Drums Of War: Georgia and Armenia On the Brink | P. Shakarian & L. Kasradze

## The Spiritual Faultline: Church, Identity, and Power in Armenia What emerges from the conversation is a portrait of a society in which the collision between political authority and sacred institutions has become the defining crisis. In Armenia, the Apostolic Church is not simply a religious body; it is the repository of national memory, language, and cultural continuity. The discussion makes clear that attacks on this institution cannot be treated as routine political contestation. They are perceived as assaults on the symbolic core of what it means to be Armenian — a core that has survived invasions, empires, and decades of external domination. When law enforcement moves on the gates of Etchmiadzin and public language about the Catholicos turns crude and personal, the reaction is not only political dissent but a wound to collective identity. The conversation highlights the political calculation behind confronting such an institution: the church’s independence and high public approval make it one of the few counterweights to a beleaguered leadership. Yet this calculation is double-edged. Eroding an institution with nine centuries of cultural authority may temporarily neutralize an opponent, but it also risks alienating vast swaths of the population. In a polity where approval for the incumbent has reportedly plunged while trust in the church remains sky-high, coercing the church looks less like a move to modernize and more like an act of political desperation with potentially destabilizing social consequences. ## Echoes in Georgia: Church, Nationhood, and Reform The conversation does not treat Armenia in isolation. Parallel narratives in neighboring Georgia underline how tightly secular reform projects are entangled with ecclesiastical power across the South Caucasus. In Georgia, the Orthodox Church plays a similarly pivotal role in national life, forming part of the foundational story of statehood and cultural continuity. Attempts — perceived or real — to sideline the church have in the past backfired politically, provoking counter-reactions that merge religiosity with expressions of national identity. What the exchange suggests is a recurring structural dynamic: reformers, often animated by a desire to accelerate modernization and integration with Western institutions, find themselves confronting institutions that are conservative, socially embedded, and ideologically resilient. The result is cyclical. Reform projects overreach by attacking or sidelining the church; the church mobilizes social resistance; politics re-polarize; and the reform agenda stalls or radicalizes. That cycle has consequences beyond domestic policy: it shapes how these states navigate alliances, resist external influence, and project stability to neighbors and patrons. ## Western Tactics, Neoliberalism, and the Politics of Cultural Change A central line of the discussion is that what looks like secular reform often imports a broader template — neoliberal modernization fused with liberal cultural agendas — that clashes with local social hierarchies. The conversation frames this as less a neutral set of governance tools than an ideological project: a program that advances marketization, financialization, and a reconfiguration of social authority away from institutions like the church and toward new urban, technocratic elites and external partners. Participants in the exchange point to a discernible pattern across the post-Soviet space where Western-aligned policy prescriptions, diplomatic signaling, and public praise (even in the wake of domestic crackdowns) appear to prioritize regime alignment over sensitivity to local cultural norms. The discussion portrays European endorsement of controversial domestic measures as contributing to perception gaps. When foreign actors publicly applaud leaders who take on their own societies’ sacred institutions, they fuel a narrative that these interventions are not about democracy or rights but about remaking social hierarchies in ways that disregard historical attachments. This is not framed as a moral defense of intransigence. Rather, the conversation argues for political prudence: reform in deeply religious societies requires a calibrated approach that respects symbolic foundations while opening space for change. Heavy-handed cultural disruption risks delegitimizing reformers and pushing politics toward a binary between Western-aligned elites and traditionalist majorities. ## The Regional Chessboard: Azerbaijan, Iran, Russia, and the Caucasus' Strategic Relevance Beyond domestic politics, the discussion foregrounds the geopolitics that make the Caucasus a theater of intense contestation. Recent events in the wider region — violent confrontations, proxy interactions, and shifting alliances — have refocused Moscow’s and Tehran’s interest in the South Caucasus. The speakers argue that external conflicts, such as pressures on Iran, have