Capitalism’s Morbid Symptoms: War, AI and the Crisis of the West | Prof. Radhika Desai

Watch this video on YouTube

The liberal capitalist class is in panic — and for a good reason. Their reign of terror is finally coming to a close. Not only because of the emergence of the formerly colonized Global South but also because the capitalists have so thoroughly hollowed out their own nation states that collapse is all but inevitable. Professor Radhika Desai joins Pascal to examine elections, imperial power and the deepening crisis of neoliberal capitalism. They discuss Brazil, Israeli politics, the Israel lobby debate and the relationship between class interests and national strategy. Desai argues that financialization, inequality, repression and speculative AI investment reveal systemic decay. The conversation also considers youth protests, European rearmament, the postwar social compromise and China’s contrasting development model, asking how economies could prioritize ordinary people’s welfare and sustainable prosperity over private profit. Radhika's Links: YouTube — Radhika Desai, Geopolitical Eco

Summary

At the heart of the exchange, Radhika Desai contends that neoliberal capitalism is exhibiting systemic decay manifested through financialization, inequality, repression, and speculative AI investment. She links recent electoral shifts—Lula’s comeback in Brazil and the polarized Israeli vote—to deeper class and geopolitical dynamics: domestic class struggles shape foreign alignments, and imperial projects deploy proxies like Israel while pursuing the transatlantic capitalist class’s interests. Desai situates contemporary crises in the rollback of the postwar social compromise since the 1970s, arguing that neoliberal policies—deregulation, privatization, regressive taxation, deindustrialization and mounting indebtedness—have hollowed state capacity and legitimacy. These “morbid symptoms” drive political instability, militarization in Europe, youth protests and intensified repression. China’s contrasting development model appears as an alternative to Western capitalism’s failure. Desai calls for economies that prioritize ordinary welfare and sustainable prosperity over private profit, framing multipolarity and renewed domestic class compromises as essential to averting further decline.

