America's Final War | Dr. Arthur Kachikian

## Introduction The exchange recorded in the conversation captures a disquieting thesis: a sequence of contemporary crises—set off by a catastrophic war involving Iran and rippling through Armenia and the South Caucasus—has exposed the unraveling of institutions, norms, and strategies that once constrained great‑power violence. The argument is not merely that a single military campaign has failed; rather, the discussion portrays a systemic fracture: a liberal order that promised restraint and accountability is giving way to a politics of chaos, proxy manipulation, and moral impunity. Against this backdrop, the region‑level shocks in the Caucasus, the instrumentalization of ethnic minorities, and a growing rhetoric of religious crusade point to a world in which arms‑control, international law, and democratic restraint are collapsing simultaneously—raising the specter of nuclear proliferation and great‑power miscalculation. ## Armenia and regional fallout The immediate theatre of violence, the South Caucasus, is described as already engulfed by conflict with spillover effects into Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. Refugee flows, attacks on infrastructure, and even strikes reaching nuclear facilities in the region—allegedly without immediate radiation releases—signal an escalation that cannot be treated as isolated. The conversation underscores how fragile boundary lines and frozen conflicts can be reignited into cascading crises when a major power conflict occurs nearby. Armenia, which had hoped to be insulated by geography and diplomacy, finds itself dealing with displaced civilians and the political knock‑on effects of a wider strategic confrontation. This is not merely a humanitarian emergency; it is a geopolitical one. Attempts—reported in open sources—to involve neighboring states or to create incidents inside Azerbaijan or Turkey reflect a familiar playbook: expand the battlefield indirectly to compel allies into action or to fracture regional coalitions. The presence of drones and missile fragments in Nakhichevan and near Turkish territory reflects how modern conflicts in the post‑Soviet space can quickly involve third parties and test mutual defense commitments. The conversation highlights the alarming ease with which a localized exchange can metastasize into a regional conflagration when state and non‑state actors pursue aggressive escalation. ## Kurds, proxies and regime change A central strand of the discussion traces repeated attempts to avoid direct intervention by leveraging proxies and minority groups—efforts that, according to the speakers, have so far failed to produce the intended political change in Tehran. The conversation points to a pattern: air campaigns and special operations are followed by efforts to ignite internal dissent via ethnic minorities or diaspora networks in hopes of provoking a collapse from within. The Kurds are a canonical example: courted, deployed in past conflicts, then abandoned when strategic priorities shifted. The Kurds’ refusal, born of bitter experience in Syria and Iraq, is presented as a tactical prudence that frustrates outsiders’ hopes for regime change. But the logic of proxy warfare also reaches into Iran’s Azeri, Baloch, and Arab minority regions. Using these populations as instruments for external policy risks a permanent internationalization of internal fault lines and a long‑term dismemberment strategy that would be both morally egregious and practically self‑defeating. The conversation insists on a blunt point: military force can destroy, but it cannot substitute for political legitimacy. If direct attrition and aerial bombardment fail to produce regime change—as past interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan showed—the turn to proxies becomes the next predictable, and dangerous, step. ## Chaos as strategy Perhaps the most provocative claim advanced in the exchange is that chaos itself has been weaponized as policy. Where earlier statecraft prized order and stable client regimes, a new calculation—attributed variously to powerful states and their regional partners—treats fragmentation and enduring instability as strategic assets. Chaos creates dependency, undermines rivals’ governance capacities, and produces strategic vacuums that outside powers or their proxies can exploit. The conversation places this logic at the heart of a deliberate regional approach: if sustained instability facilitates control—through economic penetration, security bases, or influence over splintered elites—then the instruments of war and disruption become policy ends in themselves. This approach, however, ignores the eventual political and moral costs of creating durable disorder. The historical parallels invoked—Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan—are offered as cautionary tales of how temporary military superiority can morph into indefinite occupation or a quagmire of violent fragmentation. The