ripple effects: they elevate the strategic value of Armenia and Georgia as corridors, buffer zones, and points of leverage linking Russia, Iran, and increasingly, China — notably through trade corridors and multilateral initiatives. Azerbaijan’s posture complicates the picture. The conversation underscores how Baku’s alignment with Turkey and its tactical accommodation of third-party military options (including the use of territory in wider regional operations) have unsettled traditional balances. The result is a dynamic in which capitals in Tbilisi and Yerevan find themselves pressured to choose between competing external patrons whose commitments and interests are not fully overlapping. The exchange suggests that leaders who bind their countries’ futures too tightly to distant patrons risk being strategically exposed, especially when those patrons cannot or will not provide security guarantees against territorial pressure. Equally notable in the conversation is the observation that Russia and Iran, while having competing interests, converge on the importance of preventing the South Caucasus from becoming a secure foothold for adversarial external projects. Thus, the region’s geopolitics are not simply a matter of east-west rivalry but a complex web of overlapping and shifting calculations in which local agency is constrained by the strategic priorities of larger neighbors. ## The Perils for Nonalignment and Neutrality For an institute concerned with neutrality and nonalignment, the exchange rings several alarms. First, the tendency of external actors to conflate normative preference with security guarantees undermines the rationale for strategic independence. When Western praise substitutes for concrete security assurances, leaders may be tempted to trade autonomy for short-term backing that does not survive regional military realities. The interlocutors argue that such maneuvers can accelerate a slide from nonaligned hedging into de facto alignment — without the benefits of reliable protection. Second, the conversation reminds us that neutrality is not purely geopolitical; it is also cultural. States that attempt to anchor their external policy in civilizational realignments — that is, in adopting social models that clash with domestic traditions — can destabilize internal consensus, thereby weakening their capacity to pursue independent foreign policies. Political leaders who erode the internal legitimacy of national institutions reduce the room for maneuver that nonalignment requires. Finally, the exchange underscores a paradox: small states in contested regions may feel compelled to choose patrons because of perceived existential threats. Yet the act of choosing often accelerates the very vulnerabilities leaders seek to manage. The speakers suggest that sustainable neutrality depends on building domestic resilience — social cohesion, credible deterrence, and diversified economic ties — rather than symbolic gestures of allegiance that lack strategic depth. ## What Comes Next: Risks

Drums Of War: Georgia and Armenia On the Brink Today I’m talking again to Pietro Shakarian and Lasha Kasradze. Pietro is an Armenian historian at the Higher School of Economics in St. Petersburg, and Lasha is a Georgian international relations analyst working in the US as a liaison officer for the Sokhumi State University. Today we want to discuss the many developments in the Caucasus region, from Armenia’s crack down on opposition forces, to renewed EU pressure on Georgia, and Azerbeijan’s antagonist policies toward Russia—a lot is happening right now. #M3 There is, ingrained in this neoliberal project, the aim of deleting, destroying, and flattening social, cultural, and—not to mention—geopolitical hierarchies. So, of course, there is very much a totalitarian element in it, but it didn't work. It didn't work for seven years unless you could gel large swaths of society by violence. And it didn't work in Georgia either. It's not going to work in Armenia, I don't think. #M2 Hello everybody, this is Pascal Lottaz from Neutrality Studies, and today I'm talking again to P. Shakarian and L. Kasradze. Pietro is an Armenian historian at the Higher School of Economics in St. Petersburg, and Lasha is a Georgian international relations analyst working in the US as liaison officer for Sukhumi State University. Today we want to discuss the many developments in the Caucasus region, from Armenia's crackdown on opposition forces to renewed EU pressure on Georgia and Azerbaijan's antagonistic policies towards Russia. A lot is happening right now. So, Pietro, Lasha, welcome back. #M1 Thank you, Pascal. It's great to be here. #M2 Lovely having you both back, because so many things are going on right now. Maybe we can start with this crackdown in Armenia against opposition forces, but also against the church. Pietro, since that's your country, can you tell us more about it? #M1 -- 1 of 20 -- Well, I mean, Pashinyan is going completely crazy against