New York Times: USA Running All Operational Decisions in Ukraine, Wants More Ukrainians To Die.

## A disclosure that rewrites the story What emerges from the conversation about the New York Times piece is not merely an exposé of tactical cooperation; it is a reframing of the entire conflict’s authorship. The discussion argues that the article marks a shift from portraying the West as an external supporter to admitting a hands-on operational role in a war long described as chiefly Ukrainian. That admission matters beyond journalism: it redraws the boundaries of agency, responsibility, and moral accountability for the human toll on the battlefield. The exchange takes that reframing seriously and interrogates what it means when a leading Western outlet depicts American officers and agencies as the architects of strikes, logistics and escalation decisions — and even as critics when Ukrainians are judged to have sacrificed too little. ## From aid to command: how narrative cushions the vertical integration A central point raised in the conversation is the contrast between how the article frames American involvement and the practical reality it chronicles. On the page the engagement is cast as partnership and mentorship; in practice, the discussion emphasizes, the relationship described is hierarchical and operational. Terms like “kill chain” and depictions of a command hub in Wiesbaden are used to show that much more than materiel was transferred: decisions, targeting information and strategic directives flowed from Western nodes to Ukrainian units. The narrative device of consent — that Ukrainians “asked for” help — softens the appearance of control, but does not alter the essence of what the conversation says is a de facto integration of a national army into a broader coalition apparatus. This is an important semantic point. If the relationship is a partnership, responsibility can be debated and diffused; if it is vertical integration, then the moral and legal burden for operational choices shifts decisively outward from the country whose soldiers carry out orders. The discussion dwells on that distinction because it affects how the public understands casualties, territorial choices and the lines that were or were not crossed in the name of strategic objectives. ## The mechanics of modern coalition warfare The conversation draws attention to how the article describes the mechanics of contemporary conflict. Modern wars are not fought only by uniformed battalions in a single theatre; they are constructed through intelligence sharing, remote targeting, liaison teams, logistics chains and interoperable equipment. The piece under discussion reportedly lays bare how those mechanisms connected a U.S.-led war-management apparatus with Ukrainian execution on the ground. Wiesbaden, Ramstein-type conferences and embedded liaisons are presented as more than symbolic: they are the operational neural network of a war coalition. The speakers use this claim to press a wider conceptual point: our vocabulary for such conflicts is strained. “Proxy” implies substitution, “coalition” implies coordination among equals. What the New York Times account appears to reveal is a hybrid: a coalition in which one member supplies decisive command and targeting functions while another supplies ground forces and manpower. The conversation suggests we need new terms — and new legal and ethical frameworks — for such arrangements, because existing categories blunt the reality of influence and responsibility. ## Hero stories, sanitization, and the manufacturing of consent A recurrent strain in the discussion critiques the article’s rhetorical strategy. The reported narrative constructs heroes: a cadre of Western officers, a few named Ukrainian leaders, and a storyline of technical brilliance and moral rectitude. The conversation challenges this construction as a sanitizing device. By celebrating tactical successes and praising the expertise of foreign officers, the article, the conversation contends, normalizes and aestheticizes militarized intervention. It converts operational decisions that have catastrophic human consequences into an epic of competence and sacrifice. This rhetorical move matters because it shapes public emotion and political latitude. When foreign deaths are treated as metrics of skill and when local deaths are framed as noble sacrifice, democratic oversight and critical debate become harder. The exchange underscores how media narratives that humanize foreign commanders but abstract or exoticize the bodies and families on the ground create consent for policies that might otherwise provoke more skepticism or demand more restraint. ## The moral economy of bodies: complaining about the unwillingness to bleed Perhaps the most disturbing theme the conversation highlights is the article’s alleged portrayal of Ukrainian lives as inputs in a tactical equation. The discussion is especially sharp on reported passages that suggest frustration in Western quarters that Ukrainians were not mobilizing sufficiently — that younger conscripts ought to be put “in the game.” That language, the conversation argues, reduces citizens to expendable instruments of grand strategy and reveals a brutal calculus at the heart of coalition command: territorial or tactical gains justified by human costs borne disproportionately by one state’s population. This is where questions of sovereignty and dignity come to the fore. The conversation frames such passages as an affront to the notion that decisions involving life, death and national fate are inherently sovereign choices. When external commanders are depicted urging foreign leaders to mobilize their youth and then lamenting their refusal, the moral asymmetry becomes stark. The speakers in the exchange use this to interrogate the ethics of asking — and expecting — one people to sustain the attrition necessary for another’s strategic aims. ## Escalation, omitted contexts, and the politics of red lines Another strand of the conversation probes what the article leaves out or minimizes. According to the exchange, the published narrative reportedly downplays or elides Russian strategic aims post-2022 — especially the shift toward an attritional approach and the targeting of NATO-related infrastructure. The discussants argue that omitting that context flattens the logic of escalation and misrepresents the risk calculus that policymakers claimed to be balancing. The conversation also scrutinizes admissions that targeting into Russian territory and deeper strikes were enabled by Western intelligence. That admission, as the speakers note, reframes debates about red