They Are BREAKING The Next Promis. Germany On The Way To The Next War.

## Fractured Assurances: Why One Number Matters What emerges from this exchange is not merely a debate about manpower or polling numbers; it is a question about the staying power of the post‑Cold War settlement in Europe. The conversation frames Germany’s announced intention to be able to mobilize up to 460,000 personnel as a symbolic and practical rupture with the compact that helped end the division of the continent. That single figure—when read against the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany (the Two Plus Four Treaty)—becomes a touchstone for broader anxieties: whether written guarantees still constrain great powers, whether legalistic innovations can paper over political decisions, and whether incremental changes in force posture risk reopening the very faultlines the treaty sought to close. ## The Two Plus Four Treaty: A Compact Built to End a System The discussion places the Two Plus Four Treaty at the heart of the matter. Concluded in 1990 between the two German states and the four victorious powers of World War II, the treaty was designed to settle final borders, sovereignty, and limitations that would make German reunification acceptable to neighbors wary of a resurgent Germany. Among its clauses was a clear numerical ceiling: the unified Germany would reduce its armed forces to a maximum of 370,000, with specific limits on ground and air components. What the conversation reminds us is that this was not an abstract diplomatic flourish but an insurance policy. The pact translated collective memory—of invasions, occupations, and continental war—into a codified restraint intended to reassure neighbors, particularly the Soviet Union and its successor, Russia. Seen in that light, commitments like the 370,000 cap are less about arithmetic and more about constraining intent: they were meant to bind German military capability within bounds that made no single European state overwhelmingly dominant. ## From Suspension to Renewal: Germany’s Re‑arming Trajectory The exchange sketches a trajectory from 2011—when Germany suspended conscription and pivoted to a volunteer Bundeswehr—to the present moment, where political leaders are contemplating the return of mandatory service and a mobilization target well above the treaty ceiling. The proposal to reintroduce conscription in 2026 and to plan for a force of 460,000 is portrayed as part of a wider continental drive to remilitarize in the wake of the war in Ukraine and perceived retrenchment by the United States. This is framed as more than a ticketed policy reversal; it is a cultural and institutional shift. The conversation suggests that what was once considered a defensive, measured posture is giving way to an “offense establishment” mentality that prizes scale, readiness, and integration into collective strike formations. Even if 460,000 remains smaller than the forces that Russia can field, the point emphasized is relational: Germany is not a standalone variable. Its enlargement of capacity has ripple effects in alliance structures and regional security calculations, converting a national decision into a continental vector for escalation. ## The Nuclear Question: Technicalities and Trust Deficits A central strand of the exchange focuses on nuclear commitments. Article Three of the Two Plus Four Treaty also included a clear renunciation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons by a unified Germany. The conversation underlines how NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements—where US warheads are deployed in allied territories under US custody—have always been a legalistic workaround to that promise. The arrangement allows host countries to participate in nuclear planning without the formal title of ownership; yet the discussion notes the substantive contradiction between the spirit of the treaty and the reality on the ground. This contradiction matters because it is about credibility. The treaty’s drafters sought to exclude nuclear weapons from unified German territory as a reassurance to the Soviet Union. Regardless of technical ownership, the physical presence of nuclear weapons and the infrastructure to deliver them undermines the type of predictability the treaty intended. The conversation argues that such sleights of hand—where form is preserved while substance shifts—erode trust and open the door to reciprocal moves by others who feel grievance and vulnerability. ## Legalism, Excuses, and the Politics of Renegotiation The discussion is sceptical about the likelihood that treaty language alone will prevent change. It anticipates that Germany—or its allies and legal advisers—would deploy a range of arguments to justify exceeding earlier commitments: that the 370,000 figure was a target rather than an immutable cap, that changing threat environments nullify earlier bargains, or that violations by other parties relieve Germany of its obligations. The conversation highlights how international law often yields to political necessity, with states invoking contextual shifts to recalibrate commitments. This dynamic has implications beyond legal niceties. When written undertakings are reinterpreted to suit present needs, the perceived sanctity of international agreements diminishes. The conversation equates this erosion with a cascade effect: once one party treats a treaty as malleable, others feel entitled—or compelled—to reinterpret, withdraw, or refuse compliance. In security politics, these legal maneuvers are not just arguments in courtrooms; they are signals to rivals and allies that restraints are no longer reliable. ## Spiral Dynamics: From Incremental Changes to Strategic Reorientation One of the more urgent claims advanced by the exchange is the danger of a security spiral. Increasing German force size or reinstituting mass mobilization is presented not simply as a domestic policy choice but as an input into alliance structures that will alter threat perceptions. The conversation warns that even if intentions are defensive, their effects can be escalatory: neighbors may move to counterbalance, invest in deterrent capabilities, or adopt hostile postures. Historical memory looms large in the argument. The treaty’s restrictions were informed by 20th‑century history—by fears of German militarism and the devastation that followed its ascendance. The conversation suggests that failing to adhere to the letter and spirit of past bargains risks reviving those anxieties. Whether such anxieties are politically warranted or exploited by opportunistic leaders, they shape the strategic landscape. In a worst‑case