The Geopolitics Behind FIFA | Dr. Rolando Dromundo

## Politics behind the World Cup The World Cup has long been more than a sporting festival; it is a global stage where states, corporations, and populations project power, prestige, and narratives. The recent tournament underscores this: an expanded 48-team format, high-ticket prices, and complex logistical arrangements have intensified the political stakes. What was presented as a neutral celebration of football instead reveals a mesh of geopolitical calculations — from state image-making and domestic politics to international sanctions and the uneven application of moral standards. The exchange with Dr. Rolando Dromundo makes clear that contemporary mega-events are not detours from geopolitics but arenas where it plays out in concentrated form. Expansion of the tournament is not simply a sporting decision. Adding teams multiplies venues, infrastructure demands, and the scale of state involvement and spending. That enlargement therefore amplifies who benefits and who bears the cost. At the same time, the timing and composition of participants can turn the competition into a mirror of international conflict: teams arrived from countries at war with others, and political tensions — from migration disputes to interstate hostilities — surfaced in the run-up and during the event. These dynamics turn the World Cup into both a reflection and a tool of geopolitical bargaining. ## FIFA, host countries, and public money FIFA proclaims apoliticism even as it depends on the political and financial capacities of host states. The organization’s model pivots on extracting concessions from local governments: tax exemptions, exceptional legal terms, and logistical guarantees that push public money into private-managed events. The conversation highlights a core contradiction—FIFA insists on non-interference in football governance but demands sweeping control over the conditions of hosting, obligating states to underwrite a spectacle that often yields contested public benefits. The United States, with its vast consumer market and corporate sponsorship ecosystem, is the archetypal safe harbor for such a model. Wealthy host states can absorb the costs and translate the event into profitable opportunities for sponsors; poorer countries face harsher trade-offs. The uneven bargaining power surfaces in which cities bid to host and which withdraw — many municipal governments balk at the fiscal commitments FIFA requires. The result is a reallocation of risk: private profit and global branding accrue to FIFA and sponsors, while taxpayers in the host jurisdictions shoulder infrastructure bills, security expenses, and often enduring maintenance liabilities. This dynamic is compounded by the opacity of FIFA’s internal decision-making. Legacy scandals of corruption are not anomalies but symptoms of an institutional architecture lacking robust accountability mechanisms. Without enforceable transparency or external regulation, host negotiations remain heavily tilted toward the priorities of FIFA and its corporate partners. The incentive structure privileges short-term revenue over civic deliberation about long-term development or social equity. ## Russia, Israel, and double standards The conversation raises a pointed critique about uneven applications of sanction and exclusion by international sports bodies. In 2022, FIFA and UEFA moved swiftly to ban Russian participation following the invasion of Ukraine, a decision that mirrored broader Western responses. Yet, as Dr. Rolando and the discussion note, similar punitive logic has not been universally applied — notably, Israel has not faced comparable sporting sanctions despite serious critiques from many quarters about its conduct in conflict zones. This asymmetry is not merely administrative oversight; it illuminates how geopolitical influence, alliances, and normative hierarchies shape whose actions are policed. Sports institutions do not operate on a neutral set of rules applied equally to all members. Instead, the willingness to take measures against a state often depends on that state’s geopolitical weight, the orientation of dominant blocs within sport governance, and the interests of powerful sponsors and national federations. The result is a patchwork of inclusion and exclusion that reflects global power imbalances rather than consistent ethical standards. Furthermore, FIFA’s membership roster itself exemplifies inconsistent recognition practices. Territories and sub-state entities gain or are denied membership for reasons that often diverge from diplomatic or international-law norms. The selective recognition of certain entities while excluding others demonstrates how sports federations can become arenas for identity politics and statecraft, where recognition confers visibility and legitimacy outside the formal channels of diplomacy. ## FIFA as a private power structure 00: 26:53 Can FIFA be reformed? FIFA is legally a private association