Russia's TRAP for Europe Is Working | Prof. Vladimir Brovkin

Europe, Russia, and public opinion The conversation with Prof. Vladimir Brovkin lays out a clear and unsettling premise: the current confrontation between Russia and the West is not fueled primarily by mass popular hatred in Europe, but by elite politics, media narratives, and the strategic patience of a resurgent Moscow. What looks like brinkmanship on the surface—strikes, sanctions, and saber-rattling—masks a far subtler campaign aimed at exploiting European political weakness and time. Brovkin’s assessment reframes the crisis from an emotional clash of peoples to a long-term political contest in which Russia is betting that European publics will refuse the costs of continued escalation. A central thread running through the exchange is the distinction between elites and ordinary citizens across European states. Brovkin stresses that while European governments and media elites have adopted virulent anti-Russian rhetoric, ordinary Europeans are far less animated. There is sympathy for Ukraine’s suffering, anger at the violence, but not the visceral dehumanization of Russians that some leaders promote. In Germany and France—two pivotal battlegrounds for European policy—public sentiment, he argues, would balk at any government decision that genuinely risked war with Russia. Electoral volatility, domestic crises, and migration pressures mean publics are more preoccupied with bread-and-butter problems than with a grand ideological confrontation with Moscow. This gap between elite-driven policy and public tolerance matters because war requires sustained societal consent. Brovkin’s point is that Europe’s leaders may rhetorically escalate, but material mobilization—the willingness to fight, to risk energy security, to accept economic fallout—is absent in most European electorates. That reluctance forms the backbone of what he identifies as a Russian “trap”: push hard enough to polarize and radicalize European politics so that the more accommodationist, stability-minded forces regain office in subsequent cycles. If Europe’s mainstream elites isolate Russia enough, they risk creating the political conditions that will eventually make rapprochement attractive to voters tired of crises and stagnation. Why US-Russia ties are more dangerous The analysis shifts in tone when attention moves to the transatlantic partner whose posture matters most: the United States. Brovkin warns that the US–Russia relationship is the more perilous dynamic because American politics contains both greater élite hostility toward Russia and actors predisposed to risk. Unlike many European publics, the American political elite—across much of Congress and influential interest groups—maintains deep animus toward Moscow. That enmity, combined with structural factors in US foreign policy-making, increases the probability of miscalculation. A key distinction Brovkin draws is the United States’ internal political unpredictability. He credits Donald Trump, paradoxically, with restraining escalation in the recent past: Trump’s outreach and inclination to negotiate created a brake on more interventionist impulses in Washington. But that reprieve is conditional and transient. If a post-Trump or post-Trump-era leadership in Washington resets to a more hawkish posture, a relatively minor incident could rapidly escalate into a broader confrontation. The danger is not only conscious intent to provoke but also the interaction of misperception, domestic political signaling, and the presence of regional flashpoints—Cuba, Venezuela, Iran—that could pull Russia and the United States into indirect, risky contestation. Broader still is the way each side reads the other’s weaknesses. Brovkin notes a powerful belief in Moscow that time favors Russia: demographic, economic, and military trends are, in Russian estimation, slowly realigning the global balance away from Western primacy. That conviction makes Russian leaders patient in the short run and deliberate in their approach. Combined with US elite animus, it creates a dangerous mix: Russian restraint intended to exploit Western political cycles can collide with American impatience and desire to punish or deter, producing unintended escalation. The US’s institutional capability and willingness to project force contrast with Europe’s internal constraints; both dynamics interact dangerously when Washington’s calculations diverge from European caution. US politics, war hawks, and future risks Prof. Brovkin’s reflection on American domestic politics is sharp and pragmatic. He argues that the US political class contains significant war-promoting currents—especially among groups who see global primacy as a non-negotiable good. Those war hawks can drive policy in moments of high emotional salience or when they perceive an opportunity to reassert American dominance. That risk is heightened by the fragmented and polarized American political environment where actions that