Japanese Military Expert Talks Defense, Alliances, China, Ukraine and Venezuela | Koji Imaki

## Introduction Japan stands at a strategic inflection point: a long-standing pacifist constitution, an entrenched security dependence on the United States, and an increasingly assertive neighborhood are colliding with political pressure to “normalize” Japan’s defense posture. The conversation with Koji Imaki, a former Japan Air Self-Defense Force pilot and senior leader, brings these tensions into sharp operational focus. Rather than abstract debates about constitutional text or party labels, the discussion reveals how doctrinal shifts, alliance bargaining, and technological choices shape what Japan’s military can and cannot do — and how those constraints translate into concrete missions, training, and capability development. Imaki’s reflections underscore a central paradox. Japan’s strategic posture is simultaneously conservative and adaptive: conservative in maintaining a defense-first legal framework and adaptive in quietly expanding what that framework allows, through new doctrines such as “stand-off defense” and incremental operational practice like force protection for allies. The result is a Japan that is neither fully remilitarized nor permanently hamstrung by pacifism; it is a state negotiating the limits of self-defense in a multipolar, contested region. ## Japan's Strict Rules for Overseas Operations Japan’s postwar defense identity was built deliberately around limits. Article 9 of the constitution is the legal touchstone that constrained political and military imagination for decades: renounce war, maintain no traditional military forces, and reserve only defensive measures. The Self-Defense Forces (SDF) evolved under that canopy, prioritizing air defense, maritime patrol, and island defense rather than expeditionary strike. Imaki emphasizes that these constraints were not merely legalistic pedantry; they translated into doctrine, training, and even battlefield behavior such as restrictions on when Japanese personnel could return fire in multinational missions. The 2015 reinterpretation of the constitution loosened the most visible operational chains: it permitted limited collective self-defense and deployments alongside allies outside Japan for clearly defined purposes like evacuation and logistical support. Yet the change did not precipitate a flood of overseas combat operations. Practice has been cautious, narrowly tailored, and operationally conservative. Deployments to places like Afghanistan were cast as evacuations or non-combat support; rules of engagement in coalition settings often required Japanese forces to act only in self-defense, a posture that created moments of awkward dependence on coalition partners for protection. Those operational realities have fed domestic debate: are existing rules fit for present-day contingencies, or do they leave Japan exposed or ineffective when allied forces — and regional security — demand more integrated action? The 2022 shift toward a “stand-off defense capability” illustrates how Japan is methodically translating strategic anxieties into doctrine without crossing constitutional red lines. The government framed what is in effect a counter-strike capacity as a defensive requisite — a semantic and legal maneuver that allows more robust capabilities while staying within constitutional constraints as interpreted by policymakers. For practitioners like Imaki, such doctrinal recalibrations are less an ideological remilitarization than a response to a changed threat environment: more missiles, more coercion in maritime domains, and an imperative to deter attacks before they materialize. ## Reciprocity in the US-Japan Defense Treaty At the operational heart of Japanese defense thinking is the U.S.-Japan alliance. Imaki and the broader conversation depict this relationship not as an immutable given but as a bargaining equilibrium built on reciprocal expectations. Historically, the bargain has been land-for-protection: American bases on Japanese soil in exchange for extended deterrence. Yet as Japanese leaders and policy elites talk about doing more, allied reciprocity becomes a central issue. If Tokyo is to assume greater burden-sharing, what does it expect in return? Does reciprocity entail more collaborative basing, integrated command arrangements, or technology sharing — and how much symmetry is realistic to demand from the global superpower? The debate extends deep into political symbolism. For some in Japan, being a “normal” country means shedding the linguistic and legal constraints that forced the euphemism “Self-Defense Forces.” For others, normalization means merely paying a fairer share of alliance costs: developing indigenous capabilities to be a more useful partner rather than assuming a separate independent role. Imaki’s practical lens reframes reciprocity: the SDF has already been performing “force protection” missions for U.S. aircraft and vessels in Japan for roughly a