USA In Shock: Russia Just Won BIG In Asia | Dr. Anuradha Chenoy

## Intro: Analysis of Putin's State Visit Vladimir Putin’s recent state visit to India was more than protocol and photo opportunities; it was a staged affirmation of an evolving geopolitical architecture. The ceremony’s pomp signaled a deliberate political message: two long-standing partners reasserting a multidimensional relationship at a moment when Western capitals are trying to reshape alliances and punish divergence. Far from an impulsive spectacle, the visit crystallized threads of defense cooperation, economic recalibration, and diplomatic signaling that have been woven over years. The optics mattered because India chose to elevate the visit to a state occasion, placing the country’s leader at the airport and foregrounding the relationship for domestic and international audiences alike. That elevation is itself an argument about strategic priorities and autonomy. Rather than delivering a suite of headline-grabbing agreements, the visit consolidated incremental but consequential steps — logistics agreements, trade roadmaps, and institutional moves — that together alter the strategic calculus in Asia. The outcome is less about instant wins and more about cumulative resilience: a mutual lifeline that helped both countries weather the recent shocks of sanctions, energy market disruptions, and shifting alliances. Reading the visit in isolation misses the point; it is a public chapter in an ongoing process of alignment-by-practice that has implications well beyond bilateralism. ## Strategic Autonomy vs Western Pressure The exchange made clear how strategic autonomy functions in practice: New Delhi insists on the freedom to conduct diversified relationships even as Washington attempts to marshal pressure. The conversation emphasized that neutral or nonaligned positions often draw accusations of implicit support for one side — a persistent dilemma for states that refuse to mirror Western binary framing. India’s posture, as articulated in the visit’s rituals and rhetoric, was not passive neutrality but an active insistence on policy choices rooted in perceived national interest. This assertion of independence came against a background of coercive economic measures and diplomatic nudges. Tariff increases and targeted sanctions were wielded as instruments to deter India’s purchases of Russian energy and to pressure New Delhi toward alignment. Yet these measures carried unintended consequences: they accelerated India’s diversification of markets and suppliers, and they deepened political resolve to resist external dictates. The result is a clearer demonstration that strategic autonomy is not mere rhetoric but a policy stance shaped by long-term economic and security interdependence. The visit became a public rebuttal to any presumption that India would subordinate its geopolitical calculations to Western demands. ## Trade Deficits & The Rupee-Ruble Mechanism A key practical problem in the India–Russia relationship is monetary reciprocity. The balance of trade leans heavily toward Russian exports — primarily energy and raw materials — leaving Russia with large reserves of Indian rupees. That accumulation of non-convertible currency threatens to distort the relationship unless mechanisms are created to close the financial loop. What emerged from the talks is the deliberate building of such mechanisms: local-currency trade settlements, greater use of Vostro accounts, and permission for Russian entities to reinvest rupee surpluses in Indian treasuries, bonds, and equities. This is not a simple return to older rupee–ruble arrangements; it is a modern attempt to fashion a bi-directional financial architecture that works despite sanctions and SWIFT exclusions. Practical steps — a Russian central bank presence in Mumbai, Sberbank offices, and permissions enabling reinvestment — suggest a deliberate strategy to transform trade imbalances into longer-term capital flows. That matters because currencies underpin trade patterns: without a viable method to recycle rupees, the partnership would risk entrenching a one-way dependency. The approach being taken is incremental and technical, but if institutionalized it will create durable economic linkages and reduce friction in bilateral commerce while offering a model for other BRICS currency-cooperation experiments. ## The China Factor in Russia-India Relations A recurring subtext of the visit was China’s place in the emerging regional architecture. Russia’s official strategy of Greater Eurasia conceptualizes an integrated continental space that includes China, India, and other Asian actors. Moscow’s pivot eastwards does not mean India is subsumed into a Russia–China axis; rather, Moscow seeks to manage trilateral dynamics so no single partnership dominates its orientation. For India, the calculus is delicate: deepening ties with Moscow while managing a contested northern frontier with China and expanding economic relations