Europe Self-Destructs in the Name of "Security" | Dr. Biljana Vankovska

## Europe’s security fever and a self-destructive trajectory Europe today is caught in a paradox: a continent that once sold unity as peace now measures worth through military alignments and arms purchases. The conversation with Dr. Biljana Vankovska frames this as more than bureaucratic drift or policy incoherence; it is a systemic tilt that makes Europe dangerous by rendering its decisions irrational. The drive to be geopolitically relevant has pushed European states to prioritize the language and instruments of security—bases, weapons, and alliance expansion—over the slower, messier work of building resilient societies, healing post-conflict wounds, and deepening economic and institutional ties. That choice, the speakers argue, risks turning a project meant to contain violence into one that reproduces it. The argument is not simply that Europe is rearming; it is that the politics of security have become performative and transactional. When policy is steered less by coherent strategy than by a fear of irrelevance, governments adopt measures that produce short-term signaling rather than long-term stability. This dynamic has consequences both for external relations—how Europe deals with Russia, the Balkans, and beyond—and for internal cohesion, where promises of welfare and democratic integration are increasingly subordinated to military logic. ## The price of independence: North Macedonia’s fraught birth North Macedonia’s post-Yugoslav path is a small-case study in how great-power priorities shape the lives of small nations. The republic declared independence early in the Yugoslav dissolution and managed what many called an “oasis of peace” amid regional violence. But formal independence did not mean full sovereignty in practice. External actors quickly shaped the terms of Macedonia’s international identity: Greece’s vetoes over the country’s name, the UN’s imposition of a provisional label, and long negotiations over identity highlighted how international institutions and neighboring states can impose identity costs on newly independent polities. Dr. Vankovska’s account emphasizes how these identity disputes were less about practical threats and more about leverage and historical grievances. A small, disarmed Macedonia was portrayed as a security risk to Greece—an argument that required extraordinary rhetorical and institutional contortions. The result was a long-running political trauma: generations of Macedonians negotiating name and legitimacy with a neighbor while being coached by external powers on the “right” path to integration. What stands out is the mismatch between the lived needs of Macedonian citizens—economic recovery, social reconstruction, reconciliation—and the foreign script they were asked to follow. Western entrants to the region projected that NATO membership, and then EU accession, would solve many of these problems. That projection became a political imperative that shaped domestic choices in ways that, in hindsight, were counterproductive. ## Colorful revolutions and the pattern of external intervention Events that look spontaneous at street level often sit on templates. The so-called Colorful Revolution in Macedonia and Euromaidan in Ukraine illustrate how social mobilizations, domestic grievances, and external funding/encouragement can mesh into rapid political change. The conversation identifies repeated elements: student protests that evolve into broader political contests, civil society energy channeled by political actors, and international actors—diplomats, NGOs, and sometimes intelligence-linked organizations—playing outsized roles. Dr. Vankovska draws a clear throughline: when governments diverge from the policy preferences of influential external patrons—by seeking closer ties with Russia, China or diversifying energy routes, for instance—they became targets for domestic pressure supported from abroad. The Macedonian example suggests that geopolitical alignment, not solely democratic deficits, can be a primary driver for regime change campaigns. The “textbook” features of such interventions—messaging, leadership cultivation, and pressure—repeat across contexts, often with predictable outcomes that substitute regime turnover for durable institutional reform. That pattern raises normative questions about sovereignty and justice. Even when a targeted government bears legitimate responsibility for corruption or authoritarian practices, the conversation warns against mistaking externally driven overthrow for democratic renewal. The mechanisms used to induce political change often create new dependencies and reshape domestic politics in ways that amplify polarization rather than solve root problems. ## NATO and the illusion of security for small states The narrative that NATO membership is a passport to modernity and EU accession has been particularly powerful in Balkan politics. Yet the Macedonian experience exposes the costs of treating military alignment as the primary route to modernization. The “there-is-no-alternative” framing drove elites to adopt policies directed less at economic reconstruction or social healing and more at meeting the criteria and expectations of external security patrons. Even when the goal was to close a geopolitical puzzle—filling the Balkans with NATO members to create a consistent bloc—the benefits for a impoverished small state were ambiguous. NATO accession did not make Macedonia a strategic heavyweight; it made it a consumer of military hardware and a node in broader strategic competition. As Dr. Vankovska points out, the logic shifts from “we are protected” to “we must buy security,” turning scarce public resources toward arms and procurement. The irony is stark: in the name of security, countries impoverished by transition spend on weapons rather than welfare, deepening social strains that could threaten the very stability those purchases were meant to secure. This transactional relationship is magnified by partner states’ priorities. Great powers and alliances often value political alignment and territory more than democratic quality. For smaller states the calculus becomes: conform to external strategic designs, even if it costs crucial autonomy and social investment. In the long term, that trade-off can undermine resilience, creating security through dependence rather than capability. ## Consociational politics, domestic fragility, and the limits of imposed models One of the conversation’s most striking points is how peace deals and external mediation can create institutional forms with paradoxical effects. The consociational arrangements imposed after