US Hegemony Is OVER: The Global South Defies Washington | Dr. Ezequiel Bistoletti

## The end of unquestioned supremacy: a new global fault line A decisive shift is underway in world politics: the material foundations that once underpinned U.S. pre-eminence are eroding, and a concerted push by the Global South—through BRICS and other alignments—is transforming the geopolitics of finance, trade and influence. The recent exchange recorded in the conversation with Dr. Ezequiel Bistoletti captures this moment as both an opportunity and a danger. On the one hand, states long marginalized from the Western-dominated order are organizing alternatives; on the other, Washington’s reflexive use of economic coercion, legal pretexts and military signaling makes a peaceful transition increasingly unlikely. The result is not merely competition but a widening contest over the rules of the international system, with Latin America and Africa emerging as central arenas. ## BRICS, the new financial project, and the challenge to dollar hegemony The BRICS grouping has moved beyond rhetoric. What began as a loose diplomatic club has accelerated into a project aimed at creating alternative financial architecture—new development banks, settlement mechanisms and trade arrangements denominated outside the dollar. The conversation highlights the Brazilian summit as a clear marker: the summit did not merely reaffirm political solidarity; it produced tangible steps toward financial independence that provoked an immediate and harsh response from the United States. This tension reveals the core of today’s struggle: when economic leadership shifts, the leverage that sustained a unipolar order weakens. Dr. Bistoletti’s reading—that the dollar now represents the United States’ last fortress of global dominance—is instructive. Economic and military weight have diffused: China leads in production and investment, Russia retains significant conventional and nuclear capabilities, and myriad emerging power centers are building institutional capacity. The dollar’s role as the premier reserve and settlement currency has been the chief instrument preserving U.S. global reach. If BRICS and its partners can institutionalize viable alternatives, the costs of sanctions, exclusion and unilateral monetary coercion for the United States rise steeply. That is why Washington’s reaction has been so blunt: not merely defensive, but existential. ## From sanctions to tariffs to saber-rattling: the tactics of a declining power The conversation makes an important diagnostic point about how the United States is responding to these shifts. When an actor faces structural decline, policy often becomes a mixture of coercion and improvisation. Recent months have shown this dynamic—sanctions, extraterritorial litigation, and even the threat of punitive tariffs against countries that deviate from U.S. preferences. These measures are simultaneously attempts to deter alignment away from the dollar and signals meant to reassure domestic constituencies that U.S. leadership is intact. Yet the strategy is self-undermining. Coercive measures push targeted states deeper into alternative arrangements, and when combined with military posturing or calls for massive rearmament by allies, they heighten the risk that systemic competition will spill into kinetic confrontation. The recorded discussion emphasizes that this is not a hypothetical: increasing European rearmament plans, NATO spending pledges, and hawkish rhetoric in capitals such as Berlin have created an ecosystem in which miscalculation can turn political rivalry into open conflict. In short, parasites of dominance breed the very alliances and countermeasures that hasten the dominant power’s loss of control. ## Hybrid war, proxy dynamics, and the perpetuation of a global contest The conversation participants advance a view that contemporary war is rarely a single, contained event; rather, it is a patchwork of hot conflicts, proxy campaigns and persistent pressure that together amount to an ongoing world war. The Ukraine conflict exemplifies this logic—seen as a theater where great power interests clash indirectly, while rhetoric about peacemaking and mediation is simultaneously deployed. Similar patterns appear around Iran, Africa, and increasingly in Latin America. This hybrid character makes policy responses more opaque and dangerous. States can claim non-involvement even while sustaining proxies, sanctions regimes and covert operations. Legal and judicial tools become instruments of influence—anti-corruption cases, extradition requests, and selective enforcement of norms are repurposed to shape foreign political landscapes. The result is a global environment in which the instruments of statecraft overlap and blur: economic warfare is wedded to legal pressure and information operations, while military buildups serve as the backdrop for diplomatic coercion. ## Latin America’s historical neutrality and the struggle for spheres of influence