with Beijing in other domains. The conversation highlighted that Moscow, Beijing, and New Delhi can each be uneasy partners at times, but there is also a pragmatic overlapping of interests. Russia’s deepening ties with China coexist with an enduring, cross-spectrum relationship with India rooted in defense, education, and industrial collaboration. The diplomacy of inclusion — ensuring China does not feel excluded from Greater Eurasia frameworks — is part of a broader Russian strategy to avoid zero-sum alignments. For India, cultivating this triangular balance is an exercise in strategic hedging: preserve critical defense and technological partnerships with Russia while counterbalancing China across the Himalayas and in the Indian Ocean. ## North Korea & Labor Mobility Agreements 00:35: 11 US National Security Strategy, Pakistan & The Quad Beyond the headline partners, several peripheral but consequential issues threaded through the discussions. Labor mobility and migration arrangements, for example, were touched upon as practical mechanisms for people-to-people and economic engagement that can outlast diplomatic turbulences. Agreements that facilitate labor flows serve dual purposes: mitigating trade imbalances through services and fostering grassroots connectivity that complements state-level ties. Equally, the discourse around regional groupings and strategic documents — including references to U.S. national security strategies and the Quad — situates the India–Russia relationship within a larger contest over influence in South Asia and the Indo-Pacific. India’s insistence on resolving bilateral disputes without third-party mediation — especially regarding Pakistan and the Line of Actual Control with China — reflects a persistent preference for sovereign agency. The Quad’s trajectories, Pakistan’s recalibrations, and even North Korea’s regional role are all variables in a complex regional chessboard. What the visit showed is that India intends to keep a plurality of instruments and relationships active rather than folding into a single security architecture promoted by any great power. ## Are US-India Relations Improving or Declining? Assessing U.S.–India relations in the wake of the visit demands nuance. Over the longer arc, bilateral relations have deepened across defense, technology, and trade. Yet recent frictions — perceptions of slights, economic coercion, and public diplomatic claims — have introduced strains. The conversation suggested that while New Delhi values its growing security and commercial ties with Washington, it resists being publicly subordinated to U.S. narratives or transactional demands. The U.S. reaction to India’s engagements with Russia — including tariff measures and public admonishments — has hardened sensitivities in New Delhi. Strategic partnerships are not binary; they are layered and contingent. India’s recent choices reflect a desire to keep options open, to leverage multiple partnerships, and to assert its own agenda. This does not foreclose cooper

USA In Shock: Russia Just Won BIG In Asia Last week, Vladimir Putin visited India and was received there with the highest honours. What does this tell us about these two countries and the emerging BRICS states? Here to discuss with me is the Indian scholar and Russia expert, Professor Anuradha Chenoy, a former professor and dean at the School of International Studies at India’s prestigious (JaVa Halal) Jawaharlal Nehru University. Links: Anuradha's articles in "Economic and Political Weekly": https://www.epw.in/author/anuradha-chenoy Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Goods Store: https://neutralitystudies- shop.fourthwall.com Timestamps: 00:00:00 Intro: Analysis of Putin's State Visit 00:07:05 Strategic Autonomy vs Western Pressure 00:18:28 Trade Deficits & The Rupee-Ruble Mechanism 00:25:05 The China Factor in Russia-India Relations 00:33:16 North Korea & Labor Mobility Agreements 00:35: 11 US National Security Strategy, Pakistan & The Quad 00:47:32 Are US-India Relations Improving or Declining? 00:52:00 India's Anchor: Global South & BRICS Leadership #Pascal Last week, Vladimir Putin visited India and was received with the highest honors. What does this tell us about these two countries and the emerging BRIC states? Here to discuss this with me is the Indian scholar and Russia expert, Professor Anuradha Chenoy. Anu, welcome back. #Anuradha Chenoy Hello, glad to be with you again, Pascal. #Pascal Glad to have you on again. You’ve been looking at India–Russia relations for many years. Can you tell me first, what did you make of this state visit? And was there anything that surprised you, or did it go as expected? #Anuradha Chenoy Well, look, I think there were several levels to this visit. There were bilateral aspects, regional implications, and political, strategic, economic, defense, and symbolic dimensions. You know, a lot of signals were being sent. What many in the press and elsewhere expected were some