Russia Responds To West‘s New Sneak-Attacks | Dr. Pietro A. Shakarian

## The Stakes: Why Iran Matters to Russia and China The conversation lays out a simple but easily overlooked fact: Iran is not a peripheral interest for Eurasian powers; it is a strategic linchpin. Destabilizing Iran would do more than reshape the Middle East. It would sever overland links that underpin Russia’s and China’s regional strategies, imperil access to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, and create security vacuums across the Caucasus and Central Asia. The speakers repeatedly stressed that Iran’s size, population and geostrategic position give it an outsized footprint. A collapsed or client-state Iran would not be Syria redux; it would be a systemic shock with cascading effects for energy, trade corridors, and the balance of power along Russia’s southern flank and China’s Belt and Road routes. That larger framing helps explain why the reaction from Moscow and Beijing has been more than rhetorical theatre. The stakes are not merely sentimental ties or shared antipathy toward Western pressure. In concrete terms, a fragmented Iran threatens Russia’s southern buffer zones and overland energy and transport corridors; it would complicate Beijing’s push into West Asia and undermine nascent North–South projects intended to link Russia, Iran, and the Indian subcontinent. Seen in this light, the diplomatic and technical support offered to Tehran is an investment in preserving strategic depth, not simply an expression of solidarity. ## The January Pact and the Limits of Commitment One of the clearest contributions of the exchange is a reminder to distinguish formal treaty language from implicit strategic signaling. The January Pact between Russia and Iran deepened military-technical and intelligence cooperation, but it is not—and according to the conversation, was never intended to be—a straight mutual-defense alliance. This nuance matters because Western commentary has often framed Moscow’s posture in binary terms: either an unconditional shield or an outright betrayal. The participants warned that such narratives are convenient simplifications that serve geopolitical aims by trying to drive a wedge between Tehran and Moscow. Acknowledging the pact’s deliberate ambiguity helps explain current Russian behavior. Moscow has codified a high degree of interoperability and strengthened technical ties, yet it has deliberately stopped short of an Article 5–style guarantee. That posture reflects Russia’s calculation about risk: it wants to deter and complicate adversary action against Iran, and to secure access and influence, without automatically dragging itself into a conflict that could escalate in multiple theaters. The pact is thus a pragmatic instrument to institutionalize cooperation while leaving political space for maneuver. ## Diplomatic Leverage and Behind-the-Scenes Military Assistance The conversation stresses that diplomacy in this crisis is not cheap talk. Public declarations, UN votes, and even strongly worded Security Council statements carry operational value for Tehran. When Russia and China publicly defend Iran’s legal rights or condemn strikes, they reduce the diplomatic isolation that can precede harsher measures and provide Tehran breathing room in international fora. At the same time, interlocutors emphasized that much of the consequential activity happens offstage—classified exchanges, military-technical transfers, and intelligence cooperation that do not lend themselves to public accounting. This two-track approach—loud diplomacy coupled with quiet assistance—serves several purposes. It signals commitment without creating an automatic trigger for escalation; it provides practical aid that can enhance Iran’s resilience (for example, in air-defence repair and augmentation); and it sends a message to other regional actors that attempts to engineer regime change will face strategic pushback. As Dr. Pietro A. Shakarian notes in the conversation, Iran does not currently need to be “saved” by outside powers in the existential sense; it remains a capable actor. But Moscow and Beijing will still provide calibrated help that preserves Iran’s strategic viability. ## Local Resilience and the Limits of Regime-Change Calculus A recurring theme is the miscalculation behind external hopes for swift regime collapse. Historical parallels—the Iran–Iraq war, the aftermath of proxy conflicts in the Levant—reveal that attempts to force political transformation by military means often consolidate national identity rather than fracture it. The conversation highlights Iran’s strong sense of historical continuity, nationalism, and capacity to absorb shocks. Rather than producing a willing post-revolutionary client, a high-profile intervention could harden resistance, rally disparate ethnic groups around a common cause, and ensure long-term instability. This dynamic matters because it complicates the strategic logic of actors who prefer instability in the