CHECKMATE: Russia-Iran Treaty SHOCKS The West | Dr. Pietro Shakarian

## A strategic firewall: why the Russia–Iran treaty matters beyond headlines On 17 January 2025 Russia and Iran signed a Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership that—by text and intent—moves far beyond a conventional bilateral pact. Rather than a narrow military alliance, the treaty is a multilayered instrument designed to institutionalize cooperation across diplomacy, economics, regional security and cultural ties. Its significance is not only in what it says explicitly (new mechanisms for economic exchange, mutual sanction support, security guarantees) but in what it signals: two states long painted by Western policymakers as isolated are formalizing a shared project to shield a broad Eurasian space from external political penetration. As the conversation with Dr. Pietro Shakarian makes clear, the treaty should be read as both a codification of decades-long rapprochement and an anticipatory doctrine for preventing another externally driven destabilization in Russia and Iran’s perceived backyard. ## Treaty as codification of deeper ties Dr. Pietro Shakarian frames the treaty as the crystallization of a process that has been unfolding for at least a decade—and arguably for three. What was previously a 2000 agreement required comprehensively updating. The 2025 document does that on paper: it systematizes cooperation forged in Syria in 2015, coordinates responses to sanctions, and creates institutional scaffolding for bypassing financial chokepoints like SWIFT. These are not rhetorical commitments; they are practical measures aimed at increasing resilience. Most importantly, the treaty builds on shared experiences of international pressure. That commonality—sanctions, diplomatic ostracism, and battlefield cooperation—has generated a political logic in which joint countermeasures, mutual economic support, and strategic alignment become both feasible and desirable. Crucially, Dr. Shakarian emphasizes that this regime is not yet a mutual-defense pact in the NATO sense. Officials on both sides insist it is not an alliance, and the text reflects that nuance. The treaty creates a framework that could be deepened over time; it establishes rules, norms and expectations that make a future, closer security intertwining far easier to institutionalize. Treaties like this work by lowering the transaction costs of closer coordination; the next steps—deeper military interoperability, intelligence sharing, or formalized collective defense—would be built on an already ratified baseline. ## Article 3 and the language of neutrality One of the treaty’s most consequential devices is the articulation of neutrality-like norms in Article 3. As discussed in the conversation, Section 3 prohibits supporting the aggressor if a signatory is attacked and commits diplomatic backing for the victim state. This is not an automatic commitment to collective military action; rather, it imposes a categorical prohibition on siding with external attackers and commits the parties to political solidarity. For states that have been individually subject to what they term “unilateral coercive measures,” such a provision is no small thing. It creates a predictable diplomatic posture that deters third-party powers contemplating intervention or proxy escalation. This emphasis on neutrality and non-support for aggression is consistent with a broader pattern in Russian diplomacy—similar clauses appear in other recent agreements—and signals an attempt to build a network of understood non-enmity. The net effect is to create diplomatic friction for external actors who might hope to isolate or leverage regional states against each other. Where formal alliance obligations are absent, the same stabilizing effect can be achieved by agreed norms of non-intervention and coordinated responses to outside coercion. ## The Eurasian focus: Caspian, Caucasus, Central Asia One of Dr. Shakarian’s central points is that this treaty is profoundly Eurasian in orientation, not merely a Middle East arrangement dressed in grand language. Articles 12–14 devote sustained attention to the Caspian Sea, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Article 12 explicitly obliges the parties to strengthen peace and security across these regions, to cooperate to prevent interference by third states, and to oppose destabilizing presences. Article 13 treats the Caspian Sea as a shared strategic zone—addressing security, energy cooperation, and even ecological management. Why is that significant? Geography and history explain part of it: the Iranian plateau, the Caucasus and Central Asia have long been zones of overlapping Russian and Persian influence; the cultural and economic ties run deep. But beyond that historical logic lies stark geopolitical rivalry. Central Asia and the Caspian basin are energy-rich prize zones. Western planners and corporate interests have long eyed pipelines, transport corridors, and resource access that could dilute Russian and