Empire of Lies is Imploding Fast | Stanislav Krapivnik

## The War on Venezuela The conversation makes stark a simple but unsettling truth: what passes for restraint in the current great-power order is fraying. The exchange centered on Venezuela casts the episode not as an isolated operation but as an intelligible continuation of patterns — the blunt seizure of resources, the normalization of kidnapping a sitting leader, and the willingness to treat blockade and financial strangulation as instruments of policy. The interlocutors described a moment when force is no longer the last resort but a first-line instrument of geopolitical extraction. From the vantage offered in the discussion, Venezuela’s fate is less a matter of idealism or democracy promotion than of raw resource calculus. The abduction of the Venezuelan president and the killing of civilians were read as actions that remove the veneer of humanitarian pretext. Where prior interventions were dressed in rhetoric about liberation or stability, what emerges now is a candid demand for tribute: hand over oil shipments under duress, or face the consequences. The conversation frames that as a qualitative shift — the velvet glove has been discarded. Participants also drew attention to American domestic dynamics that enable such foreign adventurism. A sizable portion of the U.S. public, they argued, lacks historical memory of past interventions and the consequences they produced. That ignorance, when combined with partisan impulses and media cycles dominated by attention scarcity, makes it easier for political leadership to present aggressive moves as ordinary or inevitable. In short, the political ecosystem at home reduces the reputational costs of external coercion, while firms and vested interests lobby for the restoration of privileged access to resources. ## Resource Grabs & Global Escalation A throughline of the analysis was that resource grabs drive escalation in ways that diplomacy cannot easily counter. The seizure of oil assets and attempts to re-establish preferential access to hydrocarbons mirror historic precedents, but now the stakes are raised by a more permissive use of force and the integration of financial blockade as a weapon. The interlocutors argued that contemporary grabs are less about regime change per se and more about reasserting commercial control — reinstating the terms that once allowed multinational firms to extract wealth with minimal return to host societies. The conversation also mapped how such grabs ripple beyond a single theater. Heavy crude from places like Venezuela supplies refineries configured to process certain blends; disruption or transfer of that supply chain has knock-on effects across markets and alliances. Further, actions against tankers and commercial shipping — switching flags to avoid direct confrontation, for example — create legal and diplomatic contortions that heighten risk. When private assets become pawns in geopolitical competition, miscalculation multiplies. Another worry surfaced repeatedly: that competition for rare earths, offshore reserves, and strategic minerals is accelerating territorial appetites in high-latitude and volcanic regions. Technological claims — such as novel extraction techniques tested on volcanic vents — turn geology into a new field of contest. The conversation suggested Washington and its allies may be tempted to treat resource-rich peripheries as open targets for rent-seeking, with the attendant risk of drawing larger powers into direct confrontation over economic control. ## The End of Diplomacy A striking theme was the erosion of diplomacy’s relevance as an instrument for stabilizing crises. The participants in the exchange contended that current actors increasingly prefer coercion and unilateral action over negotiation. That is not simply rhetorical posturing: when states publicly announce “locked and loaded” strategies and then act on them, it undermines incentives for mediated settlements. Negotiation requires that the parties believe bargains will be honored; when political leaderships demonstrate a willingness to abduct leaders or ransom resources, trust evaporates. This dynamic also weakens the moderating institutions that once conducted back-channel diplomacy. Officials in the conversation argued that the political class in Washington increasingly expects that force will accomplish what diplomacy used to accomplish. Where previous administrations might have sought alliances to legitimize interventions, today’s posture can bypass such coalitions and use coercive measures directly, while still depending on a pliant media narrative. The result is a public stage where bargaining chips are converted into headlines, making face-saving, reciprocal compromise far harder. Interlocutors further emphasized that even where negotiation remains the goal for some, the fragmentation of authority within allied coalitions renders agreements brittle. A president might sign treaties or ceasefires, but