The Proxy-War Against Russia Is Older Than You Think, Includes Sweden | Mazze Nielsson

## - Preview & Introduction Sweden’s surrender of two centuries of neutrality has become a test case for Europe’s shifting security architecture—less a refuge from conflict than a newly minted frontline. The recent conversation with Mazze Nielsson, co‑host of Sweden’s Dissident podcast, treats the NATO accession not as a simple security upgrade but as a turning point that exposes a longer, quieter history of external influence, remilitarization, and the systematic narrowing of independent foreign policy in Europe. What emerges is a narrative in which fear is both a political resource and a policy tool: fear of Russia justified rapid alignment, while deeper currents—economic, intelligence, and diplomatic—have steered Sweden toward a role it once resisted. This piece reconstructs that exchange into a broader analysis of what Sweden’s choices mean for Nordic sovereignty, the prospects for counter‑mobilization at home, and the continuity between Cold War-era interventions and contemporary geopolitics. ## - Is Sweden safer now that it's in NATO? The immediate promise of NATO membership was simple: collective defense under Article 5 would deter aggression and enhance Swedish security. In practice, the reality is more ambiguous. As noted in the discussion, NATO membership transforms the calculus of threat: incidents that might once have been bilateral or regional risks now carry the possibility of collective response. The Polish downing of drones and the proliferation of aerial incidents over allied airspace illustrate how localized violations can become flashpoints. For a country that had long managed its security through neutrality and limited entanglements, the risk of being pulled into an armed confrontation in which Sweden has limited direct stakes is new and material. That danger was foreseeable. Sweden’s move was accelerated by the shock of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which left public opinion and political elites receptive to rapid alignment. Yet the speed of the decision masked that Swedish defense establishments had been cooperating informally with NATO since the late 1950s. The accession therefore formalized practices that had long existed in the shadow of neutrality, reducing the buffer between alliance operations and Swedish territory. In short: NATO may deter some threats, but it also makes Sweden a strategic stake in conflicts between great powers rather than a neutral mediator. ## - Is Sweden re-militarizing like Germany? Remilitarization is not merely an increase in budgets; it is a reorientation of national priorities and identities. Sweden’s reintroduction of conscription and the rapid expansion of defense spending mirror trends elsewhere in Europe, notably in Germany. After dismantling aspects of its Cold War mobilization, Sweden is now rebuilding industrial capacity, training pipelines, and doctrines that emphasize collective operations with NATO partners. The defense industrial complex—long embedded in Sweden’s economic fabric through major firms and family conglomerates—stands to gain, and political narratives of external threat have provided convenient cover for redirecting public funds. This re-militarization interacts with social policy: as military expenditure rises, the welfare systems that once defined Swedish exceptionalism come under strain. Public discontent about healthcare, housing, and social safety nets competes with arguments for higher defense allocations. The result is a political economy in which arms production and security narratives symbiotically thrive—an outcome that benefits defense manufacturers, reinforces alliance dependence, and weakens domestic consensus for an independent foreign policy. ## - Is there a counter-movement against NATO in Sweden? Despite the costs and the rapidity of change, organized resistance in Sweden remains fragmented. Dissident and alternative media efforts—such as those led by Mazze Nielsson and colleagues—try to inject a counter‑narrative, but their reach is limited relative to mainstream public service broadcasting and elite discourse. The controversy over inviting the Russian ambassador onto a widely viewed program exemplifies the cultural constraints: critics argue against a platform for “propaganda,” even as similar criticisms are not uniformly applied to other diplomatic voices. This asymmetry reveals how fear of Russia has hardened into a normative filter for what counts as legitimate debate. That said, there are signs public opinion is not immobile. As citizens experience the practical implications of alliance membership—potential foreign bases on Swedish soil, the obligations of collective defense, and the human costs of a more militarized posture—skepticism may grow. But a coherent counter‑movement requires more than skepticism; it needs cross‑class civil society alliances, political leadership, and media platforms capable of reframing security