scenario, the discussion contends, Europe could be drawn back into broader confrontation—not because of a single state’s appetite for aggression, but because of reciprocal reactions to perceived breaches of trust. ## Political Narratives: Blame, Distraction, and the Domestic Angle The exchange also situates the debate about force size within domestic political currents. It notes how remilitarization can be framed by proponents as necessary prudence in an uncertain era, while critics point to hypocrisy and double standards. The conversation points to the political utility of blaming external actors for insecurity, a maneuver that can rally public support for military expansion while diverting attention from internal policy failures. This politicization matters because public support is a necessary condition for sustained rearmament. The conversation suggests that where leaders manufacture or amplify external threats, they can secure tolerance for measures that would otherwise be contentious. That dynamic raises normative questions about democratic oversight, the transparency of security policymaking, and the role of historical obligations in contemporary political debate. ## From Promise to Policy: Choices and Consequences The exchange closes on a normative note: promises written into treaties are not mere ceremonial ink; they function as stabilizers in a fractious in

Germany���s Next Broken Promise: En- route to The Next War The german defence minister announced that the country would not only remilitarise, but put up to 460'000 troops under arms. The problem? There is an international treaty from 1990 which promised the German military would not exceed 370'000. This together with the broken promises about not stationing nukes in the unified Germany are a major break of the settlement brokered to end German-German division and with it the Cold War. If you want to support our work, consider buying a mug or a shirt: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall.com #M2 Hello, everybody. I would like to talk to you tonight about Germany's next illegality under its international commitments. What I'm talking about is this thing here: as the German defense minister recently said, the Germans are thinking about the possibility of bringing back conscription in 2026. Back in 2011, the Germans stopped conscription—the mandatory military service for their male population—and ever since, it has been voluntary to serve in the Bundeswehr, the German army. But this in and of itself is not the biggest problem. This is, of course, part of the entire rearmament and the current European fanaticism about needing more weapons, more military might, more firepower, and more capabilities, because they are very scared since the United States is basically turning its back on the Ukrainian project. They are very unhappy about it, and now this talk about vulnerabilities is being used by the war hawks and by the war machine in order to change policies that were once basically set in stone. The thing I'm talking about here is not so much the issue of conscription, but what these people are already unwittingly planning, which is a clear violation of Germany's international agreements—especially agreements that it had with the Soviet Union and its successor state, Russia. The thing that concerns me most here is this part where Mr. Pistorius, the defense minister, is saying that Germany must be capable of mobilizing a total force of 460,000 soldiers and reservists. Now, first of all, you will notice that this force is still significantly smaller than what we know Russia has under arms or was able to mobilize over the last couple of years. But still, we are talking here about only one of the NATO countries, and we're seeing how the Germans are thinking of themselves as part of an integrated NATO or at least European strike force. The problem, though, is that this number is just presented as if this is going to be the new and unproblematic goal. And just to let you know, I tried to look across the media outlets and I also found a German media outlet, T-Online, that talks about the same number. So this number is not just an invention of Russia Today. This is probably what the Germans are planning somewhere in the backrooms. Now, why is -- 1 of 5 -- 460,000 a problem? It's a problem because there is an international treaty—the so-called Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany. It's also called the Two Plus Four Treaty because it was negotiated between the four victors of the Second World War—that is, the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France—and the two Germanys at the time. You remember, right? Back in 1989, 1990, there were two Germanys. There was the Federal Republic, and then there was the German Democratic Republic, the GDR. And what happened, of course, is that the GDR was swallowed whole by the Federal Republic. The GDR ceased to exist. But on the way to this event—which really should be called an absorption, but which we today remember as reunification—I reject that term because it wasn't a reunification; it was an absorption. It was the end of the GDR, and the GDR also legally, under international law, ceased to be a subject of international law because it dissolved. The continuation is, of course, the Federal Republic. But that's another issue. The point is that there were these negotiations that took place, and basically this document—the legal treaty, the legal framework—once and for all ended, brought a final peace, a final end to the Second World War. The Second World War—the fighting itself— stopped in 1945. Then there were agreements on all sides. Then there were two Germanys. And then there was a de facto European agreement. In the Cold War scenario, there was the Iron Curtain, and there was a hard contact line between East and West Germany. There was, of course, always the contentious issue of Berlin—West Berlin being a part of the Federal Republic while entirely enclosed within the German Democratic Republic. I mean, all of this problematic history was there because there was never an agreed-upon overall settlement of the European situation. That settlement had to wait until 1990, and this is it—the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany. You can download it; it exists in English. And if you read through it, you know this is the document that spelled out under what kind of conditions the two Germanies would be allowed to unify, or under which conditions the Federal Republic would be allowed to swallow up the German Democratic Republic. I must say, this is something that the German Democratic Republic also wanted. This was a