The West's HYPOCRISY In The Middle East | Hossam Nassar

## A fracture in the region: the limits of moral clarity and the calculus of survival The conversation lays bare a bitter paradox at the heart of today’s Middle East: moral outrage and strategic survival often point in different directions, and the resulting choices reveal long-standing hypocrisies and hard limits. The exchange wrestles with the immediate danger of a widening war that could pull in nuclear-armed states, while also unpacking why key regional actors — above all Egypt — make decisions that look, from the outside, like moral compromise or even collusion. What emerges is not a simple indictment of states or leaders but a portrait of politics in extremis: leaders balancing domestic stability, long-term national projects and regional red lines against the humanitarian carnage unfolding next door. Hossam Nassar’s reflections crystallize a recurring theme of the discussion: the distinction between what is morally desirable and what is politically survivable. ## The immediate danger: escalation, nukes, and unpredictable patrons One strand of the conversation focuses on the acute strategic risk: an increasingly combustible confrontation between Israel and Iran that risks widening into a regional conflagration. Nassar warns bluntly that the conflict, triggered by Hamas’s 7 October attack and Israel’s retaliatory campaign, has already reached a point where miscalculation could drag in external powers. He describes a dynamic in which local actors have already shown a willingness to escalate — and in which the United States, Europe and regional patrons could tip the balance unpredictably. The prospect of a direct US military intervention, or a false-flag incident that compels one, looms as the critical unknown. In such an environment, even states that are sympathetic to one side’s grievances must place an absolute premium on avoiding wider war. The nuclear dimension complicates matters further. The conversation treats the question of Iran’s nuclear ambitions with necessary skepticism: public claims and political rhetoric have long framed Iran as an existential nuclear threat, yet clear, incontrovertible evidence of an operational Iranian arsenal remains elusive. Against that ambiguity, Israel’s informal nuclear status and its history of preemptive action make any Iranian sensitivities combustible. Nassar’s position — calling both Iran and Israel “criminal” in different respects — captures the moral ambivalence many observers feel: condemnation of repression and regional adventurism on the one hand, and horror at the scale of civilian suffering in Gaza on the other. ## Egypt’s calculation: sovereignty, security, and red lines The most sustained theme of the conversation is Egypt’s strategic posture. As the country that shares the only land border with Gaza apart from Israel, Egypt faces unique pressures. Nassar insists that Egyptian policy reflects a pragmatic calculus rather than betrayal: a determination to prevent the war from spreading, to avoid repeating the catastrophic wars of the twentieth century, and to protect national sovereignty and the Sinai. From Cairo’s standpoint, any attempt to “sweep” Gaza into the Sinai would be a casus belli; the country has a clear red line against demographic engineering on such a vast scale. At the same time, Egypt’s domestic political context matters. The conversation describes how the governing project that has remade Egypt’s infrastructure and economy over the last decade produces a kind of patience among many citizens: visible development projects create tolerance for private economic hardship. That is a source of political resilience for the current leadership and a constraint on dramatic shifts in foreign policy. When external critics frame Egypt as complicit with Israel, Nassar argues, they neglect Cairo’s active diplomacy — conferences convened to stem hostilities, shuttle mediation with Qatar and the United States, and public sensitivity to the humanitarian crisis — but they do not see the structural limits of what Egypt can do without risking a larger war. ## Hamas, violence, and proportionality The conversation refuses to let moral fog excuse strategic inattention. Nassar is clear in condemning the 7 October attack by Hamas as a “stupid” and “criminal” miscalculation that invited catastrophic retaliation. Yet he simultaneously frames Israel’s response as beyond proportionality, characterizing it as “atrocious” and “near-genocidal.” This double condemnation is important: it rejects a reductive narrative that automatically valorizes any act framed as resistance, while also refusing to normalize mass civilian suffering. For observers in the region, that tension is familiar — many publicly decry the attack yet are outraged at the scale of the punishment. This careful differentiation — that an initial violent act does not justify indiscriminate annihilation — is politically consequential. It explains why powerful Arab publics can