How To Defeat The USA At Its Own Game | Prof. S.M. Marandi

## The strategic impasse: negotiating under a cloud of mistrust The recorded exchange with Professor S.M. Marandi exposes a central dilemma shaping Iran–US relations: negotiating the technicalities of a nuclear agreement is possible, but any durable political settlement is undermined by a deep and reciprocal credibility gap. The conversation makes clear that Iran approaches diplomacy not as a standalone endeavor but as one strand of a broader strategy that binds legal, military, and reputational instruments together. For Tehran, talks serve both as a genuine channel for legal assurances — via the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) — and as a public litmus test to demonstrate who is, in practice, willing to honor bargains. Whatever emerges from the negotiating table will therefore be judged not only on clauses and timelines but on continuity of political will on the other side. ## The problem of American inconsistency One of the most persistent themes in the discussion is the unpredictability of American policy and the profound consequences that has for diplomacy. Professor Marandi emphasizes historical precedents: the original JCPOA’s rapid unraveling after the U.S. withdrawal under President Trump remains a fresh memory that conditions Iranian calculations. The problem is not episodic; it is structural. When commitments can be reversed at the whim of a successor, the party that suffered the reversal will rationally distrust any new promises without structural guarantees that go beyond a signature on paper. In the present moment this unpredictability is magnified. Mixed messages emanating from the United States — public vacillations by senior figures, shifting positions on Ukraine and Gaza, and the deployment of different emissaries with different tones — feed Iranian skepticism. The very possibility that a signed deal could be negated the next day by a leader’s statement or a social-media post poses a political asymmetry that Iranian policymakers simply cannot ignore. Thus, the trust deficit is not merely rhetorical: it is a practical blockade to any negotiated architecture that relies on the continuity and enforceability of U.S. behavior. ## Negotiations as international theater Beyond negotiating for parochial gains, Tehran uses the negotiation process as a means of shaping international public opinion. Marandi frames talks as an instrument to show the “global majority” that Iran has not walked away from diplomacy. Two linked purposes drive that calculus. First, Iran wants to signal its willingness to operate within international law and oversight mechanisms — principally the IAEA — to demonstrate that its nuclear program can be constrained and monitored without sacrificing sovereignty. Second, continuing to participate in talks allows Iran to expose what it views as unreasonable American demands. In this sense, diplomacy functions as reputational leverage: even if an agreement is improbable, the act of negotiating is itself a form of strategic theater aimed at delegitimizing unilateral coercion. This approach rests on an astute reading of global geopolitics. By keeping talks alive while publicly outlining the red lines they will not cross (defense alliances, conventional capabilities, or sovereignty over enrichment), Iranian interlocutors seek to carve moral and legal space that blunts U.S. pressure and attracts sympathy from non-Western states and publics. For states in the Global South, displays of procedural engagement matter; they can tilt diplomatic noise and possibly constrain unilateral measures by making such actions appear capricious or unjustified. ## Military preparedness and deterrence The conversation underscores that negotiation and détente are only half of Iran’s strategy; deterrence and defensive preparation constitute the other half. Marandi repeatedly stresses that Iran has invested heavily in survivable military capabilities over the past two decades: underground facilities, expanded missile and drone inventories, and upgraded air-defense and anti-ship systems. These investments are read not as aggressive posture for conquest but as insurance — a means of imposing high costs on any actor contemplating strikes on Iranian territory or infrastructure. That deterrence calculus is conservative and realist: the United States lacks the political and logistical ease to project massive, sustained ground power into Iran, while any punitive air campaign would confront formidable geographic and defensive realities. Marandi draws a geographic argument about basing and reach — the difficulties of using regional airbases without local acquiescence and the vulnerabilities of long-range strikes — to argue that even high-tech strikes would be costly and strategically risky for Washington. Moreover, Iranian holdings of long-range missiles and a distributed network of targets mean retaliation would not be limited to the initial scope of an