Australia and Japan are Ditching US Empire | Prof. Warwick Powell

## A diplomatic reset? The recent public thaw between Canberra and Beijing is less a momentary bout of diplomatic theater than an outward sign of a deeper reassessment unfolding in Australia. The imagery — handshakes, smiling leaders, visits to the Great Wall and Panda Park — is deliberate and scripted, but the substance matters more. How a nation frames its relationship with a dominant neighbor tells us about how it sees its own interests, vulnerabilities, and options. In Australia’s case, those calculations are in the process of being rebalanced: economic interdependence, security concerns, and regional stability are being reassembled into a single, more nuanced strategic proposition. That synthesis, voiced by the Australian prime minister and underscored repeatedly during the trip to Shanghai, Beijing, and Chengdu, signals a willingness to interrogate long-standing assumptions about alignment, deterrence, and dependency. Warwick Powell, whose recent commentary informed much of this conversation, highlights the trip’s symbolic choreography but insists the trip’s real significance lies in bringing three pillars — economy, security, and regional stability — into a cohesive public argument. Whether this signals a permanent pivot or merely a recalibration remains open. What is clear is that Canberra is testing the waters: seeing what can be said and done without rupturing vital ties, while also managing frictions with its most consequential ally. ## Revisiting Australia’s strategic choices Australia’s strategic identity has long been tied to a larger protective umbrella. During the mid-20th century the umbrella was British; in the postwar order it became the U.S. alliance. This sub-imperial posture — the sense that Australia’s interests were effectively coterminous with those of a superior power — has allowed Canberra to enjoy the benefits of security guarantees at the price of diminished strategic autonomy. But assumptions about enduring American primacy in Asia are no longer universally accepted in Australian policy circles. Powell draws attention to a bifurcated debate: one camp sees the United States retrenching from regional primacy and urges Australia to adapt to a future where China is the dominant regional power; the other camp, often louder in certain political circles, pushes to shore up American influence. Thinkers such as Hugh White articulate the former: a blunt urging to “learn to live with” Chinese dominance. Other voices, including once staunch defenders of the alliance like Peter Varghese, have softened their outlook, acknowledging that the era of uncontested U.S. leadership in Asia is waning. The shift is not uniform, but a critical mass of Australian debate now recognizes that the old certainty — that American power would indefinitely secure regional balance — is in doubt. That reassessment has consequences. If the United States cannot be relied upon to maintain a stable balance, then Canberra must weigh whether to double down on military integration with Washington, seek hedging strategies, or attempt to carve a more independent posture that preserves economic ties with China while deterring coercion through other means. The answers are not purely technical questions about force structure; they are normative choices about what Australia wants its national interest to be. ## The uncomfortable reality of military entanglement One striking tension revealed in the discussion is the mismatch between talk of strategic independence and the reality of embedded military integration. Over the last decade and a half, U.S. forces, facilities, and intelligence infrastructure have deepened their presence in Australia. Pine Gap, forward-deployed naval visits, and troop rotation arrangements amount to a durable American military footprint. Powell points out that this embeddedness creates both practical and political consequences: being part of the American power-projection network makes it difficult for Australia to credibly claim neutrality in the event of a major conflict in East Asia. This reality was laid bare by recent interventions from prominent hawks who argue that Australia should accept this integration openly — that the nation is de facto part of an American imperial constellation and should therefore be at the joint planning table. That argument is blunt and politically provocative because it eliminates plausible deniability. If Australian soil supports American military operations, how can Canberra credibly claim a non-belligerent stance should those operations draw fire? Powell suggests that such frank assessments, however distasteful to many, may be necessary to prompt an honest public debate about the costs and obligations of alliance dependency. Compounding the unease is Washington’s own behavior: demanding “strategic clarity” from allies on how they would act in a hypothetical conflict with China, even while preserving strategic ambiguity about its own Taiwan policy. The timing and public nature of such demands — leaked to disrupt a prime ministerial visit, as Powell suspects — underscore the coercive pressures allies can face. For many Australians, being pressed to commit combat support in hypothetical contingencies is a reminder that alliance benefits carry hidden strings. ## Economic interdependence and the politics of regional stability If military ties complicate Australia’s choices, economic interdependence makes some options politically unpalatable. China is Australia’s largest trading partner and a central market for Australian exports. Powell emphasizes that Canberra is increasingly articulating economic security as equally important to conventional notions of security. The prime minister’s messaging that relations with China matter not only to Australia’s economy but also to its security and regional stability is an attempt to recalibrate public and elite thinking: if economic disruption can cause domestic dislocation with security implications, then trade is not purely a matter of prosperity but of resilience. This economic reality also reframes regional strategy. ASEAN has already become China’s largest trading partner and vice versa; regional systems are integrating in ways that complicate zero-sum logic. Powell highlights that Asia is not a simple binary of U.S. allies versus China-aligned states. Countries across the region navigate delicate hedges: deepening commercial ties with Beijing while preserving military relationships with Washington. Australia’s dilemma is how to manage economic dependence without ceding strategic autonomy, and whether to invest in