🚨USA Plays for Time: Prepping Invasion, Gaming Markets, Loosing War | Larry C. Johnson

## A war of improvisation, not of design The conversation with Larry C. Johnson paints a stark picture: this is not a theater of master plans but of incremental mistakes. Rather than a calibrated grand strategy, what emerges is a sequence of reactive decisions—each one constraining the next—until a military course seems almost forced by the presence of amassed forces and political momentum. Johnson’s core claim is blunt: the current U.S./Israeli coalition campaign against Iran has taken on the character of path dependence. Political and military actors keep doubling down because they have already moved pieces onto the board, and the political calculus makes retreat politically costly. That dynamic, more than any coherent strategic aim, is driving discussions about amphibious landings and “surgical” island seizures. This is a crucial reframing. When policy is driven by what has been committed rather than what is prudent or achievable, decisions become performative—designed to justify prior moves rather than to produce clear ends. The transcript repeatedly returns to a single worry: the White House and its partners have created a tempo of operations (logistical buildups, public statements, symbolic gestures) that make escalation probable. Once the boots are on the decks of amphibious vessels, the political and personal costs of not using them rise sharply. The consequence is a momentum that all but ensures miscalculation. ## Markets, messaging, and manipulation One of the most disturbing themes in the exchange is the intersection of political theater and market behavior. Johnson alleges that morning statements and proclamations—sometimes hinting at imminent peace, at other times promising decisive military options—have immediate, predictable effects on U.S. markets. Tweets and early-morning pronouncements coincide with stock market spikes, suggesting that political messaging is being used to influence market positions. Whether this is cynical theater, purposeful market manipulation, or a confluence of both, it undermines the public trust and signals that geopolitics is being used for private advantage. That linkage matters for two reasons. First, it changes the incentives of political actors: if public pronouncements can produce financial gains for allies or cronies, the temptation to oscillate between “diplomacy” and bellicose posturing increases. Second, it converts national security decisions into commodities traded in real time, reducing complex human and strategic costs to price movements. Johnson’s contention that some actors are profiting while the troop build-up continues is an indictment of the way domestic political economy and foreign policy can become entangled in crisis. ## The fallacy of symbolic island seizures A major portion of the conversation focuses on the idea—floated repeatedly in public debate—of seizing islands like Kharg (Karg), Qeshm, or other strategic points in the Persian Gulf. At first glance, such operations have seductive logic: seize territory, control chokepoints, put sand under the feet of the adversary. But Johnson methodically dismantles this argument. Islands cited as targets are not decisive nodes that will sever Iran’s oil exports. They are vulnerable, exposed, and costly to hold. Occupation would not neutralize Iran’s capacity to mine waters, employ submarines and drones, or attack ships from the mainland. What may be achieved is a spectacle of occupation—and a long-term liability. Two problems stand out. Operationally, forces landed on small, crowded islands face immediate and sustained danger: incoming missile and drone strikes, naval interdiction, and the challenge of resupply under fire. Politically and morally, occupying islands with civilian populations makes the occupier responsible for their safety; using civilians as leverage—whether implicitly or explicitly—risks a catastrophic reputational and legal fallout. Johnson warns that trying to “protect” island populations while using them as bargaining chips would cast the U.S. as indistinguishable from the kind of actor that resorts to hostage-taking. The United States may frame such actions as protective; the optics and law of war do not ensure domestic or international acceptance. ## Logistics, sustainment, and the illusion of tactical surprise The conversation repeatedly returns to the unsung reality of modern warfare: logistics. Johnson emphasizes that the capability to land troops is distinct from the capability to supply them. Historical comparisons—Normandy or Guadalcanal—underscore that successful landings depended on robust follow-on logistics: fuel, water, ammunition, field hospitals, and a protected supply line. In the Persian Gulf theatre, none of that is guaranteed. Fresh water, in particular, is a strikingly mundane but decisive constraint; tens of thousands of gallons must flow daily to sustain even a small force. Without secure