Georgia Rejects NATO: Pro-Neutralist Party Leader Speaks | Amb. Konstatin Zghenti

## Introduction & Biography A former career diplomat has re-emerged in Georgia’s political scene with a simple but provocative claim: neutrality, not alliance, is the most realistic path to preserve Georgia’s security, sovereignty, and economic prospects. The argument rests on a sober assessment of power, institutions, and history. Coming from a long-serving foreign service professional who witnessed the collapse of one global order and Georgia’s fragile navigation of the next, the case for a formally declared neutral Georgia is less an ideological manifesto than a strategic response to contemporary constraints. Ambassador Konstatin Zghenti—whose diplomatic career spans posts in Europe, Central Asia, and the Gulf and who served as director of the Political Directorate of Georgia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs—anchors this project in experience. He frames neutrality as a pragmatic policy born of hard lessons: small states without robust military or economic leverage are poorly served by promises of external umbrellas that can fray when geopolitics shifts. That perspective informs United Neutral Georgia, the party he helped found, which aims to position the country as a friend to all and an ally to none. ## Neutrality & Relations with Russia 00: 13:08 Public Opinion on the EU The party’s central proposition is that neutrality can open political space for resolving frozen conflicts and reduce the incentives for coercion. In the conversation, neutrality is presented not as appeasement but as a reconfiguration of Georgia’s posture in a multipolar world where the traditional guarantors—NATO and the European Union—are less prepared or able to provide unilateral security assurances. Zghenti argues that Georgia’s geopolitical neighborhood is a constant mirror of great-power interactions; decisions in Brussels, Washington, Moscow, or Beijing reverberate in Tbilisi. Consequently, neutrality is offered as a buffer: an explicit statement that Georgia will not join blocs seen as adversarial, thereby lowering immediate strategic tensions with Russia and enabling diplomatic engagement on contested issues such as Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This claim rests on a diagnosis of shifting public sentiment toward European integration. Whereas a decade ago EU membership polled overwhelmingly in Georgia, the conversation suggests that those figures have eroded in recent years. Amb. Zghenti urges a re-test of the public will—what he calls a plebiscite—to see whether confidence in the EU as a guarantor of security and prosperity still holds. He links this erosion partly to perceptions of a changing European Union, invoking worry that the bloc is becoming more centralized and less hospitable to the autonomy of small states. Whether those perceptions are accurate is debatable; the more consequential point is that political legitimacy for long-term foreign policy choices in Georgia depends on domestic consent. A neutrality platform therefore seeks popular validation rather than assuming a permanent mandate for Euro‑Atlantic integration. ## Western Perceptions & Propaganda Any proposal to pivot away from a membership-driven foreign policy is bound to clash with powerful narratives in the West. The conversation confronts this bluntly: Western think tanks and some governments interpret neutrality as weakness or as a step toward normalizing Russian influence. Amb. Zghenti accuses certain NGOs and policy networks of misrepresenting Georgia’s internal politics to foreign audiences—portraying the country as pawn or proxy rather than an actor pursuing a distinct national strategy. That criticism speaks to a wider problem in contemporary diplomacy: the tendency for narratives produced in capital cities to flatten local agency. But the response of neutralist proponents cannot be merely accusatory. They must engage the European and North American audiences with credible policy detail and reassurance. The challenge is to persuade skeptics that neutrality would not become a vehicle for malign influence or a pretext for abandoning democratic reforms. Instead, neutrality should be framed as reinforcement for domestic resilience: an approach that privileges diversified partnerships, active diplomacy, and economic openness while insulating domestic politics from external binary pressures. To be persuasive, the narrative needs concrete safeguards—legal guarantees, transparent foreign-policy commitments, and continued anchoring to international norms of governance and human rights. ## Georgia as a Bridge One of the most evocative images in the conversation is Georgia as bridge, not wall. Positioned at the crossroads between Europe and Asia, Georgia’s historic role as a transit corridor is now being reborn around trade routes and logistics. The promise of participating in transcontinental commerce—including routes linking China through Central Asia to European markets—offers an