The International Order Is Dead | Amb. Sándor Kusai

## The End of the UN and US Hegemony The conversation lays out a stark diagnosis: the institutional architecture built after 1945 to constrain great-power behavior is unraveling. What was once called an international order grounded in a multilateral legal apparatus and sustained by American leadership now looks, in this telling, less like a stable framework and more like a fragile set of props being kicked away. The immediate evidence is dramatic: large-scale unilateral moves by a major power that include withdrawing funding from and participation in dozens of international organizations, military interventions that bypass long-standing norms, and operational choices that treat international institutions as expendable tools rather than foundational limits. The result is not merely institutional decay; it is the political reassertion of raw power over law. This assessment does not cast blame on any single actor alone. It highlights a structural shift: the United States, reacting to its perceived strategic constraints, is prepared to delegitimize the very rules it once promoted. For decades the international system’s authority rested on a combination of American enforcement and a veneer of legal universality. When that enforcement becomes selective, the legitimate claims of international law erode rapidly. The conversation argues that this is not a temporary breakdown but a pivot — the end of an era in which the UN and allied institutions were effective arbiters of interstate conduct. If the United States treats the UN system as collateral damage in a broader campaign to maximize unilateral freedom of action, the institutions themselves risk becoming remnants rather than referees. Equally important is the critique of institutional leadership. The conversation points to managerial paralysis within the UN as an internal factor that has made the system vulnerable. Where the organization could once convene and mediate, it is now seen as slow, compromised, and ineffective. When organizational leadership fails to adapt to geopolitical change, the multilateral project loses credibility at the very moment it is most needed. The combination of external assault and internal sclerosis makes it plausible that the UN may survive in form for a time but will likely lose the functional authority it once held. ## Return to 19th Century Power Politics A central theme emerging from the exchange is that the international system appears to be reverting, in practice if not in name, to a late 19th‑century model of interstate relations: open power competition, spheres of influence, and coercive diplomacy. That does not mean a literal replay of colonial empires, but it does suggest a reversion to a logic where brute capability and opportunistic coercion dominate outcomes rather than negotiated rules and collective enforcement. What makes this reprise more dangerous today is the technological and geographic scope of modern power. Whereas 19th‑century great-power politics involved a limited number of actors and colonial possessions, the contemporary field includes a far more numerous and technologically capable set of players. Rising powers from the Global South, resurgent regional actors, and nonstate capabilities multiply the arenas in which contests can play out. The conversation emphasizes that the next phase will likely be messier and more diffuse than the old imperial rivalries because it will involve many more stakeholders with overlapping ambitions. This reversion also alters the calculus for conflict. International law historically served to regulate violence and contain escalation; if law fractures, then the predictable constraints on escalation vanish. The fallback is a renewed emphasis on deterrence, alliance-building, and, in worst-case scenarios, preemptive use of force. The immediate consequence is increased instability: localized crises can cascade into broader confrontations without the buffer of effective multilateral mediation. The insistence that current policy choices open “a window of opportunity” for other powers underlines this: if Russia, China and other actors exploit the moment to press territorial or strategic claims, the transition from rule-based order to balance-of-power politics could be accelerated catastrophically. ## Europe's Denial and Subservience The conversation places responsibility for Europe’s predicament squarely on political elites who are described as out of touch, unable or unwilling to recognize the changing strategic environment. The argument is that European leadership has become habituated to a transatlantic security framework and the political benefits of alignment, even as the guarantor of that framework demonstrates increasing unpredictability. In this view, many European governments have chosen short-term alliance comforts and elite payoffs over a sober reassessment of strategic autonomy. Beyond a critique of elite complacency, the exchange highlights structural reasons why Europe behaves as it does. The EU’s integration has created a dense web of interdependencies—financial, regulatory, institutional—that can be used to discipline dissenting members. Member states that resist dominant policy lines often find themselves isolated not just politically but economically. This produces a powerful centripetal force toward consensus or acquiescence, even when public opinion in some member states may be inclined otherwise. The conversation goes further: Europeans’ rhetorical attachment to the UN Charter is increasingly performative. Public declarations of commitment to international law persist, but practice deviates—especially when geopolitical interests collide with the obligations those declarations imply. The result is a kind of political cognitive dissonance: states invoke multilateralism while simultaneously participating in coercive, unilateral or alliance-driven actions that undermine its meaning. The danger, the analysis warns, is that this duality will deepen the EU’s strategic dependency and delay necessary reforms toward genuine European sovereignty in foreign and security policy. ## Internal EU Tyranny and Control 00:35: 24 Pressure on Neutral States A striking part of the exchange focuses on the EU’s internal mechanisms for enforcing conformity—what one might call the “administrative toolkit” of integration—and how those tools are being repurposed to police political dissent. Sanctions, funding conditionality, regulatory pressure, and legal procedures designed to ensure common standards can be, and increasingly are, deployed to marginalize member states that resist dominant