be sympathetic to the Palestinian cause while opposed to militant tactics that risk national security. It also clarifies why Egypt, positioned as mediator and gatekeeper, will emphasize ceasefires, humanitarian corridors and diplomatic pressure rather than military escalation. ## Theocracy, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the politics of governance Another major thread in the discussion examines domestic ideological struggles across the Arab world. Nassar’s critique of the Muslim Brotherhood hinges on the concept of hakemiyya — the claim that sovereignty properly belongs to God — which, he argues, transforms politics into a space where opposition becomes sacrilege. The Brotherhood’s ability to convert social services into political capital, he says, masks an ambition that, once translated into power, threatens pluralism by closing the avenues for protest and dissent. This critique situates Egypt’s post-2011 trajectory within broader regional patterns: the appeal of populist religious movements, the fragility of democratic transitions, and the recurring temptation to trade pluralism for order. Nassar draws a provocative parallel between theocratic tendencies in different systems, warning that religious absolutism can metastasize in varied political cultures. His argument is not a blanket defense of authoritarianism; instead, it is a warning that certain forms of governance foreclose the civic mechanisms that make accountable politics possible. ## Western hypocrisy and the endurance of realpolitik One of the synoptic judgments in the conversation is a blistering critique of Western policies in the region. Nassar — who combines Western education and professional experience with a regional political lens — embraces the common critique that the West has been hypocritical for centuries. This is not merely rhetorical. The conversation frames hypocrisy as systemic: colonial legacies, instrumental alliances and selective moral intervention have all contributed to a regional politics where Western interests often trump universalist principles. Yet the conversation does not reduce responses to morality alone. Instead, it points out the strategic limit: regional states must live with Western power and learn to negotiate compromises that protect national interests. The idea that sometimes “you have to be hypocritical in order to survive” captures a sobering realism: surviving politically and preserving national projects may require tactical concessions to stronger powers, even at the cost of moral discomfort. That insight helps explain why Egypt and other states make choices that infuriate activists in the West and the region alike. ## Spillover, demographic threats, and the precariousness of borders The final analytic strand concerns the practical consequences of mass displacement and demographic maneuvering. Pushing Gaza’s population into Sinai would not only be a humanitarian catastrophe; it would redraw the security map in ways that risk triggering direct conflict between Egypt

The West's HYPOCRISY In The Middle East Today I’m talking to Hossam Nassar, who is a former 1st Undersecretary of State for Foreign Cultural Relations in Egypt from 2008-2012. He currently works as a freelance Strategic Management Consultant and recently recently started a YouTube channel on which he does political commentary in Arabic, mostly. Links: Hossam Nassar's YouTube Channel (Arabic): @hossamnassar Neutrality Studies Goods Shop: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall.com #M3 From a macroeconomic perspective, Egypt is doing very well. The kind of real development happening in the country has not occurred in the past 200 years. Even Mohammed Ali Pasha was incapable of achieving such development. Even Nasser, with all his ambitions, did not accomplish this level of progress. The current administration is, in a sense, superimposing another Egypt over the existing one in every aspect. This is unprecedented development happening in Egypt. That's what is making Egyptians, despite their economic suffering on a personal level, extremely patient because they see things happening on the ground. #M2 Hello, everybody. This is Pascal Lottaz from Neutrality Studies, and today I'm talking to Hossam Nassar, who's a former First Undersecretary of State for Foreign Cultural Relations in Egypt, a position he held from 2008 to 2012. He is currently working as a freelance strategic management consultant and has also started a YouTube channel where he does political commentary, mainly in Arabic. Hossam, welcome. #M3 Thanks, Pascal. Thank you for having me. #M2 Thanks for coming online. I would very much like to know your assessment of what is going on in West Asia—or, well, the Middle East, as it's commonly referred to—and also the situation as viewed from Egypt. Can you maybe tell us your take at the moment on what's going on? #M3 Well, the situation is becoming very grave right now. We're on the verge of stepping into a nuclear war between Israel