Foreign Minister SHOCKS Europe With TRUTHS About US-EU Relationship | Evarist Bartolo

## The myth of an unbreakable transatlantic bond The conversation presents a jarring rebuttal to the comfortable story that the United States and Europe form a single, indispensable axis of world politics. What emerges from the exchange is not occasional disagreement between allies but a structural pattern: a relationship in which Europe is routinely treated as a junior partner, sometimes as a client, and occasionally as an inconvenience. That diagnosis reframes current crises not as isolated policy disagreements but as symptoms of a deeper imbalance—one that shapes Europe’s choices, limits its maneuverability, and degrades the very idea of strategic autonomy that many European leaders publicly endorse. This is not merely rhetorical provocation. The speakers describe concrete behaviors by U.S. diplomats and officials—derisive comments about European capacity, implicit demands that European states align automatically with American priorities, and practices that amount to diplomatic bullying. Those behaviors matter because they harden into expectations. If European policy-making becomes an exercise in matching U.S. signals rather than deliberating on independent interests, the EU will not be the reliable partner it aspires to be; it will be a repeat customer for American strategy. ## Europe’s lost art of diplomacy A recurring theme in the discussion is the erosion of classic diplomacy: patient, reciprocal engagement with states one dislikes, fears, or competes with. The argument is stark—the EU and many of its member states have unlearned basic diplomatic rituals like listening, face-to-face negotiation, and keeping channels open even in moments of acute tension. Diplomacy, the conversation argues, has been replaced by formulaic sanctions, public posturing, and transactional deals mediated by capitals outside Europe. The consequences are practical and immediate. Refusing to meet with counterparts in Moscow or Beijing is presented not as moral clarity but as strategic self-harm. When European officials decline even to listen, they miss opportunities to shape outcomes, to understand leverage, and to protect wider interests such as trade, migration management, and regional stability. The anecdote about ministers being told not even to sleep in the same room with “the enemy” dramatizes how ritualized ostracism can precede policy mistakes—where refusing dialogue becomes an excuse for not preparing alternatives. Moreover, the conversation points to a transformation of diplomatic norms within Europe itself. Forums that should allow for sustained debate instead resemble performative stages: short interventions, little cross-examination, and a culture that sidelines dissent. Where negotiation requires compromise and time, there is impatience and a preference for fast, binary decisions that produce visible unity rather than durable strategy. ## The southern blind spot and a neglected neighborhood One of the most striking claims is that the EU’s geopolitical imagination has shifted north and east at the expense of its southern neighborhood. The enlargement rounds of the early 2000s reoriented Brussels toward the eastern flank and the perceived risks posed by Russia, China, and the Indo-Pacific. Left behind, the Mediterranean and Africa recede into policy marginality—even as demographic and economic trends make them central to Europe’s future. This southern blind spot has consequences beyond moral culpability. By failing to build genuine partnership architectures with neighbors in North Africa and sub‑Saharan Africa, the EU undermines its own migration, security, and economic objectives. The conversation contrasts European one-way templating—programs designed around what Brussels wants from its partners—with alternative approaches, notably China’s practice of asking recipient governments what they want and financing projects accordingly. The result is predictable: countries turn to actors who offer agency rather than paternalistic conditionality. The conversation also highlights a structural hypocrisy. Europe decries exploitation in its rhetoric while continuing economic patterns that extract raw materials and deny value-added production to African countries. That short-term extraction model deepens migration pressures and feeds geopolitical competition. If Europe genuinely wants to reduce push factors and cultivate influence, it must shift from a taker model to a partner model—and that requires humility and institutional reconfiguration. ## Power hierarchies inside the EU: multiple speeds and unequal voices The European Union is treated in the exchange not as an egalitarian club of equals but as a tiered system in which France and Germany constitute a privileged core, followed by a middle layer, and a large periphery that is expected to follow. Small states worry that their vetoes and residual sovereignty might be the last barriers to an irreversible centralization