Why Trump is Willing to Give So Much to Putin | Amb. Chas Freeman

## Framing the Stakes: What’s Really at Issue in the Ukraine Talks The recent flurry of diplomacy around Ukraine is less about stopping a fight and more about the reconfiguration of European security and great-power relations. The conversation with Ambassador Chas Freeman makes this plain: the ceasefire proposals and peace talk choreography are symptoms of a far larger question—whether the United States and Russia can reach a new modus vivendi that reshapes the post–Cold War order. If such a deal is pursued, Ukraine becomes the site where a grand bargain is realized or rejected, not the unilateral prize either side was painted to be. That shift reframes every public denunciation, every demand for “boots on the ground,” and every moral argument about sovereignty into bargaining positions in a strategic contest over how Europe will be organized for decades to come. ## Trump’s Objective: Rapprochement, Not a Single-Issue Peace Ambassador Freeman offers a pointed interpretation: President Trump appears to be aiming at a broad rapprochement with Russia, and the war in Ukraine is a means to that larger end. From this vantage, ceasefire proposals are tactical devices—levers to restart a relationship with Moscow rather than endpoints in their own right. This helps explain Trump’s willingness, in public perception, to concede what looks like much to Russia. The reality, Freeman suggests, is that the concessions are grounded in the facts on the ground: Russia already controls significant Ukrainian territory and, barring a dramatic military reversal, stands to consolidate more. Trump’s approach therefore reads less like capitulation than a recognition that diplomacy must begin with those facts. That calculus has political consequences. A U.S. administration prioritizing normalization with Russia will structure offers and incentives around achieving that rapprochement—security guarantees, economic cooperation, and a reworked European architecture—rather than insisting on a maximalist restoration of Ukrainian territorial integrity. Amb. Freeman’s emphasis is not simply tactical: it invites us to see the American initiative as driven by a geopolitical logic rather than personal affinity alone, even if personality amplifies the political will to break with prevailing narratives. ## What Russia Wants: Neutrality, Protection, and a New Security Architecture Parsing the demands attributed to Moscow clarifies why few negotiators see easy solutions. Freeman identifies three core Russian objectives: protection for Russian speakers in Ukraine (which Moscow now ties to recognition of annexed oblasts), Ukrainian neutrality (explicitly barring NATO membership or hostile forces on Ukrainian soil), and a renegotiated European security architecture that addresses Russian security concerns. The implication of these demands is profound. The neutrality Russia seeks resembles the mid-20th-century Austrian formula: a sovereign, democratic state committed to nonalignment, with legal guarantees for minority rights. That model, Freeman notes, offers a template—Austria’s post–1955 arrangement being both neutral and prosperous. But the third demand—the broad security settlement—is the hardest: it requires reconceiving NATO’s posture, commitments, and the web of alliances that have underpinned European security since 1949. For Moscow, neutrality for Ukraine without a reconfigured European security order would be partial and unstable. For NATO and European capitals, any renegotiation that leaves Russia feeling secure will feel like surrender. That is the political blind spot that makes such talks combustible. ## Negotiation Dynamics: Skill, Credibility, and the “Nuances” Problem Successful diplomacy depends on skilled practitioners and credible interlocutors. Freeman highlights an asymmetry in experience—Russia’s delegation is seasoned, while some U.S. political actors involved have far less diplomatic track record. That gap matters in bargaining over texture and text: “nuances” or qualifications can become the difference between a deal and a disaster. Moscow’s acceptance of a ceasefire “with nuances” is not a wishy-washy footnote but a demand for fundamental principles—principles that echo Russia’s 2021 ultimatum and the early 2022 Istanbul drafts. Equally important is the Ukrainian position. Zelensky’s public refusal to cede territory or formally pursue neutrality has been a major obstacle, according to Freeman. Even the Jeddah talks—which yielded a temporary alignment between Washington and Kyiv—left open whether Kyiv would follow through. Diplomacy in this context is a triangular tug: Washington and Moscow may find a corridor to an agreement, but Kyiv’s willingness to accept the political costs of territorial compromise or neutrality is central. Without Ukrainian assent, any externally brokered “solution” risks being unstable or rejected outright. ## European Disarray: Spoilers, Scare Stories, and Strategic