beyond the zero‑sum narrative that currently dominates. ## - The history of Olof Palme and Sweden's lost independence Olof Palme personified a Sweden that could both admire and critique the United States. His public opposition to U.S. bombing campaigns during the Vietnam War and his willingness to pursue dialogue with the Soviet Union set him apart from the conformist foreign policy elites of his era. Palme’s brand of “common security” imagined a European architecture attentive to both Western and Soviet security concerns, and he sought to position Sweden as a mediating voice rather than a vassal. The conversation highlights the tragedy and the symbolism of Palme’s assassination. Occurring on the eve of a planned visit to Moscow and in the context of his renewed efforts at de‑escalation, the murder fed narratives that an independent Swedish foreign policy was being forcibly curtailed. Allegations by Swedish intelligence officials and foreign counterintelligence figures that Palme’s signaling toward détente made him an “agent of influence” fed suspicion that external actors were prepared to remove leaders who challenged the emergent U.S. security order. Whether or not a direct conspiracy can be proven, the assassination effectively marked the end of an era: a Sweden that once practiced leverage through moral authority and mediation was gradually reconfigured into a more compliant partner of Western defense structures. ## - How did Europe become a US satellite after the Cold War? The post–Cold War order carried promises of a ‘Europe whole and free,’ but institutional and military integration under the U.S. security umbrella consolidated in ways that reduced autonomy. The discussion frames this not as accidental but as the result of deliberate strategies—diplomatic incentives, intelligence ties, lawfare, and the quiet normalization of military basing and interoperability. A pattern emerges: when allies stray from Washington’s preferred line, mechanisms of pressure—whether economic, judicial, or covert—are deployed to steer them back. The reference to recent political interventions in places like Romania is invoked as contemporary evidence of how legal processes can be instrumentally applied. At a deeper level, Europe’s dependence was reinforced by the expansion of NATO, the entrenchment of U.S. bases and logistical nodes across the continent, and the asymmetry of power in transatlantic institutions. This structural dependence makes independent foreign policy initiatives politically costly and operationally difficult. Countries that once sought to balance between blocs found themselves integrated into U.S. strategic planning, with diminished capacity to pursue alternative security architectures. ## - What are NATO's plans for Sweden & the Nordics? NATO’s posture in the Nordic region appears to be precisely what one would expect of an alliance seeking to expand its theater of operations: increased infrastructure, rotational forces, basing arrangements, and contingency planning that presumes collective involvement in h

The Proxy-War Against Russia Is Older Than You Think, Includes Sweden Sweden abandoned 200 years of neutrality to join NATO, hoping for security. Instead, has it become a frontline state, a target in a war it has no stake in? And was its independent foreign policy deliberately dismantled with the assassination of Olof Palme? To discuss this and more, today I’m talking to Mazze Nielsson, one of the host of Sweden’s Dissident Podcast to give us an update about Sweden. We explore the remilitarization frenzy sweeping the Nordics and dive into the forgotten history of Sweden's independent path under Olof Palme, who sought dialogue with the Soviet Union. We also break down the details of his suspicious assassination and how it fits a pattern of eliminating European leaders who challenged the US-led order. Finally, we discuss the long-term Anglo-American strategy to dominate Eurasia and the current status of US bases in Sweden. Links: Dissident Poden Substack (Swedish): https://dissidentpodden.substack.com Nilsson's X (Twitter): https://x.com/mazzenilsson Timestamps: 00:00:00 - Preview & Introduction 00:01:10 - Is Sweden safer now that it's in NATO? 00:07:18 - Is Sweden re-militarizing like Germany? 00:11:35 - Is there a counter-movement against NATO in Sweden? 00:15:48 - The history of Olof Palme and Sweden's lost independence 00:35:10 - How did Europe become a US satellite after the Cold War? 00:51:09 - What are NATO's plans for Sweden & the Nordics? 