resilience — economic diversification, supply-chain security, strategic industries — rather than exponential military spending as the sole answer. The domestic politics of this balance is fierce. Hawks warn against accommodation and call for greater defense spending; others advocate a more consequentialist approach, weighing costs and benefits and prioritizing measures that preserve diplomatic flexibility. The public conversation is shifting from a default pro-U.S. posture to one that takes the complexities of economic ties seriously. ## Japan’s parallel reassessment The questions confronting Australia are mirrored in Tokyo. Japan, too, is grappling with how to manage a rising China, a robust alliance with the United States, and its own economic dependencies. Powell’s analysis of the regional dynamic suggests that Japan’s policy calculus is converging, in some respects, with Australia’s: both states must balance alliance obligations with the practicalities of neighborly coexistence in an integrated economic order. Washington’s recent insistence on clarity from Australia and Japan illustrates the strain that alliance leadership places on partners. Allies are being asked to commit to contingent courses of action without the United States fully clarifying its own red lines. For Tokyo, the specter of entanglement in a conflict over Taiwan raises n

Australia and Japan are Ditching US Empire Dr. Warwick Powell is an Adjunct Professor at Queensland University of Technology and a Senior Fellow at the Taihe Institute. Links: Warwick Powell's Substack: https://warwickpowell.substack. com/ Neutrality Studies Goods Shop: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall.com #M3 Hello everybody, this is Pascal from Neutrality Studies, and today I'm talking again to Dr. Warwick Powell, an adjunct professor at Queensland University of Technology and a senior fellow at the Taihe Institute. We want to discuss a bit about what's happening between Australia and China, and in a second part, we will also focus on Japan a little bit. So, Warwick, welcome back. Great to be back with you. Glad to have you. And you know, I've learned that I really must suppress the urge to pronounce the second "W" in your name. People told me that. But let's actually focus. #M2 It's okay. The English pronounce it with a silent W in the middle, and the Americans tend to pronounce the W explicitly—which, of course, is an odd thing, because Americans don't pronounce the H in "herbs," whereas the English will pronounce the H in "herbs." So I don't know why, but it is just what it is. #M3 Not a consistent language, but none of them are. None of them are. Whatever floats your boat. Warwick, about Australia—your prime minister recently went to China, and there are really new signs to me, like handshakes and happy faces and talk about friendship and a good relationship. That really surprised me, because Australia so far has been one of the spearheads of the Western world— the Western alliance—against China. Can you update us on what's happening there? #M2 Look, as you say, the Australian Prime Minister, Anthony Albanese, recently completed a six-day diplomatic trip to China where he visited three cities: Shanghai, Beijing, and Chengdu. Each of these cities hosts an Australian government presence. So, Australia has a consulate in Shanghai and in Chengdu, and, of course, the embassy in Beijing. From an Australian point of view, I think it was a very good thing for the Prime Minister to visit each of the cities where there is a permanent physical representation. Of course, in visiting these three cities, he also, I think, sought to accomplish a few -- 1 of 17 -- other things along the way. This is part of the combination of symbolic significance in diplomatic language, where often actions speak louder than words, but it also created opportunities for him to deepen a series of relationships between Australia and China. So the depth and breadth of the relationship were demonstrated both by the time he spent in China and by the fact that he visited a diverse number of places and undertook a wide range of activities. There were meetings with senior business figures, and of course, curated meetings with government officials, as well as a number of out-on-the-street moments. Now, all of that is carefully planned, as you and I both know, to ensure not only that there are no security issues when state leaders are out and about, but also, importantly, that they send the correct messages and avoid any unintended diplomatic snafus along the way that could undermine the purposes of these trips. So on that score, the trip delivered, I think, some very important results. Symbolically, it demonstrated that Australia sought to have good working relations with China. It showed that through the people-to-people engagement—visiting the Great Wall, the Panda Park in Chengdu—but also through the dialogues with business and government leaders. So on all of those fronts, the trip was an incredible success. We can put all that aside, in a sense, because that really speaks to, I think, the professional ability of the teams involved in putting it together. What's strategically significant about that is, firstly, the reactions of certain sections of the Australian body politic and the commentariat. And I have no doubt we'll touch on that a little bit more in a moment, so I'll put that aside. But I think the other really interesting part of the trip was actually a remark that China is important to Australia in terms of the economy—which, of course, is well known—but also in terms of security and regional stability. And he brought those three ideas together in one tweet. This is, I think, the first time in a long time that an Australian Prime Minister, particularly in the context of discussions about China, has brought those three issues together into a cohesive proposition: that Australia's relationship with China matters to Australia's economic well-being, to security, and to regional stability. And I think that's the significance of this particular trip. #M3 So do you think that this is part of a shift, not just in diplomatic signaling, but actually indicative of an underlying change also, you know, in the bureaucracy and so on, where these kinds of policy shifts tend to take time, right? Because they're the outcomes of deliberations and even sometimes generational shifts within the apparatus. Did something click—not click, but did something kind of move toward, "Okay, we need to improve ties with China" somehow? #M2 Look, in terms of the immediate moment, the backdrop is the instabilities and the capricious foreign policy and defense