that would make Brussels the new metropolitan center. This internal stratification shapes how policies are made and how dissent is managed. The account suggests that when strategic decisions are framed as existential or urgent, the temptation is to shortcut consensus by devaluing the concerns of smaller members. The result is not only resentment but practical misalignments: measures that work for continental powers can have disproportionate negative effects on island states or economies with specific vulnerabilities. The conversation raises an important normative point: if the EU is to remain politically viable, it must preserve meaningful mechanisms for smaller members to influence policies that affect their livelihoods. Otherwise, the union risks two equally damaging outcomes—a hollowed-out federalism where formal equality exists only on paper, or a gradual renationalization as member states reassert control over policies that no longer reflect their distinct interests. ## Militarization, arms markets, and the economics of tension A disquieting insight in the discussion links diplomatic posturing with defense commerce. Tensions, it is argued, are sometimes cultivated because they create demand for armaments—a blunt but economically potent logic. The imagery is stark: when disputes escalate, state actors look to sell platforms and munitions; when contracts are signed, tempers cool. This nexus distorts both foreign policy and public debate. Security conferences dominated by defense contractors, ministers whose constituencies are tied to military-industrial interests, and an architecture that privileges hard power solutions over preventive diplomacy all conspire to make armament a self-reinforcing industry. The conversation suggests that Europe’s policy reflex is increasingly to treat problems through the lens of supply—where the right answer is framed as “more capability” rather than “better politics.” If Europe's leadership allows this dynamic to persist, the long-term costs will be both strategic and fiscal. Over-investment in platforms without parallel investment in diplomatic bandwidth, development, and regional partnerships magnifies the risk of protracted conflict, supply dependencies, and a narrowing of policy options. ## Neutrality, small-state agency, and the future of European strategy Embedded in this critique is a defense of neutrality and of the practical agency small states can exert when they insist on independent judgment. The conversation repeatedly returns to the special position of island and constitutionally neutral states: their interests do not always line up with grand narratives about great-power rivalry. For them, migration, maritime access, and commercial routes may matter more than rhetorical solidarity in a distant theater. Preserving the ability to veto, to sit at separate tables, and to maintain channels with all parties are presented as prudential safeguards, not signs of disloyalty. The insistence that small states retain a voice within the EU is n

Foreign Minister Reveals Shocking US-EU Truths | Evarist Bartolo All the talk about the "unbreakable" transatlantic bond between the USA and Europe is nothing but smoke and mirrors. In reality, the USA has been using Europe the way a pimp uses his mistresses. The greatest victim of US contempt is of course Ukraine who is now even asked to pay for its gang- rape in precious minerals. But the rest of the continent is not far behind. When will EU leaders wake up? The good news is, a few Europeans see right through the dirty game. First among them is Malta. Today I’m talking to Evarist Bartolo, a labor politician of the beautiful island state of Malta. Mr. Bartolo was a member of Malta’s parliament for 30 years, and he served as Minister of European and Foreign Affairs, between 2020 and 2022. Since Malta is an EU member with a neutrality clause in its constitution and Mr. Bartolo was in office right around the time when the Russia-Ukraine-NATO conflict came to its horrible boil, I thought we should talk about Malta’s experience of that. Publications: Times of Malta: [https://timesofmalta.com](https://timesofmalta.com/) (search for Evarist Bartolo) Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/evarist.bartolo/ Website: https://evaristbartolo.mt/ #M3 When you talk to some of the American diplomats, the contempt that they have for the Europeans is total. It's total. They're making fun of Macron's idea of strategic autonomy. You know, what strategic autonomy? Well, they cannot even organize a party together, let alone have strategic autonomy. You know, the kind of contempt that Victoria Nuland is famous for. That is not exceptional. I mean, that is normal, you know. #M2 Hello everybody, this is Pascal from Neutrality Studies, and today I'm talking to Evarist Bartolo, a Labour politician from the beautiful island state of Malta. Mr. Bartolo was a member of Malta's parliament for 30 years, and he served as Minister of European and Foreign Affairs between 