They Never Wanted Peace: How US Channels Warfare Through Vassals | Evarist Bartolo

## Introduction The dream of a "Common European Home" promised an end to zero-sum calculations across the continent—a security architecture built on mutual recognition instead of domination. That dream, as the conversation with Evarist Bartolo makes clear, did not simply ebb away because of inevitable geopolitical friction; it was actively undermined by choices and institutions that channel power in a particular direction. The central argument emerging from the exchange is stark: the United States, operating through the NATO alliance and a compliant European policy apparatus, has systematically privileged military primacy and managed European autonomy in ways that steer the continent away from cooperative security and toward confrontation. What follows is an analysis of how that process unfolded, why diplomacy has been marginalized, and what lessons history still offers for coexistence in a multipolar world. ## Why the 'Common European Home' Failed The window for building a genuinely inclusive European security order opened with the Soviet Union’s leadership in the late 1980s. The phrase "common home" captured the possibility of a continental architecture that would prevent any party’s security from being achieved at the expense of another. Yet, according to the conversation, from the outset that vision met resistance—not primarily from on-the-record debates, but within confidential diplomatic channels and strategic calculations. Declassified documents reveal a U.S. posture that favored NATO as the principal guarantor of European order and relegated the OSCE and other multilateral frameworks to secondary status. This was not merely an issue of divergent visions. It was a consequential policy choice: when one actor assumes unipolar dominance, the incentives are to entrench alliances that preserve that dominance rather than cede room to genuinely multilateral mechanisms. The conversation highlights how early U.S. policymakers viewed a strong, strategically autonomous Europe with suspicion, preferring an EU that would complement NATO rather than challenge it. In practice, that meant that opportunities to institutionalize mutual reassurance—through economic interdependence, enduring diplomatic routines, and cultural exchange—were squandered in favor of arrangements that kept military capability and decision-making centralized within an Atlanticist framework. ## "Let's Fight It Out": How NATO Dominates EU Foreign Policy One of the most disturbing insights from the exchange is how porous the boundary between NATO and EU decision-making has become. Council meetings that should have been arenas for sober diplomacy increasingly resembled ad hoc extensions of NATO’s agenda. Ministers who meet under the EU umbrella often convene—as part of overlapping routines—within a NATO context, and that close coordination can convert NATO positions into EU policy with minimal scrutiny. The mechanics are simple and powerful: informal NATO breakfasts, overlapping personnel careers, and an entrenched reflex to coordinate policy in advance mean that the EU often plays second fiddle. This structural dominance has two consequences. First, the EU’s policymaking processes are primed to adopt military-first responses; second, the space for independent European strategic judgment—what many call "strategic autonomy"—is narrowed in practice. The conversation recounts high-level moments when the language within EU councils shifted from diplomacy to combative posturing: not just preparedness for conflict, but an appetite to let conflicts play out to achieve strategic ends. That disposition turned diplomatic forums that once sought de-escalation into echo chambers for escalation. ## The Generational Shift Away From Diplomacy A recurrent theme is the changing memory and moral economy of leaders. The generation that built post-war cooperative institutions was shaped by vivid, lived memories of the destruction wrought by total war. Their firsthand experience made diplomacy a visceral priority. Successive generations, raised in relative peace and prosperity, inherited the systems without the same emotional attachment and - crucially - without the same fear of large-scale violence. The result is an intellectual and ethical drift: diplomacy becomes a toolbox for crisis management rather than the primary instrument of prevention. This generational gap has practical consequences. Younger foreign ministers and political leaders, the conversation suggests, speak of war with a rhetorical casualness that would have been shocking to their predecessors. Where statesmen once prized back-channel engagement and patient bargaining—exemplified by crises such as the Cuban Missile impasse—many contemporary leaders show a preference for coercive measures and spectacle. The institutional cultures of ministries and blocs have ossified around this new normal, and training pipelines produce diplomats more