White Australia, which we had in this country for about 100 years, just frightened of Asia, that we're a small Europe, or we were a small European community, very vulnerable, frightened of our own region. So we've always looked for an outside protector, and that's the central issue that we face now. How are we going to break out of that, be more independent, recover our sovereignty, and play a much more active role—not an overbearing role—in our own region, particularly with Indonesia, which is the largest Muslim country in the world on our doorstep and more important to us strategically than any other country in the world? But we still are frightened. We want to cling to an outsider. #M2 And this mentality, actually, it's more a psychological problem, isn't it, than it is a real strategic problem? Because, I mean, Indonesia has no ill intentions toward Australia, nor do Japan or ASEAN countries. You have to go to a very far stretch of the imagination to think that China would have ill intentions. Now, China has maritime forces, but the view that China will go all the way down, skip all of ASEAN, and go and occupy Australia is very far-fetched. Where is that psychological discomfort coming from? #M1 I mentioned it. I think it comes initially from racism, being frightened of the yellow peril, and then later attacks of a political strategic form. So there's a history for it. We're slowly growing out of it. We were once a white European country. Now, of course, we have had massive refugee flows and migration from Asia and, of course, before that, Italians and Greeks from Europe. We are not the British outpost that we used to be because our population has changed quite dramatically, and -- 3 of 14 -- White Australia has been abolished. So things are changing. It would change more quickly if we became a republic and could drop the Queen as our head of state. That keeps a sentimental attachment to the United Kingdom. But I think there are some changes in attitude, but it is still ingrained now because of what I described as the Americanisation of Australia. We just rely so much on the United States, and we think and act in regard to what America's interests would be. The American media is reflected in our media. They frame our attitudes by continually projecting American views and news out of Washington, influenced by their agencies, which, of course, influence the Washington Post and New York Times. And we still rely on our media from those outlets. Our papers are full of material from the United Kingdom and, more recently, of course, the United States. That's a major problem. Adding to it, we have Rupert Murdoch, who used to be an Australian citizen and is now an American citizen. He owns, in terms of broadsheet readership in the morning, newsprint and newspapers, over 60% of news outlets in Australia. So we have a major problem with the Americanisation of our media. Our major companies, like the Commonwealth Bank, are very largely American-owned. Our resource companies, RTZ and BHP, are largely American-owned. Our culture and our films come not exclusively, but a large amount, out of the United States. Our politicians will invariably line up with the United States in every situation. They reflect being frightened of the region, and they assume that their voters are frightened of the region, so they play to that, to the anti-China industry, which is so rabid at times in Australia. The threat from China is like a dodgy butcher putting a sly hand on the scales when he's weighing meat. He always wants a view and response that's favorable to the anti-China group. And it's there almost every day in our media, and it is followed. There is no sign, in my view, that China is a threat. But it's the base on which so much consideration and debate rests in Australia. China has not had a war for over 40 years. It had a border skirmish with Vietnam, I think, in 1969. Since then, it's not been involved other than in occasional border skirmishes. In that time, America has had war after war after war. China's got enough problems domestically and economically. Its 1.4 billion population has land borders with 14 countries. It wants to attend to those concerns and interests. There is nothing in the history of China, unlike the United States, that suggests they are going to imitate the United States as their own power grows increasingly year by year. But unfortunately, Australia and others, and Americans, keep what I call sort of looking out of the rear vision mirror and assuming that this coming Chinese power will grow and will act internationally like we have, like the Americans, with the Monroe Doctrine: keep out of our space. We're going to have 800 bases around the world, but don't you dare intrude into our space. Colonial empire. So we have a fabricated view of China and that threat. We clearly have to be mindful and careful in relations with all countries, and particularly China, which is growing rapidly in military power, although nowhere near the scale of the United States. So we need to be aware and establish our own independence and protect our own sovereignty, which we are not doing at the moment. -- 4 of 14 -- #M2 You have a beautiful way of putting these things. And I want to go to the whole media situation in a moment. But you're touching upon something that'