Instability Rising: UK Sanctions Georgia. Azerbaijan Iran-War Threat | Lasha Kasradze

## Instability Rising: leadership strikes and the illusion of quick victories The recent wave of claims about high‑profile assassinations and retaliatory strikes in the Middle East exposes a larger strategic fallacy: the belief that removing a few leaders will break a state’s will or disable its capabilities. The conversation that unfolded around these events—focused on reported attacks on Iranian figures and the intense Israeli‑American campaign—reveals how decapitation thinking persists in policy circles and media narratives, even as empirical evidence and historical precedent point the other way. Rather than producing decisive victories, targeted eliminations often harden resolve, complicate command structures in predictable ways, and invite asymmetric responses that routinize escalation. The stakes are enormous: regional conflagration, fractured domestic politics in key states, and a global economy vulnerable to disruption. ## The myth of decapitation strikes The persistent appeal of senior‑target assassination is psychological as much as strategic. Removing a perceived linchpin offers an attractive, neat solution to the messy politics of war: cut off the head, and the body will fall. The exchange captured in the discussion highlights how easily such fantasies become operational scripts for statecraft. When a potentate or security chief is targeted, commentators and officials rush to frame the act as a crippling blow. Yet experience in the region—most recently across conflicts involving Iran, Hezbollah, and various non‑state actors—shows this is rarely true. Several dynamics undermine the efficacy of decapitation. First, institutional redundancy: revolutionary or militarized institutions often cultivate parallel chains of command precisely to survive attrition. Purposive succession planning, compartmentalization of knowledge, and decentralized logistics mean that removing a leader tends to produce quick, operational continuity rather than paralysis. Second, symbolism and mobilization: assassinations can be repackaged as martyrdom, bolstering elite cohesion and popular support at least in the short term. Third, misdirected measurement: Western media and officials interpret leadership targeting as a strategic lever without acknowledging that tactical successes can have negative strategic effects—alienating neutral states, strengthening hardliners, and providing rallying points for recruitment and alliance formation. The participants in the conversation repeatedly returned to these themes, arguing that decapitation often becomes a substitute for a coherent strategy rather than a component of one. ## Iran’s strategic resilience and the costs of underestimation The discussion also underscored Iran’s capacity to absorb shocks. Its commanders and political class have long anticipated targeted violence. This anticipation manifests in hardened dispersal, institutional depth, and integrated proxy networks that distribute risk. The conversation made an important point: Iran is not Lebanon or Syria; it is territorially vast, institutionally embedded, and prepared to endure and retaliate in ways that render superficial strikes ineffective. Underestimation by foreign powers has concrete costs. The speakers argued that both the United States and Israel misread Iranian resilience and miscalculated the limits of coercive force. Tactical airstrikes that remove specific figures do not meaningfully reduce missile inventories, degrade dispersed launch capabilities, or eliminate proxy coordination across a theater of operations. Instead, they can provoke stepped‑up retaliatory campaigns—ballistic missile barrages, drone swarms, and attacks on commercial interests—which erode defensive cushions and expose allies and neutral states to collateral pressure. In short, misapprehending Iran’s strategic depth invites escalation that can be far costlier than the ostensible gains of a decapitation strike. ## Regional escalation and the constraints on coalition building A recurring theme in the exchange was the political difficulty of constructing a durable anti‑Iran coalition. Efforts to internationalize confrontation—through ship patrols in the Strait of Hormuz or multi‑national naval escorts—run into predictable limits. Europe’s cautious posture, the reticence of many African and Asian governments to be drawn into direct confrontation, and the unwillingness of some Gulf states to swap security ties for economic risk all constrict the appetite for kinetic expansion. This fragmentation matters because a coalition’s breadth shapes deterrence credibility and conflict management options. Isolated policy decisions by a single government or a small club of allies can force adversaries into asymmetric counters—attacking commercial infrastructure, leveraging energy exports, or using proxies to stretch the conflict laterally. The conversation pointed to the ironies of coalition