Iran Wreaks HAVOC on US Forces. American Civil War Brewing | Col. Daniel Davis

## Iran Escalation and the Strait of Hormuz The recent exchange of strikes between the United States and Iran has not merely intensified a regional confrontation; it has exposed a collapse in strategic coherence. What began as a struggle over sanctions, nuclear constraints, and regional influence has, in effect, devolved into episodic tit‑for‑tat attacks with no clear end state. As Col. Daniel Davis stresses in the discussion, this conflict is now less about controlling the Strait of Hormuz as an objective than about satisfying immediate impulses and political signals. When military action becomes a sequence of isolated punitive strikes rather than a campaign tied to attainable political aims, the risk rises that violence spirals while strategic goals recede. The memorandum of understanding (MOU) that briefly reduced friction in the strait illustrated both the potential for de‑escalation and the ease with which it could be undone. The MOU granted Iran temporary authority to manage safe passage for a fixed period; it was meant to buy time and normalize traffic. Yet the U.S. reaction—establishing an alternative southern corridor and asserting control despite the signed text—undermined the agreement’s logic. The result was predictable: Iranian warnings, selective enforcement, and the resumption of direct strikes against shipping perceived to violate Tehran’s conditions. In short, the episode shows how lack of fidelity to an agreement can convert a fragile pause into renewed confrontation. Beyond the legalistic parsing of who “controls” the corridor, the strategic question remains: to what end are kinetic actions being taken? Col. Davis argues that many recent U.S. strikes lack observable military utility. Hitting a bridge or a desalination plant may register politically but does little to coerce Iranian behavior related to chokepoints, deterrence, or regional posture. When targets are chosen for symbolic value rather than to change an adversary’s capabilities or calculus, escalation becomes a costly expression of impotence rather than an instrument of policy. ## Why the U.S.–Iran Agreement Failed The MOU’s failure is instructive because it combined genuine openings with contradictory political signaling. On paper it provided an exit ramp: the blockade could be lifted, commerce restored, sanctions eased, and negotiations resumed. In practice, major American political actors explicitly conditioned compliance on Iranian behavior, effectively turning the MOU into a temporizing measure rather than a committed bargain. Col. Davis notes that regional and global actors were prepared to benefit from reopening trade and normalizing flows of oil, gas, and associated commodities—but that those gains required patience and consistent follow‑through. The dynamic that sank the agreement was partly domestic politics and partly miscalculation about coercive leverage. Some U.S. voices apparently saw the MOU as a temporary pause, a way to get oil flowing and then reapply pressure from a more comfortable position. The risky assumption was that the United States could calibrate force in a way that would compel Tehran to capitulate to demands it had previously resisted—including in the face of far greater pressure campaigns. That assumption has proven false. Iran absorbed previous assaults, adapted, and preserved sufficient resilience to harden its stance. When the expected payoff from renewed force did not materialize, the U.S. response fractured the credibility of the original agreement and reopened the conflict. A second reason for the breakdown was the clash between public statements and private commitments. Announcing a deal and publicly insisting on strict, immediate adherence to unstated conditions creates a credibility gap. The MOU’s architecture required mutual restraint and incremental gains; unilateral reassertions of control by either side not only violate the letter of understanding but cause the other side to feel betrayed. The erosion of trust, once set in motion, is difficult to reverse in a high‑stakes environment where prestige, domestic politics, and regional alliances amplify each provocation. ## Nuclear Escalation and the Lack of an Exit Strategy Any discussion of U.S.