decade. That operational reciprocity is meaningful, even if it falls short of the symmetry some political commentators imagine (for example, the idea of Japanese bases on American soil). In Imaki’s view, the path forward combines delegating new missions to the SDF while deepening joint programs and co-development projects that anchor reciprocity in capability rather than purely in territorial swaps. A second implication of this alliance bargaining is political leverage. Shifts in U.S. domestic politics and trade policy — symbolized by tariff disputes and transactional pressure — have injected uncertainty into Tokyo’s calculus. The prospect of overreliance on a single partner drives Tokyo toward diversification, an argument Imaki endorses in practice, even while acknowledging the alliance’s centrality. Concretely, reciprocity is being operationalized in technology co-development, integrated logistics, and mission-sharing frameworks, not in a symmetric trade of basing rights. ## Military Dialogue with China Conversations about Japan’s military posture inevitably run up against Beijing’s reactions. Any Japanese expansion of capabilities, even those framed as defensive, triggers suspicion across East Asia. Imaki articulates a pragmatic approach: China and Japan need military-to-military dialogue, partly to manage crises and partly to reduce the chance of unintended escalation. Yet the region lacks a NATO-like collective security architecture, so bilateral and ad hoc multilateral channels become the default mechanisms for deconfliction. Operationally, this absence of a region-wide collective defense mechanism shapes Japanese planning. Tokyo cannot assume regional political solidarity or a coordinated military backstop in the way European states could under NATO. Therefore, Japan’s defense posture combines deterrence — through capability build-up and alliance commitments — with selective confidence-building measures. The idea is to avoid creating provocative footprints while still preparing to defend critical sea lanes, islands, and infrastructure. Imaki’s point on diversification is crucial here: Japan’s pursuit of partnerships with European states, Australia, and others is partly an attempt to hedge against regional rivalry. Joint weapons development programs, like the GCAP fighter collaboration with European partners, are not merely industrial strategies; they are political signals that Tokyo is widening its security relationships beyond bilateral dependence on Washington. Such moves can complicate Beijing’s strategic calculus by embedding Japanese capabilities in a broader, multinational ecosystem that increases the political cost of coercion. But dialogue with China is not just about posture; it must also be procedural. Communication channels to manage encounters at sea and in the air are operational necessities. The conversation makes clear that Tokyo sees military dialogue as part of crisis management: mechanisms that allow rapid notification, behavioral norms, and agreed procedures to prevent minor

Is Japan About to REMILITARIZE? An Ex- JASDF Officer's Analysis Is Japan's recent defense build-up a shift toward hawkishness, or just an attempt to become a "normal" country? How would Japan, a pacifist nation by constitution, react if its main ally, the US, were to start a war? We dive deep into the unique constraints and surprising flexibility of Japan's military. Today I’m talking to Koji Imaki, a former Pilot and Senior Leader in the Japan Air Self- Defense Force with many flight hours in both the American-made F-35 and the indigenous F-2 fighter jets. Mr. Imaki has worked for decades in the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, so today we want to discuss his country’s military position in the emerging multipolarity. Mr. Imaki shares his unique perspective on the operational realities of Japan's constitutional limits, the delicate balance of the US alliance, and the search for new defense partners. We also explore the internal debate over defense spending and the ongoing, complex military relationship—or lack thereof—with neighbors like China and Russia. Links: Imaki's Linkedin: https://www.linkedin.com/in/koji-imaki-46066a1b0 Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Goods Store: https://neutralitystudies- shop.fourthwall.com Timestamps: 00:00:00 Introduction 00:00:46 Why Japan Has a "Self-Defense Force", Not an Army 00:07:16 Japan's Strict Rules for Overseas Operations 00:13:48 Is Japan's New Government More Hawkish? 