USA Starts War With Venezuela. Bombing Campaign. Maduro Reportedly Captured.

## Framing the moment: an audacious blow to post‑1945 norms What emerges from the conversation is a stark claim: a sudden, large‑scale U.S. military operation against Venezuela—carried out in the dead of night and reportedly culminating in the capture and removal of President Nicolás Maduro—marks a dramatic rupture with established international practice. The exchange frames this episode not as a localized law‑enforcement action but as high‑intensity warfare: missile strikes, helicopters or aircraft over Caracas, and an attempted decapitation of a sitting head of state. Beyond the immediate human and material costs, the argument offered in the discussion centers on the symbolic violence of such a move: a revision of the limits of presidential war‑making, a challenge to sovereignty norms, and a test of whether military force can be used as a fast track to regime change in the Western Hemisphere. That framing is not merely rhetorical. The conversation repeatedly juxtaposes this alleged operation with previous watershed moments in U.S. extraterritorial action—operations that have defined contours of modern international law, presidential prerogative, and regional reaction. By placing the episode on the same continuum as the 1989 Panama intervention and the targeted killing of a foreign general years earlier, the discussion invites readers to think of the event as both precedent and provocation: precedent in method and provocation in scale and geography. ## What the conversation reports: the alleged strike and its immediate fallout According to the exchange, multiple explosions were recorded across Caracas and other cities, accompanied by video evidence shared by various outlets. The operation is described as “large‑scale,” involving missiles and airborne assets, and timed to the early morning hours to maximize surprise. The critical claim repeated across the conversation is that the U.S. publicly announced the capture of President Maduro and his removal from Venezuelan territory—an outcome that, if true, would be exceptional in contemporary interstate relations. The conversation draws attention to the unusual nature of the public narrative offered by the U.S. side: an explicit claim that captures and seizures were carried out “in conjunction with U.S. law enforcement.” The discussants treat this phrasing as implausible on its face—law enforcement agencies ordinarily lack the capacity or jurisdiction to conduct military incursions in another sovereign country—and use it as a cue that the operation was better understood as a military and intelligence operation rather than anything judicial or police‑led. Those immediate reports also raise operational questions: Were U.S. special operations forces responsible? Was the action primarily aerial bombardment combined with commando raids? Or did the United States rely on paid insiders and betrayals within the Venezuelan security apparatus? The conversation underscores that these tactical uncertainties matter because they relate directly to the likelihood of a sustainable political outcome. ## Legal and historical dimensions: norms, precedents, and the erosion of constraints The discussion repeatedly frames the alleged operation as a violation of international law and a symptom of the long‑running erosion of legal constraints on U.S. use of force. Historically, major kinetic actions by a U.S. president historically triggered Congressional debate and required legal justification; the conversation contends that those institutional checks have atrophied, allowing presidents to authorize strikes without collective domestic deliberation or clear international mandate. Drawing on history, the exchange compares the scenario to the capture of Manuel Noriega in 1989 and the targeted killing of a foreign commander years earlier, situating the Venezuelan episode within a lineage of unilateral interventions. Yet the conversation also emphasizes a key difference: unlike Noriega, who was a former ally turned pariah, the sitting Venezuelan president commanded a contested but enduring claim to legitimacy at home and recognition from significant international actors. That fact, the discussion suggests, complicates any legal or political attempt to normalize a U.S. seizure of a head of state. The interlocutors also bring in the International Criminal Court as a rhetorical touchstone: the notion that the U.S. might prefer domestic custody and “show trial” over ICC proceedings is offered as a reminder of selective engagement with international institutions. In short, the legal argument in the exchange is twofold: the action appears unlawful under basic sovereignty norms, and the political choices about accountability that follow are likely to be governed by power politics rather than neutral legal process. ## Mechanisms of regime removal: bribery, special forces, and political engineering A persistent theme in the conversation