signal toughness can have outsized electoral or reputational value. At the same time, Brovkin highlights another paradox: American power is not what many believe it to be. He contends that, quantitatively and qualitatively, China already possesses the most formidable military capacity, with Russia still ahead of the United States on certain strategic axes in Brovkin’s view. Whether or not one accepts the exact ranking, the practical implication is crucial: US decision-makers may fetishize military options without recognizing the limits of what those options can achieve against a vast, dispersed, and well-armed Russia. Such misperceptions are dangerous because they invite strategies that overestimate leverage and underestimate the costs of escalation. The Professor also points to the multiplicity of theatres where US-Russian competition might ignite. Iran looms large—full-scale American military action there would be disastrous, he argues, because it would demand occupation-level resources and would likely degrade US global status. Proxy conflicts, maritime confrontations, and cyber escalations pose lower thresholds for entry but can nevertheless produce spirals that neither side intends. Brovkin’s judgment is pragmatic: avoid assuming that nuclear deterrence alone will stabilize relations. Conventional capabilities, geography, and political will all combine to create contours of risk that are neither simple nor safely contained. Weapons costs and military industry A recurrent theme in the discussion is the convergence of military power and industrial capacity. Brovkin emphasizes that Russia’s advantage is partly structural: its vast geography, dispersed industrial base, and integrated air defense systems create logistical and operational challenges for any adversary contemplating high-intensity conventional strikes. Destroying Russia’s capacity with non-nuclear means would be prohibitively expensive and practically fraught, he argues, because of the volume of munitions required and the difficulty of penetrating layered defenses. This point folds into a critique of current Western assistance models. Spending vast sums on high-end munitions, consultant services, and foreign military aid in the short term may not be sustainable politically or economically. European budgets are stagnating; public patience for continuous, costly aid without visible returns is limited. Meanwhile, arms procurement costs spiral. Brovkin suggests that Russia’s military-industrial complex, while not without flaws, benefits from proximity to front-line requirements and a wartime production posture that Western peacetime industries struggle to match. The net effect is that a protracted contest favors the side that can better align industrial production with strategic needs and domestic political tolerance for prolonged expenditure. For Western planners, the lesson is uncomfortable but necessary: technological superiority does not automatically translate into decisive advantage. Concentration of forces, logistica

Russia's TRAP for Europe Is Working | Prof. Vladimir Brovkin If you thought Russia's restraint is weakness... think again. There is strategy behind every move. Today, Dr. Vladimir Brovkin, Russian-born American historian and former Harvard associate professor, discusses Europe’s weak public will for war with Russia, rising US-Russia risks, Putin’s long game, Ukraine’s drone attacks, Russia’s military and industry, the likely endgame in Ukraine, and why Moscow is turning it's back to Europe. Links: History and Politics with Dr. Brovkin: https://www. youtube.com/@vladimirbrovkin4052 [BOOK] From Vladimir Lenin to Vladimir Putin: Russia in Search of Its Identity: 1913–2023: https://www.amazon.com/Vladimir-Lenin-Putin-Identity-1913-2023-ebook /dp/B0CKFNV3RT Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Merch: https://neutralitystudies.com/shop Donation: https://neutralitystudies.com/donate Timestamps: 00: 00:00 Introduction 00:01:19 Europe, Russia, and public opinion 00:07:15 Escalation and Putin’s restraint 00:13:26 Why US-Russia ties are more dangerous 00:18:26 Russia’s military power and time advantage 00:24:43 US politics, war hawks, and future risks 00:30:56 Drone attacks and Russia’ s response 00:40:37 Weapons costs and military industry 00:48:08 What a Russian victory may look like 00:54:54 Borders, Kaliningrad, and the Baltic question 00:58:18 Russia’s turn toward Asia 01:01: 09 Where to follow Dr. Brovkin #Pascal Welcome back to Neutrality Studies, everybody. Today, for the first time, we have Dr. Vladimir Brovkin, a Russian-born American historian and former associate professor at Harvard University, and the author of several books, his latest one being *Russia in Search of Its Identity: From Vladimir Lenin to Vladimir Putin*. He's also the host of a very insightful YouTube channel called *History and Politics with Dr. Brovkin*. Vladimir, welcome. #Vladimir Brovkin Thank you so much. Thank you, Pascal. Very, very happy to