00:16:34 Reciprocity in the US-Japan Defense Treaty 00:22:51 Can Japan Defend Itself Without the US? 00:29:09 Military Dialogue with China 00:37:48 Japan's Stance on Russia and the Ukraine War 00:43:34 How Japan Would React to a US-Led War 00:50:47 The Debate Over Japan's Defense Budget #Pascal Hello, everybody. This is Pascal Lottaz from Neutrality Studies, and today I'm talking to Koji Imaki, a former pilot and senior leader in the Japan Air Self-Defense Force, with many flight hours in both the American-made F-35 and the indigenous F-2 fighter jets. Mr. Imaki has worked for decades in the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, so today we want to discuss his country's military position in the emerging multipolarity. Imaki-san, welcome. #Koji Imaki Thank you. Thank you for having me. It's a great honor for me. #Pascal I'm very glad you said yes to this, because I've been looking for a military expert in Japan for a while—someone who could also tell us a bit about how the Self-Defense Forces work as Japan’s military. Maybe we should start by explaining in what sense the Japanese military is different from -- 1 of 16 -- other countries’ militaries, and why it’s called a Self-Defense Force. Could you give us a short rundown, especially focusing on the differences compared to, say, the U.S. or European militaries? #Koji Imaki Yeah, Pascal-san, that’s a very interesting and actually deep question to answer. Let me start with the current Japanese National Defense Strategy. It’s a five-year defense plan, or what they call a defense build-up plan. There’s one element among the seven pillars of focus in the National Defense Strategy, which I think they call the stand-off defense capability. That used to be discussed in the Diet, between the coalition parties—the LDP and Komeito—as the counter-strike capability. Now it’s called the stand-off defense capability. So that kind of capability is basically the most fundamental offensive capability for any military service, because you need to have a strike-back capability to defend your country. But in Japan’s case, possession of such a capability has not been strictly prohibited, but rather avoided, I would say, by the Self-Defense Forces because of the interpretation of the Japanese Constitution. The Constitution doesn’t prohibit having such a capability, but based on political judgment, the Self-Defense Forces have focused purely on defense-oriented capabilities, such as air defense. And we’ve been relying on that kind of capability from our allies and partners, such as the U.S. forces in Japan. But facing the current situation—quite challenging security circumstances around Japan, such as North Korean missile development and Chinese coercive activities around Japan, including the East China Sea and the South China Sea—the Japanese government in 2022 decided to have such a capability to defend our country. So they came up with a somewhat unusual term, “stand-off defense capability,” but again, it’s de facto the counter-strike capability. That, I think, explains how the Japanese Self-Defense Forces are a little bit different from other services in Western countries, and how the Self-Defense Forces have developed their capability over the seven decades of our history. #Pascal Yeah, we might just need to add, you know, that the Japanese Constitution has this famous Article 9, which says that Japan renounces the right to go to war, first of all, and secondly, will not maintain forces to do such a thing. Hence, Japan has no military, but only Self-Defense Forces, because the Constitution recognizes the right to self-defense. And in conjunction with that, the doctrine was that Japan would only maintain capabilities to shoot down any kind of incoming threat, right, but not to strike a potential target where a threat could emerge. And that was the change in 2022, right? That Japan, for the first time, said if North Korea launches a rocket at us, we will not just shoot down the rocket—we might also strike the launch pad in North Korea, right? That’s the difference, at least as the government explained it. And do you also see it like that? Or would it also extend to other scenarios? -- 2 of 16 -- #Koji Imaki Hmm. I didn’t go into various detailed scenarios, but I think that one is very easy to understand. And actually, that sort of discussion is not new in Japan—it didn’t just pop up in the 2023 timeframe. Almost 40 or 50 years ago, there was a Japanese government statement in a cabinet discussion saying that waiting for an adversary to launch a decisive strike on Japan—and then being dead because of that—is not what the Japanese Constitution asks Japanese nationals to do. So that hasn’t changed. The political will has been there, that such a capability is within constitutional constraints. But again, based on political judgment, the Japanese government decided not to have such a capability up until 2022. So that’s sort of been the long-standing policy for Japan. #Pascal Right. And, you know, one of the things is that Japan’s policy changes and self-defense policy changes are looked at with great suspicion, especially from China and South Korea. They’re often interpreted as a potential threat. But I usually tell people, look, in 2015, Mr. Shinzo Abe changed the interpretation of the Constitution to also allow Japan’s Self-Defense Forces to be deployed together with allied forces outside Japan. But that change actually didn’t lead to a militarization of Japan. It didn’t lead to