and Iran, with a lot of talk about the US possibly intervening in the war. It would -- 1 of 13 -- make things even more serious if the US steps in. I'll talk about my own perspective first, and then I'll give you the Egyptian perspective. I'm very neutral, by the way—well, kind of. It's very difficult to be 100% neutral. The whole situation started on the 7th of October with the foolish attack by Hamas on Israel. They miscalculated—the Hamas leadership miscalculated the Israeli response. They underestimated the reaction and overestimated their own power. On the 7th of October, the minute it started, I said it was a stupid thing to do. It's criminal, and it's a terrorist attack on Israel. Saying that in Egypt is not something people usually like to hear. #M2 However... let me just ask, is it the case that a majority of Egyptians would look at it differently? They would oppose your view? #M3 Emotionally, yes. Emotionally. And what I said on the 7th of October was that Israel's response would be extremely severe, harsh, and extremely violent. And there is no way for Hamas to win this war. So that was my interpretation back then. However, having said that, in terms of proportionality, the Israeli response was extremely atrocious, barbaric, near-genocidal. And from my perspective, having seen the daughters and sons of a people—namely, the Jewish people—who have been oppressed in Europe for nearly 2,000 years, and that ended in the Holocaust. They nearly went into extinction. Having the daughters and sons of a people who have been oppressed for such a long time committing such atrocities against the Gazans and the Palestinians—from my perspective, it was unbelievable. I just couldn't believe that the oppressed became such oppressors. And I have predicted that the war will extend into Lebanon, possibly Syria. I said earlier, even before the 7th of October, that Israel's main target is Iran, for whatever reasons they have. I currently consider both Iran and Israel to be criminal states. The Iranians are no less criminal. #M2 What is the crime of the Iranians, especially in the current context? Because they were just attacked by Israel, weren't they? #M3 Yes, I'll explain that. The Iranians are criminals inside Iran. They are oppressing their own people. However, Israel is criminal outside of Israel. But that does not give Israel the right to attack Iran. I'm totally against Iran having a nuclear bomb or a nuclear warhead. However, Israel is already a nuclear power. They claim to have 300 or 400 nuclear warheads. So justifying an attack from a nuclear power on a would-be nuclear power like Iran—which is still doubtful—is questionable. And -- 2 of 13 -- Netanyahu has been claiming that Iran is on the verge of having nuclear capability since, I mean, Noah's time. And it still hasn't happened. We haven't seen yet any clear evidence or clear proof that Iran has a nuclear bomb. So Israel decided to go on its own. They are not authorized to do that. They are violating international law, and they have been the aggressor. On the night Iran was attacked, everybody was saying that Iran was finished. And I said on my YouTube channel that this is not the case. Iran, despite being a kind of fragile state, is strong. And they would hit back, and probably they would hit back the same night, on the 13th of June. And that's exactly what happened. They absorbed the attack and got back at Israel after 12 or 18 hours. And since then, it's been escalating. And they have demonstrated that they can break this dome of Israel, the Iron Dome, to the extent that the Israeli people are being hit badly, and there is a kind of unprecedented panic in Israel, which is affecting Israel economically and socially as well. So, in a nutshell, the situation is grave, it is not good, and it could escalate if the U.S. decides to intervene—which could be today, as we speak, it could be tonight, it could be over the weekend, or it could never happen. You never know what Trump's mind is or where it is. He's a chameleon. He's like Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde. And he's extremely intelligent in having his own exit. If he decides on evil, he usually has an exit plan into goodness, and the other way around. It's very difficult to predict. So whether it's going to hit or not remains to be seen. #M2 Yes, it does. And also, we now know that there's a very strong disagreement within the United States and within the power base of Donald Trump on which course of action to take. And it's almost impossible to see into this black box and determine who has what kind of influence. Plus, we don't know if there will be any form of— I mean, there's still a threat that there might be a false flag attack on some US military asset in the region, and that might drag— I mean, that might push everything over the edge. You, looking at everything that's happening from Egypt— and Egypt being the only other country besides Israel that has a land border with Gaza— Egypt is often