Macedonia’s 2001 conflict—meant to bind ethnic communities together and prevent renewed violence—produced a hybrid system in which coalition-making became almost automatic and ethno-political vetoes entrenched. On paper, power-sharing prevents exclusion. In practice, it can freeze politics, empower elites, and limit accountability. Macedonia’s consociational reality is a double-edged sword. It keeps a fragile peace by guaranteeing representation, but it also makes swift political change difficult and encourages transactional politics where external actors can mobilize one side to block the other. Such systems are particularly vulnerable to external meddling precisely because domestic coalitions are delicate and the cost of exclusion seems existential. Policymaking becomes less about public goods and more about maintaining ethno-political equilibria—which external patrons can exploit. The wider lesson is that institutional engineering from the outside—the design of constitutions, mandated coalition rules, and peacekeeping frameworks—must be attuned to local dynamics. Without local ownership and investment in long-term social reconstruction, peace arrangements can calcify into rigidities that external actors then leverage for geopolitical ends. ## What Europe sacrifices in the name of security — warnings and choices

Europe Self-Destructs in the Name of "Security" | Dr. Biljana Vankovska Today I’m talking to Dr. Biljana Vankovska, who is a full professor of international relations and peace studies at Ss. Cyril and Methodius University, in Skopje, the capital of North Macedonia. Biljana has been serving on various academic journals such as “Security Dialogues” and “Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies”, and she‘s one of her regions most prominent Voices in international relations, talking and writing about peace and reconciliation for decades. Biljana is also a friend of Jeffrey Sachs who kindly connected the two of us. #F1 I never had any romantic views about the European Union, and I see it as an economic imperial force. At some point in time, they even dreamt of being a global actor, strategically important and all that. Now they are struggling to get out of their irrelevance, and because of that, they are dangerous because they're doing irrational things. #M2 Hello, everybody. This is Pascal from Neutrality Studies, and today I'm talking to Dr. Biljana Vankovska, who's a full professor of international relations and peace studies at St. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje, the capital of Macedonia. Biljana has been serving on various academic journals, such as Security Dialogues and the Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, and she's one of her region's most prominent voices in international relations, talking and writing about peace and reconciliation for decades. Also, let me mention that Biljana is a friend of Jeffrey Sachs, who kindly connected the two of us. Biljana, welcome. #F1 Thank you, Pascal, and thanks, Jeff, for getting us in contact. I'm a great fan of your podcast, so I gladly accepted the invitation. I have to mention something else: I usually recommend my students follow the podcast because, through the dialogues you have with your excellent guests, they can learn much more about these changing worlds firsthand through analysis and testimonies. It is much better to learn about international relations today this way than from a book. Nothing can be learned from a book today. #M2 -- 1 of 15 -- Thank you very much. You know, it's quite funny because we're almost back to Socrates, right? Socrates refused to write because he said philosophy happens in discussion. And then, of course, what we have left about him are the books that Plato wrote about him. #F1 Yes, there are good sides to that and bad sides. Yes, you are right. #M2 But let's move to our international relations discussion, because I am really eager to know how North Macedonia views international relations. What's the general perspective? What are the opinions of people around you? Because, of course, your country has a very, very complicated history, even just in the last 30 years, having been part of Yugoslavia and then being the last republic that kind of stuck it out together with Serbia in the early 2000s, and then becoming independent and even changing your name for the sake of joining NATO—something that Serbia would never even dream about. Can you give us maybe an overview of what is going on in North Macedonia right now, especially looking at Russia and Ukraine? And how do you interpret the development of Macedonian international relations? #F1 To correct you, at the beginning, Macedonia gained independence in 1991, rather soon after the outbreak of the conflict in Slovenia and Croatia, in September of that year. Macedonia declared independence. #M2 Sorry, I confused it with Montenegro. My apologies. Yes, Macedonia. #F1 No problem. No problem. The whole region is so complex that I know it is hard to explain. Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and then Kosovo, of course, is a special case. So, yes, I really appreciate this opportunity to talk about a very tiny country in the south of what used to be Yugoslavia. And this was a unique case at the time because even the so-called international community called us an oasis of peace because we were the only former Yugoslav Republic to separate from the rest by peaceful means. So no bloodshed, no casualties, no destruction whatsoever. But, of course, each of these separate parts of what was once Yugoslavia had their internal problems. -- 2 of 15 -- And for the first time ever, we had to deal with them without Belgrade, the central government, to really practice independence. It was easy to draft a constitution, copy-pasting from some Western models, but we all know as social scientists that it takes time to make institutions work, to really find what works in your environment and what doesn't, because you cannot just parachute democracy somewhere and expect good results. So Macedonia had problems of its own, but the biggest one, to the surprise of many, was the name of the country. And I'm really tired of talking about the name of my country, you know, the struggle. First of all, in the first step to get accepted into the United Nations, we faced the first problem because Greece, as part of the European community, had much higher leverage to interfere in this process. They claimed that small Macedonia, which had no army and was totally disarmed by the Yugoslav army that retreated to fight elsewhere, was a security threat to Greece and Europe. Under that pressure, Macedonia was forced to accept a