neighborhood. If the aim is to weaken a regional rival or create enduring niches of influence, fomenting chaos can be a double-edged sword: fragmentation might provide short-run opportunities for third parties, but it also creates ungoverned spaces where nonstate actors proliferate and where great-power rivals can be drawn into extended commitments. For Russia and China, those are outcomes to avoid. Their objective, the conversation suggests, is to preserve a stable Iran that can be a predictable partner, not a shattered landscape that multiplies risk. ## Ethnic Fault Lines and Regional Cascade Risks The conversation draws attention to internal composition as a key variable seldom foregrounded in headline analyses. Iran’s multiethnic society—Persians, Azerbaijanis, Kurds, Baluchis, Arabs in Khuzestan, and others—creates both cohesion and vulnerability. While national identity has historically cut across those divides, a severe external shock could accentuate local grievances and provoke centrifugal pressures that intersect with neighboring states’ claims and regional rivalries. These ethnic dimensions have direct implications for Russia’s neighborhood. A destabilized Iran could spill into the Caucasus and Central Asia, emboldening separatist movements, reconfiguring borders, or prompting intervention by neighboring states. The presence of large ethnic Azerbaijani communities in northern Iran, for example, could feed into Azerbaijan’s calculations or regional contests over territory and influence. That prospect is deeply unattractive to Moscow, which depends on a relatively stable southern periphery and fears the diffusion of conflict into former Soviet republics where Russia has critical security interests. ## Great-Power Coordination and the BRICS Calculus One of the striking takeaways is the degree to which the crisis has catalyzed dialogue among non-Western powers. The conversation describes ongoing consultations between Moscow and Beijing and signals a forthcoming high-level exchange. For both Russia and China, protecting Iran’s stability aligns with broader visions for multipolar economic and security architectures: safeguarding trade routes for Belt and Road projects, ensuring access to energy corridors, and preserving the operational coherence of BRICS-era initiatives. That alignment does not automatically translate into uniformity of action. Both capitals balance a desire to deter destabilizing interventions with competing priorities—domestic pressures, resource constraints, and the risk of wider entanglement. But the shared interest in preventing a Western-orchestrated regime change in Tehran creates a strong incentive to coordinate diplomatic pressure, share intelligence where useful, and provide selective military-technical support. In short, the BRICS triangle in this moment operates less as a formal alliance and more as a pragmatic concert to manage a potential systemic disruption. ## The Risk of Escalation and Moscow’s Calculus A central tension explored in the exchange i

Russia Responds To West���s New Sneak-Attacks Today I’m talking again to Pietro Shakarian, an Armenian historian at the Higher School of Economics in St. Petersburg who has analysed the Russian-Iranian relationship for a while. We are talking on June 19th, only 6 days after Israel’s sneak attack on Iran and currently everybody is waiting for what the US will do, but a direct military attack seems likely—at least right now. Today we discuss what this means for the political relationship between Iran and Russia. Links: Pietro's Book on Amastas Mikoyan: https://iupress.org/9780253073556/anastas-mikoyan/ Neutrality Studies Goods Shop: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall.com #M3 The Russians are often playing the role of the adult in the room in these scenarios. They will only respond to an escalation if they really need to. They do not want to see the situation in the Baltic region escalate further than it already has. And we also have to consider something else. When I mentioned how the Russians felt betrayed by the continental West Europeans, the sense of betrayal is much stronger when it comes to Finland and Sweden—the Scandinavian countries in particular. #M2 Hello, everybody. This is Pascal from Neutrality Studies, and today I'm talking again to Pietro A. Shakarian, an Armenian historian at the Higher School of Economics in St. Petersburg, who has analyzed the Russian-Iranian relationship for a while. We're talking today on June 19th, only six days after Israel's sneak attack on Iran, and currently everybody is waiting to see what the U.S. will do. But a direct military attack still seems likely, at least at this point. And what this means for the relationship between Russia and Iran is what we want to discuss today. So, Pietro, welcome back. #M3 Pascal, it's great to be on your show again. Thank you for having me. #M2 Thank you for coming online. And, you know, coincidentally, I had a talk with another colleague on military affairs