if domestic political factions or proxy partners remain motivated by alternative aims, any deal becomes provisional. The conversation painted a world where diplomacy can be killed by a thousand informal spoilers — militias, contractors, corporate lobbies — each with independent incentives to resume hostilities. ## The Empire Turns Inward Beyond external projection, the exchange pointed to a drift inwards among imperial actors. The analysis suggested that great powers increasingly treat foreign policy as a vehicle for domestic political consolidation: resource grabs fund patronage networks, military posturing rallies a domestic base, and external enemies distract from internal fissures. In this reading, the appetite for intervention is not merely strategic but existential for certain political formations: the more a regime relies on external victories to shore up legitimacy, the more likely it is to keep pressing outward. This inward turn also creates perverse continuities: leaders who never bore arms themselves are most willing to send others to fight, and elites insulated from direct consequences become more reckless. The conversation highlighted the disconnect between decisionmakers and the populations that bear the cost of war. When those who set policy are removed from its human toll, the calculus skews toward riskier gambits. Moreover, actors whose legitimacy rests on portraying themselves as defenders of national greatness will prioritize displays of strength over prudent long-term statecraft. The participants warned that when imperial systems turn inward in this manner, they become less responsive to external norms and more driven by short-term domestic political rhythms. That makes the international environment more volatile and less forgiving of errors. ## Nuclear Red Lines A thread of palpable anxiety ran through the discussion about nuclear escalation. The interlocutors noted that acts once considered beyond the pale — direct strikes on central governmental symbols, targeted attempts at regime decapitation — now flirt with thresholds that could provoke nuclear doctrines. The fear is not only a deliberate thermonuclear decision but that misinterpretation and rapid escalation make unintended crossings more probable. The conversation stressed that strategic cultures differ: some governments still seek negotiation and de-escalation, while others interpret force as the primary language of interaction. If a political actor strikes at the core of another’s sovereignty — whether through assassination attempts or direct attacks on national leadership — the targeted state may see existential stakes and respond in kind. When nuclear doctrines are framed around the defense of political survival, the margin for error is dangerously slim. Interlocutors expressed skepticism that current political formations in key capitals sufficiently appreciate these red lines. The worry is compounded by the presence of decentralized actors and hybrid tactics — proxy wars, cyberatta

Empire of Lies is Imploding Fast | Stanislav Krapivnik Subscribe to my channel on Substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Links to Stas: Stanislav Krapivnik's YouTube Channel: @MrSlavikman Stanislav Krapivnik's Telegram: https://t.me /stastydaiobratno Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com (Opt in for Academic Section from your profile settings: https://pascallottaz.substack.com/s/academic) Goods Store: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall.com Timestamps: 00:00:00 Intro & The View from 2026 00:07:40 The War on Venezuela 00:14:50 Resource Grabs & Global Escalation 00:21:18 The End of Diplomacy 00:25:20 The Empire Turns Inward 00:35:19 Nuclear Red Lines 00:44:40 The Next War: Iran 00:51:14 Reconstruction & Outro #Pascal Hello, everybody, and welcome back to Neutrality Studies. Today, we’re joined again by our friend of the show, Stanislav Krapivnik. Stas has his own YouTube channel and has been on here many times. He’s giving us an update on how world affairs look from Russia. Stas, welcome back. #Stanislav Krapivnik Thank you, thank you. Always a pleasure to be back. Always fun to watch the world turn into... no, actually, I don’t know how else to put it these days. #Pascal I’m very, very desperate now because, you know, in 2026 I had a sliver of hope. It seemed as though Trump was not acting on Venezuela, just threatening. And it looked as if the attack everybody expected on Iran in December wasn’t coming. So maybe they were holding off. Maybe we were getting to some form of strategic equilibrium. Maybe the discussions with Russia, even if they didn’t lead to a result, would bring at least some stability. But now it seems that everything’s coming apart. Stas, what did you make of the first week of January? #Stanislav Krapivnik Well, one thing you learn really quickly is that all those MAGA people—well, I won’t say all of them, that’s not the right way to put it—but a good two-thirds were a bunch of