–Iran confrontations must confront the specter of nuclear escalation—or the lack of a clear pathway to prevent it. Col. Davis’s analysis highlights a glaring strategic omission: there is no credible exit strategy that links current kinetic moves to a manageable, long‑term political end. Without such a roadmap, attacks risk converting a limited bilateral crisis into a broader confrontation that could touch on nuclear signaling, deterrence postures, and alliance entrenchment. Iran’s own public rhetoric—ranging from vows of revenge to broader goals of ousting U.S. influence in the region—complicates the picture. Whether incendiary public sermons or formal policy pronouncements, these declarations raise the political bar and narrow diplomatic space. They also make it politically harder for Tehran to climb down without domestic backlash. On the other side, the United States has sent mixed signals about its ultimate objectives: are strikes intended to coerce specific behaviors tied to the MOU, to punish assassination and other transgressions, or to degrade Iran’s broader capabilities? When ends remain ambiguous, the risk that escalation will be ill‑matched to achievable objectives grows. An absence of a negotiated, verifiable, and durable framework for nuclear constraints leaves the region perpetually vulnerable to crises of credibility. Military force can destroy infrastructure, delay programs, or signal resolve; it cannot by itself produce the sustained political settlement necessary to address nuclear questions. Without credible diplomatic channels and incentives for compliance, kinetic options are a blunt instrument with diminishing returns. ## America’s Rapidly Depleting Missile Stockpiles One practical constraint that surfaced in the conversation—and which is underappreciated in public discourse—is the finite nature of the United States’ high‑end munitions. Repeated strikes across varied targets deplete inventories of precision weapons, cruise missiles, and other high‑value ordnance. Col. Davis points out that the United States can pulverize infrastructure, but that capability is not limitless, and prolonged attrition of stocks will eventually limit options and increase unit costs of action. Depleting stockpiles also has secondary effects on allied confidence and operational planning. If partners perceive that the U.S. capacity to sustain high‑intensity strikes is time‑limited, they will be less willing to assume the stabilizing role Washington traditionally provided. Conversely, adversaries may feel emboldened to protract conflict, betting on American constraints. These dynamics create a self‑reinforcing spiral: the U.S. uses precious munitions to demonstrate resolve, inventories fall, allies hedge, and adversaries press on—all of which incentivize further risky use of remaining stocks. A rational policy would integrate munition logistics, resupply timelines, and industrial base limits into both operational planning and strategic messaging. When operational tempo outpaces industrial capacity, forceful rhetoric becomes hollow; the credibility of deterrence hinges not only on words and short‑term strikes, but on sustained capacity to act if escalation deepens. ## The Failure of America’s Post‑Cold War Doctrine The current crisis also exposes how ill‑suited certain post‑Cold War doctrines are to contemporary asymmetric contests. The U.S. approach—leaning on technological superiority, precision strike, and episodic coercion—assumes a direct linkage between force and political outcomes. That linkage is frayed when adversaries possess different time horizons, resilient asymmetric tactics, and domestic narratives that valorize resistance. Col. Davis’s critique is blunt: militar

Iran Wreaks HAVOC on US Forces. American Civil War Brewing | Daniel Davis After three rounds of attack in less than two years, the US/Israeli war alliance is at the weakest point in decades. The damage the unsuccessful military campaign are doing to US power projection is enormous. Join me to night for a talk with Colonel Daniel Davis, the host of @DanielDavisDeepDive. Check out Danny's foreign language channels: French: https://www.youtube.com /@DanielDavisDeepDiveFrance German: https://www.youtube.com/@DanielDavisDeepDiveGermany Spanish: https://www.youtube.com/@DanielDavisDeepDiveSpanish Portuguese: https://www. youtube.com/@DanielDavisDeepDivePortuguese Italian: https://www.youtube.com /@DanielDavisDeepDiveItalian Russian: https://www.youtube.com/@DanielDavisDeepDiveRussia Chinese: https://www.youtube.com/@DDDDChinese And here you can support Neutrality Studies: Our Substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Our Shop: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall. com Donations: https://neutralitystudies.com/donate Timestamps: 00:00 Iran Escalation and the Strait of Hormuz 14:00 Why the U.S.–Iran Agreement Failed 21:45 Nuclear Escalation and the Lack of an Exit Strategy 26:07 America’s Rapidly Depleting Missile Stockpiles 29:31 The Failure of America’ s Post-Cold War Doctrine 34:19 What Could Finally Force U.S. Policy to Change? 