just earlier about the military relationship between Russia and Iran. But with you, I would like to look at the political level, which you have also analyzed, like the treaty that was recently created. Could you give us a rundown of how you think the situation in and around Iran is now affecting Russia's political choices? -- 1 of 19 -- #M3 Well, first and foremost, we have to consider the dynamic of the January Pact, which I'm not going to go through point by point again on your program because I already did that. But just to reiterate for your audience, the treaty envisions a deepening of technical military cooperation, but it is not a mutual defense pact. That's very important to understand. Moreover—and this is an important point, too, and something Russian analysts will emphasize—both the Russian side and the Iranian side are not at the point where they want to bring it to a mutual defense pact level. That's extremely important. So, it was not a situation where, let's say, Iran wanted to make a defense pact deal and Russia, you know, betrayed Iran or something like that. And by the way, these narratives about Russia being an untrustworthy ally of Iran—this kind of narrative is designed in the Western media to drive a wedge between Russia and Iran. So if you are subscribing to this idea—I mean, I'm saying this in general to your audience—if there is anybody out there who's subscribing to the idea that Russia will betray Iran or that Russia has betrayed Iran, you're adopting a narrative that is meant to drive a wedge between these two countries, right? So it serves a geopolitical purpose. But in any case, the point is that they're just content right now with where their relations are: with intelligence cooperation, cooperation maybe in military assistance, technical assistance, but not necessarily an outright mutual defense pact. It's extremely important to emphasize that point alone. So, yeah, no. And also, you have to understand the stakes for Russia and actually also for China in this regard, because, again, I put it into context—the Eurasian backdrop. If, for example—so again, the whole initial attack by Israel against Iran was motivated by this idea, at least this is what they were saying, about the nuclear program, to take out Iran's nuclear program. But in truth, we can see that quickly the objective of the attack changed, and Benjamin Netanyahu declared that it was about regime change. Even the name of the operation—Operation Rising Lion—the lion is the national symbol of Persia, of Iran. So the idea was to maybe instigate some kind of uprising. But God forbid, if there was a regime change in Iran—again, think about this. This is a country of 90 million people. By area, it's the size of Mongolia. It's not Syria. It's not Iraq. If a country like that were to be dismantled or destabilized, God help us for the whole region, because look at all the countries it borders. The former Soviet republics in the Caucasus and Central Asia— this has a direct bearing on Russian security. Also, if there were a destabilized Iranian state, it would obstruct Russia's access further south to the Persian Gulf. This would also affect China, undoubtedly. So anyway, those are some points to consider. Russia has an interest in seeing Iran not fail. But it also feels at this point—and the Iranians too feel at this point—that they're strong enough, the Iranians feel strong enough, that they don't necessarily need a mutual defense pact. #M2 -- 2 of 19 -- Right. And, you know, the same point Stanislav Krapivnik, whom I just talked to, also emphasized: the soft underbelly of Russia is a strategic vulnerability, of course, from the Russian point of view. So Iran is very pivotal in actually making sure that no such threats—groups of, well, we call them terrorists, or just politically motivated groups, and also, of course, US proxy and CIA forces—can infiltrate this line. But do you think the Russians are now looking at increased military-to-military cooperation among them, or what kind of support do you think Russia is trying to give Iran, other than the diplomatic efforts that Vladimir Putin was offering? You know, with, "Okay, let's mediate this," which has been floating around the last couple of days, and in which it seems that neither the Israelis nor the Americans are really willing to take part. #M3 Well, first of all, we have to look at the fact that the diplomatic overtures, the diplomatic statements, the diplomatic moves—that's not nothing. OK, so everybody thinks that, well, it's just rhetoric, it's just, you know, "we support Iran" or whatever, and it's not really anything. But it really is quite important. And also, you have to consider, Pascal, that the Iranians often ask for this diplomatic assistance from the Russian side. It's not as if Russia is just making these statements; Iran is asking, and Russia is basically saying to Iran, "What can we do for you?" And Iran is saying, "If you could support us, let's say, in the UN..." Right? Russia