Showdown Over NATO Accession | Turkey is blocking Sweden | Interview with Naman Karl-Thomas Habtom

## The Therapeutic Promise of Tragedy The conversation centers on a provocative claim: classical Greek tragedy offers more than literary insight—it supplies a framework for understanding and healing contemporary conflicts. Throughout the exchange, the speakers return to the idea that many national and international ruptures are, in essential ways, domestic tragedies writ large: disputes between close neighbors, kin, and intertwined communities rather than between distant, unrelated societies. This reframing matters because it changes the remedy. If the war in and over Ukraine can be read through the tragic lens, the route out is not merely military victory or diplomatic capitulation, but a structured process of recognition, purification, and dialogue that aims to rebuild the moral and emotional bonds that once held a polity together. That therapeutic function is not an abstract novelty for the conversation’s main interlocutor, Naman Karl-Thomas Habtom, but an argument with empirical ambitions. By mapping the tragic pattern—repeated cycles of grievance, escalation, and retribution—onto Ukrainian history and contemporary politics, the interlocutor invites policy-makers and civil society actors to think about interventions that address the psychological architecture of conflict, not just its territorial manifestations. ## The Far Right’s Outsized Political Role One of the more fraught and persistent themes emerging from the conversation is the role of far-right groups within Ukrainian politics. The exchange does not treat the existence of nationalist and neo-Nazi elements as mere Kremlin talking points; rather, it documents a pattern in which small, ideologically driven organizations have wielded influence out of proportion to their numerical strength. Three mechanisms explain this phenomenon: provision of coercive capacity during moments of upheaval (notably in 2014), rapid mobilization and battlefield participation when conventional armed forces were absent or hesitant, and the promotion of a unifying identity that positions itself explicitly against Russia. What makes these groups politically consequential is their hybrid nature. They are not content to operate only as electoral actors; they organize as “brotherhoods” with long-term ambitions to shape the nation’s ideological trajectory. War environment amplifies their utility and legitimacy: violence and existential threat produce incentives to rely on those who bring immediate order and readiness to fight. The conversation stresses that Western observers and partners cannot credibly ignore this dynamic. Military advisers, security assistance, and institutional cooperation have occurred in contexts where these formations are present, meaning Western states have faced an uncomfortable reality: strategic goals have sometimes required dealings with actors whose domestic political agendas are deeply illiberal. The interlocutor warns against a complacent faith that liberal pluralism will naturally outgrow or marginalize these forces once state institutions consolidate. Instead, the far right may consciously seek to entrench itself precisely to prevent that liberal future from arriving. Crucially, the conversation underlines that the far right’s hostility is not limited to Russia; it also opposes Western liberal social values. This double antagonism complicates assumptions that alignment with Western security structures will automatically reduce illiberal tendencies inside Ukraine. ## Crimea, Donbas, and the Logic of Self-Made Tragedy The exchange treats the annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas not as isolated events but as episodes in a longer, self-producing tragic sequence. Born of political choices—sometimes deliberate, sometimes the product of elite miscalculation—these crises become catalysts for new grievances that fuel further violence. The interlocutor frames tragedy as “self-made”: each escalation contains seeds of its own reproduction. That insight reframes responsibility away from a binary of aggressor versus victim and toward a more complex account in which multiple actors contribute to cycles of resentment and retaliation. Addressing Crimea and Donbas through this analytic lens raises uncomfortable implications for peace-building. If tragedies are partly produced by governance failures, identity policies, and exclusionary nation-building, durable settlement must do more than redraw borders or impose ceasefires. It must confront the domestic policies and social narratives that produced estrangement in the first place. Otherwise, as the conversation warns, any “peace” risks becoming a temporary pause between eruptions—an interlude in a pattern rather than a definitive resolution. ## Recognition, Catharsis, Dialogue: A Classical Prescription At the heart of the tragic remedy the interlocutor offers are three classical steps: anagnorisis (recognition), catharsis (emotional purging), and dialogue (transformational engagement). Recognition demands an honest public reckoning with how one's own choices contributed to the crisis. Catharsis requires a collective process to purge hatred so that communities can return to civil engagement without the need for revenge. Dialogue then fosters the mutual transformation that makes coexistence possible. This model is both moral and practical. It reframes justice as restorative rather than purely retributive: the point is not to punish the vanquished but to rebuild the social fabric by cultivating compassion and accountability. Such an approach recognizes that vengeance perpetuates cycles of violence; a stable settlement must instead reconstruct relationships. The interlocutor’s reading of tragedy therefore moves away from fatalism—“there is no escape from tragedy”—toward a tempered optimism: while humans are prone to repeat tragic patterns, they can also be induced to choose a different course if social institutions and leadership create the right conditions for self-reflection and mutual recognition. ## Truth and Reconciliation as a Modern Dionysia If the Dionysian festivals of ancient Athens functioned as communal mechanisms for catharsis, the modern analog the interlocutor highlights is the truth and reconciliation commission. Implemented in diverse contexts across more than 50 countries, these mechanisms offer concrete precedents for how societies deal with legacies of violence. The conversation draws lessons from at least three instructive cases: South Africa, Guatemala, and Spain. South Africa’s model illustrates the potential of religious and civic institutions to mediate transitions from violent oppression to negotiated civic solidarity. Guatemala shows how truth-seeking can begin national debates in contexts where previous governments were reluctant to confront atrocities—importantly, while external actors were implicated. Spain’s “Pact of Forgetting” underscores a different calculus: the deliberate choice to prioritize political stability and institutional consolidation by postponing public reckoning for a period. Each model carries costs and benefits. South Africa’s approach was public and reconciliatory but did not resolve all demands for justice; Guatemala’s truth process has struggled with impunity; Spain’s strategy avoided immediate destabilization but delayed closure and accountability. The interlocutor’s central point is methodological rather than prescriptive: there is no single model for Ukraine to copy. Instead, Ukrainian society must craft its own mechanism of truth-seeking and reconciliation, taking inspiration from different models while adapting to local political realities. What matters is institutionalizing processes that promote recognition, allow for catharsis, and create spaces for genuine dialogue—thereby turning the therapeutic potential of tragedy into a practiced politics. ## Toward a Pragmatic Path for Ukrainian-Russian Reconciliation Perhaps the most consequential implication of the conversation is i

The Tragedy of Ukraine In this video, we talk about the Book called The Tragedy of Ukraine, its components, and discussing on better futures more than fearful futures. https://v.gd/tragedy -- link to the publisher, De Gryuter https://www.amzn.to/3UC8xcn -- link to Amazon.com Free samples of the text are available on Google Books -- https://t.ly/EkeZ Nicolai got his PhD from the University of Virginia in 1984, and taught at the Monterey Institute where he founded the Center for Contemporary Russian Studies. He was a Fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations, worked at the US Embassy in Moscow, and monitored election results in Russia, Belarus, and Latvia in the early 1990s. Since then he worked with many different private and public offices in Russia and did various research fellowships. He holds an Honorary doctorate from Novgorod State University and he is a member of the American Committee for US-Russian Accord. Nicolai has worked for decades on Russian and Ukrainian politics. His books include “Russian Foreign Policy: From Empire to Nation-State” (1997), “Crafting Democracy: How Novgorod has Coped with Rapid Social Change” (2004), and in December 2022 he will publish, “The Tragedy of Ukraine: What Classical Greek Tragedy Can Teach Us About Conflict” (2023). #M3 If modern history has shown us anything, it is how easily manipulable public sentiment is. And while we typically look at this with dismay, I pointed out back in 2005 in my book, Crafting Democracy, that this also opens the door to the possibility of positive narratives being used to imagine better futures instead of more fearful futures. #M2 Welcome, everybody. This is Pascal again from Neutrality Studies, and I'm here one more time with Nicolai N. Petro, who's a professor at the University of Rhode Island and the author of The Tragedy of Ukraine: What Classic Greek Tragedy Can Teach Us About Conflict Resolution, to be published this month, December 