is the question of mechanism. How do you capture a president in a large, politically polarized, and militarily guarded capital without provoking collapse into protracted conflict? The discussion outlines three non‑exclusive possibilities: a muscular special operations raid; clandestine bribe‑and‑betrayal operations within the president’s inner circle; or a combination of bombardment to soften targets plus covert human intelligence to secure the primary objective. The conversation leans toward the plausibility of inside betrayal—payoffs to key personnel—rather than a Hollywood‑style commando abduction under heavy fire. The reason given is pragmatic: getting to a protected leader in a presidential palace surrounded by loyal forces usually requires insiders. Journalistic reporting that is cited in the exchange—about attempted recruitment of pilots and offers to exploit close associates—feeds into this narrative. If accurate, those mechanisms have political implications: they make U.S. influence a product not only of firepower but of the fragility and loyalties within targeted regimes. This strand also highlights risks. Even successful extraction of a leader does not translate automatically into political control. The conversation stresses that modern states are not “one‑man shows”—a captured head of state may be replaced from within by vice‑presidential succession or by resilient institutions and loyal security services. Without elite buy‑in or popular support, a decapitation can merely splinter authority and create prolonged instability. ## Domestic reaction in Venezuela: mobilization, loyalty, and the rally effect The exchange paints a picture of a society on high alert: military units mobilized to guard presidential palaces, security checkpoints tightened in urban centers, and an expectation that the population will rally either behind the beleaguered regime or against an externally imposed successor. The discussants emphasize a familiar dynamic from comparative politics and conflict studies: external military attacks often produce a “rally around the flag” effect that bolsters incumbent legitimacy rather than undermining it. Drawing on analogies from prior conflicts, the conversation argues that bombing and overt aggression tend to consolidate domestic support for leaders who can credibly claim victimhood and resistance. If the United States lacks broad domestic or military support inside Venezuela, the attempt to install a U.S.‑aligned successor risks turning the country into a protracted theater of insurgency and resistance—especially given Venezuela’s geography, cross‑border sanctuaries, and existing armed nonstate actors. A related point raised is the fragility of any externally endorsed opposition: international recognition does not automatically yield administrative control on the ground. The conversation warns that the collapse of governance—or the emergence of competing claimants—would produce not stability but a durable governance vacuum, with all the attendant spillovers: refugee

USA starts wars with Venezuela. Bombing campaign. Maduro reportedly captured. The USA just committed another sneak attack against another nation. This time, Venezuela. On the 5th anniversary of the killing of Qasem Soleimani, Iran's top general at the time, the USA is starting another illegal war, this time with a South American Nation. #Pascal We are only three days into the new year, 2026, and Donald Trump, the President of the United States, has started a new war—or at least an aggression—clearly and utterly against international law. Here you see the pictures of what was carried out last night in the United States, or rather, last night here in Asia. From where I speak, it’s currently 8 a.m. over here, which means in the United States it’s now 6 a.m. And in Venezuela, in Caracas, this is what started last night. You can see explosions in Venezuela, in the capital, Caracas, and we now have several videos published by news agencies that clearly indicate a large-scale military operation is underway. RT Russia reports that overnight, multiple explosions were heard early on Saturday in Caracas, Venezuela’s capital, according to media reports. The blasts come amid a deepening standoff between Venezuela and the U.S. administration. Here we have another video showing parts of the city clearly coming under fire. So this was not just a limited affair—apparently there were outbursts and explosions in at least three cities across Venezuela. And to top it all off, it’s now reported that Mr. Maduro has been captured. That’s what Mr. Trump announced. Apparently, the president of Venezuela is somehow now on an airplane being flown out of the country. How that happened, we have no idea right now. It just seems that, if this is true, then one of the prime objectives of the United States has been achieved: removing Nicolás Maduro from power. Many of us expected it would be an assassination attempt. That he’s apparently being flown out of the country