Trump's Gaza Plan, the Israel Lobby, and Ukraine Negotiations | Harvard Prof. Stephen Walt

## The Israel Lobby Today The exchange makes plain that the United States’ relationship with Israel is not merely the product of shared values or strategic necessity; it is also the product of a durable, well-organized political ecosystem that channels American power in Israel's favor. The conversation revisits arguments first popularized in The Israel Lobby, and reminds us that this ecosystem retains its capacity to shape policy even as public opinion shifts. What has changed superficially—more visible activism on campuses, sharper criticisms from younger American Jews, and a fracturing of pro-Israel consensus—has not dismantled the fundamental mechanisms that translate money, organization, and messaging into policy outcomes. That asymmetry between public attitudes and political practice is central to understanding why U.S. policy can appear so divorced from domestic priorities and international realities. Stephen Walt’s interventions in the discussion are important because they insist on precision: the lobby is not a monolith of a single religion or ethnicity, nor is it solely an ethnic-interest group. Rather, it is a constellation of organizations and political actors united by a policy preference: strong, often unconditional U.S. backing for the State of Israel. Recognizing that distinction kills two myths at once—the idea that criticism of Israeli policy equals anti-Semitism and the idea that American Jews are politically homogeneous. What remains is a political force capable of generating bipartisan congressional action and executive-level alignment even when significant portions of the American public express skepticism. ## Lobby Mechanics and Misconceptions A key takeaway from the exchange is the way political influence operates in practice. Lobbying is less about a single lobbyist whispering into a senator’s ear than it is about an infrastructure: donors, think tanks, advocacy groups, media outlets, and sympathetic policymakers who together create incentives and punishments. The comparison to other powerful lobbies—gun rights organizations and pharmaceutical interests—was invoked for a reason: policy outcomes often reflect organized interests more than diffuse voter preferences. The interlocutors emphasize a crucial normative point: labeling a policy network as the “Jewish lobby” is both inaccurate and dangerous. That rhetorical slippage confuses ethnicity and advocacy, and it elides the presence of non-Jewish actors—evangelical groups, corporate interests, and foreign-policy realists—who also play pivotal roles. At the same time, insisting on that care with terminology should not be an excuse to avoid hard questions about why U.S. policy so consistently privileges a foreign government, or to overlook the democratic consequences of that alignment for ordinary Americans facing domestic needs. This is not simply a debate about morality; it is also a debate about democratic accountability. When well-organized groups successfully steer foreign policy away from majority public opinion, the result is a credibility gap between citizens and their government. The conversation underscores that consequence: people see congressional resolutions or executive actions that appear to prioritize a foreign government's security over domestic priorities like infrastructure or social services, and that breeds cynicism about political responsiveness. ## Terrorism, Cause and Effect One of the most consequential threads in the discussion centers on causal narratives about terrorism. For decades, a convenient rhetorical frame has linked threats to Israel with threats to the United States, suggesting a shared front against Islamist extremism. Walt questions the coherence of that frame. He points out that many of the groups threatening U.S. interests have explicit grievances tied to U.S. policy in the Middle East, including its support for Israel. This is not to exonerate violent actors or rationalize terrorism; rather, it is to insist that explanations of violence must grapple with motive and context. This perspective introduces an uncomfortable but necessary analytic pivot: if foreign policy behaviors create grievances, then counterterrorism that ignores grievance formation is incomplete. The U.S. did much of the kinetic work against jihadist groups after 9/11 without seriously addressing the political drivers that had fed radicalization—occupation, civilian suffering, and perceived double standards. The conversation suggests that the failure to address those drivers keeps the cycle of violence—and the narrative that justifies further intervention—alive. Walt’s point carries a strategic warning: tactical military successes that fail to resolve underlying political issues are likely to be temporary. Over time, new cohorts radicalized by continuing injustice will emerge. If U.S. policy is to break the chain of recrimination and retaliation, it must confront whether its support of certain Israeli policies contributes to the very problem it aims to solve. ## Trump’s Gaza Plan and the Question of Ethnic Cleansing The debate around the Trump administration’s public musings on Gaza crystallizes many of these tensions. The plan—portrayed by its proponents as an imaginative fix—was broadly dismissed in the region and exposed as unrealistic at best and dangerously delusional at worst. The proposal to resettle Palestinians outside Gaza or to put Gaza under U.S. control flagged a deeper moral and strategic problem: proposals that attempt to resolve an intensely political conflict by moving or removing populations do not solve questions of justice or legitimacy. In the conversation, this approach is explicitly linked to ethnic-cleansing rhetoric. The speakers make an unsettling but necessary connection: when a plan contemplates the removal of an entire population or their permanent displacement, it crosses from strategic miscalculation into a human-rights catastrophe. Whether described as "forced transfer," "depopulation," or "ethnic cleansing," such outcomes would produce long-term instability, regional backlash, and moral degradation of the actors who enable or facilitate them. The conversation makes clear that any policy option that removes Palestinians from contested land should be rejected not only on humane grounds but also on the practical grounds that it would further destabilize the region and produce more resistance, not less. ## Regional and Domestic Consequences Foreign policy is not contained abroad. The exchange draws attention to the reverberations of U.S. choices—resonating in the