Chinese influence. By allocating specific treaty language to these spaces, Russia and Iran are not simply acknowledging mutual interests—they are declaring shared stewardship and laying down red lines against trans-Caspian encroachment. The Caspian article is telling because it is not merely symbolic. Dedicating an entire article with multiple sections to a single inland sea signals an intention to manage resources, shipping, environmental issues and security in a coordinated manner. For Moscow and Tehran, preventing the emergence of rival geostrategic infrastructures—whether pipelines, rail corridors, or military footholds—is as important as formal alliance commitments. ## Economic architecture and sanctions resilience Beyond security clauses, the treaty contains measures intended to mitigate the effects of unilateral coercive measures. The parties elaborate mechanisms for bypassing financial chokepoints, supporting each other under sanctions, and developing alternative economic exchange systems. Those are practical tools designed to blunt the impact of financial exclusion and to sustain trade in strategically important sectors like energy, agriculture and defense. Dr. Shakarian draws attention to the BRICS context here: the treaty should be read in the light of an emerging multipolar economic architecture in which Russia and Iran seek to deepen ties with other non-Western economies. Bilateral currency settlements, barter arrangements, and technocratic workstreams to fortify logistics and transport corridors are the kinds of initiatives that will matter operationally. Economically, the pact seeks to institutionalize supply chains and payment systems that function independently of Western-mediated finance—an objective with long-term implications for how sanctions are made and how effective they can remain. ## Implications for neighbors: Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey The treaty’s regional emphasis has immediate implications for neighboring states whose strategic choices now sit under a new set of pressures. Armenia and Georgia are highlighted in the discussion because both are navigating difficult geopolitical choices between European integration and maintaining ties with Moscow and Tehran. For Armenia, the treaty heightens the security calculus around the Zangezur/Syunik region and raises the stakes of any Azerbaijani designs aimed at severing physical connectivity between Iran and the South Caucasus. For Georgia, the push-and-pull between pragmatic independence, Western sympathy and the realities of geography becomes sharper—especially given the Black Sea’s renewed salience. Azerbaijan’s posture—close interactions with Turkey, Israel and Western energy interests—may be complicated by a stronger Russo-Iranian coordination. Likewise, Turkey’s regional activism, including soft-power campaigning in Central Asia, is explicitly called out in the treaty’s logic of preventing third-party interference. Yet Dr. Shakarian notes a recurring motif: the treaty also leaves roo

CHECKMATE: Russia-Iran Treaty SHOCKS The West | Dr. Pietro Shakarian On January 17, 2025, Iran and Russia signed one of the most consequential treaties for West Asia in the past 200 years. The "Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership" is a game changer in much more than just the military sense. It sets the stage for a new era of civilisational cooperation and erects a fire-wall against the diabolic strategy of US/NATO/Israel to plunge even more nations into utter chaos. Today I'm talking to Dr. Pietro Shakarian from St. Petersburg’s Higher School of Economics, one of Russia’s most prestigious universities. Speaking fluently Armenian, Russian and English, Pietro is a historian of Russia and the Soviet Union, with a PhD from Ohio State University. He recently wrote a most detailed analysis of the new Russo-Iranian strategic partnership treaty, which is what we want to discuss today, so Pietro, welcome. Dr. Shakarian's analysis of the Russia- Iran Strategic Partnership treaty: https://usrussiaaccord.org/acura-exclusive-pietro-a-shakarian-the- russo-persian-partnership-pact-significance-and-implications/ #Pietro Their message is very unequivocal and clear. And this, again, goes back to our Article 12: Don't repeat Syria in the Caucasus or in Central Asia. By the way, Turkey is also quite active with NGOs in Central Asia to influence, let's say, the societies in Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, or Kyrgyzstan to be anti-Russian or opposed to China or whatever. But what they're saying is, don't try this or don't participate in this. And by the way, Turkey, if you're smart, you'll work with us. #Pascal Hello, everybody. This is Pascal from Neutrality Studies. And today I've got a fascinating scholar with me. I'm talking to Dr. Pietro Shakarian from St. Petersburg's Higher School of Economics, one of Russia's most prestigious universities. Speaking fluently in Armenian, Russian, and English, Pietro is a historian of Russia and the Soviet Union with a