ESCALATION: Russian Nuke Forces Attacked, Iran-US Stalemate, China War Prep | Amb. Chas Freeman

## A fragile diplomacy amid deliberate escalation The exchange captured in this conversation exposes a world where talking does not yet mean bargaining, and where acts of daring sabotage are treated as moves in an unregulated contest rather than provocation toward settlement. The central argument is stark: modest progress — the mere fact that Ukrainians and Russians sat across a table in Istanbul — is being undermined by covert operations, erratic diplomacy, and a steady erosion of the taboos that historically kept nuclear weapons off the table. The upshot is a dangerous mixture of muddled Western policy, opportunistic and clandestine tactics, and the calculative restraint of nuclear states that, for now, prevents catastrophe but not further destabilization. ## Meetings, not peace talks: what Istanbul revealed The Istanbul sessions revealed more about posture than convergence. What emerged from the meeting was not a framework for ending the war but a formalized exchange of positions and practical gestures — prisoner swaps, bodies returned, and discussions over humanitarian claims. As Ambassador Chas Freeman notes, these are meetings in the literal sense: parties exchanging memoranda that document irreconcilable stands. Historically, diplomacy is often conducted against the backdrop of fighting; ceasefires are negotiated while armies remain in the field. The surprise to many Western observers was expecting a ceasefire as a precondition for meaningful negotiation. This misreading led to confusion and inflated expectations that a brief diplomatic encounter could produce immediate, durable settlement. The Istanbul talks matter nevertheless because they reintegrate conversation into the conflict calculus. Even if the clauses exchanged are incompatible today, the very act of continuing to meet preserves channels that can be exploited later — when battlefield realities shift or when domestic politics on either side change. The pattern suggests that future arrangements will be influenced at least as much by outcomes on the ground as by diplomacy. For now, conversation is a safety valve, not a mechanism for resolution. ## The bomber strike: red lines and dangerous precedents The most unsettling development discussed was a Ukraine-led strike on elements of Russia’s bomber fleet, an attack that in practical and symbolic terms targeted a component of Russia’s nuclear triad. Whether the raid was planned over a year and a half or orchestrated with allied clandestine assistance, it raises an acute problem: long-standing mutual understandings insulated strategic nuclear forces from conventional attack because both nuclear states treated such strikes as tantamount to nuclear aggression. By breaching this norm, the operation creates a precedent that other states or non-state actors could emulate. As Freeman emphasizes, the attack exploited an ingeniously simple tactic — trucks with retractable roofs concealing drones — that can be replicated in many environments. The lesson is twofold. Tactically, it shows the vulnerability of even high-value, treaty-visible assets; strategically, it undermines restraint by suggesting that nuclear-associated platforms can be degraded without triggering immediate nuclear retaliation. That narrow window of tolerated escalation has always been precarious, and now it has been pierced. Importantly, the bomber raid also reveals a fundamental asymmetry between intentions and perceptions. Kyiv and its backers may see deep strikes as necessary to blunt Russian advantages and to signal resolve. Moscow sees them as existentially threatening and potentially justifying extreme measures in response. The absence of a unified interpretive framework — a shared understanding of what counts as crossing a nuclear threshold — increases the chance of miscalculation. ## Covert action as policy and the erosion of nuclear taboo A recurring theme is the revival of cloak-and-dagger techniques as instruments of statecraft. Historically, Britain and other powers have used unconventional warfare to shape contests from behind the front lines. That heritage now appears in modern form: remote-guided drones launched from innocuous vehicles, deniable operations intended to create strategic shock. These actions can be extraordinarily effective at producing tactical results, but they are poor tools for managing strategic stability. Freeman draws attention to the Thucydidean dynamic: allies and proxies can drag patrons into conflicts or compel patrons to respond in ways they might otherwise avoid. When third-party operators challenge norms that have constrained great-power competition — particularly those protecting nuclear delivery systems — they impose dilemmas on their patrons and adversaries. The result is twofold: first, a multiplication of escalatory pathways that lack clear control; second, an incentive for nuclear powers to harden doctrine and posture in response, which in