comfortable with public posturing than with the painstaking practice of face-to-face problem-solving. Short of re-inserting diplomatic craft into daily foreign-policy life, the region risks normalizing cycles of brinkmanship. ## US Belligerence in a Multipolar World The conversation frames recent Western policy as dangerously out of sync with an increasingly multipolar world. Sanctions regimes, military posturing, and attempts to isolate geopolitical rivals proceeded on the assumption that punitive measures could reorder global alignments. Yet sanctions do not untether states from potential allies: rather, they make realignments—to China, India, or other regional actors—far more likely. Policymakers who assumed Russia would be passive neglected the incentives that push it toward alternative partnerships. Seen through this lens, U.S. strategy appears as a form of managed confrontation: channeling pressure through allied governments and institutions to produce desired outcomes without accepting the diplomatic give-and-take that meaningful cooperation requires. The result is structural belligerence—an insistence on punishment and deterrence backed by alliances and military reach, even when diplomacy could have produced more durable outcomes. What the conversation makes clear is that this posture has limits: it generates short-term tactical gains but long-term strategic costs in the form of fragmentation, arms competition, and a world that is steadily less amenable to cooperative problem-solving. ## Is the Problem with the Leaders or the System? Pinpointing blame to individuals is tempting but ultimately inadequate. The exchange argues that the pathologies of contemporary foreign policy are as much systemic as they are personal. Yes, particular leaders may exacerbate tensions through rhetoric or impulsive decisions; but those impulses are channeled and amplified by institutional arrangements that privilege military coordination, foster personnel overlap between alliances and institutions, and normalize pre-emptive punitive measures. The EU’s institutional architecture, as interpreted in the conversation, lacks the integrative mechanisms needed to align economic, diplomatic, and security policy. Decisions on sanctions, defence procurement, and diplomatic outreach often emerge from siloed deliberations, producing incoherent strategies that are reactive rather than strategic. NATO’s dominance, reinforced by informal practices and career pathways that traverse both NATO and EU institutions, further biases outcomes toward confrontation. Changing leaders may produce short-term variation, but without institutional reform that recalibrates incentives and re-establishes diplomatic primacy, similar dynamics will reassert themselves. ## Lessons from History & Hopes for Coexistence History offers both warning and remedy. The same period that brought terrifying conflict also generated creative structures for peace: institutions grounded in repeated engagement, mutual economic dependence, and the cultivation o

They Never Wanted Peace: How US Channels Warfare Through Vassals Why did the 1990s dream of a 'Common European Home' fail so spectacularly? How did the promise of cooperative security give way to today's escalating confrontations? To find answers, today I’m talking again to Evarist Bartolo, a former Foreign Minister of Malta. Evarist recently wrote an article about this very “Mirage of the Common Home” and how the United States has always opposed a pan-European security structure. This and the Euro-American relationship is what we want to discuss today. Drawing from his direct experience, Evarist shares stunning accounts from inside EU Council meetings where fighting was favored over talking. We explore the structural dominance of NATO, the dangerous loss of diplomatic memory, and the West's belligerent response to an emerging multipolar world. Links: Minister Bartolo's Homepage: https://evaristbartolo.mt Article mentioned in the video: https://timesofmalta.com/article/mirage-common-home.1113920 Another article by Bartolo: https://timesofmalta.com/article/losing-sovereignty.1118300 Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Goods Store: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall.com Timestamps: 00:00:00 Introduction 00:00:41 Why the 'Common European Home' Failed 00:09:34 "Let's Fight It Out": How NATO Dominates EU Foreign Policy 00:20:45 The Generational Shift Away From Diplomacy 00:26:46 US Belligerence in a Multipolar World 00:35:52 Is the Problem with the Leaders or the System? 