Asia After US Hegemony: China, ASEAN and a New Security Order | Dr. Warwick Powell

## Violence and systemic change The conversation opened on a stark proposition: the violence that punctuates our era may be less a series of isolated eruptions than a symptom of systemic stress. This is not simply a moral or rhetorical claim but an analytical one—violence both reflects and accelerates shifts in the material foundations of world order. The participants argued that to understand contemporary conflicts we must move beyond the language of episodic crises and locate them within changing relations of production, energy flows and institutional infrastructure. Seen this way, violence is not only a political instrument but also a signal that existing arrangements for reproducing social and economic life are under strain. Framing the present in energetic terms reframes familiar debates about equilibrium and stability. Rather than imagining societies tending toward balance, the discussion urged thinking in metabolic terms: societies constantly harness energy to reproduce complex institutions and defer entropy. That reproduction depends on productive capacity—where it sits, who controls it, and the webs of logistics and finance that keep it functioning. When those foundations shift, so too do the incentives for coercion, competition and the construction of new security architectures. ## Energy, production and China’s rise A central theme emerged from the conversation: the concentration of productive capacity is changing. For centuries, global capitalism rested on a separation between capitals that owned production and the territories where production occurred. That separation is eroding. The conversation highlighted how China’s industrial ascendancy represents a tectonic change—one that does not simply redistribute surplus but challenges who owns the means of production. China’s rise matters because it provides an alternative node of manufacturing, logistics and technological capability. It is not just about low-cost goods; it is about an integrated productive ecosystem that can sustain a region economically. Participants noted that this offers states the option to build supply chains and energy systems that are less dependent on Atlantic-centred financial and military guarantees. The implication is profound: when productive capacity becomes multipolar, the old hierarchies of power built primarily on the monopoly of surplus distribution start to fragment. That said, the conversation was careful not to paint China as a deterministic actor that automatically fills every geopolitical vacuum. The presence of industrial heft creates opportunities for regional architectures, but turning industrial linkages into durable political stabilizers requires deliberate policy choices, diplomatic frameworks and, importantly, complementary security arrangements that are not purely military in form. ## West Asia and vulnerable US bases The Persian Gulf episode provided a laboratory for thinking about the limits of forward basing and the erosion of a specific kind of American power. The conversation observed that recent attacks and operational realities exposed forward bases as more vulnerable than previously assumed. Images from conflicts in the Gulf, it was argued, demonstrated that the physical protection that underpinned decades of power projection can no longer be taken for granted. This vulnerability has cascading effects. If forward bases cannot reliably underpin rapid, decisive force projection, then the deterrent value they once offered is compromised. Logistics, sortie ranges and supply-chain assurance degrade with distance and exposure. The result is not merely a tactical inconvenience; it is a strategic opening. States or coalitions that can operate closer to contested zones or that can create alternative local security architectures may find themselves in position to reshape regional order. The conversation suggested Iran’s strategy should be read through this prism. Rather than aiming for an immediate knockout of American capacity, a deliberate approach of stressing the fragile points in the regional architecture—bases, lines of supply, and the political will to sustain presence—creates the possibility for a new settlement led by regional powers and backed by alternative economic patrons. ## Financial infrastructure and alternative payments Military vulnerability amplifies the significance of another axis of power: financial infrastructure. The conversation drew attention to how control of payment and messaging systems has long been a lever for geopolitical coercion. Historical practices—intelligence agencies monitoring payment rails, the use of SWIFT-related pressures, targeted sanctions—demonstrate that financial chokepoints are instruments of political constraint. Against that backdrop, the development of alternative payment architectures by states like China and Russia—and the active interest of states under sanctions in digitized, sovereign payment channels—represents more than redundancy. It is strategic diversification. If states can transact outside Western-controlled rails, they reduce exposure to extrajudicial financial exclusion and increase the viability of independent foreign policies. Participants highlighted concrete moves toward integrating digital payment systems among partners who have reasons to avoid interception. The emergence of these alternatives parallels the growth of regional production and energy networks: together they constitute a non-military infrastructure for autonomy. In short, securing sovereignty in this era requires both physical proximity to production and secure channels for settling transactions. ## Asia, Australia and the limits of US power The conversation then moved to the Western Pacific, where the spectre of confrontation—South China Sea flashpoints, Taiwan, great-power rivalry—has dominated strategic debates. A notable line of argument was that US capability to shape regional outcomes is significant but not unlimited. Material constraints, political will, and the changing distribution of regional infrastructure mean that the United States cannot indefinitely underwrite a security order unilaterally. Australia’s role surfaced as illustrative of the dilemmas faced by middle powers embedded within structures anchored by an extraregional hegemon. The participants argued that Canberra faces strategic choices that are less about ideological alignment and more about practical survival: how to secure critical inputs, protect supply-chain resilience, and prevent its own territory or economic lifelines from becoming bargaining chips in a great-power