Middle East and at home. Arab governments’ public rejections of radical proposals expose limits to American influence. The fact that Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and others refused to entertain plans that would displace Palestinians is a rebuke not only to a single policy vision but to the assumption that regional actors will automatically acquiesce to American designs. Domestically, the conversation highlights a different set of consequences. Heavy-handed efforts to suppress dissent—through executive orders, campus policing, or prosecutions—risk chilling free speech and alienating younger cohorts who view the situation differently. The widening generational split among American Jews is emblematic: the new dissidents on campuses, including Jewish groups, demonstrate that the old consensus is breaking down. Attempting to legislate or litigate away criticism will not restore legitimacy. If anything, it will deepen the domestic political costs of a foreign policy misaligned with a growing proportion of the public. Moreover, the conversation makes a practical point about credibility. When the U.S. offers blanket diplomatic cover for disputed actions, it undermines its claim to be an honest broker in future negotiations, whether in Israel-Palestine or elsewhere. Allies and adversaries alike interpret such posture as transactional and interest-based, reducing the U.S. capa

Trump's Gaza Plan, the Israel Lobby, and Ukraine Negotiations | Prof. Stephen Walt Hardly a day goes by in DC without legislating on behalf of Israel, even though Americans have considerable and growing skepticism toward arming and funding that foreign government. Yet we continue to lavish Israel with billions of dollars even though American communities like those in North Carolina and California still need our help. Why does this continue to happen? My guest today explains why: Stephen Walt published The Israel Lobby with John Mearsheimer nearly 18 years ago, identifying the influential political network that exists within the United States to ensure our continued unconditional financial and diplomatic support for the foreign government of Israel. Professor Walt joins independent journalist Harrison Berger to discuss The Israel Lobby, Trump's plan for Gaza, recent crackdowns on free speech at Harvard, prospects for peace in the Ukraine War, and more. #M3 Hardly a day goes by in Washington, D.C., without legislating on behalf of Israel. Since the latest Congress was inaugurated, we have had bills that sanctioned the International Criminal Court on behalf of Israel, executive orders on anti-Semitism, which urged the Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Education to deport foreign students critical of Israel and to prosecute pro-Palestinian activists under federal conspiracy statutes. We have suspended foreign aid for all governments except for Israel and Egypt, one of the Middle East dictatorships that we bribe to repress the popular will of their people in order to make sure that region is safer for Israel. At the same time, Americans have considerable skepticism toward arming and funding that foreign government. The latest Gallup polling, which is from over a year ago, shows that Americans are at best extremely divided over U.S. support for Israel. Yet Washington continues to march in bipartisan lockstep to service that country, even though American communities like those in North Carolina and California still need our help. The reason our government so often has the priorities of a foreign country and its citizens over our own is because of the Israel lobby, which is the title of my guest's 2007 book, which he co-wrote with University of Chicago professor John Mearsheimer. Joining me now is Harvard professor Stephen Walt, who, much like John Mearsheimer, has presciently predicted many of our foreign policy entanglements and their failed outcomes. Professor Walt, it is really amazing to be able to speak with you. Thanks very much for doing this. #M2 Nice to be with you, too. -- 1 of 16 -- #M3 So I want to first ask you about a misconception that people have about the Israel lobby, that it is representative and composed solely of Jewish people. You and Professor Mearsheimer devote pages to dispelling that myth and describing the network of Jews and Gentiles alike who work overtime in our nation's capital to ensure that our unconditional support for Israel continues. Especially after October 7th, American Jews are more divided than ever over Israel, with younger generations more likely to empathize with Palestinians than older generations. The protests on campus demonstrated that generational divide. And many of those campus encampments were run by Jewish groups like Jewish Voice for Peace. Yet the lobby is in many ways at the height of its power. Israel supporters and ultra-Zionists occupy the highest levels of power in our government, from UN Ambassador Nikki Haley, Ambassador to Israel David Friedman, and Miriam Adelson's personal influence in the White House under Donald Trump. Can you just define what the Israel lobby is in 2023 as opposed to 2007 and explain why it is that although criticism of Israel has never been more present in our discourse, our government seems to be providing record support for that foreign government? #M2 So I don't think the nature of the Israel lobby has actually changed that much since we wrote our book. Some of the ways in which it operates have become more obvious and more apparent, but its fundamental characteristics are really not that different. What we emphasized in our book and what remains true today is that the lobby is defined not by religion, not by ethnicity, or anything like that. It's why I think it's completely wrong and quite unfair to talk about, say, a Jewish lobby or anything like that. It's defined by its political positions, by the positions it advocates. And the main thing that all the groups that we would call part of the lobby support is for the United States to have a special relationship with Israel, one of essentially unconditional support, one where no matter what Israel does, the United States backs it up. That's what groups like AIPAC and other groups in the lobby are trying to promote. And of course, it's not just AIPAC. There's the Zionist Organization of America. There's Christians United for Israel, a Christian evangelical group as well. And very importantly, and you mentioned this in your opening speech, many American Jews do not believe that we should have a special relationship. They don't support what Israel is doing. They don't like what the United States did, say, over the Gaza war. So in