hypocrites. They’re the ones screaming, “Oh, we don’t want any more forever wars, we don’t want any more wars at all, we want peace.” What they actually meant was, “We don’t want any more Democrat wars.” But if Trump starts a war—my God—they’re going to back him because they’re groupies. It’s basically -- 1 of 18 -- cultists. I mean, look, these are the same people who gave Trump—uh, bought up Trump coins, bought up Melania coins, earned Trump thirty billion dollars in a month. These are not rich people; these are the last ones who can afford to go into the worst investment you can possibly make, which is cryptocurrency. Cryptocurrency is great if you're paying for something. It has a transitional, transactional use. But as an investment of value, it's pointless. You know, somebody blurts something out and it goes up, then it goes down. There's absolutely no foundation for how it moves, where it moves, or why it moves. And people are invested because, you know, Trump said, “Hey, it’s my coin.” Oh, okay. Yeah, yeah. I mean, that’s a groupie mentality. That’s a cult mentality. And you see that right now. “Oh, but Trump, but—ah, yeah.” Any crap they’re putting out, I’d say at least half of MAGA is buying it up, no matter how absurd it is. #Pascal The number of people who—well, the number of people who are now saying, you know, the intervention—and let’s not kid ourselves, this is a kidnapping and a military aggression against Venezuela, close to the threshold of actual war. Eighty people were killed in Venezuela, and the president was abducted. And there are people saying, “Oh no, but he had it coming, he’s a bad guy anyway.” If you’ve never lived in Venezuela, if you’re not one of the people who had to flee, then you have no right to say anything. So shut up—it’s good that he’s gone, and now we’ll have peace on Earth in Venezuela. I can understand how, after Iraq, Syria, Libya, there are still people who argue that. Can you somehow make sense of this? #Stanislav Krapivnik Well, yeah, of course. First of all, Americans—as they say themselves in America—have a 30-second attention span, like in the average commercial. And unfortunately, that’s true. Most of them can’t find Venezuela on a map. I guarantee you that. You know, there was a National Geographic survey done for 18- to 25-year-olds about ten years ago, somewhere around there, and it found that almost a quarter of American 18- to 25-year-olds couldn’t find America on a map. You can’t find your own country on a map. But then again, you’re dealing with a population where, between total literacy and partial literacy, it’s 53% of the population. We’re not talking about immigrants; we’re talking about the native population. Half of them can’t read, or barely read at all. They don’t read, period—in other words. If you’re reading at a second- or third-grade American level, which is about a first-grade Russian level, that means you’re probably not reading a lot of books. You’re probably not reading those nasty, ugly things with dates and names and trends and, I don’t know, maps. So, you know, whatever Trump says, or whatever the media tells you, that’s the latest news of the day. Read *1984*—which most of them don’t read anyway—so they wouldn’t know anything about that. -- 2 of 18 -- #Pascal So, simply, there’s a relatively large part of the population—20, 30 percent—who literally don’t remember, literally don’t know the context of Iraq, Syria, Libya, the other interventions in South America during the entire Cold War, all the regime change operations, and all the miseries they brought. The regime of Pinochet that was installed and killed tens of thousands of people in Chile— they just don’t know about this. And that’s enough of a political base to allow this to go on and make some kind of sense in the overall news environment. #Stanislav Krapivnik Well, I’ll give one shout-out to Pinochet that he does deserve—well, two shout-outs. Out of all the governments the U.S. helped prop up, Pinochet was probably the least bad, because, as he stated, “My goal is that if every Chilean can afford a house and a car, they’ll never go communist, they’ll never go Marxist.” And he actually worked toward that. He did stabilize the economy, and he left power willingly—without a civil war, without any revolutions. That’s an exception, because the vast majority of people set up by the U.S. are not nationalists. That guy—Pinochet—was actually a nationalist. He was out to make life better. He had a different view of what the economy should be than, say, the people he replaced. But he was a nationalist—he was out for the betterment of his own economy. Most of the people the U.S. set up are either globalists or just sold-out types with bank accounts in the U.S. They don't give a damn about anything except fattening their pockets, which means fattening the pockets of U.S. corporations. And this isn’t just a Cold War–era phenomenon. The U.S. has been doing this for the last 150 years. When they say