politics: while the initiators of a conflict may expect broad international cover, they often find themselves shouldering the brunt of escalation when partners balk. The result is strategic overreach and, potentially, an attritional campaign that erodes domestic political support at home. ## Domestic fault lines: political fragility in Israel and the United States Beyond battlefield dynamics, the exchange stressed the political vulnerabilities inside the states most actively involved. Israel, despite its military prowess, faces acute fissures: social inequality, ethnic stratification, and a fragile coalition politics that predate the current crisis. The conversation suggested that protracted conflict is likelier to spark internal unrest in Israel—street protests, political fragmentation, and a legitimacy crisis—than to topple the Iranian state. The moral and reputational costs of sustained civilian casualties only amplify these pressures, eroding external sympathy and fueling domestic dissent. The United States presents its own set of vulnerabilities. The dialogue highlighted how partisan polarization and crumbling trust in traditional media outlets reshape how foreign policy is debated and implemented. Political actors with deep ideological ties to allied states—combined with a transactional, personality‑driven leadership—can drive policy toward short‑term theatrics rather than steady, deliberative strategy. This dynamic creates a feedback loop: impulsive, spectacle‑driven actions demand more spectacle to justify themselves, while the erosion of bipartisan consensus undercuts long‑term policy stability. The result is a foreign policy that risks sudden escalation without the domestic scaffolding to manage the consequences. ## Information warfare, narrative breakdowns, and the role of AI The conversation also turned to the information environment surrounding modern conflict. Claims and counterclaims—assassinations, wounded leaders, refugee flows—circulate in a media landscape saturated with disinformation and deepfakes. One participant quipped that a false report could easily be followed by an AI‑generated video of a targeted leader having coffee; this is not satire so much as prophecy. As technology democratizes the ability to manufacture plausible illusions, the fog of war becomes more lethal: policymakers may base irreversible decisions on fabrications, publics may galvanize around falsehoods, and adversaries may exploit these distortions to shape outcomes without kinetic exchange. Media institutions are not immune. The conversation noted an erosion of gatekeeping authority: outlets that once set the agenda now compete with social platforms, partisan channels, and foreign actors who weaponize narrative. This fragmentation has geopolitical consequences. When populations distrust mainstream reporting, policy elites face two options—retreat into technocratic secrecy or double down on rhetorical spectacle to reassure skeptical constituencies—neither of which enhances strategic clarity. ## Scenar

Iran War Update With Prof Michael Rossi A Live Stream with Prof. Michael Rossi. #Pascal And we are live. Hello to everybody around the world who is watching—or not watching yet. My name is Pascal Lottaz. I'm an associate professor at Kyoto University, and I'm joined today again by Dr. Michael Rossi. That's, of course, Michael Rossi from the YouTube channel PoliSci. Michael, welcome back. #Michael Rossi Pascal, good to see you once again. Good evening on the Tokyo side—it's morning here in New York. I'm actually at my office at Fordham University up in the Bronx. So, good to see you once again. And I guess we're leading off with some news hot off the wire, right? #Pascal Yeah, yeah, because we just got, about two hours ago, the news that Israel claims it has killed Ali Larijani, the head of Iran's security service. One of the offices responsible—I mean, it's a main coordinating office—and he's one of the leading figures now after the death of Ayatollah Khamenei. And what... what do you know about this affair so far? Do we have any confirmation from Iran? Nothing yet. #Michael Rossi Nothing yet. However, you know, when we spoke maybe about two weeks ago with Ambassador Chas Freeman, we were also leading the conversation with the rumors that Khamenei was killed. And I had said that, unless there was confirmation from Iran, I'd take everything with a grain of salt. The thing we realized is that Khamenei was killed, and it was denied by the Iranian government for at least 24 hours. So, in this case, we also have to proceed with caution. But if Israel is going to claim that Larijani is dead—like before with Khamenei—that is a very, very bold statement to make if it’s not true. So at this point, if they’re going to release this information, unless things change, we’re simply waiting for Iran to confirm it. But if that is the case, then that’s a major blow against the IRGC—the group that really runs the country. Not the theocrats, not the clerics, not