US Sacrifices Gulf States for Empire | Ex- Foreign Minister Evarist Bartolo

## A strategic bargain turned liability: why bases no longer guarantee security What once passed for a straightforward bargain—grant access to foreign military forces in return for protection—now reads like a trap. The conversation with former Maltese foreign minister Evarist Bartolo lays out a stark thesis: hosting foreign bases makes small states targets rather than wards, and recent events in the Gulf expose the costs of treating bases as security insurance. The United States’ global network of bases, once celebrated as a stabilizing architecture, is increasingly revealed as a mechanism for projecting power that entangles host states in distant conflicts, undermines their sovereignty, and even damages their economies. This reframing reopens a long-standing policy question: can neutrality and sovereignty provide a better route to peace and prosperity than asymmetrical security bargains? ## Malta’s experience: how a tiny island chose nonalignment Malta’s history furnishes an unusually clear case study. For centuries the island’s deep harbor made it an irresistible military prize; according to Bartolo, foreign powers controlled Maltese destiny for most of recorded history. Only in 1979, when British forces withdrew, did Malta stop functioning as a military base in any meaningful way. A subsequent constitutional commitment—backed across the domestic political spectrum—renounced military alliances and hosting foreign bases. The payoff was not merely symbolic. Once military control receded, civilian decision-making space widened: tourism and services developed, infrastructure projects could proceed without vetos from foreign war departments, and domestic priorities took precedence over imperial strategy. Bartolo draws out a critical lesson from Malta’s decolonization: hosting bases often limits a country’s capacity to govern, because strategic priorities set by the external power can override domestic needs. For small states, the supposed protection of an alliance can be indistinguishable from external control. Viewed through that lens, Malta’s decision to enshrine neutrality in its constitution becomes less a peripheral quirk and more a deliberate strategy to recover agency—one that other small states might revisit now that the vulnerabilities of bases are on display. ## Bases as lightning rods: the changing logic of vulnerability Whereas Cold War thinking treated overseas bases as shelters under an umbrella of great-power protection, the current exchange reframes them as lightning rods. The recent strikes and counter-strikes in the Gulf illustrate the simple dynamic: an adversary aiming at a dominant power will often aim as well at the weaker actors who host that power’s instruments. Bahrain, Qatar, and Kuwait have not declared war on Iran, yet by hosting U.S. military presence they have become targets. Bartolo stresses how this is not a theoretical objection but a lived reality—hosting foreign forces attracts adversarial attention and multiplies risks across the host territory. The political cost of being a “magnet” is not limited to occasional attacks. Hosting bases can reshape domestic politics, entangle societies in foreign wars, and create constituencies whose interests align with external rather than national priorities. Publicly, leaders often affirm the benefits of the security arrangement, but behind closed doors many recognize the diplomatic and economic compromises these arrangements entail. The contrast between public rhetoric and private calculation underlines the political precariousness of asymmetric security bargains. ## Economic coercion and control: the hidden costs of hosting forces Bartolo advances an economic critique that complements his political and military concerns. Colonial and post‑colonial experience shows how bases can constrain economic development by imposing the strategic priorities of the foreign power onto host economies. In Malta, vital civil projects once required war department approval; in the Gulf, presence of foreign bases can influence domestic spending, investment priorities, and even the structure of local industries. More broadly, Bartolo highlights how U.S. strategic moves can have downstream economic effects across regions. The argument that recent U.S. policy is sacrificing Gulf states to preserve the petrodollar and the dollar’s reserve status deserves attention: if the United States benefits commercially and financially from remaining one of the few open energy suppliers while sidelining rivals, then military operations and regime-change strategies can operate in tandem with economic objectives. Whether or not one accepts this causal chain in full, it is undeniable that geopolitical and monetary strategies are intertwined, and basing arrangements can be one lever among many used to steer economic outcomes—sometimes to the detriment of the host. ## Technological shifts: why fixed bases are increasingly fragile A compelling military point in the conversation is technological: drones, cruise missiles, and increasingly sophisticated ballistic and hypersonic systems change the calculus of vulnerability. As Bartolo notes, these technologies make static land bases analogous to ships tied up in a port—easy to target and costly to protect. The implication is twofold. First, the defensive logic underpinning permanent bases is weakened when relatively inexpensive weapons can inflict disproportionate damage. Second, the traditional balance of power, which favored states able to construct and maintain vast forward deployments, is shifting because cheaper technologies give weaker actors asymmetric options to strike back. George Orwell’s insight—lesser powers gaining “claws” through affordable weapon systems—resonates here. If it is cheaper to attack than to defend a spread of overseas bases, the political calculus for both host states and patron powers changes. For host states, the security bargain becomes a liability; for patron states, sustaining an expensive global lattice of bases becomes harder to justify, especially amid fiscal pressure and competing domestic priorities. The susceptibility of fixed installations to modern attack modes accelerates strategic reconsideration worldwide. ## Gulf politics and the limits of proxy alignment The Gulf provides an especially revealing laboratory for these dynamics. States in the region differ widely: Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, the UAE, Oman, and Saudi Arabia each have distinct relationships with Iran, the United States, China, and other powers. Bartolo suggests that behind-the-scenes diplomacy is already