big-ticket announcements, which didn’t happen. But I believe this was part of a long historical, political, and economic process—a very holistic process. And I think that’s what we can discuss: how it was a process and what was behind it, because many things that happened just before, or are going to happen, weren’t announced. -- 1 of 16 -- So, you know, there were a lot of signals and symbols—the geopolitical context, the fact that this was a celebration of 25 years since signing the strategic partnership agreement between the two countries. And I think it’s clear to the Indians that Russia is winning this war, and that India has— well, they said they were neutral—but they’ve kind of supported Russia throughout. They’ve both bailed each other out, in a sense. It’s been mutually beneficial over the last three years: India got Russian oil at very substantial discounted rates, which, as even the foreign minister said, powered the Indian economy. And on the other hand, India helped hold together the Russian economy at a very difficult time of overall sanctions. #Pascal Yeah, and that’s the accusation from the West, right? That China and India helped Russia by not joining the sanctions. Which is, though, a very weird argument, because why would a war—a proxy war of the West—actually oblige India and China to change their relationship with Russia? This, by the way, is always a problem for neutral states. They’re always being told that if you don’t help us, then your refusal to help is support for the other side. It’s a very, very classic thing to happen. But India stood its ground and stood very firm, right? Also under pressure from the United States, which, about a month or six, seven weeks ago, tried to crack down hard on India, saying, “You have to stop buying oil.” And India said, “No. Just no. Go sanction us more. We’re not going to stop.” And the Americans backed down. They didn’t actually follow through with those sanctions. #Anuradha Chenoy Well, there are 25% additional sanctions on India. Besides the 25% tariffs, I mean, you know, these are unilateral economic measures. They added another 25% for several months. So India is now paying—or, you know, suffering from—50% tariffs, which is very high on Indian exports, and on a large section of them, too. Indian exports to the U.S. are quite substantial, almost 100 billion dollars. So things like the auto parts industry, the jewels and gems industry—they’re almost going under. But the government has tried to subsidize them and find new channels. For example, the seafood industry has found new avenues, including Japan and even Russia, which has just given 25 marine industry licenses for shrimp imports. So the U.S. is also going to suffer, because if you create new channels and value chains, those are long-term. Even if they reduce tariffs later, India will have already diversified. And the other point you were making about pressure—I think the West always has this “with us or against us” attitude, whereas the rest of the world has a multipolar vision. It’s not that we’re against you; we just have an independent foreign policy. We have the right to choose. This is strategic autonomy. We’re not against you in any way, but leave us be on other things. We can have relationships with multiple partners—trilateral, bilateral, whatever—but we’re not aligned with this kind of very bipolar or tripolar international system. -- 2 of 16 -- And that’s what multipolarity is about. That’s what the new geopolitics is about. And they’ve given a lot of arguments. The Indians, as well as the Russians, have said, look—even Putin at this time said that the U.S. is buying nuclear fuel. So why are they clamping down on India for oil? Because what they want, there are no sanctions on. There are no sanctions on nuclear fuel. Europe, in many ways, is taking oil that originates from Russia. They might be taking it through Azerbaijan or Turkey or India, etc., but they’re buying it ultimately. So India has presented this kind of logic. And they’ve also said, we’ve increased our purchases of oil from the U.S. We’ve ordered weapons from the U.S. because, you know, the U.S. does have a system of kind of tributes. You have to... #Pascal Yeah, I never thought about it in those terms, but yeah—the tributary system, like, okay, I’m offering you my money, you give me back a little bit of weapons, and therefore we’re buddy-buddy. Yeah, that’s true. But what surprised me was… the state visit had been planned, obviously, for a long time, right? These things don’t happen overnight. Only Donald Trump comes up with the idea to meet Putin next week. Other normal countries plan this at least a year ahead, with different ministries involved, protocol, and so on. What surprised me was that it was done with so much fanfare. The official Twitter account of Narendra Modi actually tweeted about it almost every minute, with lots of pictures and beautifully made graphics and videos. Very, very proud, you know. So, in a