00:38:43 Lessons from History & Hopes for Coexistence 00:41:51 Where to Find Evarist Bartolo #Pascal Hello, everybody. This is Pascal Lottaz from Literary Studies, and today I'm talking again to Evarist Bartolo, former foreign minister of Malta. Evarist recently wrote an article about the mirage of the common home and about how the United States has always opposed the pan-European security structure. This, and the current behavior of the United States on the world stage, is what we want to discuss today. So, Evarist, welcome back. #Evarist Bartolo Thank you, and thank you for the invitation. #Pascal Thank you very much for sharing your insights again, because I think—you’ve actually observed and worked in this European and Euro-Atlantic foreign policy game for quite a while. Can you maybe tell -- 1 of 12 -- us your thoughts on how it is, and why it is, that although we had the 1990s with this idea of a peace dividend, of a big Europe stretching to Vladivostok, a common home for everybody, we never achieved it? #Evarist Bartolo Well, for a small country like Malta—you know, it's the smallest state in the European Union and one of the smallest in the world—you can imagine how, for us, cooperative security is not an ideological abstraction or discussion. It’s something that small and medium states need. But then we find out that all countries need it, whatever their size, whatever their power. The dream we had goes back to the Gorbachev era, when he used to talk about building a common security home, because that’s the only way different regions can coexist peacefully. I think the idea applies not only to Europe but also to other regions. And I remember when Gorbachev came to Malta in December 1989 to meet Bush—there was already hope that, finally, the divisions in Europe would start healing. And we would go along with the concept he described—let’s build a common security home, as you said, from Portugal to the Soviet Union—so that my security does not threaten your security. Let’s try to build it on the pillars of the economy, diplomacy, culture, and politics. Unfortunately, that did not happen. That did not happen. I spent some time analyzing classified documents, both from Moscow and from Washington, and you can tell there was no belief on the U.S. side that the Organization for Security and Co‑operation in Europe should be the dominant security architecture for Europe. For the U.S., it was very clear, even if they didn’t always say it out loud. They did say it in bilateral meetings, which were still confidential at the time but have now come to light because of the declassified documents. For them, number one was NATO; number two was the European Union—as long as it stayed within the framework of NATO, not a European Union with strategic autonomy. Kissinger, way back in the ’70s, used to say, “We do not want Europe to grow into a giant. It must remain divided dwarfs, so that the dwarfs will fight against each other.” But at the same time, it had to be contained within a framework. So, as I said, the number two policy for Europe was the European Union. Number three, as a very poor relative, came the OSCE. And I can mention some particular moments that really struck me while going through these documents. When Bush invited Helmut Kohl to a discussion at Camp David, he told him, “Don’t bring Hans‑Dietrich Genscher with you,” because Hans‑Dietrich Genscher was one of the few voices still saying, “We must have a common security architecture for Europe. We must build on the CSCE,” which this year we should have been celebrating—the 50th anniversary of such an important historical moment. But instead, it was weakened. And right from the very beginning, once they analyzed the fact that Russia—then they started talking about Russia—was defeated, they said, “Let’ s not take seriously their concerns or what they say. After all, they’re too weak to impose their will.” At that moment, when the world shifted from a bipolar world to a unipolar one, there was no awareness—no pause to ask, “Listen, are we sure that at this moment of ultimate dominance, this is going to last forever?” -- 2 of 12 -- Now that we are very strong, we’re in a position to dictate to everyone what they should do. And they tried to dictate to the Soviet Union too—starting with Gorbachev, telling him, “You’re so nice, these ideas are so good,” but then doing the opposite. The same with Yeltsin. You read the letters he used to send to Clinton, for example, pleading, “You are making me humiliate Russia. This is impossible. If you keep growing NATO toward our territories, this is going to be a big problem for me. How am I going to sell it to my country?” Because they felt that, you know—and from the U.S. side, when they talked among themselves, and we see it in these documents—they said, “Listen, ultimately we’re talking with a defeated power, so they have to accept what we do.” And then summit after summit after summit—though even from the United States, you had diplomats, even within the State Department, saying, “Listen, if this keeps growing, the Russian Federation is seeing it as a threat.” And then especially when it comes to Ukraine—Ukraine was the ultimate red line that would not be allowed to be crossed. They were aware of it beforehand but still believed they were in a position to impose their will. By the time 2013–2014 came along, Russia had already started reviving economically and militarily