Costa Rica WINS Against US Warmongering TWICE! | Roberto Zamora

## Costa Rica's Quiet Power: Neutrality as Legal Armor The conversation with Roberto Zamora makes a simple yet potent point: neutrality can be more than a moral posture or diplomatic nicety—it can function as legal armor that constrains great-power designs and protects small-state sovereignty. What happened in Costa Rica in the early 1980s and again in 2004 shows how a carefully articulated and judicially reinforced neutrality policy can limit military entanglement, force political reversals, and shape how a country is treated in the international arena. The broader implication is that international law—when internalized within domestic constitutions and given teeth by courts—can be an effective bulwark for nonalignment even against powerful states pressing for support. Roberto Zamora’s account traces two watershed moments when Costa Rican neutrality was decisive: the unilateral declaration of permanent neutrality in 1983, issued amid Cold War pressure from the United States, and the 2004 judicial challenge that compelled Costa Rica to withdraw from the so-called “Coalition of the Willing” created to legitimize the invasion of Iraq. Both episodes show continuity in how the country has used legal mechanisms and public culture to translate a long-standing foreign-policy identity into binding domestic obligations. ## How Costa Rica Joined — and Left — the Coalition of the Willing The details of Costa Rica’s brief membership in the Coalition of the Willing highlight how reputation and symbolism can be weaponized by powerful states. In 2003–2004, when the United States and its partners sought partners—militarily valuable or not—they also sought moral credibility. Costa Rica, famously without an army since 1948, nonetheless carried weight on issues of human rights, democracy, and peace. That moral cachet was precisely why inclusion on the coalition list mattered to Washington: a neutral, peace-oriented nation in the coalition lent rhetorical support to claims that the war was about spreading democracy and protecting human rights. Zamora recounts how President Pacheco’s public expression of support triggered a widespread popular backlash—polls showed over 99 percent opposition—and how that reaction catalyzed legal action. The act of joining the coalition thus revealed a fault line: the executive’s foreign-policy statement clashed with a deep-seated public identity and with a legally binding neutrality declaration. The ensuing lawsuit converted popular outrage into a rule-of-law mechanism that reversed the political decision within days of the court’s ruling. The speed and visibility of the reversal—so rapid that Zamora received a fax from U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell notifying him of Costa Rica’s removal—underlines another point: international reputation matters. The United States cared enough about the optics and the diplomatic list to respond quickly when Costa Rica’s highest court made a clear legal determination. That response was not simply deference to an island of law; it reflected Washington’s own calculus about legitimacy and the need to manage international perceptions. ## Legal Foundations: The 1983 Neutrality Declaration and International Law Costa Rica’s neutrality did not begin in 1983, but that year’s seven-page unilateral declaration crystallized a tradition into a legally framed commitment. Zamora emphasizes that the declaration was not a rhetorical flourish but a unilateral legal act intended to be binding on Costa Rica itself—independent of other states’ recognition. That matters because unilateral declarations, recognized in international jurisprudence, can generate obligations that a state must follow. In Costa Rica’s constitutional order, this international commitment was even more powerful: the Constitution treats ratified international law as part of domestic law (a monist system), and Article 7 explicitly binds the state to international obligations. Zamora’s thesis work focused on demonstrating the international-legal basis for permanent neutrality and the specific grounds on which unilateral declarations like Costa Rica’s can produce enforceable duties. One key clause of the 1983 declaration forbids the state from giving any support—real or apparent—in conflicts between other states. That strict formulation requires the state not only to remain neutral in action but to avoid the appearance of partisanship. The sting of that formulation is what made a presidential statement of support for the coalition susceptible to judicial invalidation: the appearance of involvement alone could violate the neutrality obligation. International law also framed Costa Rica’s duty under the UN Charter. The 2004 case turned on three principles: the binding nature of the neutrality declaration; the obligation to respect international commitments; and the requirement that collective uses of force be authorized through the UN Security