39:38 Election Distrust and the Risk of Domestic Crackdowns #Pascal Welcome back, everybody, to Neutrality Studies, today with an update by the wonderful host of Daniel Davis Deep Dive. I've got Colonel Daniel Davis with me. Daniel, welcome. Always good to be here, Pascal. Thanks for having me back. Well, thank you so much for coming online again. The last time has been, I think, almost two years. It was when you first started your channel. And I'm very happy also to announce, if you're listening to this in any other language than English, Daniel's podcasts are also available now in Spanish, German, French, and Portuguese. So do look for Deep Dive also in other languages. And with this out of the way, Daniel, can you give us a little bit of your assessment of what's happening currently with Iran? I mean, we are speaking on July 17th, and the bombing campaign seems to be intensifying from both sides, actually. #Daniel Davis Yeah, you know, I tell you what, some have been saying over the last few days that this has devolved not from the bigger war about nuclear weapons and programs and all that kind of stuff. It has devolved into a battle for the Strait of Hormuz. I think that even that is too broad, and I think maybe now it's just a battle between the opinions and the emotions of the two sides. And that means primarily President Trump. And that is bad, bad news, because at least if you're struggling for -- 1 of 17 -- the Strait of Hormuz, you have an objective in mind. But I think that when you analyze what the United States is doing right now, there's no logic to it. It's not leading toward any conclusion. It's just, we have some weapons, we have some missiles. Let's shoot them. And I don't know, let's hit some boats here, let's hit a bridge over there, let's hit a control tower in this other place here. Let's just throw missiles downrange and then just keep saying, well, until they behave, whatever. But it's not designed to compel anything. Nobody should be under the slightest illusion that right now the Iranian side can be coerced by more missile strikes to do anything at all that we want. I mean, we failed utterly to do that when it was all-out war. Apparently, 15,000 sorties were flown during the first 40 days. That didn't compel them to submit. Then we tried a couple of months of a blockade. That didn't compel them to submit. And then we tried, okay, let's do the MOU. Here's the perverse part. The MOU was working to our benefit. We were going to benefit because the Strait of Hormuz, the dual blockades, had opened up, or at least were in the process of opening up. We removed our blockade. The Iranians started to implement paragraph five of the 14-point memorandum of understanding, which unequivocally said that Iran, and Iran only, got to administer how the strait was opened up for the 60 days. It declared they would not charge any fees for that 60 days, but it equally declared they would determine how it would safely be opened. And then even beyond that, it had that very important word in there — only — for 60 days only, because then Iran said, starting on day 61, we're going to charge a fee. And then it said in the paragraph also that only Iran and the Sultanate of Oman would decide how it happened after that, in conjunction with conversations with other GCC countries. Nowhere in any of that, either in the current phase or in the second phase or beyond 60 days, was the United States even mentioned. We had no role whatsoever. And yet, days into this, we said, oh, you know what? I don't like it that they have control over it, even though we signed the damn document that gave them that control. And so we said, how about we set up our own southern corridor in the Strait of Hormuz, off the Omani waters, and then we'll decide who goes through and how and under what conditions. And the Iranian side said, yeah, that's not what we agreed to. That's not what we're going to do. And they started giving warnings: if you don't abide by our rules, then there will be consequences. And it's interesting, from what I understand, that there were a couple of ships, at least, that went through that southern corridor, but they went through with the permission and coordination of the IRGC, and they made it through. It's the ones that did not abide by whatever terms they set — those are the ones that were hit. And, of course, that began this back and forth, and I want to say the 26th or 27th of June is when those first ones started. Then we had a bit of a respite. And then, starting on the 7th of July, we started this nearly nonstop. And now then, this last night — and I don't remember, I hadn't seen if there was any this morning, our time — but at least six consecutive days of the U.S. striking Iran and Iran retaliating each time. -- 2 of 17 -- And that's what I keep saying, and what I had started saying on the first one: what is the purpose here? These missile strikes — towards what end? And I'll just tell you, probably an important aside to take here for a second, what Central Command has claimed in its exposé that declares what they're doing. We declared why we're doing it — in order to bring the Iranians back into compliance with the MOU and to stop attacking civilian tankers in the Gulf region. And then, the day before yesterday, I actually did a whole show just on this because I was just livid. We had it around, let's see, I think it was in Washington, D.C. time, about 4:53 p.m., we announced that we had struck a civilian tanker that was steaming toward Karg Island. Now, if you look at a map, you see that anything in the Gulf