lines, extension and deterrence. If a coalition’s capabilities are used to strike beyond a defensive perimeter, questions arise about who defines the threshold of unacceptable escalation and who is accountable for the consequences. The conversation treats this as more than procedural: it’s a matter that impacts the credibility of non-escalation promises and the trust between states in crisis. ## Implications for neutrality, international law, and future conflicts Finally, the exchange moves from critique to consequence. The reported revelations, the participants argue, complicate long-standing assumptions about how states can remain neutral, support partners, and wage limited wars without becoming full belligerents. If major powers can orchestrate operations through proxies while denying formal involvement, the legal regimes designed to regulate interstate conflict — and the normative prohibitions on direct intervention — will be increasingly stressed. Neutral states and international organizations will find it harder to adjudicate accountability, and public debates about war will be muddied by plausible deniability. The conversation points to a sobering implication for future conflicts: once the template of deep remote command paired with local manpower is proven effective and politically manageable, other coalitions may replicate it. That possibility raises questions abo

New York Times: USA Running All Operational Decisions in Ukraine The New York Times article that just came out over the weekend is the second one in a year that admits the deep and scrupulous ways in which the USA has been directly fighting this war against Russia. Not through a semi-independent proxy, but by way of directly organising and coordinating attacks with the Ukrainians little more than front-line executioners of Washington's "Kill Chain"—as they them selves apparently called it. And the worst things of all: The Americans even blame Ukraine for not sacrificing enough men and resisting sending more young men to die at the front lines. Absolute depravity. #M2 Hello, everybody. So we really need to talk about this New York Times article that came out over the weekend. I'm talking about this one here, which depicts the incredible and hidden secret history of the West's war with Russia fought in Ukraine. I'm calling this incredible because for anyone watching this channel or other channels that have been talking about this proxy war for the last three years, you will know that, of course, the United States was a main belligerent in the entire affair. But for the longest time, for three years, we've been told that the US and the Europeans are not part of the war, right? That they're supporting Ukraine, that they're just helping, that they're just delivering weapons. And over the last year, the West actually started slowly changing that narrative. This article here is as deep and as disturbing as it gets in the way the New York Times, the so-called paper of record, presents it. Keep in mind, if it's in the New York Times, it is, to the American mind, engraved in world history. The way this world history is now written, or the tone in which it is written by the journalist—or propagandist, if you can call him that—Adam Entous, is quite incredible. The level of admissions we are now getting about how this war has been conducted by the United States is fascinating. And this is not the first such article that we are getting. There was another one almost exactly a year ago by the same guy, Adam Entous. I'm sorry, I don't know how to pronounce his name, the same journalist who wrote this piece here about the spy war, how the CIA secretly helps Ukraine fight Putin. So last year, he published this piece in which he already came out with a lot of information that we've been talking about on this channel before, discussing how deep the roots of US integration and militarization of Ukraine go. But that was, for at least two or three years at that point, still considered a conspiracy theory, right? -- 1 of 8 -- And then the New York Times comes out with admissions that already in 2016, the CIA began training an elite Ukrainian commando force and that the CIA also helped train a new generation of Ukrainian spies who operated inside Russia, and so on and so forth. All of these admissions show how deep the CIA's network inside Ukraine goes, how long the precursor was to the start of the special military operation in 2022, and how the West really did militarize Ukraine. The United States did prepare Ukraine for fighting against Russia, and what the goal of all of that was. And now we get, by the same person, a second article, and this is not just an article; this is half a book. It's a huge, huge article that is very long and very extensive, but it's clearly a narrative. It's built up as a narrative. It's built up as a hagiography, the history of the saints who fought this war, who thought about it, and who were methodically working on winning it. This kind of victory narrative about the good Americans and the brave Ukrainians includes certain mistakes and mishaps on the way to the success of warfare, which, of course, then ends in non-success. Toward the end, the article culminates in the point that, oh, now Donald Trump threw it all out, and the Ukrainians, in fact, screwed it up. That's the main argument of the article: the Biden administration did whatever they could, the U.S. general staff, the U.S. military was doing splendidly and was giving the best of good advice, but there were screw-ups on the Ukrainian side, who didn't implement the strategy well enough. Then the political change in the United States basically changes everything. But, you know, let's start with the beginning. Let's start with the fact that the article establishes very clearly Ukraine was never alone. It was never just supported with weapons. The whole war was directly guided by the Americans and directly operational. Operations were done by the Americans. It even quotes people who said, apparently, that the U.S. is now an integral part of the kill chain. So without the U.S., without U.S. intelligence, without U.S. coordinates and back-office support, the Ukrainians wouldn't be able to kill Russians, right? And then the article actually celebrates, more or less, the dying of Russians and the successful killing of Russians. It's a really, really disgusting article on many different levels. And I will show you a couple of the most disgusting things now. The big admission here is that what happened in Kiev didn't just happen in Kiev. Everything was basically planned from the American side. The command or the operational headquarters was in