attack. In short, military preparedness narrows the range of feasible American options and raises the threshold for any use of force. ## Regional dynamics and the limits of allies The discussion illuminates another crucial constraint on U.S. action: the reluctance or inability of regional partners to serve as staging grounds for attacks on Iran. Marandi points to the political calculus facing Gulf monarchies, Iraq, Turkey, and even smaller emirates; cooperation that would implicate them directly in an attack on Iran would carry unacceptable domestic and regional costs. The memory of popular uprisings, the politicization of foreign basing, and the potential for Iranian reprisals make these partners cautious. This regional reality carries two implications. First, it increases the logistical difficulty and political risk for any Western punitive campaign. Second, it signals that any military option would likely require extensive American resources and entail broader regional escalation — conditions that make diplomacy attractive for both escalation management and risk mitigation. In other words, the architecture of local alliances constrains action, nudging strategic actors back to negotiation even if trust is thin. ## The propaganda—and moral—battle The conversation also treats media narratives and moral claims as active components of strategy. Marandi is explicit that Western media have not been neutral observers; rather, they often function as a political shield for U.S. foreign policy. Such coverage shapes global perception, affects domestic politics in Western capitals, and influences the willingness of other states to back or oppose coercive measures. By participating in talks, Iran seeks to exploit any discrepancy between Western public claims and their actual policies, hoping international publics — especially in the Global South — will note the asymmetry and place pressure on Western governments. This is not merely rhetorical sleight of hand. Its political payoff is real: reputational costs can translate into diplomatic isolation for the coercing power, reduce coalition cohesion, and complicate the imposition of sanctions or military actions. Iran’s emphasis on the moral dimension — highlighting perceived Western double standards, from Gaza to Ukraine — is therefore strategic as much as it is normative. ## Managing escalation: a narrow pathway forward The conversation closes on a sobering note: the margin for an orderly resolution is narrow. Any durable settlement would require structural guarantees that overcome the problem of political reversibility. Marandi suggests that the IAEA can provide necessary verification for Iran’s peaceful program, but verification alone cannot compensate for the political risk that a future administration or leader will unilaterally repudiate a deal. Practical measures to bridge that gap would include multilateralizing any agreement in a way that creates broader international stakes for reversal, explicit economic compensation mechanisms that are h

How To Defeat The USA At Its Own Game | Prof. S.M. Marandi Today I’m talking to Professor Seyed Mohammad Marandi, a Professor of English Literature and Orientalism at the University of Tehran, an advisor to the Iranian nuclear negotiating team, and a prolific commentator here on YouTube and on other platforms. Professor Marandi always offers important Iranian viewpoints as well as realist analysis, so I’m happy he agreed to come online. Goods Shop: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall.com #M3 So yes, the Iranians are preparing themselves for the worst. They are preparing themselves for aggression. But the difference is that Iran is very, very powerful. It's been preparing itself for two decades. It has underground bases across the country. And especially over the past few months, the Iranians have been upgrading their missiles, drones, anti-aircraft capabilities, and anti-missile capabilities so that when the time comes, or if the time comes, they will be able to hit very hard and very accurately. #M2 Hello, everybody. This is Pascal from Neutrality Studies, and today I'm talking to Professor Seyed Mohammad Marandi, a professor of English literature and Orientalism at the University of Tehran, an advisor to the Iranian nuclear negotiating team—or previously an advisor to it—and a prolific commentator here on YouTube and other platforms. Professor Marandi always offers important Iranian viewpoints as well as realist analysis, so I'm very happy he agreed to come online. Professor Marandi, welcome. #M3 Thank you very much for inviting me. It's an honor. #M2 Well, it's great talking to you because you've got some firsthand experience of what it is like to be connected with the talks, the negotiations with the United States. Although, if I understand it correctly, you did so with the previous negotiations. Can you maybe update us, first of all, on what's going on as we speak on this May 6th, 2025, in these negotiations? Donald