there’s going to be a physical intervention—I mean, boots on the ground—as Trump is now flippantly saying, “We don’t mind, we’re ready to go boots on the ground.” You know, they got five deferments from Vietnam, as usual. It’s always the people who never served who are more than happy to send everyone else’s kids into some kind of butcher shop. Not their kids. But, you know, in South America, it’s not just the leftists or the Marxists—no, it’s everybody. There are rightists who want revenge against the U.S., there are leftists who want revenge against the U.S., and there are centrists too. Because the U.S. has screwed everybody across the board in Latin America for 150 years. It’s a curse on Latin America, the biggest obstacle to their development. #Pascal How is this being reported right now in Moscow, in Russia? I mean, what’s the general vibe about it? #Stanislav Krapivnik Well, I mean, it’s being reported that Maduro has been snatched. I’m not going to say arrested— snatched, to be proper about it. He’s been snatched. There’s a war. I mean, Trump can say, or, you -- 3 of 18 -- know, the former vice stories—Narco Marco—can say that we’re not at war. You are at war. You’ve attacked a nation. You blockaded them—that’s already an act of war. A financial blockade is an act of war. You attacked the nation, you murdered citizens, you kidnapped its legal government. Whether it’s an elected government or a monarchy or whatever, it’s the legal government of that country, and it’s up to that country to decide what its legal government is. You kidnapped the leadership. That’s all war. That’s not even acts of war—that is war. Whether or not you say you’re at war or not, the latest as of yesterday is they’re demanding tribute. Yeah. There’s no other way to put it. They’re flat-out demanding tribute like a bunch of marauding psychopaths. “You give us three billion dollars’ worth of oil or we’ll attack you. And we’ll settle it for the profit of the people.” Translation: the U.S. is saying, “Fill up our tanker with three billion dollars’ worth of oil, we’ll sell it, and we’ll keep the money—for your profit.” Yeah, okay. “We’ll take a cut of it.” And that’s, you know, there’s an English saying: the problem with paying the Danegeld is not what you do about the Danes, because the Danes are always going to come back for more gold. And the Americans have an appetite to steal everything that’s not nailed down in any nation that doesn’t resist. They are... #Pascal Apart from the oil and the audacity of this whole thing, people are saying, “Oh, the U.S. has taken out one of the allies of Russia and China.” Is there any reason to believe that Venezuela was strategically important to Russia and should be regarded as an ally, rather than just a trading partner? #Stanislav Krapivnik Well, it was an ally. I wouldn’t say it was a strategic ally, but it was an ally and a trading partner. By the way, I loved that from Hex—I think it was Hex who said, you know, “Yeah, we’re in there.” What were China and Russia doing there? Connecting business and buying legally. China, for example, was buying the heavy crude they were buying. It’s not only in Venezuela, obviously. Venezuela produces it; the oil sands up in Canada produce it, though they require about sixty-five to seventy dollars a barrel to be profitable. Russian Urals blend is heavy crude, Iranian heavy crude. There are other countries that produce heavy crude, but in very small amounts. Those are your major sources of heavy crude. And the southern refineries are set up for that heavy crude because they used to get it from Venezuela. The reason they nationalized the oil platforms was that the deals the previous government had signed before Chávez were basically giveaways to the U.S. And considering that the Yeltsin government signed exactly the same types of deals—with Exxon, by the way, and other companies like Shell—in Sakhalin, you know, Russia knows what those deals are like. So the deal -- 4 of 18 -- that Exxon, Chevron, and Mitsubishi had all shoved down Yeltsin’s throat, or bought him out for, was that at Sakhalin‑1 they would invest one billion dollars and wouldn’t have to pay any taxes until they got their money’s worth out of it. Well, on paper, that $1 billion turned into $5 billion, and they hard‑coded the cost of a barrel of oil— not the market value, but $16 a barrel—when the market value was heading toward $50 or $60. So basically, they could pump out a huge amount of oil before they had to pay a single bloody cent in taxes. With Chevron, when Putin came in, he didn’t want to scare everybody off by nationalizing anything outright. So what they did with Chevron first—Putin being a lawyer, you know—was latch onto this little clause where Chevron had signed up for environmental laws. But Chevron didn’t give a damn, because it was the Yeltsin government before that. And, you know, it didn’t matter what you signed—just send them another case of vodka and give a percent back as kickbacks t