based in Switzerland, yet it functions with influence reminiscent of sovereign power: dictating terms to states, setting competition rules globally, and negotiating multibillion-dollar commercial contracts. This hybrid status—private in law, public in effect—allows FIFA to claim non-political legitimacy while exercising political leverage. Reforming such an entity would require confronting its embedded discretion and asymmetrical relationships with states and corporations. Is reform feasible? The conversation suggests meaningful change is unlikely without external pressure that alters incentives. Internal reform proposals have historically stumbled against entrenched interests and opaque governance cultures. For reform to stick would require binding transparency measures, external oversight, and enforceable protections for host communities — reforms that would curtail the commercial flexibility that sponsors and power brokers prize. In short, reform is imaginable, but only if accountability mechanisms are institutionalized beyond FIFA’s own structures or if geopolitical shifts change who benefits from the current arrangements. That means international norms and coalitions matter: civil society mobilization, media scrutiny, and collective state action could press FIFA toward greater accountability. But absent a credible, binding regulatory framework — whether through multilateral agreements, coordinated host-state demands, or domestic legal constraints — the incentives for superficial fixes or cosmetic compliance will remain strong. ## Could countries leave FIFA? The idea of states exiting FIFA raises intriguing strategic and symbolic questions. In practice, withdrawing from the global football system would be costly for any country seeking to sustain international sporting ties and soft-power projection. Participation in FIFA competitions confers visibility, national pride, and diplomatic capital. For many regimes, these benefits outweigh the grievances with FIFA’s governance. Moreover, secession from the global sporting order would isolate athletes and reduce international engagement opportunities. That said, the conversation entertains the possibility that a multipolar international order might produce alternative architectures: regional federations with looser ties to FIFA, parallel competitions, or transnational sporting alliances that sidestep Swiss-based governance. However, building such alternatives would require sustained investment and cooperation among a critical mass of states and federations, plus the willingness to forgo the prestige and commercial rewards associated with FIFA events. The political calculus is therefore steep: leaving is a credible protest tactic only under extraordinary circumstances when the political and reputational costs are mobilized and shared broadly. ## Football, identity, and nations Football’s magnetic power lies in its capacity to fuse sport with identity. Nations, regions, and communities invest matches with meanings that exte

The Geopolitics Behind FIFA | Dr. Rolando Dromundo Dr. Rolando Dromundo, political analyst, journalist, and author, discusses the politics behind the FIFA World Cup, FIFA’s power, double standards on sanctions, host-country pressure, public spending, sportswashing, and national identity. The talk also covers Russia, Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the role of states, and whether a changing world order could force reform in global sports. Links: [BOOK] State-Building in the Middle of a Geopolitical Struggle: The Cases of Ukraine, Moldova, and Pridnestrovia: https://www.amazon.com/State-Building-Middle-Geopolitical-Struggle- Pridnestrovia/dp/3838211723 Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Merch: https://neutralitystudies.com/shop Donation: https://neutralitystudies.com/donate Timestamps: 00: 00:00 Introduction 00:00:51 Politics behind the World Cup 00:04:31 FIFA, host countries, and public money 00:11:49 Russia, Israel, and double standards 00:16:54 FIFA as a private power structure 00: 26:53 Can FIFA be reformed? 00:33:07 Could countries leave FIFA? 00:39:44 Football, identity, and nations 00:47:00 Multipolarity and future World Cups 00:51:18 Final thoughts on FIFA power #Pascal Welcome back, everybody, to Neutrality Studies. Today we have Dr. Rolando Drumundo, a political analyst and journalist, and the author of the book *State Building in the Middle of Geopolitical Struggle: The Case of Ukraine, Moldova, and Transnistria*. Today we want to discuss the politics of the ongoing FIFA World Cup. So, Rolando, welcome. #Rolando Dromundo Hello, Pascal. Thank you for having me. It's an honor. #Pascal Thank you very much for reaching out and for actually pitching the idea of doing a talk about FIFA and the World Cup, because the politics behind this is often kind of camouflaged. We are led to believe that this is a sporting event only. But as we've seen in the very way that Donald Trump handled even just the Iran team, it