Article

## Brazil’s election and the Latin American left The recent Brazilian election did more than return a familiar figure to the presidency; it crystallized a regional tide that has been building beneath the surface. The narrowness of the margin—under 2 percent—combined with a concerted grassroots mobilization transformed what many commentators treated as an unlikely comeback into a political reality. The result is less an isolated victory than a signal: Latin America's left remains resilient, capable of rebounding even after several electoral setbacks across the region. The factors behind that resilience matter. The Lula camp’s last-minute effort to mobilize voters, coupled with long-standing social programs that large segments of the population now rely on, created a durable constituency for left-leaning governance. Institutional features also counted: Brazil’s Supreme Court and electoral administration played roles that prevented legalistic subversions of the outcome. Yet victory on election night is only the beginning. The corporate and capitalist classes, domestically and internationally, will press to constrain redistributive policies, while fiscal realities—real or manufactured—will be invoked to limit social spending. This dynamic underscores a recurring theme: electoral wins cannot be equated with untroubled governance. The left’s renewed momentum creates opportunities for progressive policy, but those possibilities will collide with entrenched economic power and global capitalist pressures. If Brazil’s presidency becomes a platform for deeper regional cooperation—BRICS-friendly diplomacy, resistance to neoliberal conditionalities—it could amplify a broader multipolar shift. Conversely, if electoral rhetoric fails to translate into structural change, enthusiasm may wane and leave space for renewed conservative advances. ## Israeli elections and Netanyahu’s wars The election in Israel took place against a backdrop of escalating violence and existential rhetoric. The framing of the contest as a referendum on the conduct and aims of war—how much force to use, how far to push—is itself telling. Political campaigning pivoted toward promises of elimination rather than reconciliation, with appeals that stoke fear and depict entire populations as threats. Such rhetoric not only deepens polarization but institutionalizes a politics of perpetual emergency. What emerges from the conversation is a bleak assessment: mainstream Israeli politics appears to have moved decisively toward an extremist logic in which maximalist military responses are seen as legitimate statecraft. Even if individual leaders face legal jeopardy or political vulnerability, the broader political culture has shifted. The reactionary consensus—across large swathes of society—renders hopes for a revived domestic left and a politics of restraint painfully thin. Beyond Israel’s borders, the consequences are regional and global. The fixation on overwhelming force escalates dangers of wider conflict with Iran, Lebanon, and non-state actors, and it deepens Israel’s isolation from potential moderating interlocutors. The prospects for a diminished Israeli capacity to pursue long-term security through political solutions grow slimmer when the political center is crowded out by calls for annihilation. The election thus becomes not merely a choice between parties but a test of whether any political force can reintroduce proportionality and restraint into a fraying public discourse. ## The Israel lobby and US imperial interests Explaining the United States’ steadfast support for Israel is complex. The conversation rejects any single-cause explanation such as a monolithic “Israel lobby” that wholly determines U.S. policy. Instead, it situates U.S.–Israeli alignment inside a larger imperial project driven by class interests and strategic objectives. Israel functions as a regional proxy—an “unsinkable aircraft carrier”—that fits into broader U.S. aims in the Middle East. This structural alignment is as much about projecting power, securing economic advantages, and preserving geopolitical reach as it is about discrete lobbying efforts. That said, lobbying networks, diaspora politics, and domestic political calculations are important amplifiers of policy. They interact with imperial ambitions, sometimes accelerating, sometimes constraining state action. Moreover, bilateral relations are not always seamless: periodic divergences reveal that proxies and metropoles can and do act with autonomy. The dynamic between Washington and Tel Aviv is therefore both symbiotic and occasionally contentious; the presence of a strong lobby explains part of the puzzle but not the system-wide imperatives that sustain the alliance. This framing matters because it redirects attention from individual personalities or singular interest groups to the material bases of policy. The decision-making calculus in Washington—about sanctions, military aid, and regional strategy—reflects corporate interests, energy politics, and the strategic desires of an elite that profits from geopolitical dominance. Understanding this allows us to see how domestic class contradictions within the U.S. are linked to foreign policy choices that in turn shape allies’ behavior and regional trajectories. ## Class, nation and geopolitical economy A central contribution of the conversation is a reframing of international relations through a geopolitical-economy lens that brings class and nation into a single analytic frame. Rather than privileging state behavior in abstraction or reducing causality to lobbying, this approach emphasizes how domestic class interests and national strategies co-produce foreign policy. Economic elites—financial, industrial, and managerial—shape and are shaped by the state’s international engagements, while national imperatives like geopolitical positioning feed back into domestic class structures. This synthesis helps explain phenomena that realist or pluralist theories struggle to capture. For instance, the Trump administration’s decision-making on foreign adventures can be read as an attempt to shore up domestic political standing by invoking nationalist narratives. At the same time, it reflects the needs and preferences of capital that benefit from military spending, favorable trade terms, and geopolitical dominance. The result is policy that often appears contradictory from a strictly “national interest” perspective but coherent when seen as serving a transnational capitalist class. The geopolitical-economy outlook also reveals the fault lines within capitalist societies. Electoral volatility, populist appeals, and social unrest are expressions of a system where promises to the working class are repeatedly subordinated to elite accumulation. When leaders promise reindustrialization or social benefits and fail to deliver, the gap between class expectation and state action widens, producing political instability and opening space for radical alternatives—both left and right. ## How neoliberalism dismantled the postwar compromise Postwar capitalism was built on a social compromise: reconciliation between capital and labor that produced a degree of stability through welfare states, full employment policies, and regulated markets. Neoliberalism dismantled that compromise by prioritizing deregulation, privatization, and fiscal austerity. Over decades, this shifted wealth upward, hollowed out public institutions, and transformed productive investment into financial speculation. The erosion of social protections and the ascendancy of market fundamentalism did not only create inequality; it also produced a legitimacy crisis. Citizens who once looked to the state for security now encounter austerity and shrinking public services. Political elites attempt to paper over these fractures with populist promises or securitized responses to dissent. But repression and militarized policy cannot substitute for material refo