Trump gave a two- month deadline to come to an understanding, an agreement. But at this point, after Trump himself exited the JCPOA, what can we expect, or what does Iran expect, from these negotiations? -- 1 of 12 -- #M3 That's a good question. I was a media advisor for the nuclear talks in 2015 that led to the JCPOA. And three years ago, when the talks were revived, I was also a media advisor on both occasions. I was in Vienna during the period of the talks. The mechanism today is a bit different. They are not engaging with the media, and I'm not at all involved, of course, in the substance of the negotiations. What I can say in response to your question is that Iran has a very bad history with the United States, with or without Trump. The nuclear deal that was signed—the JCPOA—was a deal where the Iranians immediately committed themselves to their obligations, whereas Obama never did that. He violated the deal from day one—both the spirit of the deal and the substance of the deal were violated by the United States. For example, the Iranian Central Bank was never able to conduct any international transactions at all during the Obama tenure, during his presidency after the deal. Among other things, among other violations of the deal, the expansion of the sanctions regime continued under Obama. And then when Trump came, of course, he ultimately tore up the deal. So Iran does not have a good past with the United States. And it's not just the nuclear deal. Literally, on any issue that the Iranians and the Americans have negotiated on and come to an agreement over in the last 40-some years, in every single instance, the United States violated its side of the bargain. That's just how they work. And so, as we speak, the two sides are holding indirect talks at the insistence of the Iranians. Under Biden, the Iranians' talks with the Americans were indirect, and they insist that this model continues unless the United States changes its behavior. Unless we see real changes in the way the Americans deal with the Iranians, it will continue to be indirect. If at some point the Americans show goodwill and demonstrate that they're pursuing a meaningful change in the relationship, then things could change. But so far, we don't see any sign of that. Now, Trump has said many different things to different people, and so have the people around him, and that causes a lot of confusion because Iran is not going to negotiate its allies; it's not going to negotiate its defense and offensive capabilities. Its conventional capabilities have to do with the Iranians and not with the Americans. It's not for them to make any comment on those issues or to make any decision on those issues. The Iranians will only negotiate the nuclear program, and what they will negotiate will be within the framework of international law. In other words, Iran will not negotiate its sovereignty and its right to have a peaceful nuclear program, which includes nuclear enrichment. And so, if the United States wants to have assurances that Iran is not developing a nuclear weapon, that's doable. That's what the International Atomic Energy Agency is for, anyway. That's one of its responsibilities. So that is something that can be solved. But of course, the problem is that we don't know exactly what the Americans are seeking because it sometimes changes every day. Sometimes, in a single interview—Trump's latest interview—we saw him say almost two things simultaneously. On the one hand, he was saying Iran shouldn't have a nuclear program. That's not going to happen. On the -- 2 of 12 -- other hand, he said, "I can listen to the argument about Iran's nuclear program or its enrichment cycle." I didn't see the interview, so I'm not quite sure what he said. But the point is that he says different things at different times, and the people around him have also said different things. And it's not just Iran—it's Russia. He was going to end the war in one day, and now his honeymoon period of 100 days has passed, and we seem to be seeing the United States actually moving in the opposite direction. They're now giving new arms to Ukraine under Trump, and it seems that this war is going to continue in the months ahead, from what we're seeing. But during this 100-day period, we've seen all sorts of different things. Kellogg says one thing; others say something completely different. Kellogg sounds like he's the spokesman for the Biden team. Whereas we were hearing more reasonable things from other people surrounding Trump, including Witkoff. But still, there's been no breakthrough. And now it seems like, as I said, things are moving in the wrong direction again. So the Iranians are looking at how the Americans are behaving over Ukraine. It doesn't look good. Iran has seen what the Americans have done over Gaza. Again, with Witkoff, we were told that he read the Riot Act and that he told Netanyahu to come on a Saturday to his office and to end this genocide. We had a ceasefire. We saw a