and China were the only two permanent members of the Security Council that supported Iran in the UN when this attack, you know, got underway. And also, you have to consider the fact that even some of those statements by the Russian ambassador to the UN, for example, were extraordinarily strong—like saying that Israel violated international law, that it tore up the UN Charter. This kind of rhetoric is actually quite significant. So the political and diplomatic support is actually quite important for both sides. But there is also this element: when we talk about military-technical cooperation, it's not something—even if I knew all the details—I could openly discuss on this podcast. This is stuff that would largely be going on behind the scenes between Russia and Iran. There are details of which we are not privy, but I can assure you that the military-technical ties between Russia and Iran are very intensive. At some point, it's also limited because both sides are not yet ready to take it to the next step. Even this pact from January—we have to understand that it was basically a reflection of where the relations had evolved to. It was codifying on paper the fact that the previous agreements between Russia and Iran were outdated, and now they needed to be succeeded by something else that really reflected the nature of the relationship. But you also have to consider that both sides are not yet ready for a mutual defense pact. And we should also think about this: why must we assume, in the alternative media sphere, that somehow Iran needs to be saved by Russia or China? I mean, that's only in the worst-case scenario. Right now, Iran is doing pretty well on its own. Sure, in the beginning, it was a little tough for Iran. But look, if you talk to Ted Postol of MIT, right? Look at what Iran is doing with Israel's Iron Dome—they've completely shattered it. And meanwhile, you see the Iranian air defenses; they're nothing to sneeze at. I mean, initially, when Israel sabotaged -- 3 of 19 -- the Iranian air defenses at the beginning, it was very difficult for Iran. But now Iran is back online, and you can see over Tehran—sure, there are strikes—but Iran has been quite successful at intercepting a lot of these Israeli missiles coming in. So think of it like this: Iran, as I said, is a country of 90 million people, with major human resources, and it's a very large country. Now, there are also problems that come with being such a large country. You have situations where Israel can infiltrate, Mossad can infiltrate with its spies into Iran— not too dissimilar from what we've seen between Russia and Ukraine, right? Again, even the drone attack, that was all, you know, down to a T. That was exactly like what happened with Russia and the Ukrainians, where they went into the interior of Russia and set up these drones to launch on their own, and so on and so forth. But even the issue of spies, even the issue of espionage—because, for instance, if you live in Russia, as I do, you see news reports periodically about how the FSB is cracking some Ukrainian spy ring or they've sabotaged a Ukrainian terrorist attack. So they have a problem here too in Russia with spies, even with the FSB, which is one of the top intelligence services in the world. Still, you have this problem. So Iran—it's a large country. Of course, you're going to have issues like that. But also, it has enormous assets, and it should not be underestimated in this conflict with Israel at all, really. #M2 No, you're absolutely right. But the fact is that the conflict—the war—I mean, Israel against Iran, and behind the scenes, the US against Iran, and maybe overtly... So far, the strike hasn't happened yet. I mean, the US so far hasn't dropped bombs directly with its own military assets on Iran. But if that happens, then this will impact, of course, the relationship with Russia and China, which I think is evident. But in what way can we expect either more military-to-military cooperation, or in what way can we expect maybe the Russians politically talking to the Chinese, trying to figure out a triangle or a BRICS approach toward dealing with this? Because it's not just an attack on Iran. It is a clear escalation of world affairs and one that might spiral into a much larger conflict, actually, doesn't it? #M3 Also consider this with what I was saying about how not only is the soft underbelly of Russia—that is, the former Soviet republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia—quite vulnerable to a destabilized Iran, but also, as I said, it kind of cuts off, or does cut off... If Iran were destabilized, or if a pro- Western government were to come to power in Iran, it would cut off Russia's access to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. It would be a really, really difficult situation for the Russians and also for BRICS cooperation. Consider also, too, when we talk about China—the One Belt, One Road initiative—it would really cut off China from West Asia. -- 4 of 19