Transcript

Capitalism’s Morbid Symptoms: War, AI and the Crisis of the West | Prof. Radhika Desai The liberal capitalist class is in panic — and for a good reason. Their reign of terror is finally coming to a close. Not only because of the emergence of the formerly colonized Global South but also because the capitalists have so thoroughly hollowed out their own nation states that collapse is all but inevitable. Professor Radhika Desai joins Pascal to examine elections, imperial power and the deepening crisis of neoliberal capitalism. They discuss Brazil, Israeli politics, the Israel lobby debate and the relationship between class interests and national strategy. Desai argues that financialization, inequality, repression and speculative AI investment reveal systemic decay. The conversation also considers youth protests, European rearmament, the postwar social compromise and China’s contrasting development model, asking how economies could prioritize ordinary people’s welfare and sustainable prosperity over private profit. Radhika's Links: YouTube — Radhika Desai, Geopolitical Economist: https://www.youtube.com/@RadDesai Substack: https://radicaldesai.substack.com Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/RadhikaDesai Neutrality Studies Links: Neutrality Studies Substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Support Neutrality Studies: https://neutralitystudies.com /donate Neutrality Studies shop: https://neutralitystudies.com/shop Time Stamps 00:00 Brazil’s election and the Latin American left 07:47 Israeli elections and Netanyahu’s wars 11:48 The Israel lobby and US imperial interests 17:18 Class, nation and geopolitical economy 25:22 How neoliberalism dismantled the postwar compromise 31:29 Financialization and the AI bubble 37:05 Youth protests, repression and European rearmament 45:23 Capitalism’s crisis and China’s alternative #Pascal Welcome back, everybody, to Neutrality Studies. Today, we have an update with the wonderful Radhika Desai, the owner, operator, and host of the Radhika Desai Geopolitical Economist channel and a professor at the University of Manitoba in Canada. Radhika, welcome back. #Radhika Desai Great to be back with you, Pascal, after our wonderful conference. So, yes. #Pascal It was great having you here. For everybody who hasn't seen it, Radhika was in Japan less than two weeks ago, and she gave a beautiful presentation about her approach to international relations, her Marxist approach. And we will talk about that in the second part of our interview, but I want to start with something that has been happening in the last couple of days. We have a lot of elections right now. We had Lula da Silva winning in Brazil. Right now, as we speak, the Israelis are going to the -- 1 of 16 -- polls, and we also had votes in Bulgaria. Let's start with Brazil. What did you make of the surprise victory, actually, of Lula da Silva? #Radhika Desai Well, actually, I was less surprised than many. On the Sunday before the second round of elections, the International Manifesto Group, of which I'm the convener, held one of its regular fortnightly webinars. It was in between the first round and the second round, so, of course, we analyzed what had happened, you know, what had led to the outcome of the first round. There were two things I was very aware of. First was that the Lula camp understood that it had been a little, shall we say, complacent. In the first round, they had been a little complacent. Now, in the three weeks between the first and second rounds, they were going all out to get their vote out. And I thought that if they did that, it would be very likely to lead to an upset victory for Lula. I say “upset” because, of course, the establishment press are not exactly in love with Lula. As you know, the Brazilian real has fallen to its lowest point since 1998 as a result of Lula's victory. So we know they're not in love with Lula. And they were gleefully underlining the point that no candidate who has lost in the first round has won in the second round. And I said, this could be different, not least because the margin of victory was very small. It was less than 2%. So the first thing I knew was that an effort was being made. And I know that the Lula camp has grassroots mobilization capacities, so those were being brought into play. But the other thing I knew as well is—consider this: Lula was first elected in 2003, I believe. He had two terms. Then Dilma Rousseff had two terms. And then Jair Bolsonaro got his one term. And essentially, in all the time since then, the right has only had one term in office. I mean, the pressure of the situation is leading in the direction of the left. And so I had already been saying, you know, before all of these things became necessary, that even if Bolsonaro were to win—and I considered that unlikely before the first round—it would be a very unstable government. And even before the first round, people were predicting that Bolsonaro would have a difficult time carrying out some of his pledges, including his pledge to cut the deficit, because you can't just cut welfare expenditures to nothing. This is what the Brazilian public has come to rely on. So all in all, I would say that the momentum is behind the left. Of course, that doesn't mean that the left can't make a big mess of things. It can. Hopefully it won't. And so let's see what happens. Obviously, there will be a lot of pressure from the establishment forces, from the corporate and capitalist forces, as there is on the real right now. Everybody is saying that, you know, the euphoria around Lula's victory is going to dissipate as soon as he confronts the fiscal reality. Sure, all of these things are important. But I think that Lula's -- 2 of 16 -- victory has strengthened the left in Latin America after about six other elections that were lost by the left across Latin America. And I think this is going to put a lot of steam behind the left. The pink tide, which has surged and waned, will surge