CIA on the Ground: The US Prepares for War with Venezuela | Kajsa Ekis Ekman

## Introduction The current standoff off Venezuela’s coast is not an isolated flare-up; it is the latest manifestation of a long-running strategic contest that blends energy geopolitics, covert operations, economic warfare, and relentless propaganda. The exchange recorded in the conversation unspools this knot: U.S. naval and intelligence activity, the seeming pretext of a “drug war,” fractured opposition politics in Caracas, and two competing oil giants pressing divergent policies in Washington. Taken together, these threads reveal a U.S. posture that is both opportunistic and constrained—capable of coercive escalation, but hamstrung by politics at home, messy local realities, and the peculiar limits of 21st‑century empire-building in Latin America. ## The Role of US Oil Companies At the heart of the Venezuela question lies petroleum. The conversation repeatedly returns to the moment Venezuela nationalized its oil resources and how that set off decades of antagonism. But that antagonism is not now, nor has it ever been, a single uniform force in Washington. The dialogue unpacks a split inside U.S. corporate and policy circles: ExxonMobil on one flank, favoring aggressive regime change, and Chevron on the other, favoring accommodation and commercial engagement. This corporate divergence is consequential. Exxon’s posture has been militant—funding think tanks, advocating for tough sanctions, and pushing for policies that aim to unseat Caracas. Chevron, with its own long-standing operational ties and different commercial calculus, has favored dialogue, arguing for pragmatic arrangements that salvage market access without provoking catastrophic isolation. These competing preferences ripple through administrations: hardliners who listen to Exxon push for sanctions, covert action, and public pressure; pragmatists who listen to Chevron counsel restraint and negotiation. The result is policy oscillation. Sanctions intensify, then partially roll back; oil exports are restricted but find opaque workarounds; and geopolitical calculations about global supply—especially after crises like the war in Ukraine—reshape how far policymakers are willing to squeeze Caracas. Corporate lobbying and commercial feasibility thus become not background factors but central drivers of how the U.S. chooses to use force or restraint. ## Is the US Preparing for War? The recorded exchange raises the alarm directly: U.S. warships harassing—and in some cases killing—fishermen around Venezuelan waters, the recent authorization for the CIA to carry out operations on the ground, and a posture of “maximum pressure” dressed up as counternarcotics enforcement. Yet the evidence described suggests a hybrid strategy rather than an imminent, large-scale invasion. The “drug war” framing functions as a convenient legalistic and moral cover. When militarized interdiction becomes difficult to justify politically, labeling maritime interdiction and strikes as anti-drug operations supplies a pretext—however flimsy—for use of force, surveillance, and covert action. The conversation highlights the paradox: real interdiction protocols preserve evidence and enable judicial prosecution; indiscriminate bombing of fishing boats does the opposite. Destroying boats and bodies undermines both rule-of-law narratives and the stated counternarcotics mission, suggesting political signaling more than sound law enforcement. The authorization of CIA operations is particularly telling. The agency’s deployment historically spans espionage, covert support for opposition actors, sabotage, and targeted strikes. That the White House would choose intelligence operatives over overt troop deployments signals two things: a desire to avoid a politically costly conventional war in a hemisphere with millions of U.S. residents of Latin American origin; and a preference for deniable, surgical tactics to effect leadership decapitation or to stoke internal destabilization. But deniability is brittle. Covert operations can spin into kinetic engagements or accidental escalation, especially amid naval confrontations, misidentifications, and the fog of proxy actors. In sum, the U.S. posture appears to be a calibrated pressure campaign that can be tightened, opened into kinetic action, or stepped back depending on domestic politics, oil market calculations, and battlefield frictions. The presence of warships and covert authorizations raises the risk bar, but they do not yet amount to a conventional invasion strategy. ## Why an Internal Military Coup is Unlikely One recurring theme in the discussion is the repeated failure of U.S.