Drift Europe looms as both audience and actor in the unfolding drama, but Freeman is blunt about its present incapacity to craft a stabilizing proposal. The continent lacks consensus; its governments oscillate between panic-driven rearmament and rhetorical postures that range from moral absolutism to tactical hedging. The result is not a coherent third way but a cacophony of positions—calls for peacekeepers that would, in effect, reintroduce NATO forces into Ukraine; talk of nuclear umbrellas; and national nuclear ambitions in Germany and elsewhere. These reactions are, in Freeman’s view, driven less by sober threat assessment than by fear of American abandonment and by the echo chamber of Western information campaigns. This fragmentation makes Europe a potential spoiler. Rather than contributing constructive formats for negotiation, European actors often default to maximalist military postures or moral litmus tests that impede compromise. Freeman’s warning is stark: the continent risks learning the wrong lesson—investing in military capabilities driven by an exaggerated or invented threat narrative will entrench military confrontation and perpetuate Europe’s division, rather than restore peace and integration. ## Rearmament Risks: Economic Burdens and Perpetual Division The talk of rearmament across Europe—Germany reindustrializing its defense sector, France offering deterrent umbrellas, Britain worrying about its diminished influence—carries long-term costs that are too often ignored. Freeman underscores two linked problems: the economic burden and the strategic inertia it produces. Europe’s economies are not in a position to sustain sweeping defense expansion without neglecting social investment and economic modernization. Germany’s industrial setback after losing access to cheap Russian energy and France’s wider geopolitical strains serve as reminders that defense spending is not a panacea. Worse, rearmament risks institutionalizing a military division of the continent. Rather than moving toward the “whole and free Europe” many profess, the present trajectory cements blocs, spheres of influence, and persistent military readiness against an adversary that, in sustained peace, would be a partner rather than an enemy. That outcome suits no one except permanent-war advocates and defense industries. Freeman’s counsel is practical: Europe should be devising political formats for peace and stability, not training schedules and procurement plans that assume endless confrontation. ## The Practical Path Forward: Realism, Dialogue, and Ukrainian Agency What would a pragmatic way forward look like? Freeman’s argument implicitly sketches three elements: realism about military facts on the ground; direct U.S.–Russia engagement on a comprehensive security framework; and meaningful inclusion of Ukrainian agency in any settlement. Realism means recognizing that military stalemate or incremental Russian gains have altered negotiating leverage. Dialogue means opening channels b

Why Trump is Willing to Give So Much to Putin | Amb. Chas Freeman Why is Trump being so agreeable to Russia? And why is Putin so eager to end the war through peace dealings, contrary to people's perception of him wanting to conquer Ukraine? To answer these questions and to get insight into the recent Russia-USA peace talks, today I’m talking once more to the outspoken Ambassador Chas Freeman, who among many other positions served as US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia and later became Assistant Secretary of Defence back in the 1990s. He also was Richard Nixons principal interpreter during his 1972 visit to China, which lead to the normalization of US–China relations. The best ways to support us: Donations on Patreon: patreon. com/NeutralityStudies. A subscription on Substack: pascallottaz.substack.com. Follow us also in Audio Podcast Form: Apple: https://podcasts.apple.com/ch/podcast/neutrality-studies/id1791051233 Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/2vvTf44yckVz1hDggVolgB?si=03305b3fe8ad4cf3 #M3 I see statements made that Mr. Trump proposes to give Mr. Putin everything he wants. Well, Mr. Putin already has the territories in Ukraine. He already has won the war for all intents and purposes. If the war goes on, he will take more of Ukraine. And so what Mr. Trump is doing, it seems to me, is recognizing the realities that the war has produced. And those are unfortunate. They have been particularly unfortunate for the Ukrainians, who may have lost as many as a million men in the battles, who have been depopulated, deindustrialized, de-democratized, and who remain the poorest and most corrupt society in Europe. #M2 Hello, everybody. This is Pascal Lottaz from Neutrality Studies, and today I'm talking once more to the outspoken Ambassador Chas Freeman, who, among many other positions, served as U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia and later became Assistant Secretary of Defense back in the 1990s. He also was Richard Nixon's principal interpreter during his 1972 visit to China, which led to the normalization of U.S.