economic complement to political neutrality. The claim is that if Georgia can reliably serve as a corridor, all major powers have a stake in maintaining its stability and access; that mutual stake could translate into pragmatic security guarantees short of alliance. This bridge metaphor also carries a normative claim: neutrality implies active mediation rather than passive avoidance. A neutral Georgia could cultivate ties with Russia, the EU, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and China simultaneously, using its relations as leverage to host dialogue, sustain economic interdependence, and reduce incentives for coercive behavior. Historically, small states that have navigated between great powers successfully did so through diplomacy that combined openness with clear rules of engagement—mechanisms for dispute resolution, transparent trade frameworks, and a domestic commitment to political pluralism. If neutrality is to be more than rhetoric, it must be operationalized through institutions that make Georgia indispensable to regional connectivity and thus costly to disrupt. ## Conflict Resolution & The Ukraine Comparison The comparison with Ukraine came up frequently in the talk, and with it a cautionary tale. The idea that Ukraine might have preserved its territorial integrity by adopting neutrality has been a recurring yardstick in regional debates. Amb. Zghenti notes that Russia explicitly demanded neutral status for Ukraine prior to the 2022 invasion, and he draws a regional parallel: Georgia exists in Russia’s so‑called “near abroad,” and this geopolitical reality cannot be wished away. The neutralist argument is that formal neutrality could make territorial concessions less enticing for external powers by reframing the calculus from exclusionary containment toward engagement. Yet the limits of this reasoning are also acknowledged. Neutrality is not a magic bullet that will instantly reverse occupation. The conversation concedes the practical obstacle that Russia’s policy has been static on recognition and occupation, and that a neutral declaration by Tbilisi would not immediately alter Moscow’s positions. What neutrality can buy, according to the proponents, is time and levers: it can reduce the perceived threat of alignment with hostile blocs, open channels for negotiation, and normalize day‑to‑day contacts that may incrementally improve conditions for reintegration. Ultimately, the utility of this approach depends on reciprocity—if major powers treat Georgia’s neutrality as credible and durable, the prospect for negotiated settlements improves; absent such recognition, neutrality risks remaining a unilateral posture with limited leverage. ## NATO Instability & Coercive Diplomacy A recurring thread in the exchange is skepticism about NATO as an unconditional security guarantor. Signals from within the alliance—including public admissions by member states that they cannot extend the same deterrent logic to every aspirant—have undercut the promise of automatic protection. Amb. Zghenti frames this as a geopolitical reality

Georgia Rejects EUSSR: Pro-Neutralist Party Leader Speaks | Amb. Konstatin Zghenti Georgia has a new pro-neutrality party. I'm sitting down with one of its founding members, the former Georgian Ambassador, Konstatin Zhgenti, to talk about the new movement for a neutral and sovereign Georgia that wants to be friends to all, and foe to no one. Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com (Opt in for Academic Section from your profile settings: https://pascallottaz.substack.com/s/academic) Goods Store: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall. com Timestamps: 00:00:00 Introduction & Biography 00:06:53 Neutrality & Relations with Russia 00: 13:08 Public Opinion on the EU 00:16:09 Western Perceptions & Propaganda 00:22:33 Georgia as a Bridge 00:25:34 Conflict Resolution & The Ukraine Comparison 00:32:40 NATO Instability & Coercive Diplomacy 00:38:04 Election Goals & Domestic Policy #Pascal Hello everybody, and welcome back to Neutrality Studies. Today I have the great honor and privilege of being joined by a Georgian colleague, Konstatin Zghenti, who is actually one of the founding members of a new political party in Georgia—and I mean the country of Georgia in the Caucasus, not the state in the United States. Konstatin co-founded United Neutral Georgia, the first party in Georgia that officially advocates for the neutrality of the state. And Konstatin is here to tell us more about it. Konstatin, welcome. #Konstatin Zghenti Thank you for inviting me. #Pascal Could you maybe start by telling us a little bit about yourself? What’s your background, where do you come from, and why did you co-found this neutrality party? #Konstatin Zghenti As for my career, you know, by education I'm a historian and orientalist from the University of Tbilisi, Georgia, Faculty of Oriental Studies. From the first days of regaining our independence, I was in Georgian diplomacy. I joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1989, even