turn further amplifies tensions. Another troubling development is the broader normalization of nuclear rhetoric. Across some political debates there are suggestions that nuclear use might be legitimate in contexts previously unimaginable. When public discourse entertains dropping nuclear devices as a solution to political problems, the stigma that kept nuclear weapons off the bargaining table erodes. Strategic prudence hinges not only on capability but on shared moral and political constraints; when those constraints fray, strategic stability becomes harder to maintain. ## Dysfunction in U.S. diplomacy: improvisation and its costs A major strand of the discussion centers on the chaotic conduct of American foreign policy and how that shapes global responses. The portrait painted is of an administration that wants to engineer outcomes — peace with Russia, a reset with Iran, a ceasefire in Gaza — but lacks a coherent, institutionally-backed strategy for doing so. Diplomacy without bureaucratic scaffolding produces improvisation: informal envoys, off-the-cuff agreements, and reversals under domestic pressure. Freeman’s critique is pointed. Effective negotiation typically requires teams, institutional memory, and a process that can turn initial ideas into sustainable commitments. When negotiating envoys arrive unaccompanied by interpreters, policy staff, or clear mandates, the accuracy and credibility of their communications are compromised. Worse, when political pressure from interest groups or political rivals reshapes or repudiates prior understandings, negotiated openings close rapidly. This pattern sows distrust among foreign interlocutors; why enter into serious talks with a partner who may repudiate terms the next day? The consequence for allies and rivals is predictable: they hedge. China, Russia, Iran, and other states become wary of engaging too closely with an erratic interlocutor. Europe's own policy disarray compounds the problem: political commitments and punitive postures that lack strategic forethought contribute to policy that appears punitive rather than constructive. In short, the West’s inconsistently executed diplomacy hands advantage to patient, process-oriented states that can plan beyond daily headlines. ## How other powers read the Western disorder From the vantage of Moscow, Beijing, Tehran, and capitals across the Global South, Western disarray is both a risk and an opportunity. These states interpret the instability of U.S. policy as a signal to protect their strategic interests more assertively. Russia sees an opening to press territorial and security claims where it perceives Western reaction to be uneven. China is cautious about engaging publicly but also calculating about exploiting weaknesses in Western unity to advance long-term objectives. Iran interprets fractured Western diplomacy as both an inducement to seek incremental concessions and a reason to be skeptical of bargains that might be rescinded under domestic political pressure. The convers

Russian Nuclear Escalation, Iran Stalemate, China War Prep Today I’m talking again to Ambassador Chas Freeman, who served as US Assistant Secretary of Defense and as U. S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia in the early 1990s. Links: Chas Freeman's website: https://chasfreeman.net/ Goods Shop: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall.com Timestamps: 00: 00 Preview 00:54 Intro 01:27 Thoughts on the ongoing Russia-Ukraine negotiations 07:15 Thoughts on the recent surprise attack by Ukraine 13:56 Current dynamics between USA and Russia-Ukraine 24:35 What is the reaction of global powers to what the Trump administration is doing? 31:21 Is Taiwan about to become the next Ukraine? 37:55 Is the world waking up from propaganda? What's going to happen? 46:21 Outro #M3 Traditionally, the elements of a nuclear deterrent force on both the American and the Soviet side— the Russian side, if you will—have been exempt from attack for the very simple reason that both countries regard an attack with conventional weapons on their nuclear deterrent capacity as equivalent to a nuclear attack and justifying a nuclear response. Both sides take this very seriously. Of course, Ukraine is not part of the SALT agreements, nor is the UK. So they are free, I suppose, mischievously to challenge this exemption. And they've done so. And it's very dangerous. #M2 Hello, everybody. This is Pascal Lottaz from Neutrality Studies, and today I'm talking again to Ambassador Chas Freeman, who served as U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense and as U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia in the 1990s. Ambassador Freeman, welcome back to the channel. #M3 I'm glad to be with you, Pascal. #M2 I'm glad we can have another debate. This time, we’re focusing on Russia and Ukraine, and especially the current negotiations that are going on. We've just had the second round in Istanbul. We are talking today—my June 4th in the morning, your June 3rd in the evening. What