Europe SPEEDS UP March To War With Russia | Dr. Rein Müllerson

## Iran war and Russia’s reading of it A single external shock can reconfigure rivalries and hasten fault lines already under stress. That is the central lens through which the conversation views the recent attack on Iran and its ripple effects. The speakers read the assault not merely as a discrete Middle Eastern crisis but as an accelerator of a larger geopolitical drift: the re‑entrenchment of blocs and a sharpening West-versus‑the‑rest dynamic. What matters is less the immediate battlefield outcome and more how major powers recalibrate perception, alliances, and resource allocation in response. The discussion stresses three interlocking consequences for Russia. First, the strategic optics: Western intervention against Iran is interpreted in Moscow as part of an expansive posture that undermines Russia’s patchwork of partnerships. Second, the economic and military implications: the conflict has pushed oil and gas prices up and begun to deplete sophisticated air‑defense interceptors and other munitions that the U.S. and allies can then no longer supply in unlimited quantities. Third, the diplomatic signal: repeated patterns of diplomacy followed by strikes — whether the 2015 Iran deal’s unraveling or the history of Minsk — feed a Kremlin narrative that Western negotiations often come with hidden coercive ends. Taken together, these dynamics prompt a mixed Kremlin reading. On one hand, the loss of an allied partner in the Middle East could, in theory, weaken Russia’s international reach. On the other, the economic windfall from higher hydrocarbon prices and the attrition of Western defensive systems tilt the balance in ways favorable to Moscow. Importantly, the interlocutors insist that Iran is unlikely to capitulate quickly; protracted low‑intensity conflict prolongs both the resource squeeze on the West and the strategic recalibration in Moscow. ## Kremlin stakes and regime change fears At the heart of Moscow’s threat assessment lies a fear of regime change as an instrument of Western policy. The conversation traces a consistent Kremlin logic: external intervention that aims to reshape domestic political arrangements in peripheral states is read as a direct precedent and potential template for Russia. Historical memory and a recent sequence of Western actions create a sense that regime change is now a frequently used tool, thereby rendering Russia acutely sensitive to any operation that decreases the predictability of interstate relations. Drawing on decades of experience and personal recollection from the 1990s, the discussant lays out why this anxiety is durable. The 1990s are framed as a rare period in Russian history when the country teetered toward dysfunction and loss of sovereignty. That vulnerability, canvassed in the conversation, explains the Kremlin’s insistence on security guarantees and its hostility to any arrangement that treats Russia as a junior partner. The result is a zero‑sum worldview: when changes occur on the periphery that have been engineered or supported by Western powers, Moscow interprets them as potential threats to regime continuity and territorial integrity. This fear of external meddling underpins many of Russia’s more assertive moves. If Western tactics seem to include the expedited transition of regimes hostile to Russian interests, then defensive — and sometimes preemptive — measures will follow. The interview frames this not as irrational paranoia but as a strategy born of historical contingency and repeated exposure to what is perceived as Western instrumentalization of diplomacy. ## Oil shock and military depletion effects The conversation affirms that weapons and energy markets are now strategic terrain. The attack on Iran has immediate effects on global oil and gas markets; closures of key maritime chokepoints and damage to production infrastructure push prices upward. For a hydrocarbon exporter like Russia, that constitutes a near‑term advantage — higher revenue to cushion domestic budgets and fund military operations. But the longer game matters too: elevated prices reshape alliances and bargaining power across Eurasia. On the military side, the exchange highlights how modern air defenses and interceptors are consumable and expensive. The dialogue points out a stark arithmetic: costly interceptor salvos versus cheap kamikaze drones makes prolonged attrition favorable to parties deploying low‑cost, high‑impact systems. As Israel, the United States, and Gulf partners exhaust missile interceptors, the pool of high‑end defensive systems available for transfer to Europe and Ukraine dwindles. That depletion has a cascading effect: fewer available interceptors mean European air defenses become more brittle at the same time that front‑line combatants (Ukraine, in this case) rely on precisely those transferred systems. This dual mechanism — energy windfalls for Moscow and attrition of Western military stocks — creates a paradoxical