ceasefire. Then, soon afterwards, Trump started speaking about ethnic cleansing and expelling Palestinians from their land and taking it over. A very sinister thing to say, but that's what he was saying. But that was not only sinister, but it was against the agreement that he brokered. Witkoff brokered a deal, and Trump was the first person to literally reject the deal. And then, of course, he gave the green light to Netanyahu to restart the genocide. Before that, Netanyahu began the starvation siege, which continues as we speak, and people are beginning to die as a result of starvation. So his man put forward the deal, it was accepted, it was implemented, and then he tore it up—literally. Trump himself tore it up. So we have an instance where Trump himself was behind the deal, he tore it up in Gaza, and then we have another instance where he promised a deal, he promised to end the war, and he didn't, and now he seems to be shifting back to Biden's policies. So when we look at that, when we look at Ukraine, and then we put Gaza alongside that, and the genocide in Gaza, it's unbelievable, really. Nineteen months of genocide in front of the eyes of the world, and they shamelessly continue it, and the Western media is silent about it, and Western elites are all looking away. But in any case, when we look at these two cases and then we see the inconsistencies in what Trump and others around Trump have been saying over the Iranian nuclear deal, it's impossible for us to figure out where things will go ultimately. And even if we do have a deal with Trump—let's say there is some sort of breakthrough—Witkoff comes. He accepts reality. They have a deal. It's obviously not going to be the JCPOA because Iran's nuclear advances—its peaceful nuclear program—have advanced remarkably since back then. Any agreement will have to acknowledge Iran's technological advances because the United States has been imposing sanctions during these years. It's not going to give Iran compensation, so it has to acknowledge Iran's nuclear achievements. But let's say they go and Witkoff accepts that, the United -- 3 of 12 -- States accepts a reasonable deal. What's to say, or who's to say, that the next morning you suddenly wake up and Trump hasn't said something on Truth Social basically negating the whole deal? A week later, a month later, two months later—if he suddenly says, "I don't accept this deal. The Iranians are terrible people. They're liars. They're doing this"—he can make up anything, because he makes things up all the time. Who's to say that, therefore, a signed deal will last? This is the problem that the Iranians have to deal with. That's why senior Iranian officials are saying that the government, the administration, and society have to move on with business as usual as the negotiations take place, because we have no idea what the Americans are going to do. I don't think the Americans have any idea what they're going to do. #M2 This is a horrible situation because it's not just the complete loss of trust, it's the loss of credibility in anything coming from the other side. And, you know, with Russia, we could at least say that we saw them trying and we saw the US trying to shift course. I mean, it's hard to say that dispatching Witkoff was not at least meant in a way that also the Russians understood that, okay, fine, we're going to try. But with Iran, it's a completely different story, isn't it? It's heavy-handed, and it's imposing, and it's a 60-day deadline or else. It's a completely different mindset and frame. And of course, we see the influence of Israel on trying—not only, and just on a side note, the Western media doesn't just look away from the genocide. It legitimizes and excuses the genocide. It's even worse than that. But let's leave that aside. When it comes to Iran, we have a very similar dynamic where everybody blames Iran for breaking agreements, even though the JCPOA was clearly canceled by the United States. Then Mike Pompeo even had the audacity to demand that Iran still live up to it because it's still valid with the French, the Germans, and the others. I mean, that level of audacity just continues to this day. So my question is, how does the Iranian leadership deal with that? We know there are factions within Iran that have different ideas about where to go. What is the internal approach at the moment that seems manageable? #M3 Yes, there are different political parties. There are different political persuasions. Elites have differing views on where to go from here. To be very blunt, the diversity of opinion that you see in Iran, both online and offline, is much greater than in the West. And that, of course, is ironic. But you're right. When you say "everybody," of course, you're talking about the West. The West always says Iran is the side that violates agreements, but it's always Iran that has been committed to its agreements, and it's always the West that violates its agreements. -- 4 of 12 -- But Western media, just like