Armenia’s Election Was Rigged In Plain Sight | Mikael Darbinian

The June 7 parliamentary election in Armenia did not occur in a vacuum; it took place against a backdrop of national trauma, geopolitical jockeying, and an erosion of institutional checks. What emerged from the conversation with Mikael Darbinian and others is a picture of an electoral process that was visibly compromised, with political survival prioritized over democratic legitimacy. The episode exposes how domestic political calculation, enabled by weakened institutions, has been reinforced by external actors pursuing their own strategic aims. The result is not merely a contested vote count but a deeper contest over Armenia’s sovereignty, public trust, and the orientation of the state itself. ## What happened in the election On election day, multiple layers of malpractice and coercion were reported, creating an atmosphere in which the official outcome was always contestable. Longstanding grievances—economic stagnation, a sharp drop in public approval of the government since 2018, and the traumatic loss of Nagorno-Karabakh—set the emotional scene. Into that context came mass arrests of opposition figures before and on election day, a highly visible presence of ruling-party operatives inside and around polling stations, and irregular voting practices: pre-sealed ballots handed inside booths, late-night mass voting by military recruits, and systemic pressure on vulnerable or elderly voters. These tactics were not isolated incidents; they formed an integrated approach that aimed to freeze political advantage into institutional outcomes. The result was an election night declaration of victory that many observers found premature and unpersuasive, given large swaths of the count still outstanding. ## Election rigging claims The conversation made clear that allegations of rigging were not speculative but based on repeatable patterns: party operatives accompanying voters through the ballot, evidence of people’s names being ticked off without their presence, and the suspicious timing of votes from groups under command hierarchies. These are classic forms of electoral manipulation—mobilization of dependent voters, interference in the secrecy of the ballot, and administrative control of the voter list. What made the situation especially striking was the brazenness: practices occurred in public, visible to monitors, and in some cases in front of journalists. This was not a hidden fraud technicized at the margins; it was low-resolution, high-certainty manipulation that left its mark on both procedure and perception. For many citizens, the combination of arrests, coerced voting, and media narratives created a sense that the contest had been decided not by ballots but by back-room leverage and public displays of control. ## Recount and parliament threshold The technical hinge for parliamentary arithmetic became a tiny difference in vote share—literally a fraction under the 4% threshold for one small opposition party. That band of votes is what would prevent a ruling-party supermajority and preserve a measure of pluralism in the legislature. A partial recount was undertaken at several hundred polling stations, yet the process was selective and opaque. Some precincts were annulled; others were recounted in ways that raised questions about who had authority and whether the recount apparatus itself was impartial. The composition of the electoral committee and the government’s near-total control over executive, legislative, and judicial levers only deepened suspicions that any recount could be steered. For the public and for opposition forces, the recount became the battleground over whether legal mechanics could correct an allegedly tainted result—or whether the apparatus of the state would be used to consolidate power. ## Public frustration in Armenia Frustration among Armenians is both widespread and deeply ambivalent. On one hand, polls preceding the election signaled apathy and disillusionment: people tired of promises that had not translated into economic improvement, with poverty rates stubbornly high and services uneven. On the other hand, turnout increased from previous cycles, driven by anger as much as hope. Citizens want change, and many who had not thought to engage were mobilized by a sense that the stakes were existential—about democracy, dignity, and survival after the trauma of territorial loss. That frustration is compounded by the sense of powerlessness that comes when institutions appear captured: if voting no longer reliably produces change, civic faith erodes. The immediate consequence is polarisation and protest, but the deeper risk is long-term disengagement and the entrenchment of informal mechanisms—patronage, coercion, and external brokerage—that bridge the gap between power and populace without passing through democratic accountability. ## Why Pashinyan still has support Understanding why the prime minister retains a base of support after