resupply, an amphibious landing converts into a stranded, vulnerable outpost. Moreover, the element of tactical surprise is eroded by the very publicness of the buildup. Satellite, intelligence-sharing among regional powers, and the presence of Russian and Chinese observers mean that operational secrecy is limited. Johnson notes that repeated public talk of landings, islands under consideration, and the movement of amphibious gear telegraphs intent. Even an initial successful landing loses much of its strategic value if it immediately mobilizes enemy asymmetrical options—mining, missile barrages, and localized guerrilla resistance—that undercut the landing’s purpose. ## Lessons from history: Iraq, Gallipoli, and the perils of occupation The past recurs as a cautionary tale in Johnson’s remarks. He draws explicit parallels with Iraq in 2003 and even with Gallipoli in World War I. The core lesson is institutional: great powers frequently underestimate the difficulty of post-invasion governance and overestimate their ability to shape political outcomes on the ground. In Iraq, the failure was not merely military but political—disbanding existing structures without a viable replacement produced a security vacuum that fueled years of insurgency. In the Persian Gulf scenario, the analogous risk is that occupation or limited forcible control will produce a persistent insurgent environment, attriting troops, draining political capital, and provoking wider regional escalation. Johnson’s experience briefing international officials underscores the broader credibility problem: many partners and adversaries alike assume that American policymakers either have hidden, devious plans or none at all. The uncomfortable truth he offers is the latter: at times, policy is driven by improvisation and political optics rather than rigorous contingency planning. That is a dangerous combination when military forces and civilians stand to pay the price. ## The strategic consequences of a self-inflicted quagmire If Johnson is right that a planned or coerced landing is more a result of momentum than design, the consequences are foreseeable and stark. Militarily, U.S. forces risk exposure to asymmetric attacks that can impose heavy casualties and logistical paralysis. Diplomatically, occupation will harden regional alignments and likely push neutral actors to hedge or openly support Tehran. Economically, the initial market manipulation will be dwarfed by sustained instability in global oil markets, insurance refusals to underwrite passage through the Strait of Hormuz, and the costs of protracted conflict. Politically, the domestic fallout would be severe. Citizens will see troops exposed in a conflict whose objectives are unclear, while elites benefit from market volatility. International norms would be strained—occupying forces using civilian populations as leverage would be a flashpoint for legal and humanitarian condemnation. The risk of escalation—either through miscalculation, retaliation, or wider regional conflict—is non-tr

USA Plays for Time: Prepping Invasion, Gaming Markets, Loosing War | Johnson Former CIA analyst, Larry Johnson is quite sure; there is no "grand strategy" or "4D Chess" going on. The US/Israeli coalition war against Iran is just a rolling disaster (academics would call it "path dependent) in which one bad decision leads to the next and by now a ground invasion with US boots on the ground is basically inevitable because they already went through the built up of the forces— so you gotta use'm. But what can they do? And what will happen once Iran then obliterates them? Well, buckle up because this is ain't gonna be pretty. However, the noble men and women in Washington still manage to game the markets and make a lot of money while we are waiting for the troop build up to be completed. What a horror show. Support Larry: https://sonar21.com Support us by subscribing on substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Shop & Donations: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall.com #Pascal Welcome back, everybody. This is Pascal Lottaz from Neutrality Studies. It is March 31st, 2026, and we are joined again by Larry C. Johnson. Larry, welcome back. #Larry C. Johnson Hey, thanks for the invite, man. I really appreciate it. #Pascal Thank you very much for taking the time, as always, in your late evening. It’s still March 30th for you, of course. Tell me, the last time we spoke was about ten days ago—what’s your assessment of the past week or so of the Iran war, and especially the kind of very erratic ups and downs coming out of the White House? #Larry C. Johnson Yeah, if you're following Donald Trump, you know, imagine you're sitting at a Wimbledon tennis match—boom, boom, boom. You’d have to wear a neck brace watching Donald Trump change all his positions. I mean, he's all over the place—right to left, up and down. The latest... Remember, last time we talked, Scott Besson, the Secretary of the Treasury, and Trump had lifted