sense, the opposite of what the United States would like to see—and what Europe wants to see. If something happens at all, then maybe somewhere in a back room. But India made a point of demonstrating this relationship, didn’t it? #Anuradha Chenoy Yeah, well, I think there are a couple of reasons for that. One is that this is a historic relationship without any real ups and downs—it’s just been smooth. As one of the old traditional analysts said, Russia’s relations with Asia have always been steady. Sometimes it’s a bit muted, but with India, it’s always been very strong, and it cuts across the political spectrum. There’s no criticism of it, even from opposition parties. Domestically, there’s confidence in Russia at all levels—from the strategic community to local people. They feel Russia is going to be there for them because it has always supported Indian industrialization, the public sector, and exchanges of students and scientists. Every astronaut in the Indian space program has been trained there. So it’s at a very deep level, and at a very sectoral level. Domestically, it was good for Mr. Modi to showcase this. Internationally, he wanted to emphasize strategic autonomy—that Russia is a partner. And yes, we would like strategic relations with the U.S., which we’ve been trying to build for the last 20 years. But the U.S., under Mr. Trump, has kind of humiliated Mr. Modi and India in several ways over the last few months—one being by continuously claiming that they were the ones who mediated between India and Pakistan. -- 3 of 16 -- And that’s been a very strong stand for India—consistently in their foreign policy—that they will not allow any third-party intervention in their disputes. They’ll resolve them themselves, especially with Pakistan, and on the issue of the Line of Actual Control with China. They would do it themselves. They have the capacity; they’ve been doing it. So, when Mr. Trump kept saying—he said it about 30 times—that he had mediated, it basically implied that the Indian foreign policy establishment was lying. If you keep saying, “I’ve resolved it,” and it’s even written in the new National Security Strategy—right there in the first or second paragraph—it lists the conflicts they claim to have resolved, and it says “India and Pakistan.” So that irks India—that’s one. Then there are these unilateral economic pressures: tariffs, a 25 percent fine for taking oil from Russia. No regular meetings, pressure on India on all kinds of things— on buying weapons, etc. So India’s given a message, saying that it’s not going to shift its old, traditional strategic relations on account of European or American pressure. That’s why this was such a very grand, very high-profile visit. In fact, the Russians wanted it as an official visit, but India upgraded it to a state visit. And that’s why the prime minister was at the tarmac—normally he isn’t there; the foreign minister or some other ministers go. But he was standing there, right from the airport to the luncheon at his house. And also, the Russians came with a large delegation—their foreign and defense ministers, and a large business delegation. There was a one‑to‑one meeting with the business community in India, which both Mr. Putin and the prime minister of India addressed. There was discussion, and if you look at the document that came out—the Declaration of Agreement—they didn’t call it a memorandum; it was more like a declaration of agreement. It has about 23 different aspects and touches on a wide range of issues. Now, the reason I said it’s a process is because there are two or three things we need to touch upon. One is that just two days before Putin’s visit, the Russian Duma ratified an agreement that had been ongoing for almost a year. It was first signed in February, and it's called the Reciprocal Exchange of Logistics Agreement, or RELOS. It was ratified on December 2nd. Under this, both militaries can access each other’s ports and airports for logistics, drills, and disaster relief. This gives the Indian Navy and Air Force infrastructure access to Russian northern ports and the Arctic, and it gives Russian shipping access to the Indian Ocean region where the Indian Navy operates. Of course, they had signed a similar agreement in 2016 with the U.S., called the Logistics Exchange Memorandum Agreement, but this one is much deeper because of the kind of access it provides to the military. #Pascal So just to clarify, this isn’t just for commercial ships. This is military port access—no stationing, I suppose, but access, right? #Anuradha Chenoy -- 4 of 16 -- Access means they can come for repairs or maintenance, so that would be temporary, but it’s not a full station. You know, they can’t just stay there, but they can come if they need a spare part or there’s some emergency. So they don’t have to do it immediately—this is long term. They can come; otherwise, it’s difficult to access Indian ports. But this makes it easier. It still has to be put in place, but