Ukraine Just Doomed Itself | Prof. Michael Rossi

## Opening: A war born in the gray zone The first day of the Iran war makes one thing clear: this confrontation emerged less from a transparent cascade of provocation and response than from a deliberate performance of ambiguity. In the exchange recorded among analysts, the dominant theme is that the military blows and the diplomatic words were not accidental companions but coordinated instruments—negotiations serving as cover, public signaling as pretext. That deliberate blurring of war and diplomacy threatens more than immediate destruction; it undermines the credibility of interstate bargaining, amplifies risks of escalation, and accelerates a reconfiguration of regional alignments that may outlast any single campaign. ## The immediate military and humanitarian toll Within hours of the opening strikes the landscape of damage, death, and disruption was evident but incomplete. Participants in the discussion described strikes across several countries and the targeting of both military facilities and urban infrastructure. Reports of civilian casualties—schoolchildren killed by misdirected strikes—and of major damage to radar installations and bases in the Gulf highlight the asymmetric and indiscriminate character of the opening round. Military censorship in Israel and fog-of-war denials and confirmations create a perilous information vacuum. In that vacuum, rumors of the Supreme Leader’s death circulated rapidly; whether true or false, such claims have immediate operational and psychological consequences. Beyond loss of life, the strategic effects were swift. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz and interruptions in Red Sea transit through the Suez route were reported, effectively disrupting global energy and shipping flows. That kind of economic chokehold magnifies the war’s reach: insurers stop covering transits, supply chains reroute or stall, and the global markets react to the threat of prolonged interruption. The first-day strikes therefore did not merely inflict point damage; they introduced systemic shocks likely to reverberate across economies and societies far beyond the battlefield. ## Diplomacy in tatters: negotiations as theater A central claim made repeatedly in the conversation is that the recent round of negotiations functioned as a theatrical device rather than as a sincere attempt at de-escalation. Ambassador Chas Freeman emphasized that talks had been used to distract while military planning continued, a view echoed and elaborated by Michael Rossi. The revelation that the timing of the attack had reportedly been agreed at a private meeting underscores how diplomacy can be leveraged to manufacture surprise and deny opponents the ability to deter or prepare. This instrumentalization of talks corrodes trust in predictable and dangerous ways. Future partners—states and non-state actors—will rationally discount diplomatic overtures if they believe such offers are likely to mask imminent coercion. The result is higher transaction costs for conflict management: fewer backchannels, more hedging, and a reduced appetite among third parties to vouch for or mediate between antagonists. The conversation’s participants warned that this legacy of deceit will diminish U.S. credibility as a negotiating partner and push other governments to seek security through alternative alignments or layered hedges rather than relying on American guarantees. ## Constitutional rupture and U.S. domestic politics The exchange also foregrounded the domestic political implications of the decision-making process that led to the strike. Critics in the discussion framed the action as emblematic of a deeper erosion of democratic norms in the United States, arguing that declarations of war and the commitment of forces occurred without a meaningful congressional mandate. That disjunction between constitutional prerogatives and executive practice fuels both legal and political crises at home. Public opinion, the analysts noted, was largely opposed to military escalation, and yet the machinery of decision moved ahead. This divergence has two dangerous consequences. First, it weakens the institutional checks that historically constrain adventurism. Second, it politicizes military engagement in ways that may make future restraint more difficult to achieve—politicians may escalate to signal resolve, while opponents may question motives rather than strategy. The specter drawn in the conversation is not merely a policy misstep; it is a potential turning point in the relationship between citizenship, representation, and the conduct of war. ## Regional dynamics: the Gulf, Turkey, and the calculus of neutrality One of the most consequential threads explored was the dilemma facing Gulf states and other regional actors who have long tried to balance between the United States and their Iranian neighbor. Analysts pointed out that many regional governments host American bases and hardware, yet their populations