is anything but that. So, Rolando, can you maybe tell us, first and foremost, what is your analysis of the politics behind the World Cup? #Rolando Dromundo Of course, Pascal. Well, first of all, it's a very atypical World Cup. It is the first that has 48 teams. So FIFA decided to enlarge the already big cup that had 32 participants. Now it has 48, which of course -- 1 of 16 -- increases, I mean, everything—the requirements for organizing, the stadiums, and everything. But it's also atypical in the sense that, for instance, at the beginning of the World Cup, you had one country at war against another of the participants, for example. So it's like... Besides that, you have a President of the United States who has been diminishing, harassing, and attacking his neighbors, playing with the idea of Canada as a 51st state, and until some weeks before, they were speculating about military strikes against Mexico. There has been, obviously, a very aggressive speech all the time against Mexicans. It's written that it represents migration. So all this together, plus, of course, the already very publicized migration policy of the United States that has caused a lot of controversies around the world, makes it a very atypical World Cup. Because besides that, we also have a U.S. president who received something created expressly for this event, which was the FIFA Peace Prize. I mean, it was like FIFA’s way of compensating for the fact that Donald Trump really expected, I mean, the idea that he was going to win somehow the Nobel Peace Prize. And once this was not true, even if you had Corina Machado go to the White House and give her the actual prize and everything, FIFA was in need to appease Donald Trump and created this absurd idea of a FIFA Peace Prize. And you have all this ceremony and Donald Trump smiling like a child, pretending, oh yeah, I'm a hero. And he already, all the time, changes the number of wars he considers he has ended. But altogether, this is part of the political conflict that surrounds the World Cup, of course. And that's why it's very interesting, because you have FIFA that, of course, on one side pretends to say this is an apolitical event, we have nothing to do with it, that there should be no political demonstrations, but on the other side, they are completely engulfed, completely submerged in the logic of giving Donald Trump whatever he wants. And I think that one of the facts that Infantino and Donald Trump agree on a lot of things is because they have this way of doing business in which they don't care whatever the context is. It's only to maximize profit at all levels. And no matter what people say, no matter what the ethical standards may be, no matter what happens. So that's why I think there was a great understanding in that sense. We've seen a lot of issues about the ticket prices, for example. I was just comparing— I had the opportunity to attend the 2006 World Cup in Germany. I paid 70 euros at that time, 70 euros in 2006, for a second-round ticket that was an excellent match in the finals in Leipzig. So compared to that, you see now that you have prices for the final that range up to $11,000. It's completely absurd. So altogether, yes, there are many, many, many facts from which we could approach this one by one, all the political issues related to the World Cup, you know? #Pascal Yeah. So what is your take? I mean, 48 countries is huge. And the sporting events, they've always had political connections. I mean, the Olympic Games, they always have a geopolitical dimension. And even in the ancient past, the ancient Olympic Games had geopolitical connections. I mean, they were famously the moments when even warring parties would have a ceasefire in order to go to the -- 2 of 16 -- games and then compete and go back, right? At least that was the ideal under which they were done. And we see very similar problems today, right? That again, as you pointed out, Iran at war with the United States and then going there, the US actually refusing to host the team, to let it actually sleep and dine on its territory, they're having to go to Mexico. First of all, do you think that feud—that this is tenable for FIFA and for the Olympics and large sporting events to select one of the great powers going forward? And what do you think it is that we are learning from the current FIFA, the way that FIFA is dealing with this when it comes to these large international events? #Rolando Dromundo Well, large international events have always, always throughout history, and not only football, used the United States as a super showcase. It's like the biggest market, the biggest possibility. I mean, if we check the history, for example, of the Olympic Games, the Olympic Games really changed completely in the way they were being organized after Los Angeles '84. That was a moment that completely shifted the conception of what it could mean for business, for corporations, for all the sponsors to organize these games. So that's