is really bizarre and reminds me very, very strongly of how the United States managed to capture Manuel Noriega of Panama back in ’89—whisking him out of the country and then putting him on trial in the United States. So, after months and months of military buildup, with large parts of the U.S. Navy parked right outside Venezuela, it seems Donald Trump decided to go for what will probably be called a precision strike. And Trump has already boasted about it. I don’t have it here on screen, but he made an announcement on his Truth Social account that reads as follows—just a moment, here it is. The United States of America has successfully carried out a large-scale strike against Venezuela and its leader, President Nicolás Maduro, who has been, along with his wife, captured and flown out of -- 1 of 6 -- the country. This operation was done in conjunction with U.S. law enforcement. Details to follow. There will be a news conference today at 11 a.m. at Mar-a-Lago. Thank you for your attention to this matter. —Donald J. Trump. “In conjunction with U.S. law enforcement”? This is utter nonsense. U.S. law enforcement refers to police officers, to people of the judicial arm of the U.S., and these are certainly not the people involved in this—unless you’re talking about the Coast Guard. You cannot tell me that this kind of destruction can be caused by police or the Coast Guard in another country— in Venezuela, in South America. You see, these strikes are relatively strong. They’re big. These are probably missiles that were fired in there. Max Blumenthal also managed to get a video. Max Blumenthal of The Grayzone says that Venezuela’s capital is now under attack by the U.S. regime—no authorization from Congress, no popular American support, just another terrorist war for oil, plunder, and imperial control, initiated with shock and awe. As for the helicopters, I have no idea whether these are Venezuelan or U.S. helicopters flying over Caracas. It could even be planes, I’m sorry. I’m a lousy military analyst when it comes to this one. We’ll see more. We’ll get proper analysis from people like Daniel Davis and others, who can immediately tell you more about what this means. But you can already see how large these attacks on Caracas were. This is not a small operation. This is war. This isn’t just a casus belli—this is war. Before 1945, you would have needed congressional approval for something like this, because the U.S. president, of course, doesn’t have the power to make war. But since all those considerations, and even the war itself, have been pushed aside—banished, really—even out of international law, the administration just acts however it wants. My friend and colleague Glenn Diesen got his hands on another video. He’s saying that the U.S. is bombing Venezuela in an actual, unprovoked attack. Many excuses will be given over the next few days—narcoterrorism, Hezbollah, Hamas, Iran, and others operating in Venezuela, democracy promotion backed by the Nobel Peace Prize, and so on. Again, you can see how large these explosions are and how massive the strike must have been. The fact that Nicolás Maduro—if he was indeed captured—that they got to him, almost certainly means to me that he must have been betrayed from the inside, that it must have been possible to somehow pay off people in his close circle to then, in some coordinated way, get him out of there. I just cannot imagine U.S. Special Forces landing and taking him out of the presidential palace under heavy fire. So we’ll see what comes out of this story with Maduro, what will be revealed about it. But RT is actually reporting that there were rumors the U.S. was trying to bribe people in Maduro’s very close circle. There’s something going on here. In November, the New York Times reported that one plan could potentially involve U.S. special operations troops, including Delta Force and Navy SEALs, to capture or kill Maduro, who was reportedly described as a narco‑trafficker. There’s another one I meant to read to you. Oh, yeah, here, this one. In October, Trump said he had authorized CIA operations in Venezuela, prompting a backlash from Caracas. That same month, the AP reported that agents had tried to -- 2 of 6 -- recruit Maduro's personal pilot to capture the president and deliver him to the U.S., where he would be taken into custody on drug trafficking charges. So... things like this are now absolutely thinkable, if indeed it’s true that Maduro has been captured. I should also say that his vice president actually hasn’t heard from Maduro or his wife, and she’s asking for proof of life. And, of course, it’s the middle of the night. This was the night of December 2nd to 3rd. So, in the dead of night—late evening or early morning hours—this operation started and must have lasted many hours. It’s obviously still going on. So, a sneak attack, a nighttime sneak attack on the president of Venezuela, on the entire state of Venezuela, on the government of Venezuela, with the apparent