Latin America’s longstanding tradition of neutrality is an essential contingency in this evolving contest. Historically reticent to engage in great power wars, the region nevertheless occupies strategic value—resource-rich, geopolitically positioned, and increasingly integrated into global supply chains. The recorded exchange underscores that neutrality is no guarantee of insulation: rather, it is a contested commodity fought over through economic and political means. China’s approach—heavy on investment, infrastructure, and trade—has secured deep footholds across the continent. The United States, in turn, continues to wield the International Monetary Fund, World Bank leverage, and diplomatic pressure. The conversation emphasizes how these are not merely commercial choices: in Argentina, provincial control over resources such as lithium creates a tug-of-war between Chinese investment and U.S. countermeasures. The example of proposed U.S. diplomatic interventions to dissuade provincial governors from Chinese partnerships illustrates the day-to-day texture of this competition. Military bases, too, are floated as strategic prizes, but such proposals confront strong domestic resistance and historical memories, making overt militarization politically costly. What follows is a patchwork of alignments rather than a uniform bloc. Some governments may tilt toward BRICS for economic diversification and strategic autonomy; others will seek to balance with the United States; still others will play both sides to extract investment. This contest over spheres of influence makes Latin America a site where the global realignment will be played out in granular, often legalistic and institutional ways. ## Law, courts and NGOs: the subtler instruments of influence One of the conversation’s more worrying threads is how judicial processes, anti-corruption rhetoric, and civil-society channels have been instrumentalized as mechanisms of external influence. Where once military support and overt regime-change interventions were common, the toolkit now includes selective prosecutions, judicialized politics and NGO networks that can delegitimize adversarial movements. The conversation cites concrete patterns: the prosecution and jailing of political leaders in Brazil, Ecuador, and Argentina have been read by many as partial instruments of geopolitical steering. This legalization of politics has two effects. First, it permits external actors to claim legitimacy—anti-corruption, rule-of-law and democratic norms are powerful rhetorical tools that can obscure geopolitical motives. Second, it fragments national politics: polarized electorates see judicial interventions as either necessary accountability or foreign-backed persecution. The upshot is a chronic instability that external powers can exploit: from conditional lending to legal pressure, the terrain of influence now often runs through courts, not just barracks or ministries. ## A multipolar transition or a protracted global standoff? The final, unsettling inference fr

US Hegemony Is OVER: The Global South Defies Washington Today I’m talking again to Dr. Ezequiel Luis Bistoletti, a political scientist working for the University of Buenos Aires and an international lecturer based in Berlin. Ezequiel is also a fellow youtuber and the host of the Spanish-language channel Demoliendo Mitos de la Politica - "Demolishing Political Myths.” Links: Ezequiel's channel (Spanish): @demoliendomitosdelapolitica Neutrality Studies Goods Shop: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall.com #M2 Even if Russia wins this, we will still have this ongoing world war in which the US is trying to maintain its decaying supremacy. And we've seen over the last weeks many, many signs that somehow show this process is speeding up a lot. #M3 Hello, everybody. This is Pascal from Neutrality Studies, and today I'm talking again to Dr. Ezequiel Luis Bistoletti, a political scientist working for the University of Buenos Aires and an international lecturer based in Berlin. Ezequiel is also a fellow YouTuber and the host of the Spanish-language channel Demoliendo Mitos de la Política, Demolishing Political Myths. Ezequiel, welcome back. Nice to be here, Pascal. Great having you back, because we said we need to cover a couple of topics that are happening at the moment, and we will go into the great power conflagration that we're seeing in a moment. But I would like to start with you on South America, because I actually don't cover that enough on my channel. And since you are Argentinian and you must have followed the recent BRICS meeting in neighboring Brazil, I was wondering what your impression was of this BRICS meeting compared to last year in Kazan, and how you're seeing BRICS developing. #M2 Well, many people thought that Brazil was not as actively supporting BRICS as Russia and China. But I think Lula did a pretty good job with the Brazil summit, which actually fulfilled its expectations and basically continued the path