00:54:52 - Conclusion & Where to find Mazze Nilsson's work #M3 You regulate your friends or vassals by either creating accidents or by using lawfare, as they did recently in Romania, where the Romanian presidential candidate, who was on very flimsy legal grounds, was pushed aside. This is how you regulate your NATO allies or vassals. And then, when it comes to your pure enemies, you continue to have a policy of confrontation with them, and you continue to create fear within your allied nations, among the public. #M2 Hello, everybody. This is Pascal from Neutrality Studies, and today I'm talking to Mazze Nielsson, one of the hosts of Sweden's Dissident podcast, to give us an update about where his country and the Nordics in general stand in geopolitics. Mazze, welcome to the show. #M3 Thank you very much. It's a pleasure and an honor to be invited to your show. #M2 -- 1 of 15 -- I'm glad to have you because you are one of the alternative voices in Sweden that also tries to tackle difficult questions. But before we get into the most difficult part, let's maybe start with, in general, where Sweden is today, having now been two years beyond Europe, giving up neutrality— 200 years of foreign policy—and throwing itself into the loving arms of NATO. Now you must be completely safe, right? Sweden must feel very safe now, and you must be protected from all negative feelings of being under threat, because now you're safe, right? #M3 Yes, of course, definitely. Every morning I wake up and I feel especially safe. Or, leaving the sarcasm aside, I would say quite the opposite is true. The day that this podcast is being recorded is the day when Poland and the Polish military have officially confirmed that they have shot down drones over their territory. Now, had I been a Swede living in neutral Sweden, we of course would have wanted to find out where the drones were fired from. Was it an intentional attack by, in this case, Russia? Or was it an unintentional wandering of drones? Or was it perhaps a Ukrainian false flag? However, now that Sweden is a member of NATO, we could potentially be dragged into an Article 5 situation against Russia, in a battle and in a war where we don't really have a stake in any sense, way, or form. So, no, obviously, Sweden has not become safer by us entering NATO. And it was a very quick process. It was a process where the politicians used the fact that—I think a certain number of people, myself included, actually—were quite shell-shocked at the fact that Russia invaded the oblasts in Ukraine. Of course, under the correct assumption that Ukraine was gearing up to start attacking its own citizens in a way that was far beyond what was necessary. But still, Sweden and the Swedish population were quite shell-shocked by this. And then the political shenanigans started. It wasn't a huge step. Within the circles of the Swedish political elites, and especially within the Swedish military and security agencies, we had been in cahoots with NATO since the late 1950s. It's not a huge secret that Sweden colluded with NATO during the Cold War. This was, however, known to the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union accepted this as a "known unknown," so to speak. But Finland, however—Finland was strictly neutral during the Cold War. And with the Finnish shift, Sweden was kind of dragged along. So the Social Democratic Party, who was in power at the time, were quite skeptical. However, they were basically just hung out to dry when the Finnish politician, or then-Minister Sanna Marin, the Prime Minister of Finland, said that Finland is joining NATO, consequences be damned. And without asking the population—there was no referendum on giving up Swedish sovereignty after 200 years. Both Sweden and—firstly, first Finland and then Sweden—applied for membership, which of course was no surprise. But the politicians were quite savvy in the way they used the shock within the population, because Russia has always been something to scare the Swedes with. You have to remember that, aside from Denmark, Russia is the country that Sweden has had the most wars with. -- 2 of 15 -- And since we have befriended Denmark—mind you, I don't trust the Danes, but still, I mean, they're at least semi-friendly these days—so I wouldn't count them as a threat tomorrow. However, Russia— you can always use Russia to scare the Swedish population, because within the timeframe of the mind, you can still perceive Russia and the Soviet Union, since these are intermingled in the Swedish psyche, as one and the same, and as a threat. So the government and the powers that be in Sweden were quite efficient in creating the perfect fear storm, which allowed us to enter NATO. But I think now there is a backlash as Swedes realize that we're going to have U.S. bases on Swedish soil, and our conscripted soldiers might be obliged to go down to Poland and fight, or wherever they are needed if NATO calls. So the Swedish population—they weren't ready. They didn't really know what to expect. They're now learning what to expect, and there will be a backlash. But as you know, it's kind of like the Roach Motel situation: once you check into NATO, you never check out. #M2 Sorry, just in Germany, you know, what we are seeing at the moment is quite a frenetic remilitarization frenzy. At least politically, there's a lot of talk about remilitarization, remilitarization, and that we need to conscript people again into the Bundeswehr, and so on. Is this also