Ph.D. from Ohio State University. He recently wrote a detailed analysis of the new Russo-Iranian Strategic Partnership Treaty, which is what we want to discuss today. So, Pietro, welcome. #Pietro Pascal, it's a great pleasure to be on your show. Thank you for having me. #Pascal -- 1 of 18 -- Thank you for taking the time on a Sunday. Tell me, first of all, why you decided to write a very long and detailed analysis of what this new treaty means. And you also point out a couple of very important articles in there that I haven't seen in the general discourse. What exactly is the significance of this treaty to both Russia and Iran? #Pietro Well, first and foremost, we have to understand this treaty as a reflection of the strengthening of Russo-Iranian relations, specifically in the past 10 years, but you could even extend it to the past 30 years. Now, I could go back even further in history, right? I start off my article with 1829 with Kostromirza's mission to St. Petersburg following the death of Alexander Gorbachev, but the Russian- Iranian history from that point to today was a bit more varied. I mean, there were some ups and downs and so on and so forth. I'm not going to go into that completely because the main focus I have today is to discuss this treaty. But this treaty really codifies on paper, and I note this at the end of the article, what the state of Russo-Iranian relations has become. They had a treaty on the books from 2000, and that needed desperately to be updated, especially in light of recent events. Now, what do I mean by recent events? Specifically, we look at the Russo-Iranian collaboration with regard to Syria, especially during the period of 2015, exactly eight years ago now. It's hard to believe how fast time goes. But in particular, there were also developments in the Caucasus, as well as in Gaza and Ukraine. And in particular, Ukraine, because basically this kind of brought Russia and Iran closer together as two sanctioned countries, two countries that were pronounced to be isolated, quote-unquote, by official Washington. And in the end, we see actually they are proving to the rest of the world that they are bucking this isolation. And the question is, how truly isolated are they? I mean, we're seeing in here articles in this treaty, for example. And these are the articles that are probably most discussed about how they're going to bypass SWIFT. They're going to create new kinds of economic exchange mechanisms. Also, they discuss measures on mutual sanctions support. They're not going to support any kind of unilateral coercive measures against the other signatory, and so on and so forth. So that's a huge thing. Right off the bat, to look at this in the framework of what I call the rise of the rest, the BRICS, this is number one. This is the idea of Russia and Iran coming together as part of this rise of the rest. But there's also a significant defensive component to this treaty. It doesn't mean an alliance. The Iranian officials say that, and the Russian officials say that. It's true because if you look at the articles, it's not yet something like a military alliance. It creates the framework for something like that, but it's not yet that, right? A pivotal article, actually, when we look at this treaty, is Article 3. And Article 3, Section 3 has in it this note. This is actually Section 3, where it basically prohibits support for the aggressor. So if one -- 2 of 18 -- of the signatories is attacked, then the other signatory cannot support the aggressor in the event of that attack and will diplomatically support the other country, right? So it's not yet getting to a point where, if Iran is attacked, Russia would support them, or if, let's say, Russia is attacked, Iran would support them. It's not yet that locked in, but it creates the foundation for something like this. So that's that. And also, the other thing I wanted to mention is how, and this is what I'm getting to shortly in our discussion, how Eurasia-focused it is. So much of our discussions with Russia and Iran focus on the Middle East, and with good reason. We see their positions on Syria and many other issues. Even though Russia does not directly support Iran on the issue of the axis of resistance, it has supported diplomatic efforts to stop the atrocities, really genocide, in Gaza, right? Russia and China were among the first countries calling for a ceasefire. We saw, unfortunately, what happened with that. But this treaty is of enormous historical significance. #Pascal I'm quite glad that you're pointing out Article 3 because what that promises, or what this is, is what this channel is also, by its name, dedicated to. This is a neutrality agreement where both sides promise their military neutrality in case of a third-party war, which is something Russia has been doing a lot. The most important one of those being the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact in the Second World War, the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact. #Pietro Yeah. #Pascal And