many Japanese forces being deployed abroad. My argument at this point—and I wonder if you agree—is that Japan is still quite constrained in terms of where it deploys its forces. Do you also see it like that? #Koji Imaki Uh... yes, I think so. I think the operation you’re referring to was the deployment of Japanese forces to places like Afghanistan or Ukraine, basically to evacuate Japanese nationals from unsafe zones back to Japan. That was the purpose of the deployment. But I think the argument there, even within the Japanese government and among allies and partners, is: is that the only purpose? I mean, bringing Japanese nationals back from an unsafe zone to a safe zone—is that really the whole purpose of a Japanese Self-Defense Forces mission? Or maybe to include other allies’ and partners’ nationals, bringing them back to the safe zone, if it makes sense to carry out such an operation at the same time as the retrieval of Japanese nationals. So those are the areas the Self-Defense Forces need to think about in the near future—not just for the sake of Japanese nationals’ safety, but for broader safety and the well-being of people in our region, I think. #Pascal But this is where Japan has been... I mean, the discussion inside Japan has been going on for decades, right? There were Japanese troops deployed in Afghanistan who, famously, at some point -- 3 of 16 -- needed to be protected by coalition forces because, under the doctrine, they were not allowed to fire at incoming enemy fire if that fire wasn’t directed at them. If it was directed at the Spanish or the Americans, then the Japanese had to sit tight, right? That was the doctrine, and it was kept up even on the battleground. This has led to a lot of discussion about whether that even makes sense, and to pressure from the United States. So where do we stand today on this kind of, well, you know, JSDF joint operations with Japan’s allies? #Koji Imaki That's, Pascal-san, a very good and deep discussion. So the point is, if we are deploying our forces to a war zone—or basically a peacetime zone—and the Japanese definition of past deployments was that we were dispatching our forces to a non-war zone, that’s why, like you said, the only time we could use deadly force was for the purpose of self-defense. So, like you said, if they’re shooting at us, then we can protect ourselves by shooting back. But if those enemies are shooting at other people, then it falls within the category of collective self-defense—so more of a collective defense in basically wartime. And that’s the discussion the Japanese government needs to, you know, dig into more broadly—to broaden the Self-Defense Forces’ mission. And it’s quite difficult for the current LDP administration, which is a minority government. Unlike the Abe era, which had a majority in both the Diet and the cabinet, the current situation is quite different. And now Komeito is exiting the coalition because of those very serious and necessary discussions. From my perspective, they don’t want to be part of such a discussion because it would conflict with their own policy. #Pascal Yeah. And maybe we should say that the government just changed last week, and we now have a female prime minister. But that prime minister is still from the same LDP, the same party as before. The previous coalition partner, Komeito, has now been replaced by Ishin—the Innovation Party— which is more to the right and actually more aligned with the foreign policy goals of Mrs. Takahichi than Komeito, which is more of a centrist, pacifist force. So, in a sense, we now have a probably more hawkish cabinet, although the defense minister, Mr. Koizumi, has a rather centrist stance. I mean, it’s very diverse, actually, within Japan. Where would you place the current cabinet, the way it’ s formed? Let’s compare it to the previous Abe cabinets, the different stages. Where would you put it, more or less? #Koji Imaki So, you know, Pascal-san, that’s quite an interesting aspect of Japanese policymaking. But I wouldn’t call it hawkish, or I wouldn’t call it a right-wing administration, because if we go back to our -- 4 of 16 -- discussion from about ten minutes ago, we were talking about how the Japanese government and the Self-Defense Forces have been acting—and not even being able to protect our allies and partners—and that we’re trying to, you know, fix that situation. So, are we going to do it right? Or are we just going to normalize the situation as a domestic issue? Right, that’s my argument. So, uh, if we are—if, uh, one can argue that we are moving to the right, but I’d say it’s more like we’re going back to the center from very different places. Which is, you know, very selfish in a way— somebody is protecting us, so we don’t have to spend such a large amount of money on our own defense. It’s kind of that mentality. Moving toward more of a “paying the ticket fee,” like an adult fare instead of a child fare, sort of thing. So that’s my argument. #Pascal I find that very inter