the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh is complex. Part of it is political messaging and media influence that recasts blame—shifting responsibility to generals, foreign actors, or earlier regimes. Narrative work matters: controlling the explanation for defeat can blunt political fallout. Another element is the role of civil society and outside NGOs that over decades altered civic discourse and elite networks, sometimes creating factions more disposed to compromise or accommodation than to maximalist resistance. Finally, there is the dynamic of fear and opportunism: some segments of the population prefer stability or fear the unknown costs of political change, while others remain personally or economically tied to the ruling coalition. These factors—discursive framing, NGO-driven realignment, and fear of instability—can sustain a political leadership even when many citizens feel betrayed or impoverished. ## Foreign influence and corridor politics Foreign actors play an outsized role in Armenia’s political environment, not merely as occasional interlocutors but as active shapers of domestic outcomes. The conversation highlighted how Armenian leadership has engaged in what was called “support shopping”—shifting orientation, courting different capitals, and granting concessions in exchange for diplomatic backing. That approach has seen Armenia oscillate between closer ties with Russia, overtures to Iran, and then a pivot toward Turkey, Azerbaijan, and the European Union. Each external partner brings different incentives: security guarantees, economic projects, or international legitimacy. Crucially, some of these foreign relationships are transactional: territorial concessions or policy shifts become chips in a larger geopolitical game. That dynamic weakens sovereign decision-making because leaders facing domestic vulnerability may choose short-term international patrons over investments in robust internal legitimacy. ## TRIP corridor and U.S. interests 00: The talk around the so-called TRIP corridor—transit routes that connect Turkey, Azerbaijan and potentially beyond—underscores the strategic stakes at work. For the United States and the EU, Armenia’s alignment on corridors and connectivity is not merely economic; it is geopolitical leverage to reshape a region long within Russia’s orbit. The conversation emphasized that Western support for particular Armenian political actors often serves broader aims: securing alternative transport routes, reducing Russian influence, and expanding western strategic reach. For Armenia, the calculus is double-edged. Engagement with Western or Turkish-linked corridor projects could bring investment and mobility, but at the cost of becoming a geopolitical pawn. Concessions made to facilitate transit—land swaps, border demarcations, or softer sovereignty claims—can erode territorial integrity and exacerbate domestic resentment. The result is a paradox: Armenia might obtain short-term patronage and infrastructure promises while losing long-term control over the terms of its

Armenia’s Election Was Rigged In Plain Sight | Mikael Darbinian Mikael Darbinian, a former U.S. diplomat and ethnic Armenian now living in Armenia, joins to talk about the June 7 election, claims of rigging, arrests of opposition figures, and the growing power of Prime Minister Pashinyan. The discussion also covers foreign pressure from the EU, U.S., Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Iran, plus fears that Armenia is losing sovereignty. Links: Security Observer Análisis (Spanish language channel) - https://www.youtube.com/@securityobserveranalisis Security Observer Global Voices (my Think Tank channel in English) - https://www.youtube.com /@securityobserverglobalvoices Security Observer website: https://security-observer.com Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com (Opt in for Academic Section from your profile settings: https://pascallottaz.substack.com/s/academic) Merch: https://neutralitystudies.com/shop Donation: https://neutralitystudies.com/donate Timestamps: 00:00:00 Guest intro and background 00:01:12 What happened in the election 00:03:25 Election rigging claims 00:06:22 Recount and parliament threshold 00:10:05 Public frustration in Armenia 00:13:08 Why Pashinyan still has support 00:17:42 Foreign influence and corridor politics 00:22:04 TRIP corridor and U.S. interests 00: 35:08 Iran, sovereignty, and Armenia’s future #Pascal Welcome back, everybody, to Neutrality Studies. Today, again, with an episode on Armenia. I am joined today by Mikhail Darbinian. Mikhail, welcome. Thanks for having me, Pascal. Thank you for coming online. And Mikhail, you have a special profile because you actually were a U.S. American diplomat. Can you give us a little bit of your background? #Mikael Darbinian Yeah, I was a vice consul for the U.S. State Department in Argentina and subsequently in Moscow between 2020 and 2024. By the end of 2024, I was in the consular service, so foreign service. I was able to do a lot and gain