Council. Because the invasion of Iraq lacked explicit Security Council authorization authorizing force, supporting the coalition fell outside Charter-sanctioned conduct. The Supreme Court’s reading fused unilateral national commitments with collective-security norms to reach a constitutional conclusion. ## The 2004 Lawsuit and the Supreme Court Ruling The mechanics of the 2004 legal challenge reflect something distinctive about Costa Rica’s constitutional system: access to judicial review is relatively open, and international law is directly justiciable. Zamora, then a law student, filed a constitutional challenge arguing that the executive’s support violated the neutrality declaration and the state’s Charter obligations. The court largely avoided the more politically fraught questions—such as the legality of the invasion vis-à-vis Iraq’s right of self-determination—and focused on constitutional incompatibilities. The Supreme Court found the support unconstitutional for three interlocking reasons: it contravened the neutrality declaration; it violated Costa Rica’s obligation to respect international commitments; and it endorsed participation in a military action outside the UN Security Council’s authority. Equally significant was the court’s constitutional interpretation: it treated the unilateral neutrality declaration as part of a non-written constitutional layer, effectively giving the policy constitutional force. This legal upgrade meant that future executives would be constrained by the neutrality commitment in ways that ordinary policy shifts could not easily undo. The ruling had immediate practical effects. Costa Rica formally withdrew from the coalition and publicly notified the U.S. government. The episode demonstrated that thoughtful litigation—rooted in constitutional text, international law, and public sentiment—can yield rapid, binding policy reversals. It also showed that small states can wield the mechanisms of law to steer foreign relations, even when pressured by a superpower. ## Neutrality in Practice: Standing up to Superpowers Zamora’s narrative situates the 2004 episode in a longer history of legal resistance to great-power demands. The 1983 declaration itself was a direct response to Cold War pressure, especially U.S. efforts to use Costa Rican territory or complicity in operations against Nicaragua. President Luis Alberto Monge’s move to declare neutrality, Zamora recounts, was designed to close off options used by external powers—bases, training camps, or covert operations—by creating a domestic and international legal barrier. This strategic use of law to fence off foreign interference is instructive. Instead of attempting to match great-power coercion with balancing or alliance-building, Costa Rica invested in a legal regime that made certain options legally unavailable. That kind of defensive legalism can be more cost-effective for small states than military buildups or reliance on uncertain diplomatic favors. It also creates a durable public narrative: neutrality is not

Costa Rica WINS Against US Warmongering TWICE! Meet the man who managed to force his country OUT OF the "coalition of the willing" — that coalition of warmongering, bloodthirsty maniac countries that illegally and unprovokedly attacked Iraq back in 2004. I’m talking to Roberto Zamora, an international lawyer and peace activist. Links: Roberto’s Thesis on Permanent Neutrality: https://neutralitystudies.com/2025/05/the-international- legal-basis-of-permanent-neutrality/ Goods Shop: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall.com #M3 So they'd rather make demands, as they are doing in Europe, than fix the Security Council or the Charter. And that is the problem. It's the double standard and the hypocrisy of Europe. I mean, we can remember the invasion of Kosovo, right? Serbia. They were not members of NATO. NATO had no grounds to be there, and they just took over functions that should have been handled by the Security Council. And that was illegal—highly illegal—and nothing happened. Not even an apology. No, nothing happened. The problem here is that we are not looking at the root causes. #M2 Hello everybody, this is Pascal from Neutrality Studies, and today I'm talking to Roberto Zamora, an international lawyer and peace activist who, back in 2004, managed to force his home country, neutral Costa Rica, to withdraw from the so-called Coalition of the Willing, which back then attacked and subsequently occupied Iraq. This, and the politics of Central America, is what we want to discuss today. So, Roberto, welcome. #M3 Pascal, thank you very much for this opportunity to be here and discuss such an interesting issue today. Thank you. #M2 No, thank you, because you reached out to me and sent me your master's thesis in which you analyzed Costa Rica's neutrality. And in that context, you also let me know that it was you who, 20 years ago, put forward a lawsuit that in the end obliged Costa Rica to withdraw from the Coalition of the Willing. Can