all the oil sanctions on Iran. Why? Oh, we’ve got to get as much oil out there as possible, got to keep the price down. Then today—or yesterday, yeah, early this morning, Monday morning, Washington, D.C. time—Trump is out talking about how he’s not going to seize Karg Island and blow up all the Iranian -- 1 of 18 -- oil wells. I’m thinking, huh, wouldn’t that reduce oil availability by taking all that Iranian oil off the market? #Pascal So I'm going to ask Trump: which is it? #Larry C. Johnson My favorite meme so far is Trump lying on a psychiatrist’s couch, and the psychiatrist is sitting next to him saying, “So, Mr. President, these two Iranians you’ve been talking to—are they in the room with us now?” #Pascal I mean, the whole idea that Trump is actually doing diplomacy with Iran—that they have back channels, a 15-point plan, a 17-point plan, and everything’s going well, Pakistan is helping, things are winding down—I mean, it’s all a ruse again. Or maybe not even a ruse; it’s just dressing up for the American public, I think. It’s theater at this point, isn’t it? #Larry C. Johnson Well, it's theater, and it's also market manipulation. This is the second week in a row that, early in the morning, Donald Trump tweets, “Oh man, we’re so close to having a deal. Peace is at hand.” You know, he’s got his Neville Chamberlain moment—everything but the white paper in his hand— claiming he’s got a deal. And that’s about an hour and a half before the stock market opens. When the U.S. market opens—boom—up 600 points. I’ll guarantee you somebody connected with Trump is making a lot of money off that. So Trump is engaged in deliberate market manipulation, because what he’s saying is just flat-out not true. I think in other quarters they’d call that a lie. There are no direct conversations with Iran, number one. Whatever conversations are taking place are through a third party. Previously it was Oman, back on February 26th, and today it’s Pakistan, ostensibly. #Larry C. Johnson But they're not even full conversations, because Pakistan will deliver the message, and more often than not, Iran just says, “We don’t have anything to say to that,” and doesn’t respond. Meanwhile, the buildup of U.S. military forces continues—the movement of amphibious equipment to the area, to be used in a possible amphibious operation against Iran. I can’t rule out that they might actually try to take Karsk Island, as well as Omesh, and maybe Bandar al-Bas. They may try more than one. I mean, there are really a lot of rumors swirling right now, and you don’t know how much of that is deliberate, to create disinformation. -- 2 of 18 -- #Pascal I mean, listening to you, I get the impression that what they’re doing right now is, again, they need a little bit of time to amass enough troops to have a good shot at a ground invasion of some kind— some strategic island or something that somebody sold to Trump as a good idea. And Trump says, in his usual business attitude, “Okay, then let’s make a buck or two while we wait,” right? So just up and down, string the people along, keep the market where it’s useful. And then boom—we strike when nobody expects it, and we’re going to laugh and have a jolly good time when finally all the dreams come true. Is that kind of the idea? #Larry C. Johnson Yeah, yeah. His art of the deal includes lying and throwing your opponent off balance, lulling them into a sense that everything’s okay, that we’re all on track. And then, yeah—boom—out of the blue, you sucker punch. #Pascal Yeah, but at this point, you kind of wonder—who’s the enemy? I mean, the Iranians understand all of this. They’re prepared for it. They say, like, “Please come, we are happy to obliterate you.” I mean, if that’s what you want—they almost literally say that. I can’t help but notice your cap: “We, the people, are pissed off.” And we’ve had this huge march—beautiful cap, by the way. We’ve had this march, these demonstrations in Washington the other day. I mean, is Trump at this point basically trying to lull everybody inside the United States into just not rising up more? Because this seems to be getting bad. #Larry C. Johnson He's painted himself into a corner. The scapegoat so far appears to be the head of Mossad, who reportedly assured Trump and Bibi that the Iranian regime was just a house of cards—needing only one strong wind, one good blow for it to collapse—and that the people of Iran would be walking in the streets to create a new government. Well, that turned out not to be true. Iran had prepared layered defenses, and they’re all disconnected, so it’s not dependent on just one node. It’s a multi- nodal—or let’s call it multi-polar—defense. But multi-polarity? Multi-nodal. #Pascal The node is a better metaphor. #Larry C. Johnson Okay. -- 3 of 18 -- #Pascal They call it “mosaic.” The term they use is “mosaic defense.” So, like, the different parts of the mosaic play together to create the whole picture. Yeah. #Larry C. Johnson So, Iran responded very rapidly—and