contest. This section of the conversation emphasized that Asian states are increasingly pursuing diversification—economically, diplomatically and strategically. The diversification imperative arises from the realization that dependence on a single external guarantor or market is a vulnerability. States in the region are therefore knitting together pragmatic arrangements that mix ties to the United States with deepening connections to China and intra-regional partners. ## An ASEAN-centered neutral security order Perhaps the most consequential proposal in the discussion was the idea of an ASEAN-centered security architecture grounded in neutrality. Rather than simply swapping one external anchor for another, the conversation proposed a regionally driven framework that prioritizes economic integration, political nonalignment and locally governed mechanisms of conflict management. The appeal of an ASEAN-centered order rests on several suppositions. First, neutrality can create political space for states to pursue development without being forced into debilitating alignment. Second, economic interdependence—if deepened beyond raw trade to include energy grids, manufacturing linkages and payments—can create structural incentives for stability. Third, locally conceived institutions have greater legitimacy and may be better attuned to the granular disputes

Asia After US Hegemony: China, ASEAN and a New Security Order | Dr. Warwick Powell If there is one region where Western imperialism has thoroughly come to a dead end, it's East and Southeast Asia. The name of the game is diversification of partnerships. Kyoto University Symposium 2026: "Geopolitics in the Time of Monsters" Presentation 14: Warwick Powell Warwick Powell explores how energy, production and financial infrastructure shape a changing world order. Drawing lessons from conflict in West Asia, he argues that vulnerable American bases undermine established security arrangements across Asia. He proposes an ASEAN-centered regional order grounded in neutrality, economic integration and locally driven cooperation. The discussion examines China’s industrial rise, alternative payment systems, green energy, Australia’s strategic choices and the dangers of destabilization, asking how regional societies might navigate declining hegemony while avoiding another devastating war. Warwick's Links: Substack: https://warwickpowell.substack.com/ Neutrality Studies Links: Neutrality Studies Substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Support Neutrality Studies: https://neutralitystudies.com/donate Neutrality Studies shop: https://neutralitystudies.com/shop Time Stamps 00:00 Warwick Powell: violence and systemic change 06:05 Energy, production and China’s rise 11:49 West Asia and vulnerable US bases 20:31 Financial infrastructure and alternative payments 23:18 Asia, Australia and the limits of US power 27: 38 An ASEAN-centered neutral security order 31:05 Discussion: regional cooperation, energy and payments 48:10 US retrenchment, destabilization and regional choices #Warwick Powell Isn't it amazing, the last speaker—that would put me between everybody and afternoon tea, right? Which, of course, is a very dangerous position, as was mentioned yesterday. Firstly, can I thank Pascal and his team for their generosity in inviting me, and for everything that you've done over the last few days to make this event, I think, a truly memorable one in more ways than one. So thank you very much. It's also a tremendous pleasure to spend three days with a group of exceptionally bright people who also, in a sense, despite all of our diversities in where we come from and our own perspectives on things, nonetheless have, I think, a deep core common landing point, and that is I don't think that there is a warmonger amongst us, and we are in our own ways trying to come to grips with the violence that exists, continues to play out on the global stage, but in some ways perhaps has intensified in ways that has made more people much more aware of systemic violence than they have for a long time. And I say that because in Agogo's remarks earlier, he reminds us that, in fact, the monsters have always been with us. -- 1 of 17 -- And, in fact, depending on where you are in the world, those monsters have been violent at levels of intensity and extremity that I think many people would find very difficult to grasp. So the violence itself is not new, and yet there is something in our moment that perhaps has some dimensions that we need to think about, because I guess the question is: is the violence that is taking place now a continuation of the violence that has been part of global capital, global imperialism, global colonialism? Or is it a violence at a moment in which that system itself has come under such strain that it is, in a sense, reacting to that? I don't quite know the answer to that, by the way. Is it just more violence of the same, or is it the violence that has been provoked because of the systemic stress that we're witnessing? And I guess I want to suggest that perhaps it is a symptom of the systemic stress, and there are some things that we can perhaps try and learn from aspects of this violence that hopefully create a space in which we can think about alternatives. I'm going to try and do a couple of things today. One is to lean on other people's work over the last few days, and perhaps that's both the privilege and the responsibility of the person who speaks last, but also shift our register a little bit. I wanted to shift the register in a few ways. One, I wanted to, in a sense, bring some of our discussions back down to earth. Over the last two days or so, we have given a lot of collective thinking effort to big systemic questions, whether it's modes of production, whether it's questions of modernity, civilisation, and those sorts of things. But what I wanted to do was to bring all of that to a moment where, and perhaps in doing so, connect some of these big systemic drivers, the macro drivers, if you will, with a contemporary episode, which perhaps opens up a way of thinking about future possibilities. So that's the first shift in register. The second shift in register is a geographical one. We have discussed many of the issues very much in the context of transatlantic dynamics and how those transatlantic dynamics have impinged on the lives of some peoples in other parts of the world through the mechanisms of imperialism and colonialism. But I wanted to bring this discussion to a very contemporary set of concerns of mine, in large part because of where I live and where I'm from, and reflect on what some of this may mean for