2022. In this second part of the interview, we will be focusing on his new book and its arguments. Nicolai, you're publishing this work at a very crucial moment, when the war in Ukraine seems to have reached a fever pitch. Can you, first of all, tell us about your book—what it is about? Give us kind of the elevator pitch for the work. #M3 So I've been looking at the issues of conflict in Ukraine for more than a decade, and I couldn't find a good key that would explain the recurring themes that I was able to see in Ukrainian history over several decades. As I began to look at them, they appeared to me more and more familiar, reminding me of a book that I had read a while back and that remains a classic, which is Richard -- 1 of 7 -- Ned Lebow's The Tragic View of Politics. In his book, Lebow looks at classical Greek tragedy as a mechanism for understanding international relations—relations between states. I thought that's all very well and good, but it seems to me also applicable to relations within states. And so that's what I set out to do with respect to Ukraine. So, there are six chapters. The first chapter explores what tragedy is and its therapeutic function for societies that are at war and in social conflict, because the easiest way, I think, to understand the Peloponnesian War is not as a war among different societies, but rather as a war between the Greeks themselves—a family affair, if you will. One of the things that the classical Greek tragedians tried to do in order to heal their societies was to remind themselves of the humanity of the other side, which, in the course of war, they are taught to hate, but then, in the restoration of peace, they have to learn compassion for as well. So that was the goal, broadly speaking, of classical Greek tragedy. And then I specifically explore different aspects of the current conflict in Ukraine, moving from the historical aspirations for independence for Ukraine, and then, secondarily, domestic policies that have been pursued in Ukraine since its independence, which were designed to cut off its very lucrative relationship with Russia on basically every level. And finally, to the latest conflicts after 2014 in Donbas and Crimea. And at the end, I ask the question: Is there a mechanism comparable to tragedy in the modern world that could also serve a therapeutic function? And I give the example of something that we perhaps should be looking at because it's been so successful in over 50 countries over the past 45 years, which is truth and reconciliation commissions. So that's what I have to offer in terms of my analysis of Ukrainian politics. #M2 I would very much hope that that vision comes true, because at the moment, I think the one thing we can agree on is that truth has been thrown under the bus. It's really, really hard to get any kind of reliable information about what is happening in and around Ukraine. And the level of propaganda on all sides has reached new heights, I believe. But your book actually has six chapters, and in the latter part, you focus on Crimea, the Donbas, the far right, and lastly, what you call a flawed peace. I would like to talk about those. Maybe let's start with the far right, because the far right is one of these issues that, especially in the West, is being portrayed as a Russian talking point—there are no Nazis in Ukraine, this is pure propaganda. But in your book, you're actually writing about the political influence the far right has had for decades. Can you maybe explain that a little bit? Or what are the most important things to understand about far right politics in Ukraine? #M3 Sure. So over the last decade, there have been at least 60 articles in major Western English- language newspapers on the rise of the far right and neo-Nazi groups. Multiple articles in The Independent, Newsweek, The Guardian, Reuters, Associated Press, The Daily Beast, The Los Angeles -- 2 of 7 -- Times, The Nation, to name a few. In the Israeli press, there have been multiple articles in the Jerusalem Post, Haaretz, and the journal The Tablet. The issue of the rise of the far right was also flagged by Human Rights Watch, Freedom House, the Atlantic Council, and the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. These are not hard to find, and they are part of the historical record. My research in my book, along with that of the noted Ukrainian scholar Volodymyr Ishchenko, now at the Freie Universität in Berlin, and Richard Sakwa, Gordon Hahn, and others, finds that the far right plays an outsized role in Ukrainian politics for three reasons. First, it provided the muscle and the organization for the 2014 Maidan ouster of then-President Yanukovych. Second, it had battle- ready troops ready and willing to fight in Donbas in 2014 and 2015 when the Ukrainian army initially would not. Third, it had a ready-made ideology of nationalism that could provide the country with a new unifying identity as being the antipode of Russia. And for all these reasons, a set of organizations