-backed or inspired coup attempts in Venezuela. The reasons are structural and cultural: the loyalty of the Venezuelan military to the Bolivarian state, the lack of a credible, broad-based opposition leadership able to galvanize mass defections, and the chronic unreliability of the mercenary networks and contractors the U.S. sometimes resorts to. The episode of 2019—the Guaidó interlude—shows the limits of constitutional legerdemain and external recognition. The U.S. and several European governments attempted to install the National Assembly’s parliamentary leader as interim president by exploiting an obscure constitutional provision. The tactic depended on a domestic political class and military that would follow. It didn’t. Guaidó’s notoriety among ordinary Venezuelans was low, and the opposition’s internal cohesion was shallow. What the conversation emphasizes is the social context: right-wing “guarimbas” (paid or semi-paid street actions by frustrated urban factions) do not translate into mass military defection or durable governance alternatives. Further, the contractors and paramilitary operatives often used to effect coastal incursions and coup attempts have histories of fraud and incompetence. Episodes of boats intercepted at shorelines, hit squads that never disembark, and poorly funded, fraudulent intermediaries show how fragile such schemes are. Even when resources like foreign-held gold are blocked from Caracas by institutions like the Bank of England, the U.S. finds it difficult to convert financial assets into reliable political outcomes within Venezuela. Finally, political economy matters: the Venezuelan military’s institutional interests—control over resources, ranks, and social patronage networks—are intertwined with the regime. Unless a coup promises stable replacement orders that protect those interests, rank-and-file loyalty remains a robust barrier to external machinations. ## Is the US Empire in Decline? The conversation places the Venezuela contest against a larger question: is U.S. global power receding, and if so, how does that shape its strategies? Several dynamics point to a form of constrained influence rather than outright collapse. First, the multiplicity of global crises—energy shortfalls, a multipolar diplomatic landscape, and competing theatres like Ukraine and the Middle East—rule out the kind of totalizing sanctions regime the U.S. once wielded unilaterally. Sanctioning every energy-producing adversary simultaneously risks destabilizing global markets. The partial easing of Venezuela sanctions in 2023 reflects that arithmetic: Washington can be aggressive, but it must juggle prices, allies, and its own domestic political stability. Second, changing demographics at home temper the appetite for flag-waving interventions in the Americas. Latinos, as a growing and politically mobilized constituency, make mass bombing campaigns in neighboring regions a heavy domestic political price. That restraint is not moral so much as strategic: a costly regional war would be harder to justify to domestic constituencies with ties to the affected nations. Third, the reliance on covert tools—CIA operations, proxy actors, carve-outs for corporate influence—evinces a shift from high-profile invasions to more deniable, compartmentalized modes of power. That does not mean decline in

Why US Warships Are Killing Fishermen Near Venezuela Why are US warships parked off the coast of Venezuela, killing civilians? And is this the prelude to a full-scale war, a decapitation strike aimed at President Maduro himself? We dive headfirst into the escalating tensions between the United States and Venezuela, trying to make sense of this crisis. To help me understand, I'm joined by Kajsa Ekis Ekman, a Swedish Activist, author and journalist, who is currently the editor in Chief of Parabol Press. Kajsa has worked for many years on the US obsession with regime change in Venezuela, which is what we want to discuss today. We explore the tangled web of US oil interests driving the conflict and unpack the long history of bizarre and failed coup attempts. Our conversation also delves into the propaganda war, from Nobel Peace Prizes to economic sanctions, and explains why Venezuela's military has remained loyal throughout the turmoil. Links: Kajsa's Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/pages/Kajsa-Ekis-Ekman /268001276604340 Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/ms.ekis.ekman/ Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Goods Store: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall. com Timestamps: 00:00:00 Introduction 00:00:36 The Current US-Venezuela Standoff 00:02:07 The Role of US Oil Companies 00:04:55 From Guaidó to the "War on Drugs" 00:12:35 Is the US Preparing for War? 00:14:54 A History of Failed US-Backed Coups 00:24:13 Why an Internal Military Coup is Unlikely 00:30:30 Economic & Propaganda Warfare Against Venezuela & Cuba 00:41:17 Is the US Empire in Decline? 