be on your channel, which is really about neutrality and really about not taking sides, but being objective and balanced. And I always follow you. Thank you. #Pascal Well, thank you very much for that. I must say, though, you know, I repeat this quite often. I myself am not very neutral. I'm a neutralist. I try to show people why that might make sense in international relations. One of the examples is, of course, an example that you’ve studied quite a lot, which is Ukraine and the periphery of Russia. But I would like to hear your analysis today because -- 1 of 18 -- you're one of the voices who actually gives a very insightful analysis, being yourself from Russia but now living in the West. Where are we at in the West's relationship with Russia? #Vladimir Brovkin Well, it's a very difficult question because it's easy to say it's bad. Well, everybody knows it's bad, and it may get worse. However, why I'm reluctant to say it's bad is because the people of Europe don't have any hate toward Russia. And I live in Europe. I live in France. Yes, people do feel worried and upset about the current war, and many of them sympathize with the Ukrainians. Well, I do too. I mean, hey, I have nothing against Ukrainians. It's not a question of being for Ukrainians or not. Any war, any casualties are a matter of regret. But the people in Europe, they don't have a hatred toward Russia as some of the leaders of the European Union do. And they do not have this kind of condescending, you know, “these Russians are subhuman” attitude. They don't. About that, let me just comment. I gave a lecture in Germany, and I studied in Germany, and I speak German, and I have German friends. So I know Germany quite well. I've been to every corner of Germany. And I don't think there is any hatred toward Russia among the Germans. I think what's happening in Germany, and the reason that there's so much support for Ukraine, and they support Mertz, I think there are two reasons for that. One is that in the 1980s, German society went through a kind of feeling of guilt. And there were these Holocaust museums opening everywhere. And that generation felt that Germany as a nation was guilty of the crimes of the Nazi era. Now, all of a sudden, you know, they could say, hey, we're not the only ones. The Russians are doing it too. Doing what? Fighting Ukraine. And as they inflate all these, you know, when you see the images of houses that are burning, that kind of makes the Germans feel we're not the only bad guy on the block. This is one reason why they feel this is the time to blame Russia. And a lot of students that I spoke to, they have that anger because they are sympathetic to civilians who they feel are suffering. On the other hand, I think there is a kind of German imperialist tradition where the Germans, for example, say, you know, we won World War I, at least on the Eastern Front. We showed the Russians then a kind of German pride, that they're not only the losers of World War II. And now Ukraine is doing what we say. So in that sense, it's kind of a reaffirmation of German might. And this, for a certain generation, the older one, you know, when Merz says we're going to restore German might, that sounds kind of appealing. And in that sense, this is why there is some support for his policies of supporting Ukraine, but not for war with Russia. Absolutely not. And of course, the figures of 40% or 30% in as many lands for AfD, the Alternative for Germany, show that German society is not gearing up to fight Russia. In fact, I am convinced that if a serious crisis occurred, the German government would fall. The German people are not going to allow any kind of fight with Russia. I think it's impossible. It's the same thing in France. I live in France. I know the French people. I communicate with them. They are not happy about Putin. -- 2 of 18 -- They're not happy about the war. But this is a far cry from fighting Russia. That's just absurd. It wouldn't occur to the minds of most Frenchmen. #Pascal I'm quite glad to hear that from you because most people I talk to are much less optimistic. But, you know, I think I share your sentiment that in the general population, in most quarters, there is no ingrained hate for Russians on any kind of personal level. The difference, though, is when it comes to the—at least in my view—analysis of how the general population looks at the Russian leadership, which it blames for much of the warfare that's going on in Ukraine. And the other side is, of course, the elites within the political circles and media circles, which really, I mean, in my view, in a lot of European countries, just blast out a lot of Russophobia, including very, very dark stereotypes about Russia and the Russians. And that's why I view, and what you said is why I view it as so important for the Europeans, or for the European leadership—some of whom actually would like to have a war with Russia, or at least work toward that, from what we can tell. That's why