and did not want to be dominated or dictated to, as in the period between 1989 and 2014. At the famous Munich Security Conference, Putin said there must also be—he didn’t use the poetic language of a “common home,” but he was talking about—a cooperative security architecture. I mean, let's not forget that even before Putin—Putin himself had said, “If you are proposing NATO instead of the OSCE, then we’ll join NATO.” You know, this was actually said. But no, no, no—of course not. “We’re not going to let you join NATO,” which then again projects NATO as an operation that is a threat to the OSCE, to the Russian Federation. It’s very sad, because things could have been different. Things could have been done in a way to avoid the present tragedy. And I remember one of the last meetings I participated in at the Foreign Affairs Council in Brussels. And, you know, hearing minister after minister, EU officials still not taking Russia seriously—still believing that Russia was going to collapse because of the economic sanctions, that their military was making a lot of strategic errors, that they were very weak, and that they had retreated from Kyiv—all this was interpreted as a sign of weakness. “Let us now decide things on the battlefield.” I remember, and this was not in the Council of Security Ministers; this was the Council of Foreign Affairs, where, as diplomats, we should be resorting to diplomacy and talking. And one thing, Pascal, that was really striking: “Let’s not talk to the Russians. Not even talk to the Russians. Not talk, not agree, not even talk.” #Pascal I just need to ask again—you were foreign minister until June 2022, right? #Evarist Bartolo -- 3 of 12 -- Yes, until June 2022. The military operation had actually started in March, Pascal. #Pascal We were in a meeting of EU foreign ministers where people actually said, “Let’s fight it out. We have to push the Russians to fight. Let’s fight it out.” #Evarist Bartolo Yes, yes. And I will remember, I will always remember, Pascal, that towards the end—we’re talking now January 2022 and February 2022—it started becoming impossible to distinguish between a Council of Ministers of NATO and the Council of Ministers of the EU. Not only because Blinken was coming regularly, but also because of trust. #Pascal Can you quickly explain the two structures? Because not everybody knows what these councils are. Could you just explain them? #Evarist Bartolo Yes. Obviously, when we're talking about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, it has its own Council of Ministers, which is open only to members of the NATO alliance. There are some observers they like to bring along, but that’s under U.S. command. It’s separate, although it’s also in Brussels— which is interesting, because they’re neighbors, you know. Then there’s the Council of Ministers of the European Union, which is attended only by the 27 member states. At that time, there were still a number of neutral countries—Finland, Sweden was still neutral, Austria, Malta, and Ireland. But still, it wasn’t on. Sorry, Pascal, it wasn’t like a NATO council. There was no distinction. There was no distinction. Or, listen, that’s apart from the fact that ministers are intertwined with the structure, because you can go from being the prime minister of the Netherlands to the secretary general of NATO. So it’s incestuous—totally. It has become totally incestuous. #Pascal Yeah, but you know, this is really, really something important that a lot of people aren’t aware of, right? So the Council of Foreign Ministers means the foreign ministers of NATO countries. One day they meet at NATO headquarters in Brussels, and then the next day the same group of people—plus you, plus a few other neutrals—meet again on the premises of the EU. And obviously, they carry on the same discussions, right? Yes. And NATO then influences the discussion inside the EU. #Evarist Bartolo -- 4 of 12 -- Yes, and what’s interesting is that it’s done in a very concrete way. The NATO ministers meet informally for breakfast, and after breakfast, they come to the Foreign Affairs Council. I remember talking to colleagues—you know, once you gain people’s trust. I won’t mention his name, but he was from a very powerful NATO member state, actually one with one of the strongest armies now, apart from Russia and Ukraine. For example, he told me, “We discussed that the French minister said they’ re moving out of Mali.” And I said, “Oh, that’s very, very wise.” He looked at me, shocked. I said, “As usual, we’re abandoning Africa, and then we’re surprised when other great and medium powers fill that space.” So they used to have a meeting there to coordinate their position. Then obviously they would be—let me see, I think 22, no? Twenty-two out of 27 members were in NATO. And there was no doubt that the EU, as intended in American diplomacy and foreign policy, played second fiddle to NATO and was seen as a policy tool of NATO. And although, you know, we are supporting the