policy posture of the Trump administration. And that's obviously thrown a rock -- 2 of 17 -- into the pond. It's disrupted business as usual and the sort of comfort zone that countries like Australia have occupied for a long time. So in that sense, I think that has catalyzed, if not a new thought process amongst the Australian policy establishment, it's certainly provoked a need to pay more attention to some of these issues. I think that there's another thing going on as well, and perhaps it's not quite a clicking yet, but this question of Australia, China, United States, and Asia is a fluid question, and it has been fluid for quite some time. The fluidity of this issue really sits on two broad questions, I think. This is from an Australian point of view, though I think the question applies broadly as well, and certainly other capitals will be exercising their minds around these issues too. The first question concerns the status and trajectory of the United States and its position in Asia. The question is: are we witnessing the progressive retrenchment of the United States, in material terms, from a position of primacy in Asia? And if so, is this retrenchment—and the trajectory of that retrenchment—something that can be stopped and turned around? That's the first issue. In other words, where is the United States at? Back in 1941, the Australian Prime Minister at the time made a pivot from the United Kingdom—the British Empire—as the Australian protector to the United States. He did so against the backdrop of what historian John Darwin calls the "strategic abyss" of the British Empire. In other words, confronted with the collapse of the British Empire, Australia was left with no choice but to shift its security trajectory. So, are we witnessing a 21st-century version of what was the British Empire's strategic abyss unfolding before our eyes today? The answer to that question is wrapped up in the way in which the second set of issues then gets articulated, which is: what then constitutes Australia's national interest? For 50, 60, maybe 70 years—and if we push back into the period of the British Empire days— Australia's general position was as a sub-imperial power. Intuitively and institutionally, it understood its interests to be 100% consistent with the interests of the superior empire under whose umbrella it sat. Therefore, what was good for the British Empire or what was good for the United States was good for Australia. That comfort zone is disappearing. So the debate that's now unfolding in Australia is around these two pivotal questions. And the Prime Minister's utterances, bringing those three ideas together in a single tweet, I don't think necessarily signal a fundamental shift in direction, but they do signal a recognition that there is a need to test the waters about how this issue is going to unfold and be addressed across the diversity of the Australian political landscape. #M3 Yeah, that makes a lot of sense. And don't get me wrong—I mean, these tweets and so on can also be the outcome of, you know, just trying to flatter a little bit at the end of a trip, and so on and so forth. But it is indicative that these are not the belligerent tunes that we are used to hearing. So, if there is indeed a bit more of a nuanced discussion going on, do you think it goes hand in hand with this assessment of the actual geostrategic position of Australia? Because, as you said, for the longest time, Australia looked at itself as the most remote part of the Commonwealth—the empire on which -- 3 of 17 -- the sun never sets—and very proudly so. Then, of course, as a strategic ally of the United States. But geostrategically, Australia is at the tail end, or situated at the tail end, of Southeast Asia. And in what sense should Australia be under a greater threat than, let's say, Indonesia or Malaysia from the forces to the northeast or the west? How do you think this discussion of military security is now shaping up in Canberra? #M2 Look, there are different schools of thought, as I think you'd expect. There are clearly schools of thought which view China as a significant threat to Australia, and that has been drummed up over the last eight or nine years. The "China threat" proposition has loomed large and has dominated much of the thinking, and certainly created most of the noise in the public sphere. But it's not the only voice, and we do have a number of other perspectives that are intervening in the Australian national public policy debate. And it is intervening against the context of those two issues that I touched on. So many of these issues ultimately hang on one's assessment of the status of the American empire today and its anticipated status going forward in Asia. So, depending on your view of that, you will have a particular view on what will happen and how Australia may or may not be positioned in that. The second question is a normative one, right? Which is, regardless of your view or your assessment of the state of reality, what should it be and what ought you do? So we have scholars like Hugh White, who has been on your program before, who I think represents the extreme position—and I don't mean that in a radical sense, but in a spectrum sense—that the American empire is over, American primacy in Asia is a thing of the past, and Australia needs to get its head around a post- America future and figure out how it lives with China as the principal power in the region. That's the Hugh White position. There are other positions along the spectrum, including recent ones articulated by a former senior official from the Department of Foreign Affairs, Peter Varghese. Varghese penned an opinion piece that was published a week or so ago, in effect saying that Australia needs to recognise that the United States is no longer the single preeminent power in Asia and that it is necessary to recalibrate its position there. Varghese is not quite of the Hugh White position in terms of "we're just going to have to learn to live with this." But nonetheless, the shift in Varghese's view—or at least my assessment that he's shifted his position—is significant, because only two years ago, Varghese was one of the most articulate proselytizers of Australia's role as a sub- imperial power, as a beneficiary and defender of the rules-based order anchored by American primacy in the region. So there has been a shift in light of realities. Of course, unsurprisingly, there's been pushback from other quarters, which revolves around either an assessment of America's position—though increasingly, Pascal, there are fewer analysts and scholars who would argue that American primacy continues to