speakers underscore that occupying powers often evade responsibility in institutional terms, yet bear the human and geopolitical consequences: refugees, jihadi radicalization, cross‑border criminal economies, and protracted state failure. In short, chaos as strategy may produce short‑term tactical gains but long‑term strategic instability that boomerangs on interveners and neighbours alike. ## Liberal order in collapse 00: 20:11 Holy war and nuclear spread The conversation moves from regional dynamics to a sweeping indictment of an eroding liberal international order. Doctrines once thought robust—arms control regimes, international law, and a normative commitment to restraint—are described as in deep decay. Treaties that anchored strategic stability (INF, ABM, portions of START) are cited as abandoned, and the available architecture for managing escalation is portrayed as hollowed out. Into this breach has stepped a dangerous rhetorical fusion of geopolitics and religious certitude: political leaders and commentators invoking apocalyptic religious language, the speakers warn, transform limited wars into crusading ventures and make compromise politically costly. The intersection of holy‑war rhetoric and a weakening nonproliferation regime raises urgent proliferation risks. If major powers or regional actors frame the conflict in existential, civilizational terms, states that fear annihilation or loss of sovereignty may calculate that nuclear or radiological options—deterrence or breakout—are the only reliable guarantees. The conversation argues that once the taboo against nuclear use is eroded by apocalyptic framing and systematic treaty breakdown, hedging and proliferation become not merely plausible but likely. The catastrophic scenario sketched is chilling: normalization of escalation rhetoric combined with collapsing arms control could lead to either explicit nuclear deployments in regional defense postures or accelerated covert programs to field deterrent capabilities. ## World war and great power risk Beyond regional proliferation, the dialogue stresses how localized crises can stumble into great‑power confrontation through miscalculation, alliance entanglement, or proxy escalation. The recorded exchange makes a stark claim: current alignments and inflammatory discourse produce an asymmetry in which missteps—an intercepted drone, a misplaced missile, a downed aircraft—can cascade into reciprocal strikes, alliance invocation, and broadening theaters of conflict. The more fractured the global order, the less effective diplomatic crisis management becomes, increasing the odds of strategic shocks that could draw NATO elements and other great powers into wider war. Contributors in the conversation underscore that the principal danger is not necessarily deliberate great‑power war but unintended escalation. With fewer institutional brakes—deteriorating arms‑control verification, politicized international bodies, and delegitimized mediators—there is less confidence that crises can be contained. High‑stakes signaling, when

America's Final War | Dr. Arthur Kachikian The war that broke the Empire's Neck: Iran is about to become a worse disaster than Vietnam. And the Washington elite has no one to blame but themselves. After tens of millions of deaths around the globe, the US war machine is finally collapsing under its own weight and the crony capitalism that birthed it in the first place. Today I discuss with Arthur Kachikian, political scientist and sharp reader of the South Caucasus, we trace the shockwaves from Armenia and Iran to Washington, Europe, international law, democratic failure, and the fear that the old guardrails are falling away in real time. Links: Arthur Kachikian on Telegram: https://t.me/artedecco Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Opt in for Academic Section from your profile settings: https://pascallottaz.substack.com/s/academic Merch & Donations: https://neutralitystudies-shop. fourthwall.com Timestamps: 00:00:00 Introduction 00:00:23 Armenia and regional fallout 00:03:01 Kurds, proxies and regime change 00:06:46 Chaos as strategy 00:10:14 Liberal order in collapse 00: 20:11 Holy war and nuclear spread 00:29:08 World war and great power risk 00:38:23 International law and just war 00:47:40 Democracy captured by power #Pascal Welcome everybody back to Neutrality Studies. This is Pascal Lottaz coming to you from Japan, and I'm joined today by Arthur Kachikian. He's a doctor of political science and a good colleague who's been on the show before. Arthur, welcome back. Thanks for having me back. It's a pleasure. Thank you for coming. And maybe let's start with your home region, Armenia, the South Caucasus. It is today, March 9th. We've now been nine days into a war with Iran—an insane war, in my view. What is happening in Armenia and Azerbaijan, in the Southern Caucasus? How is that region currently developing? #Arthur Kachikian Well, first, let me say that this is an unprecedented event, even though we