again. #Pascal Because in South America overall, we've had, of course, a swing to the right over the last couple of years, especially with people like Milei in Argentina, but in other countries too. So the big question is: is this going to continue? And the thing is that the right in South America is also very much pro- American. It's actually very neoliberal and very much in favor of integration into the US hegemonic enterprise. On the other hand, other people, including Alexander Mercouris, have pointed out that Lula da Silva himself is actually not disliked by some of the, let's call them, hegemonic or imperialist forces, especially in Europe. I mean, von der Leyen was very quick to congratulate him, and the European imperialists are rather fond of him, or at least do not dislike him. What do you make of that? #Radhika Desai Well, I think that, yes, you can say that about Lula. I mean, remember that the Congress in Brazil has remained fairly tilted towards the right. So, you know, the corporate capitalist classes have been able to get a substantial amount of what they want. But I suspect now, Mrs. von der Leyen's enthusiasm notwithstanding, that Lula will rule with much greater conviction. I should have added one other thing, by the way. The Supreme Court in Brazil has actually played a decent role in all of this. You know, they allowed voting to be extended because the buses were not working and so on. So that extension of voting hours was allowed. And they have not allowed Flavio Bolsonaro, at least so far, to succeed in his attempt to essentially put a question mark over Lula's victory. So in that sense, I think it's been good. And I should also say that, you know, since the democratic constitution of 1988, Brazil has basically voted to the left. And I think that's a very important thing. I mean, you know, you had Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who was not exactly a Lula, but he still campaigned from the left. He campaigned as a center-left candidate. #Pascal Hey, just a very quick note. The best way to support this channel is by signing up for my free Substack. You can also help with a paid subscription there, or you can get some of our new merch on neutralitystudies.com. Links below. See you there. Thanks for that. Now, just for one second, what's going on right now as we speak is the election in Israel. And the reason why I'm not at all excited about this is that, basically, the choice is between genocide and even more genocide. It's genocidal rhetoric on all sides. And the way that these different parties in Israel competed, except, of course, for the Arab parties or Arab-friendly parties, is by asking, well, how much violence do we want to use? -- 3 of 16 -- Now, Benjamin Netanyahu just put out a tweet, and let me read that to you for one second, because I find it quite telling. He says, “This is an emergency call. The future of the Jewish state hangs in the balance. Go out and vote right now. Higher-than-usual voter turnout in the Arab sector compared to the low turnout among right-wing voters.” And then beneath that, he posts a picture of people queuing in front of a polling station, showing a lot of women in veils, a lot of Muslim women. I found this itself quite telling, also, of how Netanyahu and the others obviously look at their own citizens. Let's just repeat: these are their own citizens, the 25 or so percent of non-Jewish citizens of the Zionist state. What are your expectations? What do you make of it? #Radhika Desai I think the Israeli election is on a knife edge, so I do not know which way it will go. I completely agree with you that it is genocide versus genocide in two different formats. So on that, I really have nothing to say about the outcome of this election. The only thing I will say is that if Netanyahu loses, then he is in very, very deep trouble, which is why he's doing everything in his power, because there are all these corruption allegations against him. There will be the whole investigation of what really happened on October 7th—you know, what were the failures of his government and so on. And as you know, he will try everything. Maybe I should say two things. Number one, in addition to the images you are talking about, he also posted an image of a mushroom cloud over Jerusalem, claiming that if people did not vote for him, this would be the outcome: that the Iranians would nuke Israel and that would be the end, etc., etc. So that's the first thing. The second thing I want to say is that, you know, there used to be a time when there was a left in Israel, you know, that was sort of courageously campaigning on behalf of Palestinian rights and so on. But it is really sad to say that this left seems to be nowhere in evidence today. And more and more, the overwhelming majority of Israeli society seems to be in favor of this war. And if there is a critique of Netanyahu, it is only, “Why don’t you finish the job? You know, what are you waiting for? You should go ahead and essentially destroy Iran, destroy Gaza, destroy whatever.” And, you know, there is an old saying: “Those whom the gods would destroy, they first make mad.” And I think that this is the kind of madness that has descended upon Israel. There is absolutely no way that they can win against Iran. But this is the war that Netanyahu is committed to. And he seems to have painted himself into a corner, into an extremist corner. In fact, the whole of Israel seems to have painted itself into an extremist corner, out of which it can only emerge much diminished, is all I can say. #Pascal Before coming to our chat here, I listened to a podcast on John Mearsheimer’s channel in which he and his co-author Stephen Walt, together with the two authors of the new book Israel’s Lobby—I forget their names—analyzed a bit of the history and power of the Israel lobby and how it has -- 4 of 16 -- developed over the last 20 years. One of the points they made is that the unconditional support Israel is getting from the U.S. state ap