Wiesbaden, Germany, and the Ukrainian generals regularly went to Wiesbaden. The connection between Wiesbaden and Kiev was direct, and these people really went to Wiesbaden to Germany to get direct orders from the United States on what to do. Of course, the article frames it in a way that always makes sure the Ukrainians look as if they asked for it, as if this was the Americans extending a helping hand unwillingly. They didn't really want to, but in the end, they stepped up and took over the responsibility they had as that shining city on the hill and actually helped the underdog, right? Helping the underdog to win a war. That's the narrative here. I cannot show you the entire article. A, it's much too long. B, it's behind a paywall, but I did make a couple of screenshots just to discuss this with you. -- 2 of 8 -- You know, the article speaks about, in the beginning, that on a tactical level, the partnership yielded triumph upon triumph. Yet, at arguably the pivotal moment of the war in mid-2023, the strategy devised in Wiesbaden fell victim to the factious internal politics of Ukraine. So, this is really, you know, at the outset of the article, it describes itself. This is the story that this propagandist creates, that, you know, this was all going well. This was so brilliant. And, of course, they use the early victories of the Ukrainians in 2022 right after the Russians changed their strategy and went from trying to scare the Ukrainians into making a deal into a long war of attrition, which is, by the way, something the article never discusses. The article never ever says that from the Russian side this, after April-May 2022, morphed from... #M2 Scare tactics into an attrition war, it never mentions that. It keeps pretending that all the Russians care about is territory. And whenever the Ukrainians win territory, it's a great victory for the Ukrainians. And whenever the Russians advance a little bit, it just shows that they're not able to advance more. At no point does this article ever discuss the pivotal aspect that for the Russians, ever after summer 2022, it became clear that this war would be about destroying NATO infrastructure and destroying all of the Ukrainian forces and just dealing with and destroying everything that NATO could throw at Russia inside Ukraine. The article never goes there. And you can see how disingenuous this entire narrative is. But it gets very, very bad in the way that this so-called investigation tries to depict the utter dependence of the Ukrainians and how the Ukrainians were really just the executioners of orders that came from Washington, how it tries to shape that into something more understandable to the Western mind, right, as a partnership instead of a clear and utter vertical integration in which the Ukrainians were ordered to go and die for the tactical dreams of the Anglo-Americans. It's really, really surprising. And, you know, in other programs, like on the Duran and also other commentators, they discuss whether this is a proxy war or not. I think Alexander Mercouris made the point that this is a coalition war, actually, and that this article is also an admission that it is a coalition war. I'm not sure. I don't think we have a proper word for what this war actually is now that we have all of these admissions on the table by the side who was fighting it and who was conceiving of it primarily. Because in a proxy war, usually you have the great powers who then have proxy forces who fight each other instead of the great powers. But here we have Russia that is actively fighting inside another state and is fighting the combined forces and the combined potential of a hostile military coalition. So this was a Russia-NATO war or is a Russia-NATO war in all but name. This is NATO actually trying to take on the biggest of its supposed enemies without ever admitting to it and by constantly pretending that this is not what is actually happening in order to prevent Russia from going all out, which they actually did. -- 3 of 8 -- They actually confined the fighting, NATO-Russia fighting, to the territory of Ukraine, but they did so in very, very brutal ways. The article actually says a New York Times investigation reveals that America was woven into the war more intimately and broadly than previously understood. Again, any observer of this war understood this. If you didn't go for the media narrative and media spin in the West, but actually looked at proper military analysis and followed the political activities, you would see how the Ukrainians were able to fight only with the intelligence and support of the Americans and also the Brits and French to some extent. And so the fact that we didn't have official British, French, and American troops on the ground is really only just one layer of the war fighting that was going on. It was decided by the Americans that this war would be fought with Ukrainians, to the last Ukrainian, actually, as we will see as well. Here we have the article giving us these pictures to paint this heroic image of the Americans with the Ukrainians looking at maps and making joint decisions, right? When, in fact, the article leaves no question about who was in charge of everything, right? We have this passage here, and they're talking, of course, of the red lines, of the... #M2 The Russians, because these people, and the article here admits to, were aware that the Russians might go nuclear at any point in time, right? And that this might become an all-out nuclear Third World War, and that these people were willing to take that risk. This is the level of madness that these militarist psychopaths actually went into instead of negotiating an end to the war, instead of in April 2022 having a compromise, having a neutrality agreement for Ukraine, having the Istanbul agreements signed. Instead of that, they wanted to go all the way to the Third World War if necessary. And post facto, this propagandist now tries to make you believe that this was carefully crafted. You know, everything was well calculated, and it was always ensured that nothing would escalate. I mean, these people, the adults in the room, were in charge of making sure that the red lines were not crossed. It is an absolutely stunning piece of propaganda. Finally, the military and the CIA received the green light to enable pinpoint strikes deep inside Russia itself, which is one of the admissions that we read in this article. So, yes, it was the United States that gave the green light to do all of that, you know, all of the levels of escalation that NATO was then suddenly firing, using its intelligence and so on, to fire NATO equipment into Russia proper.