towards independence, towards the construction of a new financial order, which is basically the main challenge that BRICS is facing now. And I think the concrete results of that summit can be seen in the, let's say, quarrel that began later between the US and Brazil, or more properly between Donald Trump and Lula. Let's just remember that Trump threatened to hit the BRICS very hard if they dared to defy the supremacy of the dollar. First, he -- 1 of 14 -- said that he would impose 10% tariffs on all members, and then, because of the Bolsonaro issue— Bolsonaro is the former president of Brazil who is facing criminal charges because of storming the parliament in Brasilia some years ago. So he posted something about that—I mean, Trump—and Lula responded to that and said, these are actually Brazilian affairs, this is foreign interference. After that, Trump tried to bully Brazil with 50% tariffs, and Lula said very simply, okay, if you want to do that, we will just answer reciprocally; we will also establish 50% tariffs. And if you don't want to trade with us, no problem—we will trade with China, with India, with Russia, and with the rest of the world. Actually, the U.S. is more dependent on certain products from Brazil than the other way around—coffee, for instance. Brazil is the main producer of coffee worldwide. So I think that reaction has been the consequence of the summit in Brazil. And what I see is continuity in the BRICS path towards a new world order. The problem, and what actually worries me, Pascal, is that we see the U.S. and the West don't seem to allow this to happen peacefully. Trump is becoming more and more powerful and clear regarding the clash between these two blocs and the fact that the U.S. is not going to allow the peaceful development of BRICS, which is expanding not only with more countries but also with the project of establishing a new financial order. It established the Development Bank some years ago, and so on. And Trump said very clearly, if we lose the supremacy of the dollar, then that would actually be like losing a big world war, and we are going to do everything we can against that. This is a clash that has already started, but it is escalating because of the U.S., and sooner or later that might lead to an open armed conflict. #M3 Yeah, I mean, we're seeing how the US foreign policy operates already when it comes to Russia and also Iran, right? Iran is maybe not a systemic rival, but it is one of the classic significant others, right? In one or the other theaters. And how wars are now being fought as hybrid wars, in an on-and-off fashion, with Russia having a hot proxy or coalition war going on while still pretending to be an intermediary and an outside force for peace, and so on. But okay, that's part of the job—we've got to cut through these kinds of narratives and try to figure out how things really work. But when it comes to the BRICS, one of the things that still strikes me is that the United States, on the one hand, acts as if nothing in the world could break the structural power of the U.S.—to the point where Donald Trump, a couple of months ago, also said, you know, running a reserve currency for the world is very expensive, and other states need to compensate us for that because we're rendering such an important service. On the other hand, they're saying nothing must ever challenge that status of ours, while still imposing all of these sanctions and now also tariffs—because tariffs have basically become sanctions on the people you don't want to brand as enemies, right? Including the European Union, which recently just gave in, at least for now—von der Leyen just accepting, basically, the harshest of U.S. terms—whereas Brazil said, no, we're not taking this. -- 2 of 14 -- If you want to do this, then fine. We're going to live with it. Do you think that we are now seeing the new structural power of the states that actually have a spine and a way of dealing with the big bully to the north? #M2 Well, I think that U.S. power was, in the past, based on the economy—and by that I mean the productive economy—the military, and also, naturally, political and cultural influence. However, over the years, China and the BRICS have become the biggest economic bloc, so China is leading economically. Militarily, there is Russia, which has huge military power, so the U.S. is not number one in those areas anymore. One of the few things that still sustains U.S. supremacy is its financial power through the dollar. The last one is cultural power, for which we still don't see many counter- projects. But usually, that's always the last part of an order that changes, right? The cultural power, which is basically what Gramsci called hegemony. But the U.S. is becoming more and more aware of the fact that the last resort of world power that they have is the U.S. dollar. Militarily, it cannot carry out several wars at the same time. Economically, it was surpassed by China a long time ago. Internally, nothing is