criticized, especially by Iran, for not helping the Palestinians in Gaza and for collaborating with Israel. What is— well, let me say, maybe your opinion on this, or maybe what the Egyptian government is saying? What can you tell us about what the Egyptian government says to its own population in order to explain this closure of the border? #M3 I mean, within the Arab community, they usually say that there is no Arab war with Israel without Egypt. And it was obvious from the very beginning, even from the Hamas attack on Israel, that they were trying to drag Egypt into a war with Israel. And Egypt is refraining from doing that for many logical reasons. We have had enough wars. The last war with Israel happened in 1973, which is over 50 years ago. And Egyptians are not really interested in going to war with Israel. There is also some -- 3 of 13 -- sort of negative propaganda. Iran was part of it, but not the main part. The main part was the Muslim Brotherhood umbrella of people. As you know well, they are trying to get back to Egypt and to rule Egypt again, which will never happen. So they are propagating negative propaganda about Egypt not helping the Palestinians and even conspiring with Israel over Palestine, which is totally hocus pocus. Probably Egypt is the only state that is really putting a lot of muscle behind stopping the war and is extremely sympathetic to what's happening on the Gazan front. But there is nothing else we can do. We did everything in our capacity to intervene and stop this atrocity. Diplomatically, we have raised the issue internationally and put it on the radar screen of the international community. In October 2023, we had the first international conference in Egypt, chaired by President Sisi, with some European delegates, trying to stop the war at the very beginning. We've been collaborating with the U.S. and Qatar and mediating that effort to some success, but Israel's aggression is killing any kind of mediation. So, I mean, this kind of propaganda is not really getting any traction in Egypt. Egyptians are extremely aware and extremely capable of differentiating between Hamas and the Palestinian cause. So, in that context, the Egyptians are not really different, from my perspective. They are anti-war unless Israel is going crazy, or about to go crazy and decides to wage war on Egypt. That would be a totally different ballgame. #M2 I mean, one of the fears—and I think that fear is very, very warranted—is that Israel might, I mean, it's currently engaging in massive, large-scale killing in Gaza. If you want to, I call it a genocide. Other people say it is not. I'm of the opinion it is, but okay, fine. In the future, the ICJ and so on will have a verdict on this. But we know it is large-scale killing. We know it's large-scale destruction. And one of the fears is that the survivors—that Israel will try to sweep them basically over the border with Egypt into the Sinai. If that happened, that would be quite... it would be a huge problem. I mean, at the moment, I talked to a Palestinian scholar just the other day. He told me that the population of Gaza fell from 2.2 million to 1.85 million people, but still, 1.85 million are there. If they were pushed all into the Sinai, I mean, what would that do to Egypt? And is this a worry that you have, or that Egypt actually has as well? #M3 It is definitely a worry. And if it happens, then my estimation is that it's going to be a war between Egypt and Israel, because Egypt will never allow such a thing to happen. If it starts to happen, we will never fire any kind of bullets against our Palestinian brothers. But my analysis is that if it starts to happen, Egypt will go into Gaza, and possibly go into the Negev in Israel, trying to stop that. So this is the dangerous component. And I think the U.S. administration has started to realize that this is a red line for Egypt, no matter how Trump is talking about the "Gaza Riviera" and, I mean, this hocus-pocus thing. This would be the start of a war between Egypt and Israel, in my view. -- 4 of 13 -- #M2 Yes, I mean, even if it wasn't, it would just make everything even worse, right? It would drag the Sinai in as well, because there's no reason to believe that the Palestinians would stop opposing this even if they were pushed into the Sinai. I mean... What's the population in Egypt thinking about this? Because I just need to ask—right, we had this moment in 2012 when there was a change of government, and we had a democratic election, and then that democratic president, who was from the Muslim Brotherhood, was overthrown and died in prison. And ever since, Mr. al-Sisi has been in power, and from the outside, it's always a question of how much popular support there is for the government's policies. It's very difficult to understand. What can you tell us about the overall cleavages within Egyptian society? #M3 I'll be very honest in answering this. In 2013, when we led the revolution against the Muslim Brotherhood, El-Sisi was extremely p