and, increasingly, their foreign policy calculations are distancing themselves from Washington’s posture. The presence of U.S. forces on GCC soil—coupled with direct strikes on bases in Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait—puts these governments in an impossible bind: they neither want war nor can they easily disassociate from their security ties with Washington without domestic and geopolitical cost. The conversation emphasized that neutrality is not a static choice but a strategic posture with real risks. States that try to stay out of great-power conflicts may still be targeted because of geographic proximity or alliance entanglements. At the same time, the record of recent years shows a pragmatic recalibration among Gulf capitals: warmer ties with Tehran, tentative engagement with BRICS partners, and a nervous hedging that seeks Chinese and other mediation. Analysts noted that China’s mediation role in prior Riyadh-Tehran rapprochement now appears as a critical factor: if Gulf states see Beijing as a viable broker for regional stability and commercial opportunity, their dependence on Washington erodes. For Israel and its supporters, those shifts spell strategic vulnerability; for the Gulf, they offer an alternative to being trapped in external conflicts. ## Prestige, munitions, and the erosion of American leverage Beyond politics and regional alignments, the analysts flagged a crucial material dimension: the degradation of American military preparedness. The opening of major hostilities was predicted to draw down U.S. munitions and specialized armaments—resources already strained by prolonged commitments elsewhere. Even if tactical successes are achieved, the conversation made plain that strategic prestige can be hollowed out by protracted attrition and shortages. Prestige, one commentator said, is the shadow power casts; when that shadow shrinks, so does leverage. The implications are twofold. First, diminished matériel constrains the United States’ ability to project force rapidly elsewhere, potentially altering outcomes in Ukraine, the Indo-Pacific, or other theaters. Second, credibility costs are amplified when bargaining positions are backed by unclear or exhausted means. Allies and rivals alike will reassess assumptions about American resolve, endurance, and reliability. The combination of reputational damage from alleged diplomatic deceit and the physical depletion of resources could accelerate a multipolar rebalancing already underway. ## Toward a more fractured order Taken together, the conversation sketches a world likely to be less governed by predictable rules and more by brute bargaining among regional powers and emerging blocs. The analysts argued that the so‑called rules-based order—often invoked as a norm against territorial aggression and extra-territorial strikes—has suffered a blow. Where rules are selectively enforced or openly contravened, smaller states seek other guarantees. Economic partnerships, security blocs, and transactional diplomacy will substitu

The Iran War: Day 1 | With Michael Rossi & Chas Freeman Updates on the US-Israeli War with Iran #Pascal Welcome, everybody, to another livestream and update about what’s happening in Iran. I’m very, very pleased and grateful to be joined today by two wonderful analysts and one former diplomat — Ambassador Chas Freeman, former U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Assistant Secretary of Defense back in the 1990s. Ambassador Freeman, welcome. We’re also joined by Michael Rossi of Rutgers University, who teaches political science there. Gentlemen, welcome. Thank you, Pascal. #Chas Freeman Good to be with you, Pascal. #Pascal Well, thank you for doing this. Maybe let’s start with you, Ambassador Freeman. This new war with Iran is not even a day old yet. What do you make of it, and what have you learned over the course of the day? It’s now 8 p.m. on the U.S. East Coast, and the whole affair started around 1 a.m. this Saturday, your time. #Chas Freeman Yes, it’s too early to really tell much about what’s happening. This is the opening round in what’s clearly going to be a war of attrition. There are several obvious points to it, I think, that have been made by the U.S. military—apparently not persuasively, because the president went ahead and did this. First, whatever the outcome, it will greatly deplete American stocks of armaments and munitions relevant to other challenges, and therefore it will weaken the United States. Second, we’re already seeing the severance of east–west communications. The Strait of Hormuz is closed. Insurance companies will no longer insure ships going through there, which ensures that they won’t try to break the blockade. The Houthis are back enforcing a blockade in the Red Sea, apparently. So both the Persian Gulf— through the Strait of Hormuz, which accounts for about 20% of the global oil supply—and the Red Sea, as the passage from Asia to Europe through the Suez Canal, are closed. Third, of course, military censorship