Europe Can't Win a War With Russia — British Commodore Explains | Steve Jermy

## Steve Jermy and the petition to pause military support The conversation centers on a stark proposition: before democracies allow themselves to be swept further into an armed confrontation with Russia, there must be a public pause and a proper debate. That argument animates a petition circulating in Britain calling for a temporary halt to military assistance to Ukraine and for the issue to be put before the public. The petition's practical aim — to trigger an official government response and potentially a parliamentary debate if it reaches the required thresholds — is less important than what it signals: citizens want an honest reckoning of risk, cost, and strategy, not uncritical adherence to a political line. The discussion explains that this petition is not an isolated act of dissent but part of a broader effort to break the unanimity of Western political narratives. The petition’s proponents argue that continued weapon transfers and escalation carry domestic costs — most obviously higher energy bills and living costs — while entangling their countries in a conflict that may not serve their security interests. The petition thus becomes both an instrument for democratic accountability and a symptom of deeper unease among military professionals, commentators, and ordinary citizens who feel excluded from consequential decisions about war and peace. ## Escalation risks and Europe’s military vulnerability A recurring theme in the exchange is the mismatch between Western rhetoric and Western capabilities. Europe and its NATO partners, the discussion emphasizes, are operating with a political story about deterrence and sustained support, while Russia has been shaping and executing a coherent military strategy. That asymmetry matters: narratives can sustain political will for a time, but they do not change the hard realities of logistics, force structure, and weapons reach. The participants warn that the West lacks the industrial capacity and inventory depth to sustain a large-scale conventional war with Russia, especially after four years of attrition in Ukraine. Modern Russian capabilities — from long-range ballistic and cruise missiles to sophisticated air defenses and counter-battery networks — present existential threats to European population centers and infrastructure in a way that the public narrative frequently underplays. The lesson drawn is uncomfortable but straightforward: escalation is not just political posturing; it risks drawing Europe into a contest it is not prepared to win or even survive at acceptable cost. ## Political narratives and “cult thinking” One of the most penetrating strands in the conversation is an analysis of how contemporary media and political culture shape public perception of foreign policy choices. The discussants describe Western coverage as heavily aligned with government positions, producing a narrow echo chamber in which dissenting evidence is marginalized. That alignment, they argue, has pushed a collective mindset closer to what one contributor calls “cult thinking”: committed, self-reinforcing belief systems that rationalize contrary information rather than adapt to it. This dynamic has policy consequences. When elites and media present a single, unnuanced storyline — that continued arming of Ukraine is both moral and strategic — alternative views are dismissed as unpatriotic or naive. The result is policy lock-in: once a course is publicly framed as the only viable moral choice, alternative risk assessments, exit strategies, and diplomatic options are crowded out. The conversation proposes that breaking this loop requires restoring pluralism to public debate: more voices from military professionals, regional experts, and independent media who can challenge prevailing assumptions without being cast as traitors. ## Kaliningrad and the danger of miscalculation Kaliningrad emerges in the discussion as a quintessential flashpoint: geographically isolated, heavily militarized, and symbolically charged, it could become a trigger for a much larger confrontation. The participants sketch scenarios in which Western actions — whether deliberate or accidental — could prompt a violent Russian response, including strikes on forces or bases involved in an incursion. They note that even a limited clash around Kaliningrad could rapidly escalate because of the peninsula’s military importance and the political pressures that would follow any loss of face on either side. Beyond Kaliningrad, the point is broader: modern war is characterized by rapid tempo, several domains of engagement, and weapons that can strike deep into enemy territory. That raises the possibility of inadvertent escalation from a localized incident into a state-on-state exchange. The conversation stresses that political leaders and publics must appreciate that miscalculation, not deliberate conquest, is the likeliest path to a broader European war. Decisions taken without full public scrutiny — including the deployment of certain long-range systems or participation in provocative exercises — increase the probability of such a catastrophic misunderstanding. ## Ignored warnings and failed diplomacy The discussion repeatedly returns to the theme that Western responses have too often ignored or misread Russian signals. One contributor points to the persistence of certain studies and policy formulations that Moscow interprets as threats to its territorial integrity and state continuity. Treating Russia’s anxieties as propaganda to be dismissed rather than as inputs into diplomatic strategy, the conversation argues, has led to missed opportunities for de-escalation and negotiation. Practically, that has meant Western policy has leaned heavily on coercive instruments — sanctions, arms transfers, and international isolation — while underinvesting in channels of communication that might have contained the crisis. The exchange does not excuse Russian aggression, but it calls for a sober reassessment of what diplomacy should look like in an age where misaligned narratives and military logic can combine to produce catastrophe. Listening, it suggests, is not capitulation; it is a necessary step toward calibrating responses that reduce existential risks. ## America, Ukraine and the battlefield The United States plays a dual role in the conversation: as a supplier and guarantor, and as a driver of the strategic course that Europe follows. The discussants underscore that American commitments — both material and political — shape European choices, often giving smaller allies the cover to adopt a more