2020 and 2022. Since Malta is an EU member with a neutrality clause in its constitution, and Mr. Bartolo was in office right around the time when the Russia-Ukraine-NATO conflict came to its horrible boil, I thought we should talk about Malta's experience of all of that. So, Minister Bartolo, welcome. #M3 Thank you very much. #M2 -- 1 of 20 -- Well, thank you very much. And I must say, you contacted me because we are connected. You read an article that I wrote, and I really appreciate that you reacted to it. #M3 But I must tell you, I first discovered you through following Neutrality Studies on YouTube, and I am a consistent follower. I really like it because you provide another voice, which is very important. #M2 Well, thank you for that. And you have an experience that we really have to share here on this channel. You were a foreign minister for over two years in Malta. On the one hand, Malta is a small member of the European Union, but it is a full member of the European Union. You also told me that there was considerable pressure put on you to actually follow what the other EU states were doing. Can you maybe give us a sense of what you were thinking about what was happening between Russia and Ukraine in 2021 and 2022? And then, politically, how did that play out on the EU level? #M3 Well, I must tell you, I was not surprised. I mean, although I became Minister for Foreign Affairs in the last two years of my political career, I had been following international affairs since I was a young man. I had been given some assignments to visit on behalf of the Labour Party and to meet different people, and so on. The first speech, Pascal, that I gave to the diplomats who are based in Malta when I became Minister for Foreign Affairs was, "Listen, I'm coming from the education ministry. One of our biggest challenges was bullying. You know, there is bullying in the playground." There's bullying in the classrooms. I suspect that I'm going to find quite a bit of bullying now that I've moved to a bigger playground. And I think some of them got the message and came up to me and told me, so you want respect? And I said, of course we want respect. We do not want to be bullied. Now, the kind of bullying that takes place in the European Union, and not just in the European Union, in the relations between different states, usually comes from the usual suspects, I must say. It's from those who have had a colonial experience. So if you take the European Union, very few of the countries in the European Union have not had empires. Few of us have only had the historical experience of being colonized. Now, that gives us a different mindset. It makes us, you know, more sensitive to what we call the global south. In our case, as we are in the Mediterranean, we are very sensitive to what is going on in Africa, what is going on in North Africa and beyond. But especially, I think since 2004, when the Baltics and the Eastern European states joined the European Union, the epicenter has changed in the European Union. It has forgotten its southern neighborhood. Africa does not exist. Africa does not exist. If you were to analyze what goes on the agenda of the Foreign Affairs Council, it's the eastern neighborhood and -- 2 of 20 -- what is happening in the Pacific and what is happening with China, and a big continent next to you, which is a neighbor, where there are three Africans for every European. And we're moving to a point with Europe's demographic suicide. We're moving to a point where there will be five children and young Africans to one middle-aged and elderly European. I cannot understand this strategic, not autonomy, but strategic short-sightedness. So when the Ukraine story started developing, it was taken for granted that everyone was going to be, you know, just on board and just say, you know, this is an unprovoked invasion that shows Putin has imperial ambitions. Let's not even discuss what brought it on. Let's not even discuss why this happened and what we are going to do about it. No, everyone was expecting Secretary of State Antony Blinken to turn up and say, listen, now we must be together. We've had, you know, fractures between the US and the EU, between NATO and even within NATO. Now this is the time for us to be together, at least. I remember distinctly this: at least let's keep the invasion from not succeeding for the first two days. So at first, there was this impression that this was going to be a very short campaign on the part of Russia. Then I think it was decided, let's turn this into a good opportunity, not necessarily to defeat Russia, although some people had this illusion. But the most important thing is to keep Russia bogged down there and bleed it economically and bleed it militarily. I am struck even today, now after three years that I'm not in the Foreign Affairs Council anymore, that inbuilt, it's a very superficial forum for discussion. It's like, to a certain extent, it's like the catwalk in a fashion parade. You just come