-China relations. Ambassador Freeman, great to have you back. #M3 Nice to be with you, Pascal. #M2 -- 1 of 8 -- Well, you've been talking quite a lot recently on various programs and helping us to understand the situation of current affairs, especially of U.S. foreign policy. And I wanted to ask you first about your interpretation of this peace process that seems to be going on between the U.S. and Russia. How do you make sense of it? And do you think this ceasefire proposal that was floated and that is now being discussed has serious chances of success? #M3 Well, it is very hard to make sense of all this. My own supposition is that President Trump wants a broad rapprochement and engagement with Russia to replace the current hostility. The issue of Ukraine is a means to that end, rather than ending the war in Ukraine being an end in itself. In trying to engineer this, the American administration has confronted a number of difficulties. Obviously, the demonization of Mr. Putin, the vilification of Russia, and the national consensus, which has seen a grave threat from Russia to Europe and to NATO, stand in the way of any policy. Mr. Trump, however, doesn't seem to be much inhibited by public opinion. He is able to break through it, and that is a good thing. The obstacles to any negotiation to end the war are pretty obvious. The major one actually has been the adamant refusal of Volodymyr Zelensky, the president—maybe not the constitutional president, but the leader of Ukraine—to engage in any kind of negotiation on any subject. And I note that even though, in return for a resumption of intelligence and material support during the talks in Jeddah, right after they concluded, he came out and reiterated that he would not negotiate any cession of territory to Russia. So it's not clear how serious he is about agreeing to a negotiation with the Russians. The major achievement of those talks in Jeddah, however, was the agreement by Zelensky to negotiate with the Russians. The ceasefire was an incidental thing. In many ways, it was more a ceasefire between Donald Trump and Volodymyr Zelensky than anything else. It was an offer of a ceasefire to Russia arranged at the instance of the United States. But I think even those in the United States who came up with this proposal realized that it had very minimal prospects for actually happening. And we turn to the Russian side. The Russians have been very consistent over the years, holding to the three demands that they made in December 2021 to bring this war to an end and to achieve peace in Europe. Those three demands are essentially protection for Russian speakers in Ukraine, which Russia now insists is to be accomplished through its legal recognition of its annexation of all four of the oblasts in Eastern Ukraine, which are predominantly Russian-speaking, as well as, of course, Crimea, which is also predominantly Russian-speaking. So that is an issue that suggests there can be no progress in the negotiations if Mr. Zelensky maintains the position he now has, which is that he will not make territorial concessions. The second demand for the Russians, the most important one in many ways, was that Ukraine return to the neutrality in which it was born. -- 2 of 8 -- Ukraine was recognized by Russia at its independence on the basis of a provision in its constitution and policy statements that declared it would remain neutral and not a member of any bloc. Of course, since then, Ukraine has been persuaded to apply to NATO for membership, and this has become a major campaign issue for Mr. Zelensky and the Ukrainians, as well as for some Europeans who embrace this position. I note here, however, that Mr. Stoltenberg, the Secretary General of NATO, now openly admits that NATO membership is no longer on the table for Ukraine. So neutrality essentially means in this context, and I recognize I'm speaking to an expert on neutrality, but I think in this case, it means no hostile forces on Ukrainian territory directed at Russia. The Russians initially put forward a lot of ancillary demands about troop and armament levels and so forth on the part of the Ukrainians. I think all these things are negotiable, but neutrality is not. So essentially, to tie these two things together, Russia has been demanding a version of the Austrian State Treaty of 1955. That is a treaty which would guarantee the neutrality of Ukraine and would ensure it would not join any military bloc, but would also protect minorities in Ukraine in accordance with the CSCE (Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe) rules, which provide that minorities should have the right to cultural autonomy and to use their own language for limited purposes, even in a state where the major official language is something else. Austria has been a good example of this. Austria has been neutral. It is democratic. It is prosperous. Its various minorities—Italians