six-way talk that finally ended with signatures from all sides. But very importantly—very importantly—it was the victorious powers of the Second World War that signed off on this. And if you go down to page number three, Article Three, let's read the second paragraph first because it's quite important. This second paragraph spells out what Germany is allowed to have in terms of defense forces. The government of the Federal Republic of Germany, the second paragraph says, made the following statement: The government of the Federal Republic of Germany undertakes to reduce the personnel strength of the armed forces of the united Germany to 370,000 people. Within the scope of this overall ceiling, no more than 345,000 will belong to the ground and air forces. And then it says that the German Democratic Republic has expressly associated itself with this statement, meaning the two Germanys agreed that this is the maximum strength that a unified -- 2 of 5 -- Germany should have, and the other four governments—they took note of these statements. So this is as close as it gets to a treaty agreement on force size in Germany. And the fact that Pistorius, under this newest pronouncement, just, you know, brushes—doesn't even touch on this obligation, this treaty obligation that the Germans have—just increases it well above that size, right? 460,000. That's like 90,000 soldiers, 90,000 people, personnel more than what they promised under the treaty. So the Germans are on the way to breaking another one of their treaty agreements, especially with the Soviet Union, although I must say this document was also very important to gain the support of Margaret Thatcher and the British government. The Brits back in the 1990s didn't trust the Germans—the West Germans—not at all. Back then, there was still suspicion. And this treaty and this agreement about what a future unified German state would look like was very important to all the victorious powers. Now, of course, 35 years later, we live in a different world, and the prime enemy of the Europeans, it seems at the moment, is again the Russians. But this is a promise also made towards the Russians—towards the Soviet Union—and Russia is the legal successor state of the Soviet Union. So this would be another promise broken. Sadly enough, I have no... I have no hope that this piece of paper will carry any force at all whatsoever. First and foremost, because it has been broken before. If we go to the first paragraph of Article 3, for instance, this paragraph also promises something very clearly—you know, as clear as it gets. The governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic reaffirm their renunciation of the manufacture, possession of, and control over nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. They declare that the united Germany, too, will abide by these commitments. A unified Germany, this article says, promises that it will never, ever manufacture or possess nuclear weapons. Now, you know, the sad fact of the matter is that Germany is already currently the stationing ground of at least 20 US nuclear weapons. It might be even more because, you know, what the West Europeans did, especially in the 1990s, is this goddamn joke that they call nuclear sharing. NATO is doing nuclear sharing. And because the nukes are shared with Germany and they are under US possession and under US administration, Germany doesn't possess them. Germany doesn't have possession over them. Hence, the argument goes, this promise was never broken. But that's, of course, a goddamn joke. The whole point of this article here was to make sure that there would be no nukes in reunified Germany and that the nukes could not be a threat to, then, the Soviet Union and now Russia. And this promise was basically broken as quickly as it was made. And, you know, you use a legalism, right? You use the legalism of nuclear sharing: "We just shared the nukes. The Germans don't possess them." And the West is a master at this. So I am absolutely—I have no doubt that also on the second part, on this promise of 370,000, that the German international lawyers very quickly and very easily will come up with a reason, saying, "Oh, that was not a real promise. It was just a target number. We never said that we would keep that. We said we would reduce it, but we didn't say we would keep it. The Russians broke their agreements." -- 3 of 5 -- The Russians broke the Budapest Agreement. Therefore, we are justified in adjusting our treaty commitments—stuff like that. It's really, really easy for any party that wants to wiggle out of a written agreement, of a written treaty, to do so by some phantom legalistic arguments. But the fact remains—and this, to me, is yet another instance of breaking another one of Germany's treaty obligations towards the victors of the Second World War, and of course this time most egregiously towards Russia, which at this point would care most about this promise. These 370,000—this cap was, of course, installed because that's considered what Germany would need to defend itself on its own soil, and also with the memory that back in the 1930s, Germany started breaking its treaty obligations under the Versailles Treaty and rearming heavily, creating a much larger Wehrmacht—the army at the time—which then raided, plundered, and pillaged large parts of Europe, right? So the people who were, especially in the UK, in power at the time—the Thatcher government—remembered that. She remembered the air raids, the German air raids on London, right? And she distrusted the Germans ever since. And she wanted to make sure, and others wanted to make sure, that the Germans would not again possess the means to raid, pillage, and plunder the European continent. But now Pistorius and the rest of the German defense establishment—and just like in the United States, they should by now be called an offense establishment—are working actively on breaking that promise as well. Unfortunately, it's just another one of the dominoes that is falling, not only in the rearmament of the European continent, but in the remilitarization and the drumbeats of war, the drumbeats of even more war. I mean, it's not enough. To some people, it's not enough that we have a horrible war in Ukraine, where the Western NATO is willing to fight to the last Ukrainian. Some people want to prepare for the next step—five, six, ten years down the road—when they want to fight to the last German, to the last Swede, to the last Dane, the last French maybe, you know, in order to fulfill their fantasies of a broken Russia, which has been a European dream—a wet European dream—for at least the last 200 years, 150 or so y