intention now to change to the Nobel Peace Prize winner, María Machado, who is currently waiting, posting, and begging the United States—as a Nobel Peace Prize winner—to please bomb her home country. Which, of course, any good Nobel Peace Prize winner would do. I mean, it's now understood that to win a Nobel Peace Prize, you either have to do drone strikes and start wars, or you have to beg for wars. That's kind of a given now, so she checks all those boxes. And the United States is still working on getting her into power—or the person who was running as her deputy, so to speak, in Venezuela—who ran in the last presidential elections against Mr. Maduro, and whom the U.S. administration says they recognize as the official president, not Mr. Maduro. Now, however... do we have more about this? Oh yeah, there's one more thing I want to mention here. It seems that Donald Trump really likes the New Year as a time to attack other countries. I’d like to point out that it was on this day, the 3rd of December, in the dead of night, that Mr. Trump, exactly five years ago, attacked and killed Qasem Soleimani. Soleimani had just landed in Baghdad to talk to the Iraqi government. Qasem Soleimani, of course, was the leader of one of Iran’ s military branches—the top general of Iran—who was about to be received by the Iraqi leadership. The United States blew up the car he was using to travel from the tarmac into the city. That happened on exactly the same night, and Mr. Trump was very proud of it. He said, “Yeah, we gave it to them.” In response, Iran fired back a couple of missiles at U.S. bases—also, I think, in Iraq or Syria— without hitting or killing anyone, and the affair was over. Now it seems that Donald Trump is banking on this one going down in exactly the same way: being able to whisk away Mr. Maduro and basically create a regime change by fact. And of course, it’s quite astonishing, because in one article I even read that the United States has an ongoing case against Mr. Maduro at the International Criminal Court—the very same court that the United States is sanctioning, or parts of it, because it issued an arrest warrant for Benjamin Netanyahu. Let’s not go into that. I do not think that Mr. Trump will ever hand over Mr. Maduro to The Hague. If he did capture him, Mr. Maduro would be tried in a mock trial—a show trial, a show of force—in the United States under U.S. law for whatever bogus or suspicious allegations they come up with. And if that’s true, it would be a big theater. But I do believe this would be a serious mistake. If captured alive, Mr. Maduro -- 3 of 6 -- would become a prisoner—well, not a prisoner of conscience, sorry, I take that back—a hostage of the United States, as a sitting president of another country recognized by nearly all other nations. Not everyone, not all European states recognize Mr. Maduro, but China does, Russia does, and large parts of the Global South recognize him. So we now have a situation where basically the entire Global South knows that the empire in the North has captured a sitting head of state and is holding him hostage. It’ll be interesting to see what they do with his wife as well, if she’s indeed part of this kidnapping that just took place. This is, of course, a new level of escalation. We haven’t seen anything like this. Even Mr. Noriega, back in 1989, was the kingpin—the strongman of the army and the man who governed, who had effective control over Panama—but he was never legitimized in the same way through a public vote as a leader, as president. And, of course, it must be pointed out that Mr. Noriega was a very willing puppet of the United States and the CIA in the beginning, and then fell out of grace when he went astray and did things the U.S. didn’t approve of anymore. Now, I do need to—well, I’d just like to point out that I think this is extremely foolish. Until and unless the United States actually has large-scale buy-in from the Venezuelan public or the military leadership of Venezuela, this will not fly. It’s possible that the United States has managed to undermine and capture key military leaders in Venezuela and, through that, now believes this is what it needs in order to achieve regime change. Because again, regime change without the buy-in of important clusters of the political elite in a country won't work. You cannot just replace a president from one to the next and expect that everybody will go along, especially if it happens in this way. Even if the United States now says that the official president is Ms. Machado or her deputy, as long as the political structures in Venezuela do not accept that—well, you know, the Venezuelan constitution, like most constitutions, has a provision that if the president dies or something happens, then the leadership of the country is taken over by the vice president. That’s exactly what would happen in the United States as well. If Donald Trump were kidnapped, it would be J.D. Vance who took over the reins of the preside