strategic dividend. The more the Middle East conflict drags on, the more Russia may benefit economically and the more its opponents are forced to ration or prioritize scarce defensive capabilities. The interview uses this calculus to question neat narratives that portray conflicts as isolated; in a globalized weapons‑and‑energy ecosystem, crises magnify one another. ## Diplomacy as cover and trust collapse 00: 21:20 Divide and rule thesis and article frame A recurrent theme in the exchange is the mismatch between diplomatic form and military intent. The participants note a pattern: negotiations proceed, while behind the scenes planners ready coercive measures that undercut the talks. Examples include the collapse of the JCPOA after U.S. withdrawal and the Minsk process, which some Western leaders allegedly treated as a tactical pause rather than a durable settlement. This pattern contributes to an erosion of trust; regimes conclude that diplomacy can be a prelude to force. This perception feeds the conversation’s larger thesis: a deliberate U.S. strategy of "divide et impera" — divide and rule — underpins many of its foreign‑policy choices. The article under discussion argues that the U.S. has historically preferred a world where allies remain vassalized rather than empowered equals. From this vantage, crafting regional cleavages and exploiting local proxies becomes a rational grand strategy. The interview situates the Ukraine conflict within that framework: arming Ukraine extensively, short of alliance guarantees, amounts to creating a front that constrains and weakens Russia without the costs of formal alliance commitments. The credibility gap created by such duplicity weakens normative structures meant to manage conflict. If negotiations are perceived as tactical, then the incentives to sequester issues in the diplomatic realm diminish. The conversation suggests that once diplomatic cover is used instrumentally, the bargaining table ceases to be a place where durable compromises can be architected; instead it becomes an arena for staging political theater that masks more consequential military preparations. ## Russia and NATO integration rejection 00:31: 04 Ukraine as proxy and neutrality bargain The dialogue recalls a missed historical opportunity: the possibility of integrating Russia into a broader European security framework. Post‑Cold War hope included visions of Russia as a partner inside pan‑European institutions. That vision ran aground on two realities. First, the United States’ preference for hierarchical alliances that require pliant partners; second, Russia’s size and civilizational distinctiveness made vassalization impractical. The conversation insists that NATO’s institutional design — anchored in collective defense but serving Western strategic primacy — was not congenial to making Moscow an equal. Consequently, the talk shifts to Ukraine as the locus where these strategic tensions were operationalized. The West’s arming of Ukraine — detaching it in

Europe SPEEDS UP March To War With Russia | Dr. Rein Müllerson Regime change in Iran, Kremlin threat perception, trust collapse in diplomacy, Europe boxed into living with Russia or fighting it. I sit down again with Dr. Rein Müllerson, an Estonian academic and former advisor to Mikhail Gorbachev, to map the logic he sees behind Iran, Ukraine, NATO expansion, and a US divide and rule playbook. Links: Russia in Global Affairs: https://eng. globalaffairs.ru/ Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com (Opt in for Academic Section from your profile settings: https://pascallottaz.substack.com/s/academic) Merch & Donations: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall.com Timestamps: 00:00:00 Introduction and setup 00:00:21 Iran war and Russia’s reading of it 00:05:13 Kremlin stakes and regime change fears 00:06:20 Oil shock and military depletion effects 00:13:43 Diplomacy as cover and trust collapse 00: 21:20 Divide and rule thesis and article frame 00:22:02 Russia and NATO integration rejection 00:31: 04 Ukraine as proxy and neutrality bargain 00:48:42 Europe facing Russia or war 00:55:48 Where to find the article and closing remarks #Pascal Welcome back, everybody. Today I'm joined again by Dr. Rein Müllerson, a highly accomplished Estonian academic and former advisor to Mikhail Gorbachev. Rein, welcome back. #Rein Mullerson Thank you for having me. Thank you, Pascal. #Pascal Thanks for saying yes. You wrote a great piece in *Russian Global Affairs*, which we’ll discuss in the second half of the show. But first, I’d like to ask for your assessment of what’s happening in Iran, and how you think the Russians—whom you know quite well and have worked with for a long time— are approaching the situation now. #Rein Mullerson If we take such a long-term historical approach—which I believe is necessary—in my article about Ukraine I quoted President Mitterrand of France. Recently, Jean Glavany, who at that time, when Mitterrand was president, was