why FIFA was perfectly aware, and they knew the risk, but they were considering that, I mean, the profit would be a lot more, even though FIFA's image had been damaged a lot. Because it's really... it's not only the ticketing issues and the prices and the abuses that are a lot, but it's also the fact that sometimes the public money spent is a huge, huge investment for other countries. So you compare in Canada, only two cities accepted because Montreal didn't want to invest the huge amount of money required by FIFA. You have FIFA that forces cities to engage in these contracts in which they have tax exemptions, a lot of favors, a lot of clauses regarding the law that have to be adapted to FIFA's pleasure. So you have this institution like FIFA that arrives and makes political agreements without being a political entity or being like a state, let's say. It plays politics, but outside what is the role of the states? #Pascal Hey, just a very quick note. The best way to support this channel is by signing up for my free Substack. You can also help with a paid subscription there, or you can get some of our new merch at neutralitystudies.com. Links below. See you there. #Rolando Dromundo So, the big contradiction of sports... Right now, it's like you have these huge, huge sports organizations that pretend to be apolitical. Well, they need, they live, and they depend mostly on the public spending that is done by the states to organize these events. Because, of course, FIFA wants to determine the rules. FIFA never wants to allow, under any circumstances, that any local -- 3 of 16 -- government interferes in football, because that would be, like, chaos. Each time in history we can see that a country has tried to somehow intervene in sport, immediately FIFA doesn't allow it. But when you have to organize the event, please pay me, no? So therefore the states invest these huge sums of money for the event, which obviously for many countries is not so easy, no? And that's why the fact of organizing in the United States allows this possibility — they always have the money, they always have the resources, they always have the possibility. They can allow themselves to have this huge number of games and sell the tickets to amateurs for more than $1,000 per ticket, and somebody will buy them, because it's something you can allow yourself, as an organizing committee, to do in the United States. And that's why it's so profitable and so attractive for them to do it. And without already considering the sports industry, a part of organizing that event is like, what is your history in this sport? You know, for example, what have you done, what are the results, are you really concerned? Morocco had been trying for years, and with a lot better results in football, to be a host of the World Cup, but they have never been allowed that, because obviously it's different, no? And also the political push, and not to say the showcase that it represents. I mean, at the end, Donald Trump, who likes to be the center of attention, will have a FIFA World Cup and he will have the Olympic Games if he’s still in the presidency in 2028. So that’s why, and this is the main issue, but also the main contradiction — at FIFA, and not only FIFA, the way international sports stand today, they have absolutely no accountability. They have no way of giving any possibility of clarifying or showing any kind of transparency — how they deal with sponsors, how they deal with the real negotiation of how they give the candidacy to any country. At the end, that’s why we have been... Picturing a lot of scandals of corruption in international sport, we remember what happened with Joseph Blatter and Andrew Avelange years ago, but that won't be the last, because there is absolutely no intention of modifying the structures of accountability of how FIFA is played, and there is absolutely no possibility today that states or international organizations may somehow interfere, regulate, control, or limit the power FIFA has now, and especially against small countries. Because if they, with the United States, can find that agreement, imagine when they have to organize events in South Africa, in Brazil, even in Mexico — the capacity of resistance is a lot less for local governments than it could be with a major power. So that's why, and also this idea of creating these three host events to sell the idea that it's more multinational, multicultural, but it's half a fake because the United States has more than 80% of the games. They have all the quarterfinals, all the semifinals, they have the final, they have mostly everything. So you have only two countries added just to say, yeah, it's FIFA unites, football unites. No, but that's a fake, because football unites, but of course Mexican fans cannot go freely to the United States because, I mean, 80% of the Mexican population does not have a U.S. visa. And also, it's part of the contradictions continuously visible in international sports nowaday