confrontational posture than they might have chosen alone. Yet the battlefield realities in Ukraine show the limits of external military assistance: advanced Western arms have not guaranteed decisive victory for Kyiv, and they have sometimes contributed to prolonging the conflict without creating a sustainable path to settlement. The discussion also notes the asymmetry between American industrial scale and European capacity. Even with U.S. backing, Europe's defense production and stockpile management lag the demands of a protracted high-intensity conflict. The implication is that reliance on external support without transparent domestic deliberation about strategy, objectives, and exit conditions is risky. Citizens are entitled to know whether their governments are preparing for sustained confrontation or seeking a managed settlement — and to influence which path is taken. ## The human cost of a NATO–Russia war At the heart of the intervention is a reminder of what a failure of political judgment would mean in human terms. The conversation pauses frequently to consider the civilian toll, the displacement, and the destruction that would accompany a wider European conflict. Beyond strategic calculations, those costs form the clearest moral argument for restraint: lives, communities, and the social fabric of nations would be at stake. The contributors emphasi

Europe Can't Win a War With Russia — British Commodore Explains | Steve Jermy Commodore Steve Jermy joins Pascal to warn that Europe is courting a war it cannot sustain. They examine Kaliningrad escalation scenarios, Russian military capabilities, Western political groupthink, and the gulf between public narratives and battlefield realities. Jermy explains his support for a petition to pause British military assistance to Ukraine and demand public debate. The conversation also explores failed diplomacy, NATO’s readiness, American commitments, and why ordinary Europeans must have a say before their leaders risk a wider conflict. Steve's Links: Substack article: https://stevejermy.substack.com/p/petition-pause-british-military-support UK Parliament petition: https://petition.parliament.uk/petitions/781311 Steve Jermy's Substack: https://stevejermy.substack. com Neutrality Studies Links: Neutrality Studies Substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Support Neutrality Studies: https://neutralitystudies.com/donate Neutrality Studies shop: https://neutralitystudies.com/shop Time Stamps 00:00 Steve Jermy and the petition to pause military support 05:09 Escalation risks and Europe’s military vulnerability 08:38 Political narratives and “cult thinking” 14:26 Kaliningrad and the danger of miscalculation 20:38 Ignored warnings and failed diplomacy 27:24 America, Ukraine and the battlefield 32:17 The human cost of a NATO–Russia war 43:47 Defensive security and how to support the petition #Pascal Welcome back, everybody, to Neutrality Studies today for an update with the always brilliant Commodore Steve Jermy, a retired captain of the British Navy. Steve, welcome back. #Steve Jermy Good to be here, Pascal. I say this so often, that they say you should live in interesting times. My goodness me, don't we live in interesting times. #Pascal We do. I mean, for whatever it is, and everybody watching this knows I'm not a great fan of how politics is going, but it is not boring. And one of the things that you've now started that we want to talk about is this here. You started a petition in Britain to pause British military support for Ukraine. Steve, what is this about? #Steve Jermy -- 1 of 16 -- We have a system in Britain, and I should say that the petition was actually started by somebody else, but I had had one in draft and was about to launch it, and I'd seen this one was launched. But the system is that if you have a petition, there's a government process to put it up online. It's a sort of formalised process. If you put a petition up and you get to 10,000 signatures, the government must respond. If you get to 100,000 signatures online, then the government must debate it in Parliament. So it's an opportunity for us to actually get something into the system. I had been thinking about doing it, Pascal, and indeed had actually got a draft petition up. But then, through a mutual acquaintance, I discovered that somebody else had one which was similar to the one that I was putting up and had already launched it. And essentially what it does is, it says—their petition says that we should pause British military support to Ukraine and conduct a referendum. I probably would have worded it slightly differently. I think a referendum is a big thing in this country, so there's a lot of work to do. But essentially, the petition, which anybody can get to—I've covered it in my Substack article—but the petition actually suggests as well that the war is of no security interest to Britain, but it's actually increasing the cost of energy and therefore increasing the cost of living at a time when it's a really critical issue in the country. The cost of living is probably the biggest issue in the country, I'd say. So as soon as I saw the petition and somebody alerted me to it, Pascal, I thought, okay, well, rather than do my own separately, I'll just jump in behind this one. So I've written a Substack article to give it more of a fair wind. At the moment, I think there are about 460 signatures. It's early days, but there are probably about six British petitions on Ukraine at the moment. I think it's got more signatures than the rest of the petitions put together. Some of them just get a fair wind, and others take a little bit more time. But we've got until next year to get to the 100,000 mark. And one of the things I thought would be useful would be to make sure that any British citizens who were watching these sorts of programmes were aware of it, because I think it's really important to have a debate about this. At the moment, it's extremely... I wouldn't say... What's the word, Pascal? The British media are almost completely on the side of the government line, so the dissenting voices are hardly ever heard, apart from on independent media with people like you, I, and our other colleagues from Tbilisi and other sorts of places, Pascal. #Pascal Yeah, the word you were looking for is propaganda. The propaganda is insane, and it is pro-war propaganda, and it is pro-weapons propaganda. So what we need to do is counter propaganda in order to actually spread the news that there are people who oppose this insanity. And I'm very glad that you're now forming also a group that does this, or a group like that, that there are people in Britain coming