occurring—particularly in states like Oman and Qatar, which have maintained channels with Tehran. Even when public postures remain aligned with Washington, private conversations reveal appetite for hedging and diversification. Not every Gulf state will pivot the same way: the UAE’s deep economic and even military-industrial links with Israel complicate any simple realignment; Saudi Arabia’s relationship with Iran remains fraught and strategically complex. Yet the broader trend points toward multipolar hedging: Gulf rulers need markets, trade partners, and technological ties that a single patron cannot satisfy. As a result, the present crisis could be an inflection point prompting some states to reduce their dependence on forward-deployed forces, expand regional diplomacy, and pursue more autonomous security arrangements. ## Sovereignty, neutrality, and the hard politics of independence A central normative claim that threads the conversation is that sovereignty and neutrality are not passive stances but active strategies for preserving peace and prosperity. For small states, neutrality can be a mechanism to avoid entanglement, protect economic development, and sustain diplomatic autonomy. Bartolo’s Maltese experience provides a living argument: surrender of basing rights meant recovery of domestic policy space and a cleaner separation between national pri

US Sacrifices Gulf States for Empire | Evarist Bartolo The US has turned its "protection promise" into a war trap. Not only is Washington deliberately throwing its Gulf allies under the bus to absorb Iran's firepower, but it is also intentionally wrecking their oil and gas industries. The US benefits hugely, as it remains one of the sole open producers and suppliers of oil and gas. In combination with the recent regime change operation in Venezuela, this power play guarantees the Petro-Dollar, which then also means the USD will keep its reserve currency status. What a power play, and what an incredible way of ruling not only over enemies but over allies at the same time. Conclusion: only a sovereign (neutral) foreign policy can guard one's economy and one's peace. Support us on substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Shop and Donations: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall.com #Pascal Welcome back, everybody, to Neutrality Studies. Today, once more, we’re joined by our friend and colleague, Evarist Bartolo, former foreign minister of the beautiful island nation of Malta. Evarist, welcome back, and thank you very much for this conversation. Evarist, you actually told me that March, which we’re in at the moment, is a month in Malta when you commemorate something important—the closure of the last foreign bases on the island. We’ll talk about this in the context, of course, of the Iran war, but could you maybe give us a bit of background on why Malta hosted foreign bases in the first place, and how it was able to close them? #Evarist Bartolo Yes, the end of March is important for us because on the 31st of March, 1979, the British left their naval and military bases, which they had maintained in Malta since 1800. But that wasn’t the first time Malta served as a base for foreign powers that were competing with each other for dominance. They considered Malta to have a strategically important position just below Sicily. What interested them even more than the geographic location was the deep harbor with all-year good weather, which was obviously very, very important. That has been our blessing but also our curse, because of that deep harbor we’ve been dominated for thousands of years. So it’s not just the British base—in our history, I think we’ve been invaded about 24 times. And we've always been invaded, not because of something we did or because we, as natives, constituted a threat, but because the power that held Malta as a base was obviously a threat to other powers in the region. So for us, since 1979, we’ve, for the first time, not been serving as a military base. In our 8,500 years of history, it’s only in the last eight minutes or so—if we were to compress our history into 24 hours—that we’ve been without military bases. What’s interesting is -- 1 of 16 -- that in 1987 we managed to get a constitutional change, and both major parties in Malta committed themselves not to join any military alliance and not to allow our territory to serve as foreign military bases for other powers. #Pascal This is very important. Malta is a neutral country. But, you know, under the current foreign policy thinking of much of the Western establishment, anyone would expect that by now you’d be overrun by military forces—either the Russians or the Chinese. I mean, you have no protection. Who protects Malta? Can you explain a little how the Maltese think about their security in their neighborhood? #Evarist Bartolo The biggest problem, I would say, is the rhetoric, because there’s this perception that if you don’t have someone to protect you, you’ll be invaded. But in fact, history shows that we’ve always been invaded because we served as a military base for others. On our own, we can’t threaten anyone— and that’s a good thing, because we don’t constitute a threat. What’s been very important for us is to deny ourselves as a military base to everyone and not to align with one bloc or another. What’s interesting—and I find more people today ready to accept this argument—is what’s happening now in the war against Iran, where military bases are not security umbrellas but actually lightning rods, magnets that attract missiles and war. Instead of protecting you, you actually need to be protected from these military bases. So this is, I think, one of the unintended consequences of the war against Iran—it’s making people worldwide reconsider. I don’t think it’s happening dramatically, but from what I follow, more people are now ready to accept that. You know, I also follow what’s happening in Cyprus, for example, and more people there are ready to accept that having foreign military bases on your territory is not a security umbrella but actually a magnet that causes problems—not just militarily, but also politically and economically. #Pascal A lightning rod is a very good way of putting it, because in a sense, what Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait are now getting is the blitz from the Iranians as retaliation against the U.S. and Israel. These Gulf states are not themselves attacking Iran, but because they host the bases of those who do, they automatically become targets. I mean, it's the most natural thing in the world, even if Donald Trump keeps claiming that nobody could have foreseen something like this happening. Do you think