that sense, you know, it's not, again, a monolithic Jewish community. As for where American public opinion is, this is unfortunately an old story in American politics: frequently, when you have well-organized lobbying groups, they are able to persuade politicians to follow policies, to enact policies that are opposed by a majority of Americans. Just look at the impact of the NRA, the influence that big pharma has on health care and drug prices, and things like that. So this is a very -- 2 of 16 -- familiar story in American politics. It just happens to be the most pronounced example of it, I think, in foreign policy, where the United States consistently acts in ways that are harmful to its interests and contrary to what most Americans would normally want. #M3 I want to ask you about a few specific instances or political issues where the Israel lobby has been working recently. So, obviously, a chief argument for continuing our unconditional U.S. financing and support for Israel that arose after September 11th was that the perpetrators of 9/11 were part of a broader network of Islamic terror that threatened both the United States and Israel. Therefore, the United States should use its military on behalf of Israel to take out Israel's enemies who, under this formulation, are supposedly our own. You and John Mearsheimer demonstrate at length in "The Israel Lobby" why that narrative is pure propaganda. For one thing, the U.S. and Israel do not share a common threat of terrorism from Hezbollah, Hamas, and al-Qaeda, who, under this formulation, have the same goals and targets. Rather, U.S. support for Israel is often what generates much of the terrorism in the first place, as you lay out. But these are the arguments that neocons have presented for decades now to try and convince the U.S. to bomb Iran, for instance. And those efforts intensified after October 7th, when groups that align themselves with Iran, like Hezbollah, began retaliation against Israel's assault on Gaza. And as that conflict escalated, we continue to hear from prominent neocons like Bari Weiss that the threats Israel faces are our own and that Joe Biden must do more to confront Iran and even bomb that country. And now efforts exist to convince President Trump to do the same. What do you make of how this propaganda tactic you identified years ago has evolved? And do you think today's current national security officials are as convinced of that argument today as they were when you wrote "The Israel Lobby"? #M2 Well, I haven't seen an enormous evolution in the national security community here, but the argument that we're sort of partners against terror, which was Benjamin Netanyahu's line back in the immediate aftermath of September 11th, you don't see that getting invoked as much— sometimes, but not as much as it used to be. And, you know, there are two things to say about it. First, after September 11th, it was obvious that there was a set of groups out there—this was actually obvious beforehand—that were very hostile to the United States and were willing to attack American forces in the region and were willing to attack the United States directly. And I didn't have any problem with the United States going after those groups in the aftermath of September 11th. When you're attacked, I think it's appropriate to respond. But at the same time, what we ignored was, well, why are those groups angry at the United States? What's motivating them as well? And you heard a lot of nonsense post-9/11 that they hated -- 3 of 16 -- American values, that they were fundamentally hostile to the United States as a society. What, of course, was really bothering them was the policy the United States had adopted in the Middle East. Osama bin Laden was crystal clear that he had many objections to what the United States was doing. But one of his principal objections was our unconditional support for Israel, given how Israel was treating the Palestinians. So it was one thing to say that, OK, we have a problem here. But solving that problem involved two things. One of them was to try and neutralize the groups that are attacking the United States. And the second one would have been trying to make sure that they don't recreate themselves, that the motivations that are causing these groups to be anti-American are eliminated. Well, we did the first part, but we didn't do the second part, right? And I think that's why, particularly when you look at the situation today, we still face populations in the Middle East who have a very low opinion of the United States and where we are likely to see a resurgence of the same kind of anti-American forces. Not because they're fundamentally hostile to what America stands for, or I might add what we used to stand for, because that's not as clear anymore, but they're hostile to what the United States is doing in the region. I think this is a pretty obvious point, but it's not a point that groups in the lobby would like people to think too hard about. #M3 Well, it's interesting that you bring that up because obviously there is the old adage, you know, they hate us for our freedoms. This is how they tried to sell us the war on terror. Much in the same way, I think that Israel tries to sell its own war on terror, that, oh, they hate us because we're Jewish and not because of the occupation, which we've maintained for decades. I'm wondering, you mentioned that obviously our actions in the Middle East supporting Israel and its occupation have generated a lot of anti-American sentiment and in many ways generated some of the terrorism that we faced on our own soil, like 9/11 or the 1993 World Trade Center attack, which you lay out in the Israel lobby. I'm wondering if you anticipate anything that will come or any repercussions against the United States for all of our military support for Israel over the past 15 or 16 months. #M2 I think that's to be expected. I mean, what the United States has done since October 7th, I think, is unconscionable, where we have effectively provided military support and diplomatic protection for what, at a minimum, are serious war crimes and, at a maximum, is an attempted genocide. And it's really shocking for the United States to have done that. This has had the temporary effect of severely weakening a number of groups, like Hamas and Hezbollah, and putting Iran in a much weaker position. But it's hard for me to believe that it's not going to also be an inspiration for the kind of groups that Osama bin Laden led as well. Ultimately, we have a political issue there, and you generally can't solve political issues simply by dropping bombs on people. The fact that the United St