it's so important that the first strike—the strike against NATO, the direct strike—comes from Russia. So I view a lot of what they're doing as provoking Russia into the next phase of this already European war. But how are you viewing this current escalation? Because strikes against the Russian heartland, strikes against Moscow with drones and whatnot manufactured in Europe, would have been unthinkable in the Cold War. But now they are commonplace. And I view this as a way to actually convince the general public that, look, we always told you the Russians will attack, and attack they did. #Vladimir Brovkin Well, I don't share that view, actually. I don't think the Russians will attack. I do not think they will attack because it's not in their interest. And I’ve already expressed it several times. Putin understands Germany and Europe very well. He speaks German, he worked in Germany, and he has friends in Germany. He refers to them all the time. What I think Putin's grand plan is—and we shall see if it works or not—is that the nationalist or right-wing, or whatever you want to call them, parties, or Euroskeptic parties, are on the rise in Europe. And this you can see very easily just by Googling, you know, the success of AfD in Germany. And that means, you know, the total unpopularity of Merz and the, you know, free fall of the German economy and the migration crisis. And the very simple fact that, you know, the AfD says we're not going to be just friends with Russia. All we want is normal relations and to buy Russian gas because we need it. And it's absurd to deny it just because we don't like what they do. We don't like many things that people do, but that doesn't mean we cannot have normal trade relations with them. So this is why, you know, I think Putin—and I agree with him, I think he's right in kind of a long-term strategy—is that the Russia haters would -- 3 of 18 -- lose in elections, first of all in Germany, and most likely in France next year, because Macron is totally discredited. He's not only disliked, he's despised, he's laughed at, he's completely lost all his credibility. And this is not because of his foreign policy, but because of what's going on in France. France is stagnating. The French economy is not growing. The modernization of French industry is not happening. And the crime crisis is ridiculous because, you know, Marseille is just, you know, a place like Los Angeles—it's gang warfare. The traffic with drugs is appalling, and nobody is doing anything. This is how the French people see it. So he is not going to make it, neither is his party. It's going to be either the left or the right. Both of them don't want a war with Russia. Both of them want normal relations with Russia—Jean-Luc Mélenchon and Marine Le Pen. So whichever way it works out, it is not going to be the warmongers in France. Now, you also know, of course, the deep crisis that Britain is in. Yes, British elites hate Russia, but not the British people. I also know Britain quite well, and I went there, and I studied there, and I have friends there, etc., etc. The British people are focused on their own problems, and they have very serious problems— with migration, with deindustrialization, with the political crisis, with the political system that's not working, with the political parties, the majority gets all, etc., etc. So I don't think the British priority is fighting Russia. And even if they wanted to, they have nothing to fight with. They have no modern ships. They have no modern army. They have no air force, nothing. Really, militarily, the British are at the bottom of their history, if ever they were that powerless. So in that sense, I think that the European, you know, the European relations with Russia are very, very bad, but they may improve within a few years if the war stops, whichever way—either by Russian victory or by a compromise and a settlement acceptable to Russia. So I'm not worried about that at all, actually. The relations with the United States, I think, are much more dangerous than with Europe. Because in the United States, the Republican Party, all of the Democratic Party hate Russia. The elites hate Russia. The Jewish elites hate Russia. And a lot of war hawks in the Republican Party hate Russia—and hate Russia in the sense that they feel, “We're number one, we can do anything.” Trump keeps repeating they're the strongest power. They're not the strongest power anymore. But they keep, you know, deceiving themselves that they are. The strongest military power on earth is China. And after that is Russia. And only after that, the United States. But the Chinese are sitting quietly, and they don't show what they have. The only time they showed it was at their military parade. The kind of high tech they have is unbelievable. So anyway, why it is dangerous with the United States is because Trump is holding them back, trying to talk to Putin, trying to pretend as if there's some kind of normalization. There isn't