policy lines. The conversation calls this a form of internal coercion that functions like a soft tyranny: it narrows the range of acceptable policy options for smaller or less-aligned members. Neutral and nonaligned states are particularly vulnerable to this dynamic. The traditional space for neutrality—political independence, refusal to join military coalitions, and preservation of diplomatic pluralism—is being compressed by a system that equates deviation with disloyalty. Financial leverage, conditionality attached to recovery funds, and complex regulatory requirements become instruments for compelling conformity. For countries that have historically pursued nonalignment as a matter of national tradition or strategic prudence, this pressure produces a painful dilemma: acquiesce and lose sovereign policy space, or resist and face economic and political penalties. The conversation suggests that the EU’s capacity to centralize decision‑making has outpaced its democratic legitimacy. Coercive mechanisms work precisely because they are embedded in technical and procedural domains, not in overtly political ones. That makes dissent appear arcane or bureaucratic rather than fundamentally political, and it weakens the ability of publics to mobilize in defense of national prerogatives. In this way, the EU’s integrationist tools can function a

The International Order Is Dead | Amb. Sándor Kusai Links: Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com (Opt in for Academic Section from your profile settings: https://pascallottaz.substack.com/s/academic) Goods Store: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall.com Timestamps: 00:00:00 Collapse of the Diplomatic System 00:07:13 The End of the UN and US Hegemony 00:18:28 Return to 19th Century Power Politics 00:22:40 Europe's Denial and Subservience 00:28:00 Internal EU Tyranny and Control 00:35: 24 Pressure on Neutral States 00:39:20 The Future of BRICS and Global Order #Pascal Welcome back, everybody. Today I'm joined again by Ambassador Sándor Kusai, who, among other positions, served as Hungary's top diplomat in China between 2008 and 2014. Sándor, welcome back. #Sándor Kusai Very nice to meet you again. #Pascal Glad to have you, uh, because I need to ask a diplomat—aren’t we just witnessing the insane collapse of the diplomatic system and international law right in front of our eyes? I mean, what’s happening with Venezuela? And you just broke another, uh, a horrible message to me that I wasn’t even aware of. Can you tell us what it is? #Sándor Kusai The news today—well, by our timing it’s today, but I think in the U.S. it happened yesterday—is that Donald Trump, as president of the United States, decided and issued an executive order for the U.S. to leave 35 international organizations, plus 31 that are part of the United Nations system. So practically, the U.S. is leaving a total of 66 international organizations, a big chunk of which are various agencies, funds, and structures within the UN, including, for example, the United Nations Economic and Social Council. So even large and important parts of the UN system will be left alone by the United States, including stopping any U.S. funding for these organizations around the world. I think it's very symptomatic. It shows clearly that the global diplomatic, institutionalized structure is collapsing—and collapsing very fast. Furthermore, with the United States’ intrusion into Venezuela, it became very clear that -- 1 of 12 -- international law as such, the international legal system, is also collapsing very fast. So what we see now is really the end of the international system as we know it. And instead of that, we have the Wild West in international relations. #Pascal This very pessimistic approach is like what I read in most of the media—and I actually agree. I mean, this is not the first time the United States has invaded another country and even kidnapped its president. It has happened before. But the big difference is that before, they tried to put on the velvet glove of humanitarianism. They tried to cushion the words, to create a framing, to build a legal rationale and whatnot. And this time—nothing. It’s just all out. And now there’s the attack on the institutions that the United States itself built to manage international structures. I mean, in your opinion, in your lifetime and professional time as a diplomat, have we ever seen a moment this blatantly attacking the very structure of how diplomacy works—or did we? #Sándor Kusai Yes, I fully agree with that. I have never seen such a thing, such a process, during my more than 40 years of dealing with international relations. On one hand, it’s really very sad and makes me worry about the future of the whole international system. On the other hand, I have a little feeling of satisfaction, because for the last few years, not only I but many analysts of international relations have been talking about the imminent change of the world order, of the international system. It was the result of technical or scientific analysis of the processes, and many people criticized us, saying we were seeing dark things that weren’t really there. Everything was okay, especially in the European countries. The school of thought in the European Union, and among the politicians there, always said that our analysis was somehow wrong or exaggerated. But here are the proofs. This process of the international law and the international system collapsing has reached, I think, a turning point. This turning point consists of a few important events. The first one was the attack guided by the CIA against some Russian installation near Vladimir Putin’s residence in Valdai. That’s a new level. The U.S. confirmed that it was not the residence of the Russian president—but you know, if something is five kilometers away, then it’s practically the residence. You may sugarcoat it as you want, but it’s the residence. Then came the aggression against Venezuela and the kidnapping of President Maduro. Then, just yesterday or the day before, the boarding of a Russian-flagged ship on the high seas. And now we have the formal American decision to leave a big bunch of international organizations and defund them. So this is the new phase. It’s a turning point altogether. Altogether, these events show a turning point, which says that we are getting back to the late 19th century of power politics—nothing else but brutal, sheer power. And that means the end of the international UN system as we’ve known it since 1945. -- 2 of 12 -- #Pascal The UN system itself seems to be under attack now. Do you think the UN will still be around next year, with