out for this. So this petition, how much time do you actually have? Is it like six months, or how long? And so, like, any Brit listening, what would they do in order to support? -- 2 of 16 -- #Steve Jermy Well, if they go straight to the Substack article, they can go straight online and find it through the government website. But in the Substack article, I've actually got not one, but two links to the same petition. So just go to the Substack article. And what I thought I would do is, in the Substack article, I would give much more of a background. Again, I haven't had a chance to talk to the person who actually launched the petition. But the key thing is, the petition in Britain is moderated by the civil service. So there are certain things that you can put in and certain things that you can't put in. It's really—that sounds sort of draconian. It's not really. It's just about—they veto petitions about things that are based largely completely on opinion, or completely on things which are impossible to do. So this one's got through its moderation, which takes about one to three weeks. So it's live. And the background to the petition is in the article that I've written. It sort of fell very well into some other Substack articles I've written. I mean, one of them was on the coming war with Russia. And in the coming war with Russia, I finished off that article by saying that we needed to have a public debate about this because the risks to Britain, the risks to Europe—I mean, the risk to the world of an extending war from Russia into NATO, which is by no means impossible. #Pascal Indeed, I would say it's about 50-50 at the moment, I'm afraid to say. #Steve Jermy But the risks are huge. You know, they're sort of—they would lead into, as I said in the article, in the West, if the Russians were to respond to an attack, for example, on Kaliningrad, or, you know, some sort of exchange. Then, in the event of some sort of exchange between NATO and Russia, then we can't defend ourselves against Russian hypersonic and conventionally armed ballistic missiles. And just look at what's happening to Ukraine to work out what could happen to Europe. So it seemed to me that the government leading us into these potential wars was—and, as you say, very much in a "we'll stand by Ukraine whatever it takes, we'll provide the weapons that they need," which, of course, is simply upping the ante with Russia. And increasingly, I think the chance that the Russians could preempt us—I don't know whether they will. I think probably not—but in terms of probability, the fact that they might, or the fact that we might have some sort of Guns of August, which of course is Barbara Tuchman's discussion of how Europe fell into a war in 1914, and look at the consequences of that. And I think the consequences would be worse than 1914, Pascal, because of the weapons that the Russians could deploy there. #Pascal -- 3 of 16 -- Which is why it's so bizarre that, at a moment when Europe and the United States combined lack the ability to produce the implements of war that would be needed in order to even have a chance at a war like that, in that moment the rhetoric is still being ratcheted up. Britain has nuclear weapons. Britain still has armed forces. I mean, it's not as if Britain is completely disarmed, but it is not—I mean, compared to what Russia has, and especially after four years of war. And the whole idea, I think, of the NATO crowd was that this would, you know, disarm Russia because it would come out with less arms. But the opposite happened. They are much more resilient than we thought, or in Nicholas Taleb's words, anti-fragile, and they came out stronger, or they're coming out stronger out of this. Why do you think that it is that even now there is still this British and general European, actually, like, rabid Russophobia still leading to this military talk or the talk of war against Russia instead of, well, we need to figure out a way to live with the Russians? We're still not there. #Steve Jermy Hey, just a very quick note. #Pascal The best way to support this channel is by signing up for my free Substack. You can also help with a paid subscription there, or you can get some of our new merch on neutralitystudies.com. Links below. See you there. #Steve Jermy No, I think there are a number of reasons for that. And there are a number of people with different sort of theories, but it's probably a combination of things. But I think that the way that I've described this before is that Europe and NATO and the West are operating to a political narrative, which is how they guide their operations, whereas the Russians are operating according to a military strategy. As a writer on strategy, I can tell you I'd much rather have a military strategy than a political narrative, because the narrative is changing all the time. And I think what's happened is that the way that the narrative has been formed, and because of the modern approaches with spin in particular, which is very much a 21st-century phenomenon. You know, the presentation of views and advice and information to the populations in a way which actually improves the sort of people's view of the people in power. And unfortunately, what that means is that the information is often provided in a very, to me, deceptive way. I'm not sure if it's deliberately deceptive, but if you're providing information only which supports the government narrative and keeping from people the information which does the reverse, then, of course, the population tend to be propagandized. And as you say, I'm afraid to say as well, I think that this propagandization is quite wide. I was at a lunch only on Saturday with some former naval -- 4 of 16 -- commanding officers, and we got onto this subject. In the past, I found that almost everybody's anti- Putin, anti-Russia. There's more open-mindedness now, but certainly one or two of them were still along the lines of, "Well, Putin is obviously an evil man. He's obviously going to invade the rest of Europe." And when I say there's no evidence for that, people push back and say, "Well, it's obvious that he is." I say that's an opinion. It's not evidence. Nothing that Putin has said says anything other than the opposite. And I always say to people, why would Putin want to invade the rest of Europe? You know, our economies are in poor shape. There is social unrest. Just look at France. So, for a whole load of reasons. So I think that the short answer is that we've got into, thanks to propaganda, a form of cult thinking, a form of thinking where everybody's on board and anybody who dares dissent is treated as a sort of #Steve Jermy an