were hoping it wouldn’t happen. There have been some cases of similar things before, but we were hoping this one could be avoided. It’s a pretty unprecedented war that has now engulfed the entire region, with the potential to spread even further. It’s happening right on the borders of Armenia and Azerbaijan, close to Georgia. Reportedly, there were attempts to involve Azerbaijan and Turkey in this war. You’ve seen a drone fall in Nakhichevan, in Azerbaijan, and a missile that was reportedly fired at Turkey. Then Iran said, “We didn’t do this,” denying responsibility. So it looks like an attempt to drag Turkey and Azerbaijan in. The first refugees are arriving in Armenia—though not as many as I thought there would be. Today, there was a report that the first nuclear facility was hit, and so far there’s no radiation leak. But that’ s also something to consider. I mean, where should I start? This is a catastrophe at the regional -- 1 of 24 -- level. This is a catastrophe at the global level. With your permission, we can start with the region, and then, if you want, I’ll share some broader thoughts with you. Just prompt me. So, first, there were some scenarios, right? Number one was that the U.S. was just trying to intimidate Iran to give in to its claims—that didn’t happen. The second scenario was the Belgrade–Yugoslavia scenario, that they would bomb Iran until Iran gives in. That didn’t happen either. Then they tried the Syrian scenario—or you could also say Libyan, in a different sense—but probably Syrian, where after the original bombardment, they tried to use ethnic minorities to provoke an ethnic war in Iran. They tried to provoke a civil war, but that didn’t work. The hope was probably that after this initial bombing, the opposition would take to the streets. That didn’t happen. Then, reportedly, according to some American media outlets, they tried to use the Kurds, and the Kurds refused—wisely—because they’d already been used twice in Syria, and twice they were abandoned. So they learned their lesson. And then there was an attempt to drag—uh, is that? #Pascal Are you pretty sure, or is the U.S. still trying to work with the Kurds to get them involved? The latest news you have is that the Kurds aren’t really eager to do this. #Arthur Kachikian I can only rely on open sources—what I see in Telegram channels—and the best I can do is compare what different people are saying. I know that very authoritative outlets in the U.S., like CNN and some major others, were saying that the U.S. is working with the Kurds, so that part, you know, we can probably say is true. There were some reports that the Kurds had already crossed the border, then those were denied by the Kurds. Then there were reports that they tried, but were shot at and pushed back in Iran. So it’s hard to say exactly what’s happening, but it’s very plausible that an attempt was made to use the Kurds—and it wouldn’t be the first time. And it makes sense that you would try to use an ethnic minority in Iran. Of course, there are other minorities—there’s a fifteen‑million‑strong Azeri minority in the northern regions of Iran, the Baloch minority, the Arab minority. So if the goal is the dismemberment of Iran, the opportunities are there. And it would make sense, because apparently the air campaign, although it was successful—even though Iran managed to respond—uh, it’s probably not going to succeed in changing the regime in Iran. Yes, you can bomb Tehran, you can turn it into another Gaza, but it’s probably not going to change the regime. So then, at some point, both sides will find themselves in an impasse. What do you do? Let’s say you destroyed all the ballistic missiles in Iran, destroyed all the drones, bombed these people into oblivion, killed another 165 ten‑year‑old girls—just appalling. What do you do then? How do you change the regime? Well, you’ve got to put boots on the ground, as they say. Hopefully, it’s not going to come to that, because that would be suicidal. But there are some -- 2 of 24 -- reports—well, actually, some statements—that the U.S. does not rule it out. They tried to use other people first, the Kurds, probably the Azeris. Now that that hasn’t succeeded, they’ll probably consider this step, which would be a total catastrophe. I was just reading and watching some documentaries—just refreshing my memory on the war in Iraq and the war in Afghanistan. And what amazes me is that we refuse to learn. We refuse to learn. When you invade a country, you may be successful in removing its government, changing the power structure of that country. But then you have to understand that the only reason whatever regime you created exists is because you are there. So then, do you stay there indefinitely, supporting this new political architecture, and then suffer 4,000 casualties in Iraq and 2,500 in Afghanistan—and then withdraw because you realize you can’t stay there forever? There's an asymmetry of interest, an asymmetry of resources, and an asymmetry of legitimacy. So