working. Most of the things that Trump promised have not been fulfilled. The Epstein affair has affected him tremendously. The tariffs idea that he had—"I will put tariffs on everyone and that way I will restore the U.S. economy"—well, that was flawed from the very beginning. It wasn't a real plan to reindustrialize the U.S. For that, you need much more than tariffs. But even so, it hasn't worked at all, with the only exception of the European Union, which submitted to the U.S. and accepted these 15% tariffs, with a lot of promises of $600 billion in investments and $700 billion in energy. But nobody knows if that could really be materialized. But that's the only success that the Trump government has had with its promises and policies so far. And well, in this regard, the emergence— very slowly, it must be said, but continuously as well—of a new financial order is the last step towards the end of U.S. supremacy. And the U.S. knows this, which is why they react so harshly. The big risk that I see here is that this does not evolve peacefully, but that we finally end up in a world confrontation. Actually, a world war—a global world war—is already happening, ongoing. We don't have a direct confrontation, as you said. And I believe that even after a Russian victory, I think that's not avoidable. Some analysts say that Russia has already won the war in Ukraine, regardless of how this conflict ends—with a Russian victory, whether through political negotiation or the total military capitulation of Ukraine. Russia will probably take half of Ukraine, up to the Dnieper, and most likely Odessa as well. But what worries me now, Pascal, is that even if Russia wins this, we will still have this ongoing world war in which the U.S. is trying to maintain its decaying supremacy. And we've seen over the last weeks many, many signs that show this process is speeding up a lot. Let me just mention the 5% NATO spending on weapons earlier. -- 3 of 14 -- The European Union REARM project states that 800 billion euros will be spent on weapons as well. Germany has promised to do the same with a 500 billion dollar program for weapons. We have also seen statements emerging regarding Russia already committing sabotage acts in Germany. We want to have the biggest army in Europe, which immediately makes us think: how can a German chancellor say such a thing, considering Germany's history? Merz also said that Germany doesn't have to repeat the former mistakes of the past. What does he mean by that? Something like invading Russia? Then we have, on the other side, Trump threatening the BRICS. So we see an acceleration of signs that actually show us we are moving towards this direct confrontation. #M3 No, we are. It's just in a very short direction, given the tones that we are hearing from Germany. The explanation is that Germany—Chancellor Merz and his supporting team, and the others who buy into the German narrative—they have figured out that the "Hitler of 2025" sits in Moscow and in Gaza, right? I mean, Hitler is Hamas and Hitler is Putin, and therefore, full support for whoever fights them with the bloodiest methods is considered being on the right side of history. So I think we are currently seeing the latest iteration of Germany having again learned the wrong lesson from its own past. And I must say, a good number of Germans actually understand that. Also, in the German social media space, you see how many people actually comprehend that this is an utterly misguided direction. But unfortunately, that's the one that the German political leadership—and it's not just the CDU, it's other parties as well, especially the Greens, and unfortunately the SPD too—are marching in. Now, let me maybe bring it back. I mean, let me ask you again about one thing that is dear to my heart because of the name of my channel. South America—do you think that countries like Argentina, but also Brazil, and maybe let's take Chile, let's take Ecuador, and so on—do they understand these signs the way that we're talking about them, and will they try to maintain an arm's-length distance, like a form of neutrality? On the one hand, yes, Brazil is part of the BRICS, but I don't think BRICS sees itself as a counter to NATO or as a counter to the US. It sees itself as the non-West, and just like, "Let's continue while these idiots keep doing their stupid little spiel and see what we can come up with as an alternative." But when it comes to hard confrontation, do you think that South America will maintain neutrality again? Because in the Second World War, it did—Argentina maintained its neutrality almost until the very end. #M2 Well, in general terms, Latin America has a tradition of neutrality. In terms of military conflicts as well, Latin America has barely had, over the last 200 years, any major military conflicts among Latin American countries, with a few exceptions. That doesn't mean that there is no violence—there is internal violence and different problems. But in that context, there i