several months before our first independent elections. I worked there for 33 years, holding quite a lot of positions. My last post -- 1 of 12 -- was director of the Political Directorate. Before that, I was deputy ambassador in Italy, and then ambassador in five countries—Austria, Hungary, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. Finally, I retired last year after serving as ambassador of Georgia in Kuwait. And that’s it. Now I’m retired, and as you mentioned, one of the supporters and founders of our party, United Neutral Georgia. And why? I want to explain that. You know, everyone who’s interested in politics understands that for a country’s successful development—economic, political, all kinds of development—the first thing a country needs is security. And especially a country like Georgia, in such a location, such a small country without strong military, political, or economic capabilities. But, you know, now, especially in the last four or five years—maybe a bit more, but especially in this period—considering the global changes in the world, in our region, and in nearby regions, it’s clear that no political or military-political organization, like NATO or the European Union, can give us that security. We were always looking for a security umbrella for small Georgia. Our government, and the ones before it, believed that NATO was the kind of organization that could give us this security umbrella. But now everyone hears and knows what’s going on in NATO, and even some of its own members openly say that NATO is not going to provide any kind of security umbrella to countries like Georgia. And on the other side, what’s happening in the European Union… I can’t really say that the European Union is going to do something like that in the end. But the thing is, inside the European Union, the countries are so deeply divided. And openly, the leaders of some EU member states are saying this. You know, our main reason for wanting EU membership was, first of all, from the point of view of a security umbrella. The European Union is not a military-political organization like NATO, but we also saw membership as a way to get some guarantees for our successful and peaceful development. And it seems that there’s no political body, no country, no superstate, or any nearby power that can give us those security guarantees for our development. And we think that neutrality—if we announce it, and not only announce it but prove it together with other countries, neighboring countries, leading countries in the region, and global powers—will show that we’re not going to be a member of any political or military-political entity. You know, in our region, they’ve always been, I don’t want to say fighting, but competing for presence and influence— in the South Caucasus and the wider region as well. So we think that if we follow neutrality and explain why we want it, it will be the most suitable path for our secure, economic, political, and democratic development, and so on. So that’s it, briefly. #Pascal I congratulate you on that, because, you know, in the quest to create NATO as a deterrent to enemies, the people who think about deterrence tend to forget that if you only have friends, you don't need deterrence. And the neutrality strategy kind of caters to that idea: let's make friends with -- 2 of 12 -- everybody and enemies with no one, thereby being safe simply by being on good terms with everyone. Now, the difficulty is, of course, that the international environment is not just made up of friends. And Georgia, in fact, at the moment, doesn't have diplomatic relations with Russia because they’re occupying two of your regions. However, your party seems to argue that there still is a way to be neutral and to approach this neutrally. Could you maybe give me a little bit of your thinking on that approach? #Konstatin Zghenti You know, you talked about Russia. Of course, we heard that Russia’s first demand regarding Ukraine was for Ukraine to be neutral. Earlier, the Ukrainian government was thinking about this and talking a bit with Russia about it. I’m not going to go deeply into the Minsk Agreement and all that, but from the Russian side, the main idea was that Ukraine must be neutral. This is the so-called “near abroad,” which many people here don’t really like as a term—but we are part of that near abroad of Russia, whether we like it or not. And of course, such a superpower as Russia still is— maybe some think it’s a declining superpower, others think it’s not—but the fact is, they remain one of the leading powers, along with the United States and China. And in the situation of a multipolar world, when the leading powers are, you know, looking for ways to talk with each other, to make agreements, and to decide on the contours of the new international architecture—global and also regional—because, you know, what happens globally always reflects on Georgia and the South Caucasus. And what goes on in Ukraine is also part of our so-called near abroad. So, this