a lot of experience from it. #Pascal And now you're in Armenia, and your ethnic background is Armenian as well. #Mikael Darbinian Yeah, exactly. Ethnically, I'm Armenian as well. I've lived in the States, I've lived in Armenia, I've lived in several other countries. And we've relocated here as a family to be in a smaller, less -- 1 of 19 -- cosmopolitan, metropolitan place compared to Los Angeles, Moscow, or Buenos Aires. So it's a lot smaller here. #Pascal So what actually happened last weekend in these elections? We've heard before that there were large-scale problems in the run-up to the elections, large-scale arrests of opposition figures, important opposition figures. And then during the elections, there were irregularities too. Can you tell us what you perceived, seeing it from inside Yerevan? #Mikael Darbinian Yeah, absolutely. So, elections were on the 7th of June. They were parliamentary elections with the ruling party that's been in power since 2018. They were seeking to extend the prime minister, Nikol Pashinyan, seeking to extend his eight years of power. And throughout the years, as his public approval rating has gone down, authoritarian practices by him have increased after the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh, after numerous other losses and, you know, different failures. For example, the poverty rate in Armenia is still at 20%. In some areas, it's over 40%. This is, you know, compared to Georgia, which was able to halve its poverty rate throughout these last years in general. So, parliamentary elections with lots of arrests of opposition leaders leading up to the elections on the 7th of June and on the very day of the elections as well. Dozens of people were arrested the day of the elections and prior to that. Basically, all were critics or members of parliament or candidates for MP. So, yeah, lots of persecution of the opposition. #Pascal The conversation that I just had with two filmmakers and journalists from Armenia, they also told me that during election night, there were these irregularities — that actually Mr. Pashinyan, at 2 a. m., well before all of the polling stations were counted, just announced that he won, and that there was a lot of election rigging going on, like pretty, pretty obvious, open kinds of election rigging. What did you see? #Mikael Darbinian So these were probably the most rigged elections I've seen, I've monitored, or I've covered — at least through my own work — elections in different countries as well as Armenia. These were the most rigged elections I've seen so far, precisely in Armenia. So besides actual arrests, on the very election day, members of the ruling party would accompany voters inside polling stations. They would wait outside polling stations. They would literally walk up to people in the polling booth, guide them, showing them with a finger what to do, who to vote for. You had lots of individuals that had -- 2 of 19 -- — well, here there are 18 parties participating and one ballot for each party — so 18 different papers that you need to put in one of them. You have to take the one that you're voting for, put it in an envelope, and then put it in the box, the ballot box. Well, people would come in with an already pre-sealed envelope of the ruling party, which is number 16. People walk in with that already. They go behind the polling booths and just take it out of their pocket and then go and drop that in. Mainly elderly, for example, or people that aren't really well- versed in voting. Turnout was about 58%, which is okay. It's not the highest and it's not the lowest in Armenian history. But there were also conscripts, recruits, basically military recruits, 18-year-old lads that were in several different polling stations that were let in to vote. In one area, they were let in to vote, probably a group of maybe 40 of them, 30, 40, 50 of them. They were let in to vote two minutes before the polls closed. And in another area, they were let in at around 10 o'clock at night when the polls had already closed. So they should have been sleeping actually at that time. That's the actual time that they need to be sleeping, recruits. Well, they're taken out, they're taken to the polling booths, the polling stations while it was closed, and made to vote. And I mean, who else are they going to vote for? The ruling party, because it's all organized by them. Just to confirm, the Prime Minister currently controls the judicial, the legislative, and the executive branches of government. So basically all police, all judges, everything — he controls every one of them. So the electoral committee as well is assigned by him. So any investigations, any recounts, they're going to be tainted by individuals who are loyal to him. Hey, just a very quick note. #Pascal The best way to support this channel is by signing up for my free Substack. You can also help with a paid subscription there, or you can get some of our new merch on neutralitystudies.com. Links below. See you there. And as