is in place in Israel, which means there’s no reporting on what damage is being -- 1 of 16 -- done there. We know that in the June so‑called 12‑day war, about 480 buildings were destroyed in Israel. There’s a *Haaretz* editorial today that mentions this, though not the figure. And many Israelis are still homeless as a result of that. Here we go again. So we know there’s damage in many cities in Iran, and that an apparently mistargeted missile in Minab, in southern Iran, killed a lot of schoolgirls. We’ve seen claims from President Trump—though not quite from Prime Minister Netanyahu—that the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, is dead. Netanyahu said there were indications he was dead but didn’t claim he was. The Iranians have denied that and said he’s very much still in command. So there’s a lot we don’t know. We’re going to have an opportunity to find out a great deal more in the coming days. And I think it’s fair to say there are several legacies from this, regardless of what happens. The first is that I don't think anyone is going to be very eager to negotiate with the United States. This is the second time we've used negotiations as a ruse, as a way to distract attention while planning an attack. And the fact is that someone indiscreet in Israel revealed that the time of the attack—the date—was agreed on December 29th, already at Mar‑a‑Lago. These negotiations, as I suspected, have been an empty exercise meant to support a surprise military strike. And that makes it a little more understandable why the Russians are apparently losing enthusiasm for dealing with Messrs. Witkoff and Kushner, who have, to use an American baseball term, a batting average of zero. They’ve entered many negotiations. They’ve produced wealth for themselves and for the Trump family on occasion—at least potentially—but they haven’t produced peace. Not in Ukraine, not in Gaza, not between Israel and Iran, not with Iran and the United States. And so, um, there’s a legacy here of disrepute for the American diplomatic establishment that’s going to last and make it far more difficult for the United States to be taken seriously internationally. Of course, we are taken seriously as a serial violator of international law and as a militarily potent country. Let me just address that last point. If this war ends, as I suspect it may, with the devastation of Israel, great damage in Iran, and some serious American losses, we’ll see a loss of prestige. That is, prestige is the shadow that power casts, and it's a very important element of leverage internationally. We’ll see a reduction in that for the United States military. Even if the U.S. military is successful, we’ll nonetheless, as I indicated earlier, see a reduced capacity due to shortages of munitions and other weaponry, which reflect the decay of the American military‑industrial base. So all this is not good, and it, one way or another, promises to increase the danger of war. I guess I should say one last thing, and that is that the American objectives in this war, for a long time, were unclear. There was a whole laundry list—one being to stop the so‑called nuclear program, which the intelligence agencies have never verified to have existed. In fact, they've been quite sure that it didn’t. So it’s a fiction, like Saddam Hussein’s nuclear program, which led to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Second, there was the need to respond to protests that the Secretary of the Treasury claimed credit for instigating through the collapse of the Iranian rial, which impoverished huge numbers of Iranians and brought them into the streets—where, -- 2 of 16 -- reportedly, 50,000 Starlink receiver sets were in place to coordinate the escalation of the protests into riots and violence. Third, that Iran has developed a formidable deterrent in the form of its missile force, and that should be eliminated. So we’ve been saying in these negotiations, apparently, “You must eliminate your defense capabilities, or we will bomb you. If you do eliminate your defense capabilities, well, you’re on your own.” And fourth, Iran has been in these talks because it wants relief from sanctions, which have crippled the Iranian economy and led to the protests and their aftermath. That has not been on offer in these negotiations. What has been on offer is no new sanctions—but even that was phony. So we have a situation in which a series of demands in the negotiations, clearly calculated to make those negotiations fail, has in fact produced nothing but a deception for a surprise attack. I don't think anything good is going to come out of this for anyone. I suspect Israel will regret having put Trump up to this. I suspect Trump is in a box politically. And I think the Iranians are once again suffering the consequences of the dynamic I’ve just described. I’ll stop. #Pascal Yeah, thank you very much for this assessment. And Michael, I'll let you react to it. I just want to point out that we’re being told that Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader, is apparently dead. I mean, this is now making the rounds on Twitter and in the establishment media. #Chas Freeman Let me interrupt. He’s been declared dead on at least six previous occasions by the Israelis. I think the Iranian government has denied that he’s dead and said he’s still in charge. I think it’s an open question. Anyway, here’s a question: if the Supreme Leader is dead as a result of an assassination attempt carried out through a military attack, what’s wrong with trying to assassinate Donald Trump? #Pascal Yeah, precisely. I mean, why wouldn’t they try to do that? Do you actually think, Ambassador Freeman, that this could be on the cards? Could an assassination attempt on Donald Trump be attempted now? #Chas Freeman Well, it's possible. Of course, there’s been what I think was a false claim that there was already an Iranian assassination attempt on Trump. But, you know, this goes back to the unlearned lesson of 9 /11: if you bomb people, they’ll bomb back. If they don’t have an air force, they’ll repurpose passenger planes as cruise missiles. They’ll find some way to retaliate. Reciprocity is the name of the -- 3 of 16 -- game internationally. So if you have no respect for international law, morality, or decency, and you assassinate your counterparts, you should expect them to follow the rule of the mafia and pay you back. #Pascal And of course, until now, this is exactly what Israel has been doing. It always went after the leadership of its enemies—Hamas and Hezbollah. But this is the first time the enemy is big enough that it could actually try to carry out a successful counterstrike. Michael, what do you think this situation will produce politically, and in terms of war? #Michael Rossi Um, well, I'm glad we waited until the end of the day to talk about this. You know, to paraphrase a famous line from Sophocles, one must wait until sunset to see how splendid the day has become. I wouldn’t dare say there’s anything splendid at the end of this day. But to add a few things to what Ambassador Freeman mentioned—just within the past hour, Iran confirmed the deaths of four of Khamenei’s family members: one of his daughters and a grandchild. As for Khamenei himself, his whereabouts remain unknown. People within his family are denying the rumors that he was killed. And until I get confirmation from Iran itself that Khamenei is dead, I’m going to take all of this with not just a grain of salt, but with a salt mine. The United States and the Israeli leadership have already lied—multiple times. It’s a bold lie to make, if it is one. So we’re effectively, within the first 24 hours, dealing with a lot in the so‑called gray zone. I mean, that’s ultimately what we’re dealing with here. One thing before I get to the issue of assassination and international law: again, gray zone here. Iran has managed to successfully hit a number of American military targets within the Middle East, including Bahrain, where a major radar station was destroyed. Locations in Qatar, the UAE, Kuwait, and Dubai—we’re seeing pictures of missiles flying over Dubai itself. Various targets have been hit. This raises the question of whether the United States and Israel have bitten off more than they can chew. Or is this something the U.S. was prepared to take as retaliatory strikes—hence the reason there were orders for military personnel to evacuate these bases—as a way of then turning to the willing audience that eats this stuff up? As a way of saying, “You see, Iran is declaring war haphazardly on a number of countries.” And we won’t mention the bases, but we will talk about how Iran suddenly struck Bahrain, Kuwait, and the UAE, getting all these other countries to possibly join the conflict between the United States and Israel. Images of Dubai—of the Burj Khalifa almost being hit—are going to be played up in Western media as a way of showing the brutality and belligerence of this regime. So this is what we come away with within the first day. I think the other thing we need to take into consideration is that if the so‑called rules‑based order had any credibility up until today, it’s gone. It’s just absolutely gone. You and I had this conversation -- 4 of 16 -- yesterday, Pascal Lottaz, which in a way I’m almost glad we did—because we talked about Russia‑Ukraine yesterday, and I think after today, Ukraine is going to be… well, it’s no longer top news. But we were talking about Canada’s Prime Minister Mackey and the importance of the rules‑based order, to which he automatically stands behind the United States today in its attack against Iran, without any congressional approval—unless you consider the Knesset to be the congressional approval that Trump was looking for. #Pascal Ambassador Freeman, how do you think this is going down now in the United States? I've heard there are protests in the U.S. I mean, Donald Trump, in his speech, even used the word “war.” He said casualties will happen in war. But under the U.S. Constitution, the power to