you tell us the story of Costa Rica—how it came to join that coalition and how you forced it out again? -- 1 of 16 -- #M3 Sure, it's not really a long story. It is, I believe, a well-known fact in the international community that Costa Rica has maintained a neutrality policy for a very long time, and that this neutrality policy was expressed in a unilateral declaration under international law in 1983, when President Monge, under pressure from the Americans, decided to escape the wars of the Cold War—especially the one in Nicaragua—by declaring Costa Rica neutral. Luckily, by now, the facts are out and the history has been rewritten, so we know what happened and what the motivations were that led the United States and the UK to create a Coalition of the Willing to invade Iraq. Because this intervention, or invasion, of Iraq had no grounds in international law, they tried to find other ways to legitimize this invasion, and that was basically by creating support from a group of very random states. If you look at the list of the members of that Coalition of the Willing... And we have to recall—because one question that I get a lot when talking about this issue is: What was Costa Rica bringing to the Coalition of the Willing and to the invasion of Iraq if we don't have an army? #M2 Because you got rid of your army back in '48, '49, right? #M3 48, that's correct. And we were not bringing military might; we were supposed to be bringing moral might, right? Maybe you recall that at the very beginning, in the first speeches of Bush about the war, he said that this was a war for peace, democracy, and human rights. And if you think of any country in the world that can have a say with some moral authority on peace, democracy, and human rights, you want Costa Rica on your list, because indeed Costa Rica is one of the few countries that can speak with authority about peace, democracy, and human rights. So there you can see why the United States wanted Costa Rica on the list, why the United States used its normal mechanisms to pressure the government to obtain this support—which is, most likely, the removal of aid. And back then, at the very moment that the Coalition of the Willing started its invasion, President Pacheco decided to issue public support in the name of Costa Rica to the Coalition of the Willing. I was starting my third year of law school. I mean, the news was received very badly in the country. I mean, 99.2% of the population was against the decision. I've never seen a poll so decisive, with 99.2% of the population rejecting a decision. And I was very upset, and, you know, it came to my mind: well, we are law students, let's try something. And in the end, nobody wanted to do anything, so I decided to just try it. Costa Rica's legal system is very friendly, if I can use the word, for constitutional issues. I mean, it's very easy to have access to the Supreme Court to discuss issues of constitutionality. For instance, I didn't need a lawyer; I just needed somebody to authenticate my signature and pay 30 cents of a dollar, and that was it. -- 2 of 16 -- So I decided to give it a try. I decided to challenge the support given to the Coalition of the Willing, claiming several violations of international law, including a specific violation of the Neutrality Declaration. #M2 Sorry, just to be clear, your argument was based on Costa Rica being in breach of its own international obligations, right? That's the argument you presented and submitted to your Supreme Court in Costa Rica. #M3 Correct. So, Article 7 of Costa Rica's constitution establishes that Costa Rica is bound by international law. In fact, Costa Rica has a fully monist legal system, which means we don't make a distinction between domestic and international law. Once international law has been established and approved by Congress, it becomes part of the domestic legal system as one. So here in Costa Rica, you can go to the court and directly claim violations of international regulations, because the Constitution establishes this. So, I mean, there were many, many arguments. I argued violations of the right of self-determination of the Iraqi people. I mean, I claimed several, but the court decided not to work on them, to leave them aside and just stick with the ones that constituted a violation. So the court said that the support was unconstitutional for three main reasons. The first was the most obvious: violation of the neutrality declaration. Correct me if I'm wrong, but in the Nuclear Tests case, the International Court of Justice, when recognizing the legal value of unilateral acts, said that unilateral acts are normally very specific. And in their contents, you know that these unilateral obligations are very specific in the way they are framed and phrased, and how the country is then understood as bound. So, Costa Rica's Neutrality Declaration is a beautiful seven-page-long document. In one of its clauses, it says that it should not give any support of any kind, so it