do you make of the status of the peace process negotiations, given that there was this large drone attack by Ukraine on Russia, and Russia is now promising to retaliate—at least Dmitry Medvedev has said so? What are your thoughts? -- 1 of 12 -- #M3 Well, these aren't negotiations; they're meetings. It's progress to have Ukraine talking to Russia. This is a product of President Zelensky's pressure—who had totally refused to talk to the Russians. In fact, he issued a decree banning any negotiations with the Russians. Anyway, they're talking. What came out of this meeting in Istanbul is an exchange of memoranda outlining the positions of the two sides, which makes it apparent that there is absolutely no possibility of a meeting of the minds. Therefore, the meeting was brief—it was an hour and a half or so. I'm glad the Russians went there, notwithstanding the provocation of the attack on their nuclear bomber force, which we can talk about and its implications. But I'm glad they kept their cool and went there. There was a business-like meeting, and the two sides agreed to exchange the bodies of the dead and some live prisoners who are disabled or female. And they also discussed other issues, like the alleged kidnapping of children from the eastern provinces of Ukraine to Russia, which the Russians defend as having rescued those children from a war zone. Anyway, I think they also agreed to continue to meet. That's progress, even though there is no meeting of the minds. What this meeting in Istanbul makes clear is that the issues before the two sides will be settled on the battlefield, not at the negotiating table. That's not a surprise. I find it really rather strange that people in the West should imagine that in order to negotiate, you must have a ceasefire. This is not normal; it's very normal for the parties to a conflict to be talking about how to achieve a ceasefire and peace in the context of ongoing fighting. That is exactly what is happening here. I think it is fair to say that the attack on the Russian nuclear deterrent—the bomber force—which Ukraine conducted, very likely with the assistance of MI6, is very much a British thing. The British learned, particularly during World War II, that they actually have a glorious history of support for insurgents and unconventional warfare, going back to the Napoleonic Wars and their support of the Spanish resistance to French occupation. But in World War II, they became very proficient at blowing up bridges, assassinating people, and conducting unconventional military operations. This has all the earmarks of British covert warfare. Anyway, I think it's very clear that the timing of these attacks on the Russians deep into Russia was intended to provoke the Russians in order to sabotage the possibility of peace at Istanbul. The British, the French, and others in Europe are not interested in ending the war; they want to continue it. Therefore, the possibility that Ukrainians and Russians might actually come to an agreement again, as they had in March of 2022, was rather alarming. So I suspect the timing had to do with that. Fortunately, the Russians kept their cool. I think their leader, Vladimir Putin, has a sound reputation for being very cold-blooded about things, not easily panicking and reacting with considered judgments rather than sudden decisions. -- 2 of 12 -- And the Russians went to Istanbul. That's progress. That was good. At least they're talking. That lays the groundwork for something in the future, perhaps. But for the moment, the war will continue, with the Russians advancing on the ground and the Ukrainians striking out desperately at targets deep inside Russia or at logistical targets that support the Russian advance. Those attacks will have no impact whatsoever on the progress of the Russians on the ground in Ukraine. And they will, of course, as you indicated, draw a reprisal. Every escalation by the West and Ukraine has been met with a counter-escalation by the Russians. I don't think this will be an exception, but they've taken their time to consider how to respond. #M2 There are many things to go deeper into here, but maybe your assessment on the choice of targets by Ukraine in this surprise attack—in a way, you know, in a fashion that I think nobody foresaw, especially the Russians, who didn't foresee that this was possible. But the choice of targets is part of Russia's nuclear triad; it's bombers that can even carry nuclear weapons. What do you make of this? And how big an escalation, or how big a provocation, do you perceive this to be? #M3 Well, let's be clear. This was apparently planned a year and a half ago. That means it was planned in the Biden era, probably the Rishi Sunak era in the UK. Zelensky, of course, was the president of Ukraine at that time. It's not clear, given the adversarial relationship between the Trump administration and its predecessors, and the fact that the Trump administration does not apparently regard itself as part of the continuity within the American