its headquarters in New York? #Sándor Kusai For another year, most probably. These processes are not very fast. But I think the UN is heading very quickly in the same direction as the League of Nations ended up. It's terrible what is happening. I don't know how long it will take. And I want to add one element: it is not only the responsibility of the great powers—first and foremost, the United States—but also the responsibility of the mechanism of the United Nations, especially its Secretary-General, Mr. Guterres. It is his responsibility as well, because during his management the United Nations became totally paralyzed, unable to solve any issue, and it serves less and less as a platform for debate. So it is not only about great power politics; it’s also, I would say, about the aging and paralysis of the international system, including the UN itself. #Pascal However, like Russia, China, and, you know, even the Europeans—at least the Europeans pay lip service to the UN Charter. You know, the Charter is still a holy cow. The Europeans, of course, don’t live up to it—not at all. I mean, they do the opposite of it. But at least in words, they still refer to it, which the Trump administration stopped doing, while all the others still do. They’re kind of saying, “No, we want an international law–based world,” especially Russia, China, the Global South. Do you think what we’re seeing is the United States now actively fighting against this? Or are we seeing them leaving, and everybody else just takes what’s left and continues with it? I mean, you don’t need to have that thing in New York. You could go back to Geneva, you could put it in Malaysia—you could put it anywhere, right?—and continue with the procedural rules. What’s your thought on that? #Sándor Kusai I don't think it’s possible. I think, by the way, that for the policy of the Trump administration—which means, for the United States as such—the death of the UN or the international system is collateral damage. Not a goal, but collateral damage. Yeah, yeah, yeah. The Trump administration tries to get rid of every factor, every institution, everything that seems to limit the freedom of action of the U.S. as a power—an international power, economic power, ideological power, political power, and military power. They try to get rid of everything that limits their freedom of action. The international system and the United Nations are only part of this, but the major aim and major policy are to inflict—or rather, to reinsert, if you want—the hegemony of the United States by all means available. But why now? #Pascal -- 3 of 12 -- Why now? I mean, why not do that in 1999? It would’ve been so much easier, right? Why did these institutions survive thirty years of a unipolar moment, and now they’re dying—or now the United States is going on the frontal attack? Is it because other powers have come up and now actually have structural weight in this system, and the U.S. has to get rid of the system if it can’t use it to project power? #Sándor Kusai Yes, I fully agree with you. That’s the problem. In 1991, when the unipolar moment came, these structures—the international law—were transformed by the U.S. into a rule-based system. The rules are different from the law. The rules were established by the U.S. and, to a lesser extent, by its allies. They are less and less allies, more and more vassals. But that transformation has happened. What we have now is much more about rules than international law. But for at least four or five years, maybe more, with the emergence of other powers—even those considered secondary by U.S. thinking, like India—because the U.S. has always counted China, and for the last few decades China and Russia, as major powers. Subordinate, but major. But they never counted India as a serious power—that’s what we know. Yet even they gained stronger power, greater influence in this international system of diplomacy, policymaking, and international law. Even a secondary power from the U.S. point of view, like South Africa, could begin a very, very difficult legal process in the International Court of Justice about Gaza and the role of Israel, and so on. So it’s shown very clearly over the last few years that this system may work as a limitation on American power. So the time has come now to get rid of it. Because without playing within the framework of the rules established by the U.S.—which has some connection to international law, at least on a principled level—it’s very clear that this form of play does not serve the strategic goals of the U.S. I think nobody took it very seriously when, a month ago, the Trump administration published the new National Security Strategy. We read it, I also analyzed it, but we couldn’t really understand that it meant a total turnaround in American policy. In that nice diplomatic language—which in places is very brutal, the sentences they use—but still, in that nice diplomatic language, it wasn’t so clear that the attack was going on against the whole system. And now it’s very clear with the recent developments—the new Monroe principle began with Venezuela. Please, Colombia, Brazil, Mexico, prepare yourselves, because you are next, on the level of the Monroe principle. But if you look further, you can see how the preparation is going for a new attack against Iran. You can also see how our poor European colleagues, some of whom have a colonial past—we Hungarians did not, but they did—are reacting. So, Greenland. It’s the clearest example that nothing is stable anymore. Nothing is fixed. And it has two very important consequences. I’m afraid that the United Nations and the whole international system are heading for a total overhaul, not necessarily a rescuable one. The next year, or year and a half, will decide it. -- 4 of 12 -- We will see whether the UN is rescuable or not. That's one element. And the second element is that this new policy, this new development, opens up a lot of possibilities for the other great powers. Whether they use it in a real political way or they miss it will decide the longer-term processes. Whether the situation is used by Russia to finish the Ukraine war on their terms as soon as possible, or by China to solve the issues of the South China Sea, Taiwan, and others very fast—or if they play according to the old rules—within one, two, or three years, the United States will be strong enough again to force its will everywhere. So there is a window of opportunity for the other great powers. The consequence may be that it will be the final nail in the coffin of the international system if they use it. If they miss it, they will lose their great p