UK Parliamentarian DESTROYS Western War Propaganda | Lord Robert Skidelsky

## The Myth of Perpetual Support The conversation cuts to a blunt truth: Western rhetoric about “supporting Ukraine for as long as it takes” has long been more political theatre than policy. That mantra, repeated by governments and echoed in parliaments, served less as a road map than as a motivational slogan, one that encouraged continued fighting without any credible mechanism to deliver the promised outcome. As Lord Robert Skidelsky argued, the United States has now walked away from that script, leaving European capitals — notably London and Paris — scrambling to preserve influence and dignity in a process they did not initiate. The result is a policy gap: a public posture tied to maximalist goals, and a strategic reality increasingly defined by great-power negotiation rather than European agency. This disconnect matters because rhetoric shapes expectations. When leaders promise an unconditional “victory,” they lock domestic politics into a path that becomes harder to reverse. Citizens, constituencies, and media outlets internalize the language of existential struggle, making compromise politically toxic. Yet the military and diplomatic facts on the ground have not been amenable to such an absolute outcome. The effect is an anxious polity trying to square a moral narrative of resistance with the limits of its capabilities and the evolving priorities of the United States. ## Justice versus Negotiation: How Language Sabotages Peace A central tension highlighted in the exchange is the collision between two ways of thinking about the end of war: justice and negotiation. In Britain and much of Europe, a “just and durable peace” is immediately translated into demands for full territorial restoration, reparations, and prosecutions of those responsible. That language, while morally resonant and domestically powerful, is strategically counterproductive if the aim is to negotiate an end to hostilities. Justice in the political sense often follows victory; it is the currency victors use to extract concessions. If victory is not attainable — or not being pursued — then insisting on maximalist justice will make any settlement impossible. The discussion therefore calls for a recalibration: to distinguish ethical aims from achievable diplomatic outcomes. Pursuing truth and accountability need not be abandoned, but they require a staged approach that recognizes the constraints of power and the necessity of compromise. Absent that realism, policy risks prolonging conflict and inflicting avoidable suffering in the name of an uncompromising moral lexicon. ## Europe’s Search for Relevance One of the most striking themes is the psychological and strategic need driving European behavior: relevance. With Washington reasserting its prerogatives, and with the evolving American stance that places Europe in a secondary role in any new bargain with Russia, European leaders feel displaced. That sense of dislocation helps explain why calls for “coalitions of the willing,” European-led peacekeeping, or a renewed emphasis on military spending have become fashionable responses. This desire to remain central in shaping outcomes has a twofold logic. First, there is the fear of being excluded from negotiating rooms where decisions are made; second, there is a domestic politics dimension where leaders must be seen to do something robust in the face of external threats. But the proposed remedies — sending European troops, establishing quasi-NATO arrangements without American backing — were always implausible. They could not be negotiated into acceptability by the very parties whose consent was essential. The net effect is a Europe seeking to preserve dignity in a world where power dynamics have shifted, often misreading symbolism as leverage. ## The Lost Peace Dividend and the Rise of Multipolarity The post–Cold War aftermath was a moment for reimagining security and international cooperation. Instead, what unfolded was a presumptive triumphalism: the idea that victory in the Cold War translated naturally into a unipolar world order led by the United States. That assumption sidelined the idea of integrating Russia into a stable European architecture and contributed to policies that Russia, predictably, would see as marginalizing and threatening. Lord Skidelsky’s invocation of Keynes’s admonition — that victors must plan to live with the vanquished — is apt. Rather than building durable institutions that accommodated a resurgent Russia, Western policy pursued expansion and influence premised on uncontested dominance. NATO’s eastward extension, the interventions of the 1990s and 2000s, and the general posture of managerial globalism fed a counter-reaction in Moscow and helped to crystallize a multipolar response. The lesson is stark: the failure to convert a temporary position of strength into inclusive, resilient institutions invited geopolitical backfire. The peace dividend