happening in Sweden? Is the fear-mongering continuing to the point where the process seems to be pointing toward more military, more expenses, more drafting of people? #M3 Yes, most certainly, most certainly. Sweden—I think Germany followed Sweden in this. We actually abolished conscription about 15 or 20 years ago, but it was reintroduced after only, I think, 8 to 10 years. And it was reintroduced three years ago now. #M2 So right after... #M3 Right around the time we entered NATO. So this is, of course, done in order to facilitate our ability to rebuild the Swedish military structure. You have to remember that when it comes to military- industrial profit, Sweden is second to none. We have the Wallenberg industries, which, during the Cold War, enabled Sweden to, at its peak, put 800,000 men under arms, with a sizable fleet and air power added to that. We produced our own planes. We produced our own submarines. And, you know, being a small country such as Sweden was, it was quite a feat—which, of course, was helped by the fact that we were unscathed by the Second World War. -- 3 of 15 -- But still, these companies are working in the background and are gaining a huge market right now. If you had stocks in the Swedish weapons and arms industries, you would be quite happy today. Sweden is definitely rearming, and Sweden is creating an enemy out of Russia in order to allow for this rearmament. Because people are rightly complaining—as in every Western nation—they're complaining about the declining state of health care, they're complaining about the declining state of the social security apparatus, and of course about other social issues, which Sweden once upon a time was also a world leader in. I think you might remember the Swedish welfare state—you were always looked after from the cradle to the grave. You never had to fear being put out on the street. The idea was that you were taken care of. Now, the netting of this social welfare state in Sweden has become—you know, it's easier to fall through. And that is also a combination of internal policies. However, one can see the rearmament, and I think Sweden might actually be heading back to the Cold War level of funding the military. We might be going back to a 4% or 4.5% of GDP rate, if not even a 5% level of GDP, such as is being asked of us by our American hegemon over in Washington. #M2 Yeah, so now what we are seeing is that, OK, we have more NATO members who collectively feel less secure, and all of them will gear up for more military expenditures and potentially adventures in the future. And all of this, of course, is happening under the guise of creating security. Do you see at the moment also a counter-movement in Sweden? Because, OK, I'm from Switzerland, and Switzerland is on a different path—it's still, at least on paper, neutral. They didn't join NATO, at least. But also there, we saw how the shock was pretty deep. But it is easing out now, in the sense that some people are putting things into perspective again, especially now, also seeing how the West supports the genocide in Gaza and how our leaders, who are so vocal—so extremely vocal— about the crimes of Russia, are basically mostly, not totally, but mostly silent in order not to burn their fingers with Gaza. How is it in Sweden? #M3 It's much the same, very much the same. There is not much of a counter-movement in Sweden. We at the Dissident Club do our best. We try to—how should I put it—work in a sense of guerrilla media. We try to counter some of the more blatant misconceptions that come from the Swedish mainstream media and public service by using our channels. Of course, we are but nothing, but at least we try. Now, there is one good example concerning Gaza and Ukraine-Russia. On Swedish television, we have a program called "30 Minutes." That's when a guest comes and they're able to have a conversation, uninterrupted, with the journalist for 30 minutes on primetime Swedish public television. On this show, of course, the Ukrainian ambassador and also the Israeli ambassador have been invited. Now, of course, there has been discussion about the Israeli ambassador, but it was benign. -- 4 of 15 -- It was critiqued, but he survived it. Two or three days ago, 30 Minutes announced that next week, the Russian ambassador, Ambassador Belyaev, is going to appear on 30 Minutes. And the backlash has been massive. I mean, there is a cultural debate, there is a debate on social media, there is discussion in the newspapers: Can you really have the Russian ambassador spread his propaganda on Swedish public television? I mean, obviously you can, because you've had the Ukrainian and you've had the Israeli ambassadors tell their propaganda. But it's somehow as if, you know, Ukraine and Israel—they don't use propaganda. No, no, no, they use facts to explain their position. But as soon as it comes to the Russian ambassador, it's propaganda, it's evil, you can't allow him to tell his position. And now, the only reason that people act this w