of Arabia that was steaming toward Karg Island means it was going away from the Strait of Hormuz, away from the blockade line set by the United States in the Gulf of Oman. And we said we sent a Hellfire missile into its smokestack because we told it not to go there. That's not the blockade. The blockade is in the other direction, and that is the civilian tanker. Five hours later, we announced the next round of strikes, and we said it was because Iran had been firing on innocent civilian tankers. And I said, come on, what kind of perverse world is this? When we fire on a civilian tanker because it didn't do what we told it, and then we claim we attacked this other country because they did the identical thing we did by firing on a civilian tanker. It just defies any kind of logic. And, of course, everybody sees this, Pascal. Everybody sees this. And I'm not just talking about Iran. I'm talking about people in the region who want the war to be over. Everybody wants this war to be over. Our allies in Europe, you know, Russia, China, the Global South, Asia, you name it. Everybody sees this and they're thinking, what is wrong with America? And OK, so that's my side. Sorry for that rant for a moment. But let's get back to the practical things. Even forget about the morality and take that we don't have any morality. What are you wanting to accomplish? Do we think that by striking these targets Iran is going to say, you know what, Washington, sure, I know you assassinated our leader. I know everybody's demanding revenge for that, and a lot of people are mad at us. Most people are mad at us for even having negotiations with you. But whatever. Sure, whatever you ask for, we'll give. Does anybody think that that's even in the realm of theoretical possibility? I mean, every time we do this kind of stuff, especially with the contradictions I just mentioned, it hardens their resolve even more, which is amazing because after assassinating their leader and seeing this massive outpouring from allegedly 40 million Iranians—and the pictures and the videos certainly make that a plausible number—they're not going to give in to anything. And yet we keep doing it. And that's bad enough. If that's where we stop, that would be an awful situation. And what are we doing? But in the last 12 hours or so, it's gotten worse because now we did ramp up the target list and the types of targets we attacked. And President Trump had been signaling this the last part of the week. And apparently overnight he did it. He hit a bridge, apparently a fairly important one in southern Iran. He hit other -- 3 of 17 -- civilian industries. He hit some civilian control towers—things that have nothing to do with any military. And, you know, let me just also point out, if people hear “bridge,” well, that's a legitimate military target. It can be if that target has anything to do with the military balance, like, say, for example, in the Russia-Ukraine war. If the Russians are saying, hey, we're trying to minimize militarily the Ukraine side all along the eastern front, and so we're going to start hitting bridges behind them through which they have logistics to get lethal military aid or reinforcements, medical aid, whatever, to the front—so we're going to knock those bridges out so they can't get there—that has military utility, and that is a legal military target. The same thing applies on the Russian side: if the Ukrainians hit bridges in Russia or in the Russian-controlled areas, that's a legitimate military target. This, on the other hand, is not a legitimate military target because there is no front line, there is no battle at all. This bridge had nothing to do with control of the Strait of Hormuz. It's just a bridge that people used. I mean, that's just what the thing was for. So there's no military utility in it. And so it's almost pointless to say that it was a war crime because no one cares about that anymore in America. So we'll just leave that for the moment. But just at least look at the military utility. It provides nothing for us. We are not benefiting anything now, today. Iran is not weaker today than they were yesterday. But they're a lot more angry, and now they have done what they promised to do if President Trump escalated the target list, and they have hit targets. I saw just a minute ago that Kuwait is furious—their government—because they said you hit a desalination plant, and I believe it was a reprocessing plant for their oil industry. And they're really angry about this. I mean, what else can they do? They have to say that. But I would wager that their anger was more directed at Washington for introducing that target, because they're just sitting there in the middle of the desert. They can't do anything. Our air defense is clearly ineffective, so they're defenseless. So if America strikes targets in Iran, they're the easiest target to hit. So they, along with some of the other GCC countries, are going to continue to get hit. And the question is, how much fu