we are speaking today, on June 13th, we are still waiting — according to my information, we are still waiting for the result that should come out tomorrow on whether or not one of the minor opposition parties actually gets to pass the 4% minimum threshold, or whether they're going to be excluded, which then would actually redistribute their votes and give Mr. Pashinyan a supermajority in parliament. Is that right? #Mikael Darbinian Exactly, exactly. You're very well following everything. So there are three opposition parties: Strong Armenia, Armenia Alliance, and Prosperous Armenia. Prosperous Armenia is the smallest opposition party. It's been around for about 15, maybe 20 years. It's always kind of gone about separately — 6%, 7%, 4%. It's always kind of made parliament, but just with barely a small majority. So this time, the problem is that, according to the recount — the initial counting on the 7th of June, 8th of June, sorry, because it prolonged into the 8th of June — this small opposition party had 3.994- something percent of the votes. You need 4% to get into parliament. -- 3 of 19 -- So them getting into parliament would reshuffle the seats in parliament and actually restrict the ruling party with some votes. The ruling party currently has a majority, just a barely small majority, but they have a majority, enabling them to pass regular laws, form a government, declare a state of emergency, but they cannot make constitutional amendments, for example, assign the constitutional court and things like that. They need a constitutional majority for that. So exactly as you're saying, the small opposition party right now keeps pushing for them to recount these votes. There's been a recount at around 500, 600 polling stations out of 2005. So they've done around 600 polling stations. #Mikael Darbinian It seems like the small opposition party has gained up to 4%, but there's nothing concrete right now. Results should have been ready. The recount should have been ready by 1400 hours local time yesterday, but there's still no actual results of a recount. What's more, the electoral committee has annulled the results at several polling stations — three, I believe — and those three polling stations had votes from this small opposition party. So them annulling the results of those polling stations restricts this small opposition party from having enough votes to get into parliament. And so that's one of the major issues — basically, the government controlling the results, the recount, they're trying to restrict it so they get a bigger majority. #Pascal Where does this leave us within Armenia? I mean, what I've heard from my previous discussion is that the exit polls would suggest that the government party would have realistically gained around 30% of seats, something around there, let's say a third, which would make it still the largest party, but far away from the 49 or so percent that they're proclaiming at the moment. And of course, far away from the supermajority that they would want. And plus, it would give other parties the possibility to form a coalition government and actually have a change of government. Now, where does this leave us with the general population in Armenia? Is this just going down? Armenia has about two and a half million people, right? Or three? Approximately, just less than three. Just less than three. Where does this leave the general population? Isn't there large-scale frustration in the country at the moment? #Mikael Darbinian There is. There is. I mean, leading up to the elections, if you look at different polls, numerous polls were taken, surveys were carried out by, you know, different countries, NGOs, and the majority of them showed that many of the voters, many Armenians in general, they're not really interested in voting. They don't want to participate. This kind of changed because we saw an increased number of participants in this election compared to the 2021 elections. But in any case, people do feel frustrated because they want change. A lot of people want this change. And the 30% that you're mentioning, it does seem realistic. -- 4 of 19 -- The ruling party does seem like it could gain 30% of the votes. But obviously, with all the tactics they used—busing people in, having people vote twice, taking people's names off the list, for example, when you go to vote, you have to tick off your name—they are taking people's names off those lists, or people's names are already signed, as if they'd already voted. They went to the polling station, they saw, "Hey, who's this signing my name right here? I didn't sign it." And those types of tactics basically try to bring down the possibility for the opposition to vote. And people are frustrated. And overall, I mean, society is not—it's not—what a lot of media, especially outside of Armenia, are portraying as a choice between Russia and the West, and that Armenian society only wants to go towards the European Union and Russia is annihilating them. It's not really like tha