any ayatollahs, but really the Revolutionary Guard Council. So this would be a significant piece of information. #Pascal -- 1 of 16 -- Yeah, so this is what the Guardian is putting out, and I just want to give you a few clippings of how this is being portrayed. Here they’re quoting Mr. Israel Katz, right? The commander, the general commander of the Israeli forces, is saying that Larijani and Basij—so another person—were eliminated overnight and have joined the head of the annihilation program, Khamenei, and all the eliminated members of the “Axis of Evil” in the depths of hell. I mean, obviously a very spiteful and horrible comment to make, but again, they’re aiming for the head—for the leadership, right? And apparently Israel is still pursuing decapitation strikes, still thinking this will get them somewhere. Although, if Iran has shown one thing over the last two or three weeks, it’s that even if you kill their leadership, the next ranks keep coming through. But they’re still going after the leadership. What are your thoughts on that? Because the strategy—well, obviously, the Iranians, sorry to jump in, but the Iranians are trying to make the point that decapitation strikes against them don’t work. The missiles won’t stop flying because the system has been set up to cope with exactly that. #Michael Rossi Yes, this is effective. Well, one thing is that, you know, we may very well see an AI-generated video of Larijani buying coffee in some Tehran coffee shop as well. #Pascal You know, can you expand on that reference a little bit? Because it’s about the rumor that Netanyahu is dead, right? Yes. #Michael Rossi So, I mean, we still haven’t confirmed where he is. In all likelihood, he’s either in a bunker—either in Israel or, more likely, in Germany. If you remember, his plane was circling over the eastern Mediterranean for about four hours until it found safe haven in Germany. No surprise there. But, you know, to get back to this idea of trying to gain leverage in the war by decapitating its leadership— Iran has proven itself to be incredibly durable in this. They know it. They’ve prepared for it. If Israel has been gearing up for a major conflict with Iran for years, if not decades, Iran knows that. And they’ve especially learned from the twelve-day war last year. So that is, you get rid of the leader at the top, and there will be somebody to immediately replace them from below. It’s also not going to sit well with the Iranian people. Remember, the United States and Israel still say that they stand with the Iranian people—while they’re bombing children’s homes, schools, apartments, civilian targets, and other places like that. So, in this regard, I think that if Israel has the ability to take out the commanders—whether it’s Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, or wherever—they’re going to do that. But none of these organizations, none of these governments, crack. None of them capitulate. In fact, all it does is drag the country further into conflict. -- 2 of 16 -- But one thing we talked about last time—and this is something I’m now absolutely certain of—is that Israel and the United States are not going to suddenly give up and go home. They’re not. They’re in it. They’ve been dragged into this, and they’re going to pursue a scorched-earth policy before they realize they’ve overplayed their hand. And I think this is really the second thing we can talk about now that we’re, what, two or three weeks into this conflict. Both the United States and Israel grossly underestimated the will involved in engaging with a country like Iran. This is not Lebanon. This is not Syria. This is not a country where you can just lob a missile, the country cries uncle, and suddenly you get your way. #Pascal And I just want to point out one thing. One of our viewers wrote a comment saying, “Oh, Iranian here, I’m afraid I disagree—Professor Ali Larijani was never an official part of the IRGC.” So, just for everybody: Iran is a highly complex political construct. And if that’s the case, apologies that we misspoke, because Iran is highly complex. But Larijani is one of the major political figures who was also, I’m pretty sure this is true, the chief negotiator during the JCPOA—the nuclear deal negotiations and so on. He’s been in the Iranian top leadership for a while, just to put that out there. And, you know, he’s also a man who, just like Ayatollah Khamenei, was not afraid of dying. One of the last appearances we know of was at the Quds Day march in Tehran. He was in the crowd with people, and they even broadcast that. It was clear—Khamenei actually said, “I’m going to stay in my house. I’m not going to hide in a bunker.” People on my channel have pointed that out before, that the leadership expects to be targeted and deals with that not as something to fear, but as something to work with. And this, of course, completely changes the calculation. And of course, in my view, our media is getting that quite wrong at the moment, because, I