Asia. Because here in the Western Pacific, or in East Asia, so far we have not been explicitly caught up in the kinetic violence that we are seeing explode in other parts of the world. And yet we are often described as the next hotspot, whether it's the South China Sea, whether it's the East China Sea, the Taiwan Straits question, et cetera. And I wanted to perhaps pull some threads together to think about not only the monsters that exist in this moment in time, and perhaps even in this part of the world, but to suggest a way of thinking about this question of neutrality that perhaps can paint a roadmap for a way of responding to the violence, at least insofar as this part of the world is concerned. So that's what I'm going to try and do. I might fail entirely, but let's see how we go. I did actually have some prepared notes and paper and things just in case I didn't know what I would say, but I've discarded all of that, so this is a little bit -- 2 of 17 -- ad lib, but let's see. At a systemic level, as Pascal mentioned, much of my work has focused on understanding social and economic life through a fundamentally energetic lens. And I say energetic not because of electricity or what have you, but in a much deeper ontological sense, namely that I place at the heart of my own understanding of the world what we know of the laws of thermodynamics, and particularly two things. One, that energy can't be created or destroyed; it just transforms. And the second one, that we exist in a continual state of entropy. And both of these features are actually quite important for understanding the challenges that human societies have experienced throughout the ages. Because in many respects, what human societies, particularly production systems, are doing all the time is harnessing energy, applying that energy through work to materials, through the world around us, and creating things that we believe are of use to us in our societies, with the aim—though it's not necessarily an explicit aim, but nonetheless there is a metabolic process that seems to be at work—and that is to reproduce ourselves. Not just ourselves as individuals, biologically speaking, but to reproduce the systems in which we operate in. And that process of reproduction is actually, I would suggest, the centre of gravity. #Pascal Hey, just a very quick note. The best way to support this channel is by signing up for my free Substack. You can also help with a paid subscription there, or you can get some of our new merch on neutralitystudies.com. Links below. See you there. #Warwick Powell And this is a contrast, of course, to the centre of gravity that we find in neoclassical economics, which is around the question of equilibrium. By having this metabolic sense of social-economic systems, my foundational argument is that, in fact, we don't have systems that verge towards equilibria. It's the wrong question to ask. What we have are systems that seek to reproduce themselves under conditions of entropy, which means that we may or may not succeed in interposing negentropic interventions to delay entropy, or to give ourselves more breathing room by generating greater energetic efficiency within our systems that we can then deploy to create the things that we have in complex, multidimensional societies. Because all of those extra things that we have are demands on the work that we have undertaken and which is available for us to use subsequently beyond what we would call simple reproduction. So that's the macro backdrop to, I guess, my thought patterns. And in outlining that, I think that our moment is a transitional moment, or a moment of potential transition, because we are experiencing conflicts that are arising in two very particular ways at a macro level. Of course, capitalism has long been a system in which we have conflicts over the distribution of surpluses, whether they have been within national economies or across national economies. But what has always underpinned this long -- 3 of 17 -- arc of colonial and imperial capitalism is that there has rarely ever been a question over who controls the means of production themselves. And so those means of production may be located in far-flung parts of the world, but nonetheless they answer to the capital owners within the developed West. And so for all of this time, most of the conflicts that have arisen have arisen around questions of the distribution of surplus. But right now we are starting to witness, I think, the symptoms of conflicts around the distribution over productive capacity itself. So this is a very metabolic question. Now, in less abstract terms, it's who controls supply chains and all the raw materials upstream. That is the question du jour. Because the realization that a particular class or a group of people, elites or whatever we want to call them, no longer have sole control over those means of production means that they are no longer in the box seat to dictate the terms around questions of the distribution of surplus, because they themselves are not the creators of the surpluses. And so this is a fundamental transition, or a change in the configuration of the global economic structure, that we now have for the first time in 500 years an environment in which there is an alternative set of productive capabilities that are not subjected to the whims and the will of the centres of global capital. And of course, I'll speak of China. So China's rise is not a trivial event. It's a fundamentally transformative event, and it's one that the United States in particular sought to not just hold back, which is what it's trying to do now, but it sought to rope into capitalism. And it's failed to do that, really. And there's a great lament in the United States about that. But I won't touch on China, but maybe we can come back to China in the discussion. So that's the backdrop. Now I want to bring us down to earth. We have discussed a little over the last couple of days the conflict in the Persian Gulf, particularly around questions of civilisations, the nuclear question. But for me, there are a few other lessons out of this, I guess, that I'm starting to pay a little bit more attention to. The first lesson is fundamentally material, and it goes to the ways in which the powers that have been dominant over the course of the last, say, century, 70, 80 years, or what have you, the means by which those powers have exercised and built the architecture of power across the globe has actually begun to crumble, and in very explicit, obvious ways. Because the entire power architecture, aside from economics, finance, capital, and those sorts of things, has been built on a networ