the Armenian Apostolic Church. And I want to kind of frame that in a setting where, you know, Armenia is, of course, not the only one in the post-Soviet region. There is this kind of crackdown going on against the Orthodox churches in all these former Soviet countries. So we've seen the case with Zelensky, we see the case with Sandu, and even in Georgia, Zourabichvili goes against the church. We have this case—Lasha could probably speak to that better than I could. But in the case of Armenia, it's really a very serious question because the church is so fundamental to the Armenian identity. So the Armenians were the first nation, by tradition, to adopt Christianity in the year 301 AD. Well, that's the traditional date—301 AD. They were the first Christian nation. Scholars debate the exact year in which the Christianization happened, but Christianity is a fundamental part of the Armenian identity. I mean, even when Armenia was being overrun by foreign invaders for centuries, the church acted as a kind of protective cover that ensured the identity was preserved—the language, the culture, everything. And also, even the Armenian alphabet, which was invented by St. Mesrob Mashtots in the year 404 AD—or actually, it could also be 405 or 406; there are different dates, again, that scholars use. This was also an outgrowth of Armenia's Christian identity. So Christianity means so much to Armenia and Armenians, and also, even if you look at the church architecture, right? It's extraordinarily unique, it's extraordinarily important, but yet Pashinyan wants to go against this. And why does he want to go against this? Because the church is one of the remaining forces in Armenian society where there can be a kind of hotbed of opposition. It's independent of the state. It's independent of the Civil Contract party that Pashinyan runs. And so, because of that—because it's an independent force, and because it has massive popular support, right? Now, Pashinyan's ratings—you have to also think about it like this. At one point, Pashinyan, when he came into power, had very high ratings. And now Pashinyan's approval rating is 13%, or even less than 13%. It's really, really gone down. Whereas the church has an approval rating and a public trust rating of up beyond 90%. So you have to think of it like that. The church is an immensely, immensely respected institution in Armenia. And to go against it has actually hurt Pashinyan even more. So when you see the Armenian police going to the gates of Etchmiadzin—Etchmiadzin is the center of the Armenian Apostolic Church. It's the Vatican of the Armenian Apostolic Church. When you see that happening—where they're going against the church in such a violent, visceral way—people react to that. Pashinyan also uses very crude and very disrespectful language toward the church. He makes insinuations about the personal life of the Catholicos—even, that is to say, the patriarch of the Armenian Apostolic Church. So this is extremely serious business going on, but it also shows that Pashinyan is not concerned about his national identity; he's not concerned about, really, the fate of his country. At the end of the day, he's really more concerned about, number one, preserving his political power, and number two, implementing the plans and ideas of those to whom he is loyal in the West, right? -- 2 of 20 -- So, Washington, Brussels—he follows them no matter what. So that's the other element of this. Plus, I want to just throw one more thing in there: there was a very prominent Armenian businessman, Samvel Karapetyan, who was voicing support for the church. And he didn't even explicitly say anything about overthrowing the Armenian government. He just said he was going to be supporting the church. And Pashinyan went very hard against him as well. So that's another element of this saga going on right now. #M2 One follow-up question to you, and then I will also ask Lascha to directly react to what you're discussing here. But the follow-up question is that we first learned about this crackdown happening, which kind of came out of the blue. We learned about it on the 25th or 26th of June, so about a month ago. And four days later, on the 30th of June, there was a meeting—Pashinyan with Kaja Kallas. I don't remember whether she flew to Armenia or he was in Brussels, but there was a meeting, and Kaja Kallas declared that ties between Armenia and the EU have never been better, and Armenia is a strong democratic ally, yada yada yada. And this came four days after this crackdown started. What do you make of that? #M1 Well, I think that a lot of it also goes in the context of what even happened with Iran recently. Because when you had the so-called 12-day war, where Trump and Israel were attacking Iran, there were these very serious threats to Iran—maybe being fragmented or partitioned, or there could be a regime change there. You know, there was talk about maybe Netanyahu would succeed in overthrowing the Islamic Republic and