mean, here in this article from The Guardian, they’re writing that, oh, if Larijani is actually dead, it would be a devastating blow to the regime and to the entire war-making capacity of Iran. And I just don’t think that’s the case. This is wishful thinking again from the West. And this is not to downplay the— uh—the seriousness of a potential strike on another one of the leaders of Iran, but just to say that the entire system is built in a way to actually absorb this. Because it was utterly clear that they would do this, and in a sense, it might even be more of a sign of desperation—that, in order to have something to show, to have achieved, you just kill individuals instead of going after real military targets. #Michael Rossi This is actually one way of looking at it as well. I don't want to say that they just came up with killing Larijani off the cuff here. I would imagine this has been part of the main military strategy for both the United States and Israel. But leading into this—and, you know, waking up this morning and reading the news that's coming in—not from Western sources, because they want you to believe that Iran is about ready to crack—but it's been a couple of embarrassing days for the United States -- 3 of 16 -- and Israel. Tel Aviv continues to be hammered by Iranian missiles and drones, so the Iron Dome has been completely shattered. Netanyahu has now missed two of his national security briefings, which kind of drives the idea that if he's not dead, he's either in hiding or significantly injured. And we’ve also heard stories. They haven’t been confirmed yet—whether some of the more reprehensible members of the Israeli Knesset, like Ben-Gvir, are dead or wounded. Bezalel Smotrich’s son has apparently been injured in Lebanon. Israel is gearing up for a full-on ground invasion there, and right now we’re hearing reports of Israeli army contingents being ambushed. They’re not having as easy a time as they thought they would. Ultimately, what this boils down to is that you can’t win a war just by lobbing ballistic missiles from hundreds, if not thousands, of kilometers away. If you want to achieve victory, you need boots on the ground. This is something Trump keeps talking about doing with Iran. But in my opinion—and I don’t know, this is just how I see it—either Trump is becoming, or he’s always been, laughably delusional. I think at this point it's almost clinically delusional. And I don't know whether this is just his own ego and collapsing narcissism forcing him to sound defiant, or whether he’s being given misinformation by the people around him simply to put up some show of defiance and strength. But, you know, we hear about how he failed to get NATO to respond to engaging with or opening up the Strait of Hormuz. We hear that his closest allies—the UK, France, and Germany—aren’t committing any of their naval forces to the Strait of Hormuz. I kind of joked a couple of days ago that he can always rely on the three Baltic republics, Ukraine, and possibly Kosovo, because those are the five that will do whatever the United States says for brownie points. Estonia actually said that, if need be, they’ll send their ships in. So, you know, look out, Iran, buddy. As far as the EU is concerned, they’ve also said they’re not going to do this. So Trump is isolated—Trump is effectively isolated. Both he and Israel are realizing they’re in this for the long haul. We’ve now heard reports that this war could continue for at least another couple of months. I think at one point someone even said it could go until September. And what is that going to produce in terms of war attrition, fatigue, a drain on the economy? Because, as we’ve noticed, the United States and Israel do a very good job with these high-profile targetings, right? Whether it’s Ayatollah Khamenei, whether a couple of years ago it was Soleimani, and now today it’s allegedly Larejani. I’m going to, at this point, just assume that that’s the case—unless otherwise. I'm just going to take that more so as I'm willing to lean on that, because if Israel is saying they need a victory, it would be even more pathetic if all of a sudden he appeared and said, “No, no, I’m still alive.” But while this is happening, Iran is also hammering away at the Gulf states and forcing them to either completely abandon their alliances—their government alliances—with Washington and Tel Aviv, halt the production of oil, and effectively create huge ripple effects in the global economy. -- 4 of 16 -- This is something that Trump cannot afford, especially as we’re going into the midterm elections very soon. His popularity is very low, particularly among a vocal number of erstwhile MAGA supporters who now feel absolutely betrayed. #Pascal Right. I mean, the whole political scene in the United States, of course, really baffles me—that after all the peace talk, after being the president who incorporated the Board of Peace and made it a U.N. Security Council–mandated policy. I think he even got the