governmental system. So Mr. Trump says that the Ukraine war is not his war. Well, it is the war of the United States, of course—a proxy war. But anyway, it's not clear whether he might have known about this. So that's a mystery, and it's not an unimportant one in terms of Russian calculations and responses. But let me make a couple of points about the choice of targets. First of all, the bombers in question are out in the open as part of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty provisions, which require both sides—the Americans and the Russians—to keep these weapon systems visible to satellite and other aerial surveillance. So people who say that the Russians stupidly left these aircraft out in the open—I don't know what they're talking about. This is a legal obligation. Second, traditionally, the elements of a nuclear deterrent force on both the American and the Soviet side—the Russian side, if you will—have been exempt from attack for the very simple reason that both countries regard an attack with conventional weapons on their nuclear deterrent capacity as equivalent to a nuclear attack and justifying a nuclear response. Both sides take this very seriously. Of course, Ukraine is not part of the SALT agreements, nor is the UK. So they are free, I suppose, -- 3 of 12 -- mischievously to challenge this exemption. And they've done so. And it's very dangerous, because it illustrates a point that, actually, in another context, should be obvious from the so-called Thucydides Trap. That is, in the case of the Peloponnesian War, it was the allies of Athens who got Athens into the war. And the allies of major countries—the protectorates, if you will—are liabilities in the sense that they may do things that require a response from their patrons, which their patrons would not otherwise want to do. So, the first thing is that this is very dangerous in terms of challenging a nuclear balance. In Russian military and nuclear doctrine, it would justify a nuclear response. So far, that has not been the case, and that is very good. Second, this is also a very bad precedent in terms of the methods used. There were trucks constructed with removable sliding roofs, which were then given to Russian- contracted drivers to drive across Russia, even into outer Siberia, where they were parked. The roofs were then remotely directed to retract, at which point drones emerged and attacked the bombers. Well, think about it. Can anyone—for example, the United States, which has an enormous amount of truck traffic coming in over the Mexican border—now be confident about what that means? What was done to the Russians can be done to the United States, or to the UK, or to France, or to China, or to any other nuclear power. And so the danger and the risks of a covert action against nuclear forces have just perceptibly gone up very much. And that is another aspect of instability. So I think, all in all, the attribution to Ukraine of bold or stunningly imaginative action reflects a lack of concern about the implications of what has just happened, which are very considerable. Fortunately, we've seen so far in the interactions between nuclear powers like India and Pakistan, or the United States and Russia, a great deal of caution. But we now have people, in the Gaza context, in both the United States and the UK, arguing for a nuclear bomb being dropped on the Palestinians. So the nuclear allergy, which has protected us from the repeated use of the weapons that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki, is clearly eroding or hardly present. This is not good. #M2 No, this is not good at all. You're absolutely right. I want to link this discussion, then, also with the negotiations that are going on with Iran. But just before we do that, I was wondering about your views on the way that the current interactions between the United States, Ukraine, and Russia are being portrayed. I read this morning an article in Russia Today, and even Russia Today talks about the United States as now being frustrated and potentially giving up its role as a mediator in the conflict. And this portrayal of the US as a mediator is present everywhere at the moment. I don't think it can be—or should be—understood as this, but how do you look at this link: US, Ukraine, Russia? What's going on? #M3 -- 4 of 12 -- Well, I think President Trump clearly does want to produce peace in Ukraine. I also believe that he has a very poor understanding of the Russian requirements for peace. He's inhaled a lot of Western propaganda, which attributes to Russia motives and objectives it doesn't have, and ignores Russian statements that are quite clear about what Russia requires for peace—namely, some discussion and some agreement on a revised security architecture for Europe that gives Russia a role in the councils of Europe and reduces its fear of foreign invasion from the West, something which has precedent in both the Napoleonic and Hitler eras and can't be ignored, and also reassures Western Europeans against their la