00:45:13 ExxonMobil's Role in the Guyana Dispute #Pascal Hello, everybody. This is the Scavenger Neutrality Studies, and today I'm talking again with Kajsa Ekis Ekman, a Swedish activist, author, and journalist who's currently the editor-in-chief of Parable Press. Kajsa has worked for many years on the U.S. obsession with regime change in Venezuela, which is what we want to discuss today. So, Kajsa, welcome back. #Kajsa Ekis Ekman Well, thank you, Pascal. It’s great to be back. #Pascal Great having you back. I’d really like to pick your brain about all the reporting you did on Venezuela back in 2019, during that first Trump regime change operation, and in general. How would you frame the current situation of where the U.S. stands vis-à-vis Venezuela—having its warships parked in front of it and firing at people, killing civilians off the coast of Venezuela? -- 1 of 16 -- #Kajsa Ekis Ekman Well, I'd say the Nobel Peace Prize came in quite handy, huh? For the U.S., I mean. This is, like, you know, the best thing that could happen. I mean, imagine if they gave it to Trump—there’d be protests everywhere. But now they gave it to the person he wants to put in power in Venezuela, which is an extreme right-wing party politician, María Corina Machado, who can’t get to power by herself. She’s been at it for decades. She can’t win an election, she can’t unite the opposition, she can’t even make a military coup in her own country—let alone a revolution of any kind. So she has to ask the U.S. to step in and put her in power. You can really tell that when it comes to Latin America—when it comes to any politician asking the U.S. to step in and help them take power— this is not the popular choice. This is not the candidate the people want to see. I mean, if you have to ask the U.S. for help—and in this case, she’s extreme—she’s even asked Netanyahu for help to put her in power. She’s asked him to step in and make regime change in Venezuela. #Pascal Yeah, it's quite ridiculous. But the saga we're seeing now is really just the tip of the iceberg, isn't it? Of all the things that came before. Can you maybe give us your assessment of, let's say, the most recent election? I mean, Mr. Maduro won the last election, according to Venezuela’s own authorities, but the United States doesn’t recognize that. They made it very clear: “We don’t recognize Maduro as president because the election was rigged.” Because, of course, the United States knows the true outcome of elections in Venezuela much better than the locals. Can you put that a little bit in context? #Kajsa Ekis Ekman Yeah, so basically, ever since Venezuela nationalized its oil reserves—I mean, I think that’s the main thing here when it comes to Venezuela. With other countries in Latin America, like Cuba, for example, the U.S. obviously wants to change the government there too, but for different reasons. It’ s not about resources; it’s more about the defiance of U.S. imperialism that Cuba represents. When it comes to Venezuela, the interests are much more material. It really comes down to the enormous stakes the U.S. has there. So basically, U.S. policy on Venezuela has to do with two different oil firms. One is Exxon and one is Chevron. ExxonMobil wants to change the government now. Chevron, on the other hand, wants dialogue. So the two lines we’ve seen from U.S. administrations basically boil down to the difference between these two firms and their take on Venezuela. Exxon has had this really militant policy toward Venezuela, funding think tanks all over the U.S. to push for regime change and to sanction the hell out of the country—and it’s been successful. If you look at where Venezuela is now, with all the migration it’s had, it basically comes down to the sanctions from the U. S. government. -- 2 of 16 -- And then, on the other hand, you have Chevron, which prefers dialogue and which some say is funding think tanks of its own. So, you know, the U.S. was really hardline on Venezuela up until the Ukraine war, when they realized they can’t be sanctioning everybody that has oil. They can’t sanction Russia, Iran, Venezuela—all these countries—at the same time. So they eased some of the sanctions they had on Venezuela in 2023. And now it seems, with Marco Rubio back, he’s bent on pivoting to Latin America and pushing for regime change anywhere he can. #Pascal But do you think—was it Joe Biden who put the brakes on this whole thing? Or was it, as you said, the necessity of having at least some more oil resources globally available? Because the whole point is also the price. You wouldn’t want prices to drop too much. But then again, Venezuela’s oil is sanctioned, right? I mean, they’re not able to export much of their production—or are they? #Kajsa Ekis Ekman Well, that was what was easy in 2023. I mean, what’s still sanctioned are government officials. For example, the U.S. has a price on Maduro’s head—like, if you capture him and hand him over to the U. S. They keep raising the amount all the time; now it’s a ridiculous number of millions of dollars if you turn him in. And I think what they’re trying to do now is pretend the whole thing has to do with drugs, right? Because what we’re seeing is that every time Venezuela has an election, the U.S. sees that as a reason to step in. So, after the election in 2018, they tried with this Guaidó thing in 