this situation is now going to make people in those places rethink their security strategy? I mean, we've seen a lot of comments coming out of Saudi Arabia suggesting they’re thinking of joining the war, instead of actually doing the opposite—saying, “no more bases” in Qatar, Kuwait, and so on. They’re all condemning these actions against them. But don’t you think that, behind the -- 2 of 16 -- scenes, some of these foreign policy people—especially the foreign ministers—must be realizing that the cause of their destruction now is actually that very, very mistaken foreign policy of thinking that by providing bases, you automatically get security? I think so. #Evarist Bartolo And it’s very clear that even what’s happening in Asia—let’s focus a bit on South Korea, for example—where the base is supposed to be there to protect them from China. Whereas, in fact, if equipment is needed to protect the U.S. and Israel, you bring it over from South Korea. So it’s very clear that these military bases—and let’s remember, Pascal, that at the moment there are about 1,247 military bases around the world, over 800 of them, about 90%, belonging to the United States. And as the NATO Secretary General told us recently about NATO—and what he said about NATO applies also to military bases—it’s not to defend the host countries where these bases are placed, but actually to project global military power. Instead of protecting you, you get involved now in the global conflicts that a great power like the United States has. And it has, you know, very, very deep roots and painful consequences for the countries that are hosting them. And I can tell you, even from my personal experience, I know some of these—not just ministers, but even people at a higher level in the Gulf countries—how they talk publicly and then how they talk privately to you when you ask them these questions you’ve just asked. Do you think the bases are here to protect you, or are they actually becoming a danger and a big risk for you? And publicly, although even now they are careful about how they express themselves. Publicly, they would say, “Oh, they’re good. It’s part of the security architecture in our region.” But they know that privately it’s actually there to control them rather than protect them, and that it exposes them to serious problems—even economically. And especially if you take countries like Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar, which are small, the consequences can be felt across the whole territory. It’s not something that can exist as an enclave on its own. You know, and I can tell you, Pascal, even from our own historical experience, when Malta was serving as a military base for many years, all our territory was under the control of the War Department in Britain. It wasn’t even under the Overseas Department. So whatever civil infrastructure project needed to be done—building a road, extending the water connection, providing electricity, constructing something—you needed the go-ahead from the War Department. How did this affect the military interests of the UK in Malta? If it went against those interests—strategically or militarily—then that project simply wouldn’t happen. It’s no wonder that, in our case, the tourism industry and the services sector started developing only after we stopped being a military base, because finally there was space—not just physical and territorial space for these developments, but also, at last, decision-making space to act in the interest of our own people. -- 3 of 16 -- And I think this is something that needs to be explained over and over again, Pascal. You don’t even have to be from the Global South to understand it. If we look at what happened 60 years ago— literally in March, 60 years ago—President Charles de Gaulle told the United States to close down its naval and military bases in France. And it wasn’t only because he wanted to regain national sovereignty, which was very important, but because he felt it interfered with France’s decision- making—not just militarily, but in terms of running the country in its own interest. #Pascal Yeah, I mean, these military alliances—especially when they're so asymmetrical, right? Between a very large power and a very small one, like the large United States and the small UAE or Qatar, or the large UK and the small Malta—these are not really alliances. These are, of course, colonial relationships. And actually, in Malta’s case, Malta was a colony of the UK, right? It later gained its independence. But why do you think this whole strategy is coming under stress now? I mean, the decolonial process, at least since 1945, was supposed—at least in theory—to move in that direction. And we know that, let's say, in the UAE and other Gulf states, there was this idea of a quid pro quo, right? Security in exchange for bases, and basically submission to what this foreign power actually wants. We know the same logic applies in Japan, and this is not a secret, not a theory. I mean, the 1953 Security Treaty, which first established that the U.S. could open bases, and then the revision in 1960—the one still in force now—very clearly said, “OK, U.S., you get bases. In return, we get security.” And we don’t. The Japanese, I mean, get security, and they can then focus on economic development instead of military development, which served both sides. And that was it—it actually worked well, at least for Japan and arguably also for the Gulf states for a while. But now it’s become a liability, and I’m absolutely sure it will become a liability for Japan as well. It will become a liability for the Philippines. Do you think that what’s currently happening will serve as a signal to these other states to look again at the strategy, or will it just entrench the idea that we need even more U.S. bases to deter the other side? #Evarist Bartolo No, I think deep questions are being asked, and they’ll only increase—for at least three reasons: militarily, politically, and economically. Something that’s happening, which I find very interesting and, as far as I know, hasn’t really been pointed out yet, is that the missile and drone technology Iran has developed is actually making these bases obsolete. Right? Because they’re like anchored aircraft carriers on land. And we know the U.S. keeps its aircraft carriers and its Navy far away from Iran because of that missile and drone technology. Now, this is very interesting because I think it’s a new development. -- 4 of 16 -- And I’m sure that even militarily, even those who are in favor of war and those who make money from war, will have to rethink the presence of military bases for the very simple reason that they’ve now become very