evaporated not simply because of bad luck, but because policy choices neglected the long-term need for stability through accommodation. ## The Media, Experts, and the Narrowing of Dissent Another core strand of the conversation is the narrowing of acceptable debate within Western public spheres. Media outlets and policy experts, often closely tied to defense establishments, formed what the discussion calls a single-scripted narrative. This convergence did not happen spontaneously; institutional incentives, professional networks, and political reflexes all encouraged conformity. When the mainstream press and influential think tanks foregrounded a military-centered analysis, voices urging diplomacy and compromise were sidelined. The costs of this consensus are both intellectual and practical. Intellectually, it impoverishes policy options by crowding out analysis that would question the premises of the prevailing strategy. Practically, it hardens popular expectations and political calculations in ways that make negotiated settlements harder to accept. The exchange points to a few independent thinkers who have resisted this tide, but their rarity underscores how unusual principled dissent has become in the current environment. ## Imperial Reflexes, Moral Certainty, and the Fear of Appeasement The persistence of certain motifs in British political life — moral certainty, imperial reflexes, and a deep fear of being labeled appeasers — was a recurrent explanation for why policy stubbornly adheres to maximalist premises. These are not merely rhetorical flourishes; they are psychological frameworks shaped by history, education, and institutional memory. For Britain, the trauma of appeasement in 1938 functions as a lasting cautionary tale. That caution, however, has at times mutated into a reflex that equates any concession with the moral failure of those earlier years. This reflex dovetails with a self-image rooted in Enlightenment universalism: a belief that Western values are normative and should be propagated. From this vantage point, interventions are framed as civilizational duties rather than power politics. Coupled with imperial legacies, the result is a policymaking culture that finds it difficult to conceive of legitimate spheres of interest for other powers or to tolerate pragmatic engagement that falls short of moral maximalism. ## Reframing the Conversation: Toward Realism and Plural Perspectives The exchange ultimately calls for a reframing of how Western societies think about conflict and peace. Realism does not mean cynicism; the task is to align noble aims with the operational realities of geopolitics. That begins with recognizing limits, abandoning performative maximalism, and reintroducing diplomacy as the primary instrument of statecraft. It also requires listening to perspectives outside Western echo chambers — from the Global South to neighboring countries that remember NATO as an instrument of power rather than a purely defensive alliance. Practically, this means several shifts:

UK Parliamentarian DESTROYS Western War Propaganda | Lord Robert Skidelsky The UK is clinging on by its teeth to the mantra that it will “support Ukraine for as long as it takes.” Since Trump’s public announcement that Ukraine would never become a member of NATO, and the alliance‘s Secretary General‘s admission to the same effect, it should be clear that “as long as it takes” is now well over. But, as so often, the Europeans are the last to get the message. The UK, France and some lone outposts of Empire are still serving the “boots ok the ground” rhetoric, when it has become utterly clear that this war is lost. To discuss the UK's policy towards Ukraine, I’ve got Lord Robert Skidelsky with me today. Lord Kidelsky is an Emeritus Professor of Political Economy at Warwick University, the author of a three-volume biography of the economist John Maynard Keynes, and since 1991 he has been serving as a member of the House of Lords, that is the upper chamber of the British Parliament. Lord Skidelsky‘s Guardian Article: https://www.theguardian.com /commentisfree/2025/feb/25/britain-ukraine-victory-compromise-peace-negotiations-uk My own take at the FOLLY the Europeans are going through: https://open.substack.com/pub/pascallottaz/p /europes-walk-of-the-dammed-war-hysteria?r=a0tww&utm_medium=ios #M3 We carry on talking as though we still had the power, but in fact, we don't. So we then talk about our values. One of the phrases you hear in Parliament a great deal is, "We must." We must. As though we had the power. We must ensure that the Chinese stop persecuting the Uruguayans. We must. We must. We must. I don't know. All you can really say is this is a historical reflex of some kind. Maybe it's the way people are brought up and educated at universities or in some way just to say these things. #M2 Hello, everybody. This is Pascal from Neutrality Studies, and today I've got the great honor of talking to Lord Robert Skidelsky, who is an emeritus