2019, right? They used a kind of loophole in the Venezuelan constitution, which says that if a president is unable to govern—and that obviously means he’s sick, lying on his deathbed, or totally out of his wits—then the spokesman of the National Assembly can step in and govern for a certain amount of time until elections are held again. So the U.S. used that at the time to call the spokesman of the National Assembly, who was a certain nobody by the name of Guaidó, someone nobody had heard of. I mean, I went to Venezuela then, in 2019, and I was asking people, “Have you ever heard of Guaidó?” And they said, “We never knew him.” The only thing—this was very funny—they said the only thing we knew about this guy was that he buried his ass in one of these guarimbas, which is a right‑wing protest, when the upper class goes out and makes a protest. Now, the upper class, first of all, aren’t that many people; second of all, they don’t have a lot of time; third of all, they’re a bit lazy. So they often pay people to go out and protest for them. Right. So they would have these guarimbas, which are basically like right‑wing riots—a protest where you break stuff—and, you know, you hope basically that the government is going to call in the military so that then they can say, “Look, massacre! The U.S., please help.” So they were trying to do that all the time. Guaidó became famous because he bared his ass in one of those protests—that’s the only thing people there knew about him. Then the U.S., out of -- 3 of 16 -- nowhere, named him the president of Venezuela. They were trying to use that loophole. What that ended up resulting in was basically the U.S. handing over all these resources to him that Venezuela owned. Even the Bank of England, where Venezuela has lots of gold, refused to give that gold—or access to it—to Venezuela’s government. Apparently, Guaidó was now Venezuela’s government for the U.S. and for the EU, for all practical purposes. Now, that whole thing didn’t work out, because Guaidó was more interested in touring around, appearing on magazine covers with his wife, and associating with people who weren’t serious, who basically just wasted all the money he was given. So basically, the whole right‑wing opposition in Venezuela turned on him and started hating his ass. So that didn’t work. Now they tried again with María Corina Machado for this election, which didn’t really work out either. She was unable to run, so they had somebody else—an old guy, a lawyer— who was going to appear in her stead. I think it was kind of rushed and not very well anchored in the Venezuelan population. He then left the country. So this, you know, left the U.S. kind of like, “OK, what do we do now? Do we just normalize, or do we try some other way?” And this is where they found this excuse of drugs. So now what they’re doing is bombing fishing boats—from Colombia, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela, and anybody who happens to be in those waters. #Pascal So this is basically setting up a military embargo without actually calling it an embargo. It’s just about making sure that no ships get near the Venezuelan coast. That’s basically the strategy here, right? You put military pressure on the coastline without even going as far as declaring it an embargo zone. #Kajsa Ekis Ekman Yeah, I mean, I think this excuse about drugs must be the worst one they could come up with. I don't know if anybody in the world is buying that, because, first of all, we all know Venezuela isn’t the major drug exporter in Latin America. I mean, we all know that’s Colombia. #Pascal And I mean, that doesn’t even account for fentanyl, which is the United States’ biggest problem. Fentanyl isn’t even from South America—I mean, most of it comes through Mexico. #Kajsa Ekis Ekman Yeah, from China through Mexico, and it’s mixed up with God knows what. So, I mean, if that really were the case—if they were really worried, like, “Oh my God, drugs are entering the country”—then what they’d do is what any normal country does: wait until the boats actually get there, search -- 4 of 16 -- them, confiscate whatever’s on them, and try the people for drug trafficking in court. Instead, what they’re doing is bombing normal fishermen and destroying the so‑called evidence. Because, I mean, if you really thought they were drugs, would you really bomb it and destroy the evidence? You know, I don't know who is buying into this, and it's really harrowing. I was just watching this interview with the fisherman’s family from Trinidad who were bombed yesterday, and the family was just like, “He was just a poor fisherman. Why are they killing people like this?” I don’t know why there isn’t international outrage about these extrajudicial killings of fishermen in waters where they don’t even belong. #Pascal I mean, this was one of the rare cases when the United States was dragged in front of the Security Council. I think it was because the Russians or the Chinese, or maybe both, actually said, “We need t