actually with a plan. They methodically took out a total of 13 different ground radar systems that were critical for keeping track of planes, missiles, drones, movements of personnel, and vessels on the ocean. Once those were taken out, the United States was effectively blinded. They tried to compensate by flying in the E-3 AWACS, the one that was destroyed at Prince Salid Air Base two days ago. And now, without that AWACS—because it was doing what the radars used to do—the U.S. forces are blind again. They really don’t see what’s going on out there. #Pascal What I mean is, the situation now—one month after the first strikes—in terms of U.S. military capability, is definitely worse than at the beginning. What I don’t really know is how good the situation is for Iran. All we know is that they’re still able to fire missiles, and more and more of them keep hitting Israel and the Gulf region. Now, if we were aware of that, then what could be a realistic scenario for U.S. ground troops to be engaged in Iran or on one of the islands? I mean, trying to take out the uranium—that’s just stupid, right? It makes no sense. But just putting them there for the sake of being there also makes no sense, because you’re a sitting duck. So, what in your mind would be something this Pentagon would actually sign off on, in terms of a strategic goal for an amphibious landing? #Larry C. Johnson There is none. That’s the problem. So let’s draw a parallel with World War II in the Pacific to get an idea of when military action is taken with a very specific goal in mind. That was the invasion of Guadalcanal by U.S. Marines. The purpose was to seize the airfield—later known as Henderson Airfield—so the Japanese couldn’t use it. Because if they had that airfield, they would essentially be able to control the sea around the island, up toward New Guinea as well as toward Australia. So it actually had strategic significance. The military mission there was clear: prevent the Japanese from controlling the island, secure it, control it, and establish your own air power there. That way, you created air cover around the island, which then enabled subsequent missions to be launched. You don’t have that kind of clear objective here. So let’s start with Karg as an example. What’s the purpose there? To shut off Iranian oil? Well, Karg is not the only terminal Iran uses to load oil, so seizing it won’t actually cut off Iranian exports. What it does do is put U.S. troops in a position of great vulnerability, because they’d be on an island without effective underground fortifications or -- 4 of 18 -- bunkers to take cover in. And it’s close enough to be bombed, strafed, hit with drones, or shelled with artillery. So whatever U.S. troops land there would face an immediate problem. What’s the endgame? Is it to hold Karg Island? Okay—what does that get you? Bragging rights over territory? That doesn’t weaken Iran militarily at all. Will it disrupt their oil flow? Yes, it’ll disrupt some of it, but they’ve got other options. So that’s not the only alternative. Let’s drop down to Qeshm. It’s not quite an island because it’s connected to the mainland, but it sits right next to the Strait of Hormuz, and it’ s a great location to monitor ships passing through. There are about 150,000 people on that island, so if you take it, you’re going to have to deal with that population. Say you take it with 10,000 Marines—well, I’m not great at math, but they’re outnumbered 15 to 1, at least, maybe 150 to 1. So they’ve got a problem right away with crowd control. And if some of those Iranians have firearms, they’re going to be taking potshots at the Marines. But you claim that the goal of that is to open up the Strait of Hormuz. Okay, what’s keeping the Strait of Hormuz closed, apart from Iran saying it’s closed and the insurance companies saying, “We’ re not insuring any ships”? There’s the risk—you’ve got submarines, many submarines operated by Iran that can fire torpedoes. You’ve got mines, underwater drones that can maneuver and hit ships, drones that fly above the water, rockets, missiles. So Iran’s got a whole range of weapons they can use, and none of the actions the troops take there on Qeshm Island solve that. So again, what’s the point, other than just flexing muscles and saying, “Hey, we can land here on Iranian territory”? #Pascal Well, I mean, if you think about it in a twisted way, one of the goals could be to force Iran to use up its missile stockpile by firing at its own territory, right? You put those 10,000 troops there, tell them to dig in, maybe try to identify the bunkers Iran built, storm the bunkers, use them for your own troops, and you’d be forcing Iran to fire at itself until it’s exhausted. I mean, I can imagine people thinking in those terms. #Larry C. Johnson Yeah, it is. Again, think of it in terms of what you actually accomplish, from a strategic standpoint, by having them there. What you create is really a liability, right? And the liability is, how do you resupply