professor of political economy at Warwick University, the author of a three-volume biography of the economist John Maynard Keynes, and since 1991, he has been serving as a member of the House of Lords, that is, the upper chamber of the British Parliament, of course. Lord Skidelsky, welcome. Thank you. Lord Skidelsky, you recently wrote an opinion piece in The Guardian in which you criticized UK politics toward the war in Ukraine. Then on Monday, March 17, you again repeated your criticism also in Parliament. You spoke about the need for peace and diplomacy, and you've been criticized for that again. Could you maybe give us the core of what you think the UK is currently doing wrong in its approach toward, well, Ukraine and Russia? -- 1 of 13 -- #M3 Well, thank you. I've been roughly saying the same thing for the last two and a half years, which is that we must have a peace policy and not a war policy. And we can't have a war policy because if we were really serious about a war, we would just risk dangerous escalation. Because Russia is obviously much stronger than Ukraine. And so, you know, a war policy doesn't make any sense. And yet the British, I mean, my criticism of the British policy is that every single statement of our government in the last three years has said we will support Ukraine until it achieves victory. And that was always mendacious. It was always a lie. They were never going to do that. But what it did was encourage the war to go on and on. Now what's happened is that the Americans have simply thrown that into the dustbin. That script is now scrapped. So what they're trying to do, I think, the British, together with the Europeans, is to find some way of inserting themselves into a peace process which they never initiated. So I think that's the difficulty for British policy at the moment. #M2 I completely agree with your observation. I'm actually worried that the way the UK and the Europeans are trying to approach peace in Ukraine is counterproductive to the peace process that's happening at the moment, because it seems that the UK and Europe still cling to a peace that is basically a surrender of Russia. Do you see it that way as well? #M3 Well, you see, there are these words we use. For example, the British have now said what we favor is a just and durable peace. That's the formula. That is the word. Well, what is just and durable? Yes, of course. But if you add justice to it, then, of course, you're almost immediately destroying the possibility of peace, because we understand justice in this country mainly as a restoration of the territorial integrity of Ukraine, the payment by Russia of reparations for the damage, the bringing of war criminals to trial, and so on. We understand those as the requirements of a just peace. But if that's our policy, we're not going to get peace at all. Because you only get that sort of peace, I think, if you defeat a country in war. Then you can extract that kind of peace. But we're nowhere near either doing that or suggesting that that's the way the war should go. So the policy is very counterproductive. And here's another example of a counterproductive policy: the idea that Britain, France, and one or two other countries, which we call the Coalition of the Willing, will send peacekeeping or peace-enforcing troops and aircraft to Ukraine. Well, that was always a non-starter. It was mad to think anyone would agree with it. Certainly, the Americans didn't agree with it because it seemed to require what was called an American backstop. And the Russians wouldn't agree to it because they'd been fighting a war to stop NATO troops from coming into Ukraine. To suggest that you have a bunch of NATO troops and you don't call them NATO, you call -- 2 of 13 -- them the Coalition of the Willing, there to enforce the ceasefire, is something they would never have accepted. #M2 Where does this, let's not call it an obsession, but where does this worldview come from that this is feasible, that these are not just ideas, but that this is a policy that Mr. Keir Starmer is actually pursuing? Because when he was in the US three or four weeks ago, he stood next to Donald Trump, sat next to Donald Trump, and Donald Trump actually asked him, so can you take the Russians on by yourself? Mr. Keir Starmer could only smile, right? Because obviously, the answer is no. Why is this idea there that the Europeans somehow need to lead a force, knowing that the only way this can be achieved is with the Americans in the back? Where's this coming from? #M3 Well, they want to maintain their relevance. I mean, their script's been upended. And so, in a way, now what happens is a matter of America and Russia, or Trump and Putin, and Ukraine. And Ukraine will more or less have to accept what the two great powers can agree on in this. Now, where does Europe fit in? It doesn't, because its policy was not to talk to Putin at all. There's been no diplomatic contact between European leaders and the Russian leadership