which was, and continues to be, outside of three regions of Western Ukraine a marginal political force, plays a much larger ideological and organizational role in the current Ukrainian government than their numbers would suggest, precisely because they're not organized merely as a political party, but as a political brotherhood whose objective is to transform the direction of the nation as a whole, really regardless of the political system. They're not that interested in the political system, but in having the clout and the ability to direct and make sure that the direction of the country remains true to the objective of a pure Ukrainian nation. They thrive in the context of war. War makes them indispensable. #M2 And they are very small, but they are very threatening to the political process. In the beginning of one of your chapters, you write that every new president of Ukraine sets out to be the peacemaker with Russia, and he ends up being a new incarnation of Stepan Bandera because they are pushed to the right by these small groups. Are you afraid that even somebody like President Zelensky is actually threatened by them? I mean, would Mr. Zelensky be deposed if he went in a direction that is not in the interest of these ultra-right nationalist groups? #M3 The quote you cite is actually from the former Minister of Transportation, Emilian, who made the statement that it is inevitable that every Ukrainian president will turn out to be an enemy of Russia. I don't know whether the far right could politically remove the president, but that is an explicit threat that they have made continually since 2014. Whether or not they have the capacity to do so, we don't know, but it is part of the rhetoric and part of the way in which they ensure the political loyalty of the regime. #M2 -- 3 of 7 -- Do you know how far the US and NATO are aware of this dynamic, and whether they have any influence on this far-right sector in Ukraine? #M3 I assume that the United States government, and particularly the Department of Defense, as well as NATO institutions, are well informed about these organizations because it would be impossible, I think, to interact with Ukrainian political and military institutions without coming into contact with them. And certainly, the Western military advisers I’ve encountered—British military advisers I’ve had the opportunity to meet—were in contact with these organizations in order to ensure the effectiveness of their military mission. They are an integral part of the Ukrainian armed forces. So there's nothing unknown, I think, to the West, both in terms of the direction and function of the far right in Ukraine. It's plausible to suggest that these are inconvenient bedfellows for Western Europeans, but a necessary evil, so to speak, and that they expect that as Ukraine becomes more independent, it will also become somehow more pluralistic and liberally minded, and that consequently the role of the far right would be reduced in Ukrainian politics. But that is something the far right is aware of, and they are doing everything in their power to ensure that does not happen. And one of the things that I think is not very well understood in the West is that right now, the far right's animus is directed at Russia. But in ideological terms, in terms of political pluralism, in terms of the kind of social acceptance of liberal values that are widely endorsed in the West, the far right is just as much an enemy of Western liberal thinking, including such things as specific rights for sexual minorities and other minorities. This is something that the far right is vehemently opposed to. #M2 You know, I wish I could say I've never heard of a situation where Western powers arm highly violent minority groups in a country that then eventually turn against them and blow up their World Trade Centers. I wish that hadn't happened before. I don't know why we keep doing this. This frustrates me beyond compare. But maybe let me move to my next question, because in chapter five, you talk about Crimea and the Donbas, and you ask this question: is there no escape from tragedy? What's your argument there, and how do you answer your own question at that point? #M3 There is no permanent escape from tragedy, the Greeks argued, because it's part of our human nature. But that doesn't mean we cannot manage relations better. And part of managing the relationship and escaping the current tragic cycle—and prolonging the distance between tragic cycles—is to recognize what a tragic cycle is. Let me say a few words about that, because the answer to your question is essentially the way I describe tragedy, how it unfolds, and how one -- 4 of 7 -- escapes it. Every tragedy, I point out, is self-made. The resolution to it, therefore, lies in recognizing how we contributed to it—to our own tragedy—and therefore choosing to break ourselves out of the cycle of vengeance of which we are a part. And this is done through three steps. The first is the Greek word anagnorisis,