temporary or provisional name: the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. For many decades, we had to negotiate with our southern neighbor, Greece, over the name and try to preserve our own identity because we don't have any reserved name or way to identify ourselves. And the decision of the UN Security Council was against the UN Charter because they imposed one more condition for accepting the membership of this new country. But, you know, the weak must do what they have to. So that was a very dramatic time, but it is interesting. I'm not going into all this long history, and I say I'm very frustrated even talking about a silly thing like the name of a nation, of a country. What for? It is really something that goes beyond anything we know about serious issues in international relations. But the then leadership of the Macedonian state managed to gain recognition of the constitutional name, the Republic of Macedonia, by 135 states. So we had even the members of the UN Security Council, the top five, that accepted that constitutional name. But still, that was a problem: how to integrate the country into NATO and the European Union. Why was that important? Because the narrative that we accepted, like anybody else in Eastern Europe, in Southeastern Europe, was that there is no other alternative, the TINA principle. So the narrative went, we first have to join NATO, which is nonsense. Of course, anybody knows that one can become an EU member, not necessarily NATO, like Ireland, not to mention other cases. But still, here in this region, the Western powers projected this idea that you have to first join a military alliance and that would ease your path to Brussels, the other Brussels, meaning the European Union. And, of course, the majority of the population would rather see the European Union as, you know, this ideal picture of welfare, a community of democracies, of progress, of human rights, and well- being, and social well-being. Because we were coming from a socialist country, the transition meant total destruction of the social structures, the societal ties, and even the contact with the rest of Yugoslavia. So Macedonia used to be one of the poorest parts of former Yugoslavia and now had to survive all alone as an independent state. So there was this dream, this myth that once we are there in the European Union, everything will be perfect. They're going to take care of us. -- 3 of 15 -- They're going to adopt us as small neighbors, poor neighbors. And, you know, the story goes like that. What I have always found very ridiculous and absurd is that we were talking about a region that just suffered horrific internal and external conflicts: Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo, and all this mess. So why would post-conflict societies want to join a military alliance, rearm themselves, train their militaries, instead of investing in building bridges, healing the wounds, having some economic impetus in development and transitional justice, reconciliation, and all that? But the leadership in almost all countries in the region was on the same line. So Macedonia was following that until, I would say, Washington got really annoyed. Now I'm going to connect the cases of Ukraine and Macedonia. I wonder what is common between these two countries that are not even close to each other in geographic terms and in political terms. Ukraine was part of the former socialist federation of the USSR. We were part of another socialist federation, both on a front line, or this frontier line where great powers had mixed or conflicting interests. But we all know the Euromaidan, the cultural revolution in Ukraine. Very few people know that in the same year, later in the fall of 2014, there was a mass student protest in Macedonia. I was part of it. I supported it as a professor. We even formed something called Student and Professors Plenums, which, now I am making a footnote here, reminds me of what's going on right now in Serbia. The Serbian protests, students are protesting for months nowadays, and the professors joined them with legitimate reasons. I don't doubt that. That was the case here. That is the case in Serbia as well. So we had some legitimate problems in our country, and we continued. We didn't have another way to express the frustration and the need for a new government, for a new way of dealing with things, but by going on the streets. Much later, not much later, but sometime later, I personally, as someone who was a participant in a part of these events, naively believed we were fighting for the autonomy of our university because the government wanted to make some reforms and to put us under state control. But later on, this student protest transformed into a political protest. The then-opposition actually took over the leading part in this social movement. And that was quickly transformed into a colored revolution. In Macedonia, it was called a colorful revolution. Why? Because the first association many would have with Macedonia is the Macedonian salad, found on menus, meaning a fruit salad made with different ingredients. The message is that Macedonian society is not homogeneous. It is made up of different ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups. So the salad describes the country best. That was one message sent: this society, which is so colorful, has stood up against the ruling elite and wants something better. But what was behind that was something that took place in 2008, actually, the NATO Summit of 2008 in Bucharest. And now we all think about the proposals to offer membership ideas or plans for Georgia and Ukraine. Here in Macedonia, we were focused on our membership because then- President Bush Jr. announced a day ahead, "Tomorrow we are going to welcome three new states into our alliance: Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia." The next morning, there was a veto, of course, -- 4 of 15 -- behind closed doors. And the formal announcement was that Macedonia is not welcome as long as the name issue is open. So they should go back to resolve this problem, and then they can get back. #M2 And just a footnote for anyone who hasn't heard about the problem: the problem is that Greece has a region that is also called Macedonia, and the Greeks constantly opposed the naming of Macedonia as a country. They were the ones who said, like, oh, this is just a confusion with our region. Then there was a dispute on whether or not North Macedonia had any claims on Southern Macedonia, and so on. But that's just why Greece always opposed. #F1 It has some other elements. I'm not going deeper into that because there is really an ethnic Macedonian minority in Gre