for two and a half or three years. So they're not part of this bargain. They haven't got a place in it. And that's why they're terrified, sort of, they're really terrified of A, that Putin and Trump will form a new alliance which will exclude the Europeans somehow. And that America will withdraw from NATO, will abandon NATO, and that will force the Europeans to think seriously about their defense. And that's where I think the game is now. All the Europeans have said, we've got to increase our defense spending. They argue that it's to meet the Russian threat, but it's not so much to meet the Russian threat, because I don't think there is a Russian threat, actually. It's to follow up on the demand of the United States that Europe start paying a lot more for its own defense. At the moment, I think it's right to say that America contributes 75% of the cost of NATO. And Trump is saying, we're not going to defend you forever. If you want a separate policy, you've got to have a separate defense policy. Otherwise, we decide the main issues between Russia and Europe. #M2 Something that strikes me as incredible is that we had 30 years since the end of the Cold War, after 1991, 30 years to basically cash in the peace dividend, to get something out of the fact that the Soviet Union was no more and that even Russia wanted to integrate into the Western structures. And, you know, if you look at the way that the war against terror since 2001, how Russia actually supported a lot of what happened, at least in 2001, and how people like Gorbachev and after him also Yeltsin tried to continue building that common European house, and how that was completely, -- 3 of 13 -- utterly made impossible, also by the way that the Europeans approached Russia. I wonder, I wonder... what can be done in order to de-escalate the situation? Because the escalation is not just taking place since 2021. The escalation has been going on for 25 years with Russia. #M3 Well, both America and Europe were really responsible for the failure to cash in on the peace dividend. And I blame America more than Europe. The thing really is that the idea was we won. We won, and therefore we can create the new world order. And the new world order, because we won, is unipolar. America is the only pole left. In a way, the language was quite logical. If you accept that premise, there was a bipolar world. One of the poles was now knocked over. Therefore, there was a unipolar world, and the unipolar world was the American-centered world. And Russia had no consideration. Russia should have no more consideration than any defeated enemy, defeated but not conquered. And so, I think that was it. That's why the peace dividend failed to materialize in the end, because it was based on a hegemonic premise. And gradually, as Russia recovered strength and China, of course, was coming up very, very fast economically in this period, the idea naturally developed of a multipolar world. And that became the official doctrine of all the people who weren't part of the NATO-American alliance. And that's how I think it developed. Very interestingly, I've written a lot about the economist John Maynard Keynes. When he wrote "The Economic Consequences of the Peace" in 1919, which attacked the Treaty of Versailles, he never blamed the Germans. He never blamed the Germans. He said we've got to live with the Germans, and we've got to find a way of living with people we might not like or approve of because otherwise, he said, and this is the phrase, vengeance will come. And this is what happened, really, in a way, after the end of the Cold War and the recovery by Russia of not only some strength but some self-confidence, which had been completely shattered. Then this great feeling of humiliation, and we should have absolutely nailed down our original promise that NATO would not be expanded eastward. And we should have nailed it down. I mean, we never did. We were careless about it because we had won. What obstacle was there to the endless eastward expansion of NATO? And after all, it wasn't just that we had won, but we were good. We were the good side. Therefore, we had no aggressive intentions. NATO was simply an umbrella for all peace-loving nations who feared that Russia would sort of attack them. So that was the mindset. #M2 What I also encounter with colleagues and friends from Southeast Asia and with colleagues from the Global South is that, to them, the threat that NATO poses to Russia is quite evident. And most of them say, like, yeah, look, 1999, Serbia, Yugoslavia was not part of NATO, right? It was not NATO territory, but NATO went to bomb there. And NATO went to bomb other places, including Libya. And it is, I mean, obviously, this will be perceived as a potential threat by the Russians. The only ones -- 4 of 13 -- who don't see that are NATO members who keep saying we are the most peace-loving military alliance in the history of military alliances. Is this intentional, like willing blindness to