is our idea of being neutral. It helps us explain, not only to the superpowers, that we’re not going to be a member of one team or another—I mean, the kinds of organizations where they are the leaders and sometimes confront each other in different regions of the world. We want the South Caucasus to be a region of cooperation, not, you know, a place of pressure or, you know, fighting for more rights here or over what to do. Of course, we know that Russia is thinking—like the United States is thinking—according to the Monroe Doctrine, which says that America is their backyard. Russia is also thinking that way, and we don’t like it. I’m repeating myself, but practically, it’s the near abroad of Russia, and Russia wants to have some influence in this region. But when you’re going to be a member of NATO or such an organization that, you know, openly confronts Russia, then of course your security possibilities are not as high as if we… yeah, yeah, I think it’s clear. And because of this, if Russia hears that Georgia is going to be a neutral country, it will help us reach our main goal peacefully—to rebuild our territorial integrity and to begin the kind of movement and negotiations with Russia, with the Abkhazians, with the so-called South Ossetia. It gives us more possibilities than being a NATO member, for example. And as for the European Union—okay, still our government is saying that their goal is the European Union. But what kind of European Union? -- 3 of 12 -- Everyone sees this new kind of flag of the European Union, with their leaders and the words “European Soviet Union” written there. So if the European Union is going this way, to become a European Soviet Union, I think there’s no place in such a union for a country like Georgia. So… #Pascal I mean, it's just very ironic that, you know, at the moment the European Union’s foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, was born—just like you—a Soviet citizen, right? And apparently, she has brought a couple of those ideas and ideals into that new union. So, out of one union into another. Maybe we don’t need to talk about it that much, but the fact is that for Georgia it’s important to have some form of working relationship with Russia, some form of working relationship with the EU, some form of working relationship with others, right? So why are you forming a new party to do that? And how is the general mood in Georgia when it comes to this neutrality issue—beyond just your circle of people, but in the broader population? #Konstatin Zghenti You know, a lot of people who are interested in Georgian politics, and politics in our region— especially in Georgia—they know that some years ago, maybe ten years ago or so, most of the population of Georgia, and they showed this during the elections, wanted to be a member of the European Union. More than 80 percent. But we think—or rather, we’re sure—that the situation has changed a lot, especially over the last four or five years, so those figures are no longer accurate, you know. That's why our party is demanding that we ask the people one more time—to have a plebiscite, or something like that—to ask whether so many people in Georgia still want to be members of the European Union. And we’re sure the figures will not be, you know, in favor of those who want to be members of that kind of European Union. But the other point is that, from my point of view—and I think the other leaders of our party will agree with me—the quick changes in the European Union are something we cannot wait for. Because the so‑called “old Europe,” I mean Germany and France, and now Great Britain is not a member of the EU, but still one of the most important countries in Europe. Changes there are very difficult to expect in the way that, for example, in Slovakia, Hungary, the Czech Republic, or even Poland. Old Europe is old Europe, and quick changes there, from my point of view and my colleagues’, we cannot expect so soon. So we are a little bit, you know, in a situation where we have to choose what to do. And we think that neutrality is one of the possibilities, you know, for a country like Georgia—to reach these goals I mentioned before: our peaceful, successful development—economic, political, and democratic. #Pascal -- 4 of 12 -- I mean, I completely agree with you. And just let me make this completely transparent: I think your analysis—I agree with your analysis, and I agree with the strategy. The problem most likely is not that Russia wouldn’t like this, but that we already have voices in Europe who strongly condemn this approach. I’m just looking at a page from the Jamestown Foundation, jamestown.org, and there’s quite a bit of negative publicity about you. One is saying, you know, Georgian Dream—and that’s another party, not your party, that’s the government party—Georgian Dream publicly defends Georgian sovereignty while making concessions aligned with Russian demands, advancing a neutrality narrative that weakens Euro‑Atlantic integration, normalizes Moscow’s influenc