his chief of cabinet, published his memoirs in January this year. There are many interesting things in them, but one was particularly important for me. Mitterrand said in 1990, when discussing the possible collapse of the Soviet Union and the independence of Ukraine, -- 1 of 12 -- that if Ukraine became independent, we would have a war in Europe. So how did he know? Of course, he couldn’t be certain about it, and he wasn’t certain about it. But he knew the history. He knew the situation in Russia—certainly in the Soviet Union and in Ukraine. And therefore, he believed, as I understand it—I’m now interpreting his words—that if it wasn’t handled carefully, with caution, then such a complicated country as Ukraine might drag its neighbors into war. And that’s what happened. Now, I also think that this new conflict in the Middle East—the attack by Israel and the United States against Iran—has similar long-term historical effects. In my opinion, this is one of those events that really accelerates what’s going on in the world today: the West against the rest, as we can see. The West generally, with some exceptions—like the Prime Minister of Spain, for example, or maybe sometimes like Keir Starmer, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, where I basically live and where I’ve worked and taught for the last twenty years—has joined the United States more or less in this war of aggression. And this has contributed to, or accelerated, a process that had already started before. The war in Ukraine was one of these accelerators. And we can see the same now in the case of the war between Israel and the United States on the one hand, and Iran and many other regional states on the other, with Europe and European states also becoming involved. So that’s probably what I can say by way of introduction about this war in the Middle East. #Pascal Do you think this is also an emergency situation for Russia, now that Iran is being attacked and a potential regime change is underway there? I mean, that’s the declared goal of the United States. How do you think this is being interpreted in the Kremlin? #Rein Mullerson You know, like many things, they’re complicated events. There’s no simple answer. Though some experts I know say it’s very simple: Russia is the aggressor and Ukraine is the victim of aggression. But things aren’t that simple. And what’s going on in the Middle East isn’t simple either. How this would impact Russia is not simple. Probably, in the West, one aspect is emphasized—that Russia has lost its allies in Venezuela, potentially in Cuba. Now Iran is under attack, and therefore this would weaken Russia’s position. Maybe a bit, yes. But there are several factors that, I believe, have different interpretations and are less favorable for Russia. The first point, which seems quite obvious, is that there’s been a rise in the price of oil and gas due to this conflict—because of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the destruction of energy- producing facilities in the Gulf states. This has already happened, and the war continues. In my opinion, it will go on for quite a while—at least several weeks, probably a month. I believe Iran is not going to surrender. Maybe Trump would like to claim a victory sooner rather than later, but I don’t think Iran is ready to give up and will continue to fight. -- 2 of 12 -- #Pascal Hey, very brief intermission because I was recently banned from YouTube. Although I’m back, this could happen again anytime. So please consider subscribing not only here but also to my mailing list on Substack—that’s pascallottaz.substack.com. The link’s in the description below. And now, back to the video. #Rein Mullerson Then the second factor here, which seems to favor Russia, is that the Gulf states, the United States, and Israel as well—their military resources, particularly their stock of TARC and Patriot missile interceptors—are being depleted. They’re very expensive, as I understand it. One salvo costs about five million dollars, while Iranian drones cost twenty or thirty thousand. So this means that... #Rein Mullerson The longer the conflict goes on, the more military hardware and software will be depleted—the same hardware the U.S. now provides or sells to Europe, which European countries then pass on to Ukraine. And I believe some military analysts—I'm not a military analyst myself—think that this situation can’t last very long. In any case, the United States and European countries have fewer of these resources now, particularly interceptors and other military hardware. And the third factor—maybe, I don't know what impact it may have—is that Israel and the United States attacked Iran while negotiations were going on between these parties, between the United States and Iran, about how to resolve this impasse. By the way, it was at least partly created by President Trump during his first term in office, when he rejected the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which was concluded by the permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany on the one hand, and Iran on the other. So I believe this is not the first time the West has behaved in a deceptive way. It was the same with the so‑called Minsk Accords, which were signed in 2015 after the coup d’état in Kiev. #Rein Mullerson The conflict was then more or less a civil war between two parties in Ukraine. The West supported Kiev, while Russia supported those who had rebelled against the authorities in Kiev. As Angela Merkel, the Chancellor of Germany at the time, and President Hollande of France later confirmed, the Minsk Accords were not meant to be permanent. They were meant to give Ukraine time to become stronger and better prepared to respond to a possible Russian invasion. Of course, during that time the West sent arms and money to Ukraine to make it stronger. I believe this also shows that in such wars, you can’t trust very much. And I don’t know whether it has any additional impact, because Russia—particularly President Putin—is no longer as naive as he may have been more than twenty years ago, when he first became president of Russia. -- 3 of 12 -- #Pascal But still, I mean, Russia, for the entire last year—during 2025, basically—was very willing to engage with the United States diplomatically, right? We’ve had Mr. Putin in Anchorage recently, in Alaska. There have been at least five or so meetings between Vladimir Putin and Steve Witkoff and his entourage—this diplomatic entourage—including Jared Kushner, the son‑in‑law of Mr. Trump. Do you think that this latest development, when the United States once again—after so many times— used diplomacy to try to fool the other side into complacency... They already did that back in June 2025, when they attacked Iran while negotiations were still ongoing. Now they’ve done it again, during another round of talks. They did the same with Russia and the Minsk Accords, as you just said. Time and again, the US—or the West—uses diplomacy as a facade to prepare a hard military blow against its adversaries. And Russia seemed to go along with another round of that diplomatic facade last year. Do you think that will change now, after the Iran attack? #Rein Mullerson Not necessarily. As I said, Russia is not naive—it certainly hasn’t been. I understand that negotiations between the United States and Russia, or at least some contact, are continuing. And I hear that soon, probably in Switzerland, in Geneva, or maybe elsewhere, there will be a new meeting. That’s my understanding, and it hasn’t been canceled. Russia is certainly not going to cancel it. And of course, I understand that Russia doesn’t want to antagonize Trump too much. #Rein Mullerson One of the reasons is this. #Rein Mullerson And Russia hopes that Trump will put pressure on Ukraine to agree to what might be called—well, there was an article in *Foreign Affairs* a bit more than a week ago. #Rein Mullerson And the contacts are certainly continuing. #Rein Mullerson My understanding is that this war against Iran is a war on behalf of Israel. I don’t remember exactly how many times Netanyahu visited Washington or Florida this year, meeting with Trump there and persuading him, as I understand it, to attack Iran. It seems that Trump was not very enthusiastic at -- 4 of 12 -- the beginning, and particularly the vice president, J.D. Vance, is, in my opinion, very unhappy about this war. And you can see now, in the United States internally, not only Democrats but many Republicans— and the people as a whole—are against this conflict, this war against Iran. It is not in the interest of the United States. In that case, this is the tail wagging the dog, as it’s sometimes said, although in this case, who knows who is the dog and who is the tail, really, because of the Israeli lobby in the United States. So I believe Russia is interested in these negotiations, and the best outcome would be—well, in my article I write about three scenarios for a possible endgame in Ukraine. The first one is, of course, a negotiated agreement, trading land for peace. This would be the best for Ukraine, for Russia, and also for Europe, of course. The problem is that, in that case, it would be seen as a victory for Russia, and Ukraine’s leadership—particularly President Zelensky—doesn’t like such an outcome, which would be viewed as a victory for Russia and a defeat for Ukraine and its European allies. So I don’t know, therefore, whether these negotiations will succeed. But I believe that President Trump wants to have this conflict in Europe end soon, in order to concentrate on other issues, because the most important aim was to face China in the Far East. Now the United States is bogged down in the Middle East and still involved in the European conflict. This is certainly not in the interest of the United States. Therefore, I believe it’s still possible that the conflict in Ukraine could be resolved, notwithstanding what is going on in the Middle East. And it may even be that, if the