shall not be involved, in reality or apparently, in a conflict of others. So Costa Rica's neutrality has to be so strict that it should never even give the impression that it is taking a side in a conflict of others. And here is where the violation of Costa Rica's neutrality happened. #M2 And here, just for everybody listening, it's important to know that the seven-page document is the document from 1983 in which Costa Rica declared and announced to the world, "From today on, this is our policy." And Costa Rica views this as binding on itself. That's why it's a unilateral act, right? It -- 3 of 16 -- doesn't depend on whether other states recognize it. Costa Rica says, "This is my stance, and this is valid and binding on myself." And you picked them up on that and said, "We demand that you stick to your own rules." #M3 Yes, that was somehow the core subject of my master's thesis: to find if there were grounds in international law for such a thing to happen. And I was very much amazed by the discoveries in terms of how many grounds in international law a neutrality declaration like the one Costa Rica issued has. So the first violation was of the neutrality obligation. The second violation is a consequence of the first, because it's a violation of the obligation to respect international obligations. And the third one is because the court said that Costa Rica cannot support any action taken outside the scope and control of the Security Council. So, because the invasion of Iraq had not been authorized in Resolution 1441, Costa Rica was not able to support that action without violating its obligations under the Charter. So the court found that Costa Rica, by supporting the coalition of the willing, was in violation of the Charter itself. #M2 This is beautiful because it means the Costa Rican Supreme Court found that any country that was part of the UN Charter was in breach. I mean, that would be a logical consequence. But congratulations to your Supreme Court. That's a fantastic Supreme Court. #M3 It was, yes. It was a fantastic Supreme Court. And, yeah, I mean... Now that I'm older and I have studied the issue much further, I wish the court would have... Well, it's not made up of experts in international law. Actually, it was a very, very rare case because it's normally tackling constitutionality issues not grounded in international law, right? But at least... Oh, and then the court did something, which was that we have a mixed constitutional system. It's a written constitution, but we also have a non-written constitution, right? And this written constitution evolves through the rulings of the Constitutional Supreme Court. The court said that the neutrality declaration, or the neutrality obligations, have to be understood as incorporated as a part of the non-written constitutional system in Costa Rica. So they basically—I don't know if "upgraded" is the right word—the neutrality declaration, but they did incorporate it into the constitution. So by the time Congress passed the law on neutrality, it wasn't really necessary because it was already part of the constitution. #M2 -- 4 of 16 -- When did Congress pass this law? Um, it was not long ago. #M3 Um, let me check it real quick. In 2014, they issued the law recognizing the right to peace. And as we spoke about before, in Costa Rica, we understand neutrality as part of a broader foreign policy, which is the peace policy. So that's why it's included in the right to peace law. #M2 That is very interesting. So it was the Supreme Court that elevated the foreign policy to having constitutional force, and later, Congress also made a law about this. So it's also in the legal code. But in a sense, I mean, the Constitution, of course, is on a higher level. But that just means it's baked in very, very tightly. And for you in 2004, this meant that you could force... I mean, once this decision was out, then the president was forced to withdraw that statement of support? Or what happened exactly after the verdict came out? #M3 Yeah, it's exactly as you mentioned. It was very simple. And then it came out in the news—I mean, it was everywhere in the news, even in the United States. It was big; it was in the main media. The Costa Rican Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a note to Colin Powell, the Secretary of State at the time, saying that, well, we have this ruling, so we have to withdraw. And the next day, I received a fax at my house from Colin Powell saying that Costa Rica was now out of the list of the Coalition of the Willing. I mean, I'm just very sorry I never got a photocopy, because faxes, as you know, fade with time. But it was a little bit surreal for me, at 24 years old, to get a fax from Colin Powell to my house saying, "You're out of the Coalition of the Willing." #M2 So because you were the plaintiff, you were the one who brought the case, so Powell actually then notified the plaintiff. That's interesting that they did that. #M3 Yeah, I mean, of course they notified th