actually, interestingly enough, Russia also has a similar article now with North Korea, at least if the North Korean publication of their treaty is correct. So do you think Russia is currently trying to build a new network, not so much of allies, but of confirmed partners with these security components that would say, like, no, we will not ally, but we will not be enemies to each other? #Pietro I think that's definitely part of it. Especially within the frameworks of BRICS, I mean, we're coming off the Russian BRICS presidency. So they are definitely looking at the idea of expanding their international connections outside of the focus on the West, right? Because their international ties, I mean, overwhelmingly before, have been very focused on Europe and North America. If you look at the Russian Foreign Ministry's priorities in the world, the West used to be among the top, and now -- 3 of 18 -- they've sunk considerably in that ranking. But the other thing is, it's a little bit more than that because when we talk about, for example, some of these other articles, when I talk about, for instance, Article 12, Article 13, Article 14, there is an extraordinarily significant Eurasian dynamic. And this is very important to understand because look at the basic geography, Pascal. Iran mostly corresponds to the historical Iranian plateau, right? Or we can also maybe call it the Iranian or the Persian cultural continent, which spans, I mean, we're talking also, this could informally include in the idea of Greater Iran, the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia in this kind of informal Persian sphere. But really, Central Asia and the Caucasus, these areas are zones of joint cultural influence, we could say, between Russia and Iran, historically going back many centuries. We think about Uzbekistan, for example. We look at the great cities of Samarkand. There's enormous Persian influence in these places. So you have that, but also it's extraordinarily important for Russia and Iran in a security framework, in a security dynamic, because it's also well known that the West, in particular Western war hawks and Western big energy, wants to get into this region to undermine the influence of Russia, Iran, and also China, because Central Asia adjoins China, right? And there have always been these visions for, let's say, a trans-Caspian pipeline, basically to expand what is now the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline further east across the Caspian to Turkmenistan. Turkmenistan is a country that has maybe the world's fourth or fifth largest reserve of natural gas. Incredibly important. It's also not counting Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. These countries in Central Asia are enormously, enormously energy-rich. They're a big prize on the geopolitical chessboard. If we go back to Zbigniew Brzezinski's grand chessboard, a lot of, I guess you could say, war hawks in the West, allied with big energy interests, want to kind of cut in here to contain, as they see it, Russia and Iran. So it's not without coincidence that Article 13 is devoted entirely to the Caspian region. #Pascal Can you tell us what it says? #Pietro Well, basically, the overall point—would you like me to go over Article 12, 13, or 14? #Pascal Tell me what's important about them. Can you tell us what they are? #Pietro -- 4 of 18 -- Well, first of all, Article 12 of these treaties basically obliges the signatories, as I wrote in my article, to promote the strengthening of peace and security in the Caspian region, Central Asia, Transcaucasia—which is the South Caucasus—and the Middle East. It unequivocally calls on the sides to cooperate with the objective of preventing the interference and destabilizing presence of third states, which most certainly means, first and foremost, the United States, but also the United Kingdom. BP has a 30% stake in the BTC pipeline. Also Israel, and also the states of the EU. You could include Turkey in that, although there might be some debate: is Turkey a part of this region, or is it an interloper, right? From the Iranian and Russian point of view, the view of Turkey has not been so positive since the events in Syria, right? But in any case, it's against the third state. So that's one whole article. That's the main focus of it. And the Caspian Article 13 details specifically, in these four sections, the necessity of this region to both Russia and Iran in terms of, you know, maybe we can say security cooperation, economic cooperation, north-south cooperation, right? We talk about this idea of the north-south corridor. The Caspian Sea is another potential avenue for that, not only over land through Azerbaijan or through Turkmenistan, but also overseas. You have that option as well. In addition, even cooperation in the energy sphere is a big one, as well as cooperation on ecological issues. We also have to consider that the Caspian is a common body of water between Iran and Russia, right? So there's that. But that article alone, you have to think. I look