out, talk for three minutes, and go in again. No discussion. At most, if you say something which is not liked, you are simply ignored. So there is no discussion. There's no discussion at all. For example, when we were discussing sanctions, no one, not even from the Commission, would say, but is the world only the EU, G7, and the United States? Now, what happens if we squeeze Russia? Are we going to kill Russia because we're not going to trade with Russia? We're going to sanction Russia on our terms. But doesn't the 86% of the rest of the world exist? Is there a possibility that what we take away from Russia, Russia will look for in China, in India, in Indonesia, in other places? Not even a discussion like that. #M2 Just let me ask this. On the EU level, when you meet all the other foreign ministers and you're supposed to have a discussion, right? Because on paper, the EU is an international organization, right? I mean, the sovereign power still rests within the member states. At least that's how it's supposed to be. But even then, there's no real back and forth. There's no kind of process of trying to find a common position. So where does the position then come from? And where did this idea that EU equals the world, Europe plus America equals the world, where does that come from? I mean, people cannot be that blind that they just take that for granted. #M3 -- 3 of 20 -- You'll be surprised. I think they are culturally blind. I think 500 years of colonialism has definitely spoiled the Europeans who had empires because the attitude is taken for granted so much that they are not even aware of it. For example, I remember telling a friend, you know, even Borrell, who I consider a friend and who I consider was trying to be decent in very difficult circumstances, because I know what he really believes in and what he sometimes had to say were very different. I remember how he was literally sort of boycotted and sort of punished when he decided to travel to Moscow to meet Minister Lavrov. You know, people were, especially the Baltic countries and some of the Eastern European countries like Poland, really angry at him for even just meeting Lavrov, because they said we shouldn't meet people. So then what happens? For example, I was saying, why don't you go down to Tunisia, to Libya, to meet those people? Because we're not meeting them. We're not meeting them. And they used to tell me, but what do we go and tell them? And I said, listen, for the first time, can you please not tell them anything and just listen? Because we concoct these programs like the Global Gateway or the Southern Neighborhood Program or the Memorandum of Understanding with different Mediterranean countries. And there is no decency of sitting down with them to discuss a common program. It's just what the EU needs out of those countries. And then they are surprised. Then they are surprised when you tell them, do you know that the Chinese work in a different way? Yes, yes. What do the Chinese do? They say, well, as far as I know, the Chinese sit down with the ministers when they meet them in Africa, for example, and ask them, what can we do for you? What are the infrastructure projects that you feel we should invest in here in this country? So it's the other way around. Can you imagine on the Global Gateway, where the European Union prides itself on having thought of an answer for the Belt and Road Initiative? Because basically, that's what it is. On the implementation committee of the initiatives to be taken in Africa, there is no African city. It is just a one-sided affair. It's just what I want out of you. And when you tell them, this is very short- sighted, I mean, how do you expect migration not to happen from Africa when we are depriving young Africans of the opportunities to create wealth and to have a more diversified economy in Africa itself? Because all we need out of Africa are the raw materials and energy products. And we do not let them produce the things that we need so that they can create jobs. How are they going to create jobs? And then it's no wonder that they turn towards Turkey, they turn towards Russia, they turn towards China for investment, because those are more equitable in how they deal with debt. It's not that they are angels and Europeans are devils. I'm not talking about that. It's just a completely different attitude on how to deal with debt in other non-European countries. #M2 Is it fair to say that Europe, at this point in the 2020s, has utterly and completely unlearned how to do diplomacy as the art of reciprocal negotiations with equals? -- 4 of 20 -- Pascal, completely, completely. You're not even meant to sleep with the enemy, not to talk to the enemy. You know, not to talk. For example, I can tell you, when we used to have conflicts in the Eastern Mediterranean, you'd have Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, Egypt. Usually in the summer, the tension used to go up. And then I would realize, ah, so it's time for France to sell fig