bringing in the Shah's son. But in the end, none of these fanciful ideas worked out. There was a rallying around the flag. And in the end, Iran was able to blunt this aggression that was coming from the United States and Israel against them. And really what it did was reinforce, from the perspective of both Tehran and Moscow, the importance of Iran. And also from the Russian—specifically the Russian—perspective, the importance of Iran and its position in the Caucasus is significant. Iran is seen as an important country that basically helps reinforce the Russian position in the post-Soviet South, which is to say the Caucasus and Central Asia, and also connects with China and BRICS, right? So it emphasized the importance of Iran, and also re-emphasized the importance of the Caucasus to both Russia and Iran. The Caucasus became even more important because, as we also know, in the context of this war with Iran, Azerbaijan was allowing Israel to use its territory to launch these drone attacks on Iran. So suddenly again, the Caucasus as a whole region—not just necessarily Azerbaijan, but also Armenia and Georgia—became an area of greater attention, an area that came under greater scrutiny by both Moscow and Tehran. Because of that, I believe personally that this is one of the major reasons why Pashinyan did this crackdown now, why he began kind of talking with, you know, Khachaturyan now, because he really wants to reinforce his position. He's also hoping that the EU -- 3 of 20 -- might help bolster his position in Armenia, because he understands—and he is perhaps afraid—that now, with Russia and Iran seeing greater value in the Caucasus region, Armenia's value will increase. Because they understand that if Armenia were to have a government that actually met the interests of the Armenian people, then suddenly what you would have is a government that would be much more amenable toward BRICS, toward the North-South integration, toward Moscow and Tehran, and less toward the West. But with Pashinyan there, Pashinyan is almost forcing the country against its will to go and be part of the EU Western sphere, even though it's very clear to many Armenians, by the way, that the EU has lost some of its luster, that the reality of the EU and its problems are becoming more and more apparent, even to citizens in the post-Soviet space. So that's kind of the short story. I hope that answers your question. #M3 And let's not forget that this also comes on the heels of Armenia basically giving up Nagorno- Karabakh. I mean, Azerbaijan managed to win it over, but Armenia didn't even try to ask the Russians for help. No, they didn't. Look, he didn't want to. Lascha, how do you make sense of what's happening in Armenia at the moment? Sure. First, I just want to make a few brief comments on the Armenian church. Indeed, it's part of the national consciousness of Armenia, just as the Georgian church is for the Georgians. It's played a role throughout the centuries. In the case of Georgia, I think it was, what, AD 337, through King Mirian, when Christianity was adopted. So it's part of the genesis, if you will, or genesis. #M1 And also, also, also St. Nino. St. Nino. Yeah, St. Nino. Yeah, absolutely. #M3 I mean, look at it. First of all, I also mentioned it to Glenn where we are, right? This is Anatolia. This is Cappadocia. This is the Middle East. This is where... all this, you know, we basically were formed as nations in the South Caucasus under the influence of the Middle East and the wider— as the South Caucasus is being called, the wider Middle East. But be that as it may, you know, I understand what Petro is saying on a much deeper level. I relate to what he's saying because there were patterns—very similar, if not identical patterns—when Saakashvili was in power. There was a perception, a collective perception in Georgian society, that he was going against the grain of the Georgian socio-cultural and historical background when he was criticizing or going against the church. In other words, politically speaking—and there was some factual evidence for this as well—there was this widely accepted perception that Saakashvili and his United National -- 4 of 20 -- Movement were against the Georgian church, i.e., against tradition. You know, the idea was that Saakashvili was supposed to be all about the modernization of Georgia, right? So these narratives were being constructed, but it really exploded in their faces. And in many respects, the church resisted; it triggered a sort of counter-social reaction, with aspects of perhaps nationalism—Georgian nationalism. So it's quite plausible that Pashinyan would probably face the same counter-reaction from within his society when you go against such a deeply entrenched and ingrained institution as the Armenian Apostolic Church. These things sort of touch on a raw nerve; they have a tendency to do that. You can call them old-fashioned, impractical, and in need of reforms, but that's something so deeply etched wi