in the Tyrol, Slovenes, Hungarians, and others—have all enjoyed exemplary recognition of their cultural and linguistic autonomy. So this is essentially what the Russians are demanding. There is a third demand, however, which is far more complex and which at the moment is very contentious. That is the renegotiation of the security architecture in Europe to create a system in which Russia does not feel a threat from NATO, and NATO does not feel a threat from Russia. The problem here is going back to what I said earlier about American public opinion, and that is the successful vilification of Russia and the exaggeration of the Russian threat. This seems to have been fully internalized by most Europeans. So we see now a discussion going on among Europeans, which is motivated by fear of American withdrawal from Europe, the abandonment of Europeans, or the conditioning of defense commitments under NATO, requiring the Europeans, after 80 years of relying on the United States to maintain order on their continent, to come up with some order of their own and to do it, obviously, in cooperation with Russia, because Europe can't have a successful order if it excludes Russia and treats it as an enemy. But the Europeans seem to be still fixated on dividing Europe into rival military spheres of influence. And so, rather than talking about political arrangements that might settle the Ukraine conflict and lead to an agreement on broad security, stability, and peace in Europe, they are still talking about some things that are frankly fairly ridiculous, like peacekeepers in Ukraine, when there is no peace to keep, and when the peacekeepers would come from NATO, which means that the very reason the Russians went to war would be violated. -- 3 of 8 -- Russia went to war to keep NATO out of Ukraine. So this is really silly talk, and the silliness is compounded by the statement of people like Rishi Sunak, the Prime Minister of the UK, who says, of course, we would put troops on the ground in Ukraine, but they'd have to be backed by the United States. Well, the United States has made it abundantly clear it has had enough of Ukraine. So anyway, all of this is premised on delusional views of reality. I see statements made that Mr. Trump proposes to give Mr. Putin everything he wants. Well, Mr. Putin already has the territories in Ukraine. He has already won the war for all intents and purposes. If the war goes on, he will take more of Ukraine. And so what Mr. Trump is doing, it seems to me, is recognizing the realities that the war has produced. And those are unfortunate. They have been particularly unfortunate for the Ukrainians, who may have lost as many as a million men in the battles, who have been depopulated, de-industrialized, de-democratized, and who remain the poorest and most corrupt society in Europe. So this is when you ask, you know, to make sense of all this. It's got multiple parts. It's not easy to make sense of it. And we don't know, on top of this, what the skill level of the American diplomats involved is. We know that Sergei Lavrov and Ryabkov and others on the Russian side are very experienced. You know, Mr. Lavrov has 45 years of diplomatic experience, and he demonstrates it when he speaks. Marco Rubio has 45 days of experience. So we don't know how feasible an agreement might be, given the untested nature of some of the people who would have to negotiate it. So I'll stop here. That's a lot. I apologize for going on at such length. #M2 That is very useful. And you're touching right on two more things I want to ask about. I mean, the skill level is, of course, one. I talked the other day to Michael von der Schulenburg, who used to be a top UN negotiator, and he was intimately involved also in the Iran-Iraq conflict, ceasefire, and peace negotiations back in the late '80s. And his interpretation is that this approach towards a ceasefire is actually very skillfully done from both sides, the US and Russia, because the US managed to offer something that they can potentially implement because Ukraine is on a much shorter leash now, and Russia is now asking for the settlement of details on how to implement it. In his view, this is a very skilled way of approaching the issue. Maybe I ask you about this, but then the second thing that I wonder is if, in your experience, what the UK, France, and the Europeans are doing at the moment—talking about boots on the ground and also using this language that goes back to the second Iraq war, of the coalition of the willing—is not only not skilled, but potentially the role of a spoiler in the process of trying to create a condition under which outside interference, even if it is not a powerful interference, might actually halt the process as it is. Do you see that as a danger? #M3 -- 4 of 8 -- Well, that's really two questions. Let me start with the second. I think the Europeans are not at the table because they have no peace proposal at all. So putting them at the table would be disruptive. It would not acc