eventually you're going to have to withdraw, and whatever you created is going to fall apart spectacularly, like it did in Iraq and Afghanistan. Are you about to repeat the same mistake in Iran? It's a lot bigger, from what I understand, and the population is huge. How are you going to control this country? Are you going to do the same thing again? So Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan weren’t tragic enough—now you want another one, another tragedy. It's very hard for me to understand. #Pascal Hey, very brief intermission because I was recently banned from YouTube. And although I'm back, this could happen again at any time. So please consider subscribing not only here, but also to my mailing list on Substack—that’s pascallottaz.substack.com. #Arthur Kachikian The link will be in the description below. And now, back to the video. #Pascal I don't know. I know people say these were moments when the United States lost the war, but I keep saying no—they didn’t. South Vietnam lost the Vietnam War. The Afghan Republic, or whatever it was called, lost the Afghan War. And Iraq—well, Iraq, too, lost the Iraq War. And even today, their oil proceeds are managed in New York. The government, I mean, the parliament, has already asked the United States to leave several times, and the U.S. just says no. They still control Iraq; they have logistical control and air control over Iraq and, by extension, Israel. So, I mean, also Libya—people keep saying, oh, it’s a complete disaster. Yes, for the Libyans—but not for the Israelis, not for the Americans. For them, you know, if chaos is what you want, then it’s actually quite a success. And in my view, the strategy—especially the Israeli strategy in its immediate neighborhood—has been massive amounts of chaos, because it helps you -- 3 of 24 -- control the region. So if absolute chaos is what the U.S. and Israel want for Iran, then, you know, carpet bombing and destroying all semblance of normal civilian life—that’s exactly what you would do. Of course, it presupposes an extremely vicious goal, but I have no reason at the moment to rule that goal out. #Arthur Kachikian Yes, but eventually you would bear the political and moral—if there is such a thing—responsibility for what you did. Because you invaded this country, you disturbed and changed the political balance within it, and now, if you withdraw, you’re responsible for the consequences. The Taliban prevailed. #Pascal No, that’s the point—you’re not. How many Americans were hanged from a tree for Afghanistan? How many were hanged for Iraq? How many were hanged for Vietnam? How many presidents were put in prison in The Hague for any of those? These people have no responsibility. They will never bear responsibility. #Arthur Kachikian Yes, I’ll speak to that and then share an observation with you. Fifty-nine thousand young Americans died in Vietnam, and later on, President Carter said the domino theory was a stretch. That’s a crime. #Pascal Over a million Vietnamese. #Arthur Kachikian Fifty-nine thousand young Americans who were not out on the streets protesting the government back in Washington. #Pascal I mean, it’s really diabolical, but I do think these people think in those terms. But Arthur, let’s continue with your analysis, because I think, overall, the point that this is not a war that can be won is absolutely correct. So where does that leave us? #Arthur Kachikian Yes, but just to finish off, 2,500 Americans died in Afghanistan and 4,500 Americans died in Iraq— not to mention hundreds of thousands of people who were killed in both countries, and at least a million and a half Vietnamese killed in Vietnam. And no one was responsible for this. I agree with -- 4 of 24 -- you, it’s a crime. There’s a French saying: if you kill one person, you go to jail; if you kill fifty people, you go to a psychiatrist; and if you kill a million people, you become a hero and get a statue erected in your honor. So why would the U.S. walk into the same trap? Why would they do the same thing? Apparently, well, number one, there are some very dangerous religious overtones coming from Washington. People are speaking in terms of the Bible, Armageddon, and the return of Jesus Christ. I mean, this is very dangerous. We have a leader, a group that leads the most powerful country in the world—a nuclear power, a superpower—and they're talking in terms of a religious war, like a Christian jihad or a crusade. So what’s going to happen next? Are we going to have the next Raymond of Toulouse, or Guillaume of Bouillon, or Richard the Lionheart? I mean, Pete Hegseth—he speaks like a boy. You know, great guy with a very respectable career, but